[The following editorial, signed by Juan Carlos Coral, appeared in the August 20 issue of Avanzada Socialista, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group in Argentina of the Fourth International). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
For long weeks the specter of a political crisis haunted the capitol building. By any reckoning, Perón's heiress was unable to exorcise the interminable conflicts and traps that Perón himself had managed to overcome only by marshaling all his resources, including the dramatic threat to resign. Social Pact or uncontrolled inflation; Gelbard or López Rega [cabinet ministers representing different sectors of the bourgeoisie]; Miguel or Romero [trade-union bureaucrats vying for control of the national union federation]; state-owned or privately owned television; a fascist or a liberal university; the cattlemen or the industrialists; the orthodox Peronists, those who want to involve other political forces, the youth, the Montoneros [a Peronist guerrilla group], the loyal followers, or those who want to "return to the law of the jungle."
This infinite round of alternatives - facets of the critical situation — spun dizzily within an obvious power vacuum. A vacuum that was not accidental or unexpected, but a vacuum that was created by Perón himself in sustaining a sprawling, all-inclusive party, a heterogeneous and mediocre cabinet, and a successor whose only authority flowed from the confidence of her husband and the almost ritual respect of the Peronists. This bleak reality, we insist, was no accident. It had been anticipated by Perón himself when, shortly before his death, he stated repeatedly that his only heir would be the people. Coming from him, this abstract statement meant something like, "After me, the deluge."
With the reorganization of the cabinet, this stage of grave uncertainty came to an end. The anxious floundering, the violent disputes over filling the gap left by the death of the chief, have reached a clear outcome. While the formal mechanisms of the constitution resulted in the designation of a new president, the real power struggles provided the name of the real heir -the armed forces. The new Bonaparte, the new arbiter capable of putting each wing of the ruling alliance of social forces into place, is not Isabel, nor the youth, nor the unions, nor the bosses, nor a combination of political parties, but the armed forces; that is, the armed guard of the capitalist system. The commanders in chief, believed by some innocents to have been buried under the mountain of seven million votes for Perón in the last election, have emerged intact-graphic evidence of the continuity of the repressive apparatus that we have tirelessly exposed.
It is not accidental that the slow and difficult reorgani- September 16, 1974
zation of the cabinet was preceded by the speech by the commander of the air force. Nor is it a simple coincidence that it was the senior of the three commanders who spoke, coming forward as the representative of the armed forces as a whole. Nor is it fortuitous that a participant in the ceremony was Brigadier Rey, one of the commanders under the military dictatorship whom the Peronists boasted of having buried. Finally, the speech by Fautario [commander of the air force had all the characteristics of a true "presidential message." He had the audacity to formulate in twelve points the "National Model" proclaimed by Perón, which the Peronists are still studying.
On this very editorial page a few days after the death of Perón we forecast what would happen. Without wasting time, we said, the armed forces will move into the power vacuum that has just been created. "They will attempt to unite the various sectors of the bourgeoisie to ward off the uncertainty that is beginning to undermine the bases of the Great Accord of the bosses."
This objective underlies every word of Brigadier Fautario's speech and every measure taken by the government recently. To the cattlemen —who were threatening to pull out of the official accord - they granted an increase in the price of meat along with a reduction in the emergency tax. To the imperialists, who were disturbed by certain nationalist statements, they gave the gift of a projected law on oil guaranteeing their past and future holdings. To the "democratic" sectors worried over the fascist advance, they conceded an order closing down Primicia Argentina and they induced Abras [rightwing Peronist] to resign. To the orthodox Peronists, fearful of "Marxist infiltration of the university," they offered the ouster of Taiana [minister of education supported by the Montoneros and Peronist Youth. And, as a final demonstration of "harmony," they found formulas making it possible for Gelbard and López Rega, the two poles in a warring cabinet, to coexist. With authority reestablished and the accord safeguarded, the dialogue with all political parties was resumed after Fautario's speech and plans for recasting the constitution next year were ratified.
By restoring order in this way, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in momentarily warding off the crisis. But the events also helped reveal the erosion of Peronism. Both the reorganization of the cabinet and the designation of intravenors were based on figures of "historic Peronism." The resurrection of Ivanissevich, the designation of Rocamora and Cafiero, the confirmation of Benitez, show the atrophy of Peronism. Not only were the younger generation branded as "stupid and beardless" [reference to Perón's May Day attack on the leftwing of his youth movement], but the so-called intermediary generation was brushed aside despite Licastro's efforts to use it to bridge "the generation gap." This symptom of exhaustion or at least of stagnation, common to all the capitalist parties in Argentina, is the reflection in the leadership of the obsolescence of the various organizations.
As a counterbalance to the crisis developing among ruling circles, the country witnessed a spectacular reappearance of guerrilla warfare much broader in scope than anything seen up to now. And once again the immediate results of such rebel actions have been exactly the opposite of what the organizers wanted. Faced with the threat of guerrilla warfare, all the internal disputes of the bourgeoisie were reduced to secondary importance. And at the same time the outbreak reinforced the leading role of the armed forces as the only organization capable of successfully handling encounters with irregular forces of such size.
That is the conclusion drawn by the press of the two most aggressive military dictatorships on the continent- Chile and Brazil. O Globo says that the guerrilla attack has given the armed forces "the political and moral basis that they lacked for a large-scale counterattack," adding that the Peronists delegated to them the "task of national salvation." El Mercurio of Santiago maintains that it is a "fortunate" coincidence that the armed forces have remained on the fringe of events, because now they can be converted into a great reserve force against terrorism and become "the only effective support for Mrs. Perón." Objectively, then, the latest guerrilla actions have helped decisively to cement the battered ruling alliance of social forces and have given a great stimulus to the armed forces' resuming the exercise of power at the top level.
In short, during the past week calm has succeeded the political storm that began July 1. Forces have been realigned. Equilibrium has been reestablished. But of course this is the uneasy calm of a temporary recovery, of an unstable and precarious equilibrium. None of the structural causes, none of the problems underlying the general crisis of capitalism have been, nor can they be,
resolved by the government.
The uncontrollable drive of inflation, the crisis of the meat export trade, the shortages of raw materials in many industries, the exchange rate of 1,800 pesos to the dollar, the rise in bank-interest rates, the progressive abandonment of price ceilings, the absolute impossibility of keeping wages frozen -constitute infallible signs of coming explosions, of new crises. The squabbles among the sectors of the bosses' accord have not been resolved but only postponed with difficulty.
But what will really make all the maneuvers at the top useless, what will make all the juggling of the bourgeoisie ineffectual in maintaining the equilibrium, will be the appearance in the political arena of the main protagonist-the working class. It is assimilating the latest experiences; it is maturing as the result of the latest political swindles at its expense. Actions of sectors as dissimilar as mechanics, sugarcane workers, and workers in the fishing industry are the precursors of the next upsurge. Neither the impatience of the guerrillas nor the swamp of popular frontism offer a solution. This will be achieved through mass mobilizations led by a workers party that sets objectives and leads the fight. Then the working class will be able to tip the scales definitively. Then we will find ourselves on the threshold
of power, on the eve of socialism.