[The following article has been translated by Intercontinental Press from the August 20 issue of Avanzada Socialista, weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) in Argentina. The subheadings appeared in the original. ]
The guerrilla movements that exploded throughout almost all of Latin America in the last decade and that are now reappearing in force in our country (they have just carried out two important military operations in Catamarca and Córdoba1) have one indisputable merit. In part they succeeded in destroying the repugnant pacifism and reformism dating from years of Stalinist and Social Democratic domination of the radical movement.
In the hands of the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties, Marxism was converted into a vile caricature designed to get the workers movement to support sectors of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. These parties argued that such support would make possible a peaceful evolution to socialism. Left for the distant and uncertain future was the violent phase of the transition, which as yet the Communists have not dared to openly reject.
"Someday we will have to take up arms," say these reformist continuators of the Social Democratic and Menshevik plague that hit the international Marxist movement. Their conception led to disasters like the recent one in Chile.
The guerrilla fighters, from the Castroists to the Tupamaros, the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left], or the Argentine group that we cannot name [a reference to the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo- Revolutionary People's Army, whom the Argentine government has banned the press from referring to by name] deserve credit for having broken one of the two pillars of this reformist concept. They made it clear that the class struggle is always violent. In that way an old truth that the reformists had trampled on was reaffirmed.
But they left the other pillar — class-collaborationism — still standing. Only in Cuba did the guerrillas break the nefarious "popular front" tradition of reformism. And thus it was that together with the masses in their struggles, they created the Cuban workers state. On the rest of the continent the guerrillas - even the Castroists -have continued to practice reformism or populism at gunpoint. The toughest guerrillas have gone along politically with reformism supporting the national bourgeoisie of Latin America. From Bejar [Peruvian guerrilla leader] to the Communist party, in the case of the Peruvian military junta. From the MIR to the CP in the tragic case of Chile. From the Tupamaros to the CP in their support to the candidacy of Liber Seregni in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio [Broad Front]. In our country, from the proscribed organization [the ERP] to Firmenich [leader of the Peronist guerrilla group, the Montoneros] and the CP in the popular front, which does not yet have a definite bourgeois candidate.
How can this contradiction be explained? How is one to interpret the fact that the wake for the socialist guerrillas slain at Trelew 2 was held in the central office of the principal party of the Argentine bourgeoisie and union bureaucrats? What is the explanation for the guerrilla revolutionists serving the bourgeoisie? How is it explained that despite their differences they are found always in the same populist swamp with the reformists of all stripes?
Violence Becomes a Fetish
During the 1960s the Latin American guerrillas partially reflected a reality of the continent-brutal capitalist exploitation in a situation of relative lull in workers struggles. They singled out one side of this situation - the violence of the exploiters that demanded a defensive response, which the masses, at the time, were not politically, organizationally, or psychologically in a position to offer.
As a result, many young students became the avengers of the masses, the prophets, and the pioneers of a course that the masses would begin to follow, although by their own paths.
In 1969, the year of the Cordobazo, a new wave of militancy began among the Latin American workers. The guerrillas, far from linking up to this development and becoming part of it, continued in their role of prophet — advising and preaching armed struggle, even carrying it out with "armed units" or "revolutionary armies." In no case were these "armies" adopted by the masses, since they were totally unrelated to the trade-union and political organizations, in which the masses had begun to regroup.
Thus the guerrillas isolated themselves from the impressive mobilizations of the workers and their allies.
The guerrillas were not involved in the Cordobazo when the workers were discussing how to confront the military dictatorship politically and practically.
In August 1971 in Bolivia when the oligarchy and imperialism brought down the Torres government, the masses attempted to defend themselves with mobilizations and arms. Meanwhile, the guerrillas were miles away trying to create a rural "foco." They functioned outside the Popular Assembly, the centralized leadership that the workers had begun to construct.
In Uruguay in June 1973 the working class occupied all the factories to oppose the military coup, but by then the Tupamaros had already been annihilated in their vain attempt to construct their own army outside the CNT [Convención Nacional de Trabajadores- National Workers Congress] and the unions.
In September of the same year in Chile the isolation of the guerrilla vanguard from the masses reached tragic dimensions. When the workers clamored for leadership in the struggle and arms to defend themselves, the distant MIR was able to offer only their own armed cells unconnected to the Cordones Industriales [industrial belts], where the most combative sector of the working class had begun to organize itself.
All these developments demonstrate the same thing-that the guerrillas' attempt to pose the question of arming, without taking into account the degree of experience and organization of the masses, is completely at odds with the desired ends. As Trotsky said: "To counterpose the slogan of arming the workers to the reality of the political processes that grip the masses at their vitals means to isolate oneself from the masses - and the masses from arms." 3
The great builder of the Red Army understood that the slogan of taking up arms must be part of a structured political program that takes into account the stage of the class struggle, because basically, as Trotsky said:
"It is neither locks nor walls which separate the proletariat from arms, but the habit of submission, the hypnosis of class domination and nationalist poison.
"It is sufficient to destroy these psychological walls-and no wall of stone will stand in the way. It is enough that the proletariat should want arms-and it will find them."4
Guerrilla Politics and Class Consciousness
Why did Trotsky say that to raise the slogan of arming or to launch armed struggle in separation from the program as a whole meant, in addition to becoming isolated from the masses, to deprive them of arms?
It is because the guerrilla strategy is not only incapable of showing the masses how to arm themselves, but that it impedes and, at times, derails the development of their political consciousness. In addition, this is the negative effect that all isolated vanguards provoke when they try, like the old Russian anarchists, to proselytize with the example of their own actions.
Each attempted exemplary guerrilla action converts the working class into a passive spectator. Of necessity it produces this paradoxical effect because it does not stimulate their confidence in their own strength. Instead it fosters the illusion that a Messiah will come to solve their problems. In this way, the guerrillas promote, along with bourgeois populism and reformism, the quiescence of the masses and their confidence in "a savior"— either an armed group or a "good boss." This was clearly evident when the deaths of union bureaucrats like Vandor, Alonso, Coria, and Kloosterman did not come near stimulating mobilizations of the rank and file, the only actions that can dispose of the bureaucracy.
But things are made still worse when the completely irrational character of a guerrilla action converts it into a confusionist element playing directly into the hands of the enemy. This is what has just happened, for example, with the attacks on the barracks at Córdoba and Catamarca. They only made it easier for the government, the bourgeoisie, and the CP to argue that "it is the extremists' fault that we cannot govern."
This is criminal at a time when the workers are debating among themselves in an unclear way whether to launch a struggle against the government. At Peugeot, it made it possible for the bureaucracy to call an assembly to repudiate the guerrillas and take advantage of the occasion to force a vote of condemnation against Salamanca [a leader of the class-struggle tendency in the auto workers union].
Aiding Class Collaboration
By drawing a dividing line between revolutionists and reformists on the basis of their methods of struggle instead of their political program or goals, the guerrillas open the way for class collaborationism. Even those who declare themselves to be intransigent socialists end up supporting sectors of the bourgeoisie.
Such a dividing line based on methods is completely false. Armed struggle can be used - and strictly speaking is used at times- to defend capitalist rule. Latin America is full of cases of leaders, groupings, and bourgeois parties, which - in their internal disputes or attempts to blackmail the imperialists —count on the support of guerrilla youth. This is always less dangerous than mobilizing the working class.
The most recent example is provided by Peronism. In order to negotiate from a position of strength with the military dictatorship, it encouraged "special formations." Once it had obtained its goals, it cast them aside with the notorious affirmation that soldiers are essential in time of combat; but when it comes to governing, we turn to the politicians. That is how Perón transformed the Montoneros into "stupid" and "beardless" after they had served their purpose [a reference to Perón's May Day speech attacking his youthful supporters].
It is also easy for socialist guerrillas to cross the class line. Their old slogan-"unity of the armed organizations" - means no more nor less than indirect collaboration with Peronist policies. The same line has been crossed before. At the Plaza Vélez Sársfield rally in Córdoba the banned socialist guerrilla group acted as a cheering section for the speeches by Firmenich and the CP. These speeches called for the defense of the Gelbard wing of the government against the Vandorist-López Rega wing.
'Shooting Irons' Not the Dividing Line
Clearly, armed struggle is no guarantee of your revolutionary credentials. Even with your "irons" in your hand you can still be serving some sector of the bourgeoisie.
The true dividing line between reformists and revolutionists is determined by political program and goals and the slogans required to mobilize the masses at all times.
There are two ways of confronting this crucial problem of program and objectives in the student and workers vanguard. One is the "popular front" or reformist approach. The other is the revolutionary approach, the course of the permanent revolution.
Popular frontism holds that the revolution against the oligarchy and imperialism must be led by a multiclass front, a "national liberation front," with the Argentine bourgeoisie. For example, the JP [Juventud Peronista — Peronist Youth] and the CP propose a front with Gelbard, Cámpora, Alende, Alfonsin [bourgeois liberals], etc. They call for the hegemony of the working class within this front, but they never say how this is to be achieved. Actually, they will never be able to say how it can be achieved. If a revolution is carried out against the oligarchy and imperialism but capitalist property is left intact, no one will be able to show how the working class came out on top. The workers groups and parties that participate in such a multiclass government will of necessity serve as guardians of the capitalist interests which they promised to defend beforehand upon signing their pact with the national bourgeoisie.
The revolutionary position, which we hold, is that there are no "good" and "bad" bosses. The same objective — making a profit and enriching themselves at the expense of the workers — drives all of them. Therefore, although there are differences between a Perón and Rojas [reactionary who succeeded Perón in 1955], between Torres and a Banzer [the current Bolivian military dictator], between local and foreign bosses, experience has shown that at the hour of confrontation between the workers and imperialism, the national bourgeoisie sides with imperialism as Paz Estenssoro did in Bolivia, 5 or it leaves the field open as Perón did in 1955.
It could be that at a given moment a bourgeois nationalist government would prefer to stand at the side of the workers against imperialism as Perón did in 1946. But that will be momentary, since in general the laws of economics induce the national bourgeoisie to reach agreement with the international bourgeoisie rather than permit the workers to threaten capitalist property.
That is why our strategy holds that the working class can and must in certain cases reach partial tactical agreements with the bourgeoisie, for example, in defense of democratic rights or of an anti-imperialist measure. But, to make the revolution and rule the country, and to socialize all the means of production now in the hands of the national and international bourgeoisie, the working class must rely solely on its own strength, taking power with the support of the middle class.
For us -and in our opinion this is the true axis of the revolutionary struggle-the most important task is to mobilize the working class and construct the tools it needs to take power: unions freed from the bureaucrats and a mass revolutionary workers party capable of steering a correct course toward permanent revolution. With such a party and mobilization of the masses, the necessary response to capitalist reaction can always be found, including the armed struggle that so preoccupies the guerrillas.
The real dividing line between reform and revolution lies between popular frontism and the permanent revolution. We appeal to the youth who may be serving reformism arms in hand to change their course. We ask them to learn to respect the power of the masses, to seek to raise the consciousness of the masses, and to help win them to a mass party capable of leading the way to a socialist Argentina.
Notes
1. In mid-August the ERP suffered at least twenty deaths in an abortive attempt to take over a military installation in Catamarca. In Cordoba, guerrillas successfully attacked an explosives factory, carrying off a quantity of automatic weapons, explosives, and military uniforms. — IP
2. The August 1972 massacre of sixteen political prisoners. See the September 4, 1972, issue of Intercontinental Press, pp. 915-20. — IP
3. "The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It," The Spanish Revolution (1931-39) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), p. 117. - IP
4. Whither France? (New York: Merit Publishers, 1968), p. 36. Also in forthcoming book Leon Trotsky on France (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975). — IP
5. In 1952 Paz Estenssoro was brought to power in Bolivia in a massive workers upsurge, but his government remained loyal to the bourgeoisie, never going beyond partial anti-imperialist measures. — IP