[The following document, Board, appeared in the September 9 issue of Avanzada Socialista, weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST— Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
The foremost champions of mass mobilizations, who used to fill the Atlanta Stadium and occupy key spots in demonstrations and marches (much to the mortification of the union bureaucrats), and who before that fought by the Editorial arms in hand a leaders.
gainst the military dictatorship, have just declared war against the very government they helped install through their quite weighty support and action.
Behind what appears to be a revolutionary affirmation lies hidden in reality the tacit confession of a colossal defeat- the defeat of the naive effort to break up the so-called Miguel-López Regal circle "from within"; the defeat of plans to replace the union bureaucracy; the defeat of the proclamations based on the brilliant strategy of the "Old Man" [Perón], who, on the day following his return, would "dump" the Gran Acuerdo; 2 the defeat of the promise to "bridge the generation gap"; and, finally, the defeat of the utopian project to expropriate imperialism and construct the "socialist homeland" with Perón and Peronism; that is, through the instrumentality of a bourgeois party that some time ago gave up its principal reformist projects.
Montoneros Understood Too Late
After a year and a half of unfortunate experiences they have finally seen the absurdity of their pretensions. They came to this conclusion in quite a tragic way, it is true, through the torture and assassination of a number of militants. During the fifteen months of the Peronist regime the losses were much greater than during the entire period of the commanders in chief | the dictatorial army regimes], as Firmenich3 himself pointed out.
Nonetheless, they have not understood how to convert their tragedy into a fruitful and positive experience. They have proved incapable of making a self-criticism that could save them from future popular-frontist adventures, from becoming slaves of another bourgeois leader. Far from that, they have opted to remain enamored of their earliest errors, at the same time trying to free themselves of responsibility for bringing to office a government that did not liberate the nation from imperialism and that continues to oppress the working class. Thus they have gone so far as to use the cover of their banned weekly newspaper to publicize such a leading question as "Who Voted for Isabel?" 4
Leaving aside the heroism with which the young Peronists idealistically offer their lives, and leaving aside the democratic and anti-imperialist programs that inspire them to struggle and die, the recent declaration of war by the Montoneros, 5 in addition to being surprising and not thought out, is irresponsible and erroneous.
Essence of Regime the Same
In the first place, it is difficult to see what changes have been fundamental enough in the orientation of the regime to justify such a violent zigzag, taking them from electoralism to guerrilla warfare. What has made them abandon the bass drum in favor of the machine gun?
The arguments that the Montoneros use to try to justify their action (enforcement of the Social Pact, bureaucratic control of the CGT, 6 campaign of violent attacks and repression against activists in the mass movement and on the campus, closure of newspapers and magazines, etc.), far from being a recent surprise, were the essential bases on which the Peronist government was established. The Social Pact, for example-which lays the basis for the liquidation of the parity commissions, 7 the denial of the right to strike, a wage freeze, and an increase in the profits of the bosses—was signed during the days of initial euphoria by President Cámpora, 8 one of the traditional leaders who is still supported by the young Peronists.
The shameful Ezeiza massacre, much worse than the Trelew shootings and only comparable to the shootings in Patagonia or the tragic week of 1919,9 also belongs to that period.
Furthermore, the reforms of the Penal Code, the Trade- Union Law, the Law on Redundancy, the assassination and the of activists, the destruction of headquarters, closing down of newspapers are practices that antedate by far the regime of Perón's wife. These are the repressive instruments of the government that the Montoneros and the JP Juventud Peronista-Peronist Youth] campaigned for. They were designed for forceful implementation of the capitalists' plans to end the workers' resistance to greater exploitation.
But if the political position of the Montoneros was not thought out, the 180-degree turn they have taken in their methods of struggle is just as ill-considered. Scarcely twenty days ago in the pages of La Causa Peronista they warned that the guerrilla actions in Villa Maria and Catamarca10 did not represent "the violence of the people" in contrast to all the "blows that the popular movements dealt the military dictatorship in conjunction with the massive uprisings of Córdoba, Rosario, lines then were cleariy
Tucumán, Mendoza..• •
The drawn. On one side Lanussell and the armed forces signifying dependency; on the other Perón, the revolutionary organizations, and the liberation forces. Today's
8. Hector Campora, Peron's stand-in in the March 1973 elections, served as president briefly in the summer of 1973.
In August 1972 sixteen political prisoners were massacred at Trelew.
Twelve hundred rural laborers were shot down during a strike in Patagonia in 1922.
The tragic week of 1919 refers to the cold-blooded murder by police of workers attending the funeral of two strike victims in Buenos Aires.
Lanusse has not come out openly on the scene. There are all sorts of trappings of legality to conceal him. And Perón is no longer in the other camp, the people's camp."
Leaving aside the political differences we have with this assessment, we have to ask the Montoneros if the Lanusse and the Perón they used to need to launch armed struggle were born during the last twenty days. Because we have not been able to identify them, nor have the Montoneros told us who they are. And, furthermore, because nothing essentially new has happened, no qualitative changes that would permit us to differentiate Isabel from her Peronist predecessors. So we maintain that the change in methods of struggle is also irresponsible and erroneous.
The Montoneros' turn to violence does not correspond to a change in the national political situation. It is the expression of their own internal contradictions, of the clash between the proletarian and anti-imperialist demands driving them into struggle and the reality of a government oriented to guaranteeing capitalist profits and preserving the continuity of the current system.
Right Turn Began May 25, 1973
As long as the Peronists were in the opposition, the growth of all sectors of the movement was stimulated by the chief as a military tactic to rout the enemy. In those days each faction of the Peronist movement used to display its tape recording or letter from Perón approving the most contradictory positions-from the assassination of Aramburu12 to the negotiations with Lanusse.
But, once the Peronists got into office there was no longer any question of tapes or speeches. Each day they had to define their policy with laws and decrees, with government actions clearly and necessarily reflecting the class interests the regime defended and represented.
The Peronist movement and its leader came to office in 1973 presiding over a broad alliance of the bourgeoisie and the trade-union bureaucracy. Even imperialism participated in it, deeply involved in the nation's affairs through important economic investments. This powerful presence substantially reduced the Bonapartist arbiter's capacity to maneuver. It reduced the possibility of repeating the concessions that he had given to the working class during his first term in office. Thus the right turn that the Montoneros just discovered began May 25, 1973.
It is a lie to say that this right turn is simply the result of López Rega's personal influence or of Lorenzo Miguel's overtures. It is a lie to say that it began after the death of Perón. It was developing in keeping with Peronism's need to respond to the interests that had returned it to power. On May 113 the youth demanded clarity, and the famous dialogue "between Perón and his people" which the youth had stubbornly demanded, finally took place. Perón called the bureaucrats who had supported Frondizi and Ongania14 heroes and condemned the heroes who had fought against the military dictatorship to obtain the return of their leader as "beardless" and "stupid."
The institutionalization of the Peronist movement marked precisely the culmination of the right turn. With it the last illusion was demolished. The old guard was exhumed to bury once and for all the demagogic promise to "bridge the generation gap." The youths who had been driven out of the plaza15 were now formally segregated from the Peronist movement.
And as part of that relentless siege, the youth were attacked on the university campus where they had retreated. With [right-wing Peronist Oscar) Ivanissevich in the Ministry of Education, and the threatened naming of Tecera del Franco [another right-wing Peronist as rector, the offensive of the old guard against the bulwark of the Juventud Peronista threatened to liquidate the social and political base of the Montoneros.
The conclusions they had failed to draw from the Ezeiza massacre, the assassination of activists, the wage freeze, the encroachments on trade-union democracy, they now understood to the marrow of their bones when the government moved against the university. Suddenly, to the Montoneros, Perón's wife became the same as Ongania. With the instability typical of the petty bourgeoisie, they went from conciliation to guerrilla warfare, in as natural a way as the student generation of 1958 went from unconditional support of the "anti-imperialist" Arturo Frondizi to the "foquista" guerrilla warfare mounted by Fidel [Castro] in different conditions.
'De-Peronization' of the Middle Class
But the turn made by the Montoneros is not only a response to their internal contradictions. While the loss of the university fiefdom was the spur-the contradiction that forced the 180-degree turn-we must point out that the phenomenon expresses a deeper reality: the political frustration of broad sectors of the middle class.
The middle class, with its civil servants, teachers, students, and professionals was in the past profoundly promilitary and anti-Peronist. Its growing impoverishment brought it closer to the working class, and it joined the latter in its hatred of the Ongania take-over. The appearance of the phenomenon of the Juventud Peronista with its power in the student movement and in the public-workers unions reflected the hope those middle sectors placed in the Peronist variant of the "Gran Acuerdo Nacional."
One year of Peronist rule has been frustrating for them. Many sectors have become "de-Peronized," moving to the left. Their vacillations are expressed in the political oscillations of Alendeism 16 or in the warring tendencies within almost all the parties.
The same frustration also pushes the volatile middle class toward the opposite camp. There are already signs of the "strong state" refrain from many Peronists or ex- Peronists, providing a base and foundation for fascist groups.
In this newly born social and political movement only the Communist party remains immune to the pressures and holds steadfastly to its official policy as watchdog and prop of the political and trade agreements between the USSR and the Argentine bourgeoisie.
The turn of the JP occurs in this very turbulent social setting. The JP, which grew in the setting of the struggles of the impoverished middle class and which was consolidated in the university, has been incapable of linking up to the industrial working class. Its new policy is the desperate response of a sector whose impatience separates it more and more from the methods and goals of the labor movement.
Isabel - the Same as Ongania?
The call to begin a "revolutionary war" is a serious error of characterization and perspective.
The differences among the four Peronist governments that have followed one another since May 25, 1973, and the military dictatorship of Onganía are obvious. It is not necessary to look for them — as the young Peronists did until very recently - in official programs and actions. Because it is exactly in this sphere that the resemblances appear. Thus, what once was called a wage freeze is now called the Social Pact.
Nonetheless, the Peronist regime is diametrically opposite to the Ongania regime and also to Lanusse's, with the latter serving as a transition between two extremes. This is true in two respects:
First, Peronism has had to recognize many of the democratic conquests won in memorable struggles by the masses from the dictatorship. These conquests - among which is the relative legality once held by the Montoneros and which our party still holds— are trophies won in the Cordobazos. They belong to the masses and we revolutionists have the obligation to defend them jealously and to try to deepen them.
The decision of the Montoneros to close their headquarters and go into semiclandestinity, invoking a persecution that actually exists, implies giving up the conquests of the masses without a fight. Only the bourgeoisie gains by this surrender.
The Montoneros have shown that they are incapable of defending the democratic gains that make the Peronist regime infinitely superior to Ongania's, despite the fascist gangs and the daily attacks suffered by the working class and the people.
This is another contradiction in the politics of the Montoneros, because if on the one hand they supported Obregón Cano against the Navarro coup, 17 we do not understand why they now have a policy that in practice places the Ongania regime on a par with Isabel's.
In short, why do they relinquish the conquest of legality as if Onganía were governing, when Onganía in his time — without asking anyone— closed down all the political parties by decree?
The Seven Million Votes
But, in addition, the Peronist regime is different in another fundamental aspect, which a genuinely revolutionary policy cannot ignore-support from the workers. While the military dictatorship was hated by the masses, the workers still consider the Peronist government to be their own and they cherish it- despite attrition and frustration, the desperation of the middle layers, and the combativity of some sectors of the workers vanguard.
The political course of our middle class, so well reflected by the Montoneros, is rich in surprises. For a long time the young Peronists - with ironic and contemptuous remarks-brandished the "seven million votes" to justify their tail-ending the Peronist government and opposing those of us who have consistently stood in opposition to Peronism.
The turn of the Montoneros shows that all that was involved was an argument to justify opportunism and not a position of respect for the masses, because their current position shows petty-bourgeois scorn for the working class.
No one with that scorn can be considered a genuine revolutionist, even when raising apparently very militant proposals. For example, if in a workers assembly a companero were to propose launching a "war" against the boss and this was rejected by the majority, yet he decided to begin the "war" on his own, no matter how valid his reasons were he would be dividing and confusing the workers and arming the enemy. Especially if the same compañero a few days before had insisted on supporting the boss. It is obvious that we who had tried patiently and respectfully to convince the majority (and especially this compañero) of the necessity of mobilizing against the management would have every right, along with the rest of the assembly, to distrust this compañero's attitude.
The first thing that must be stated clearly is that all guerrilla movements disconnected from the masses seriously injure them. A vigilante attack at Peugeot was used by the bureaucracy to obtain the factory's condemnation of SMATA18 in Córdoba. The murder of an executive of IKA [Renault] a few days ago contributed even more to isolating the struggle of the Córdoba mechanics. It is practically inevitable that adventurist actions will contribute to unifying the enemy camp and to introducing division and confusion into the ranks of the labor movement. A golden rule applies here:
One learns only from one's own experiences and mobilizations and never from the external example of one's self-appointed saviors.
A Mirror Image of the Tupamaros
An initial effect of the Montonero call is that it has added to the psychological setting and climate favoring a coup. That broad fringe made up of the fascist groups (nourished in the ranks of the repressive apparatus and the frightened trade union bureaucracy), the generals posing as "saviors," the military commands speculating on how to take over - all these counterrevolutionary circles have felt encouraged at the very least. If they do not prosper it will be fundamentally because the mass movement itself prevents it — with its threatening presence or its mobilization.
The perspectives opening up for the Montoneros and the rest of the guerrilla movements can be judged from the experience of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, which mirrors what has happened to similar movements elsewhere in Latin America.
We can see the Tupamaros from their massive ascent starting in 1968, lifted by the mounting struggles of the middle class, and in their turbulent fall-jailed, divided, infiltrated, and shot down — after the military under the influence of the Tupamaro "war" took full control.
The two sides of the Tupamaro coin must be examined:
One permitted them to become one of the most imposing guerrilla movements in the world.
The reverse at first made them go down on their knees at the bourgeois altar supporting the candidacy of Liber Seregni, the bourgeois "nationalist" military figure in the neighboring country who did not have time to arouse the frustration that Péron did here. And afterwards, it prevented the Tupamaros from denouncing and fighting against the military coup. Instead they endorsed it.
'Revolutionary War' or Electoral Operation?
We did not choose the Uruguayan example for lack of local ones. Montonero history already allows us to forecast the same reformist and probourgeois course for them that the Tupamaros followed. Didn't the Argentine guerrillas who fought the dictatorship cast their votes for the FREJ ULI? 19
All the precedents enable us to say that the Argentine guerrillas with their slogan of "revolutionary war" have set in motion an electoral operation, spattered with blood, that will serve one wing of the bourgeoisie. Not much time will pass before some Cámpora, Obregón Cano, or Alende will come forth to call for a sacrifice like the one Perón called for, only to later get rid of the "beardless ones" who survive.
It is not by chance that the Montoneros are silent about the fact that the Social Pact was the most cherished offspring of Peronism in the Cámpora period. Nor is it by chance that the Montoneros omit naming Cámpora as one of their targets in the call to initiate "war." Why do they name the Radicals, the Socialists, the Communists, etc., and omit the Camporists?
Argentinazo With a Revolutionary Workers Party
Our mentioning the Uruguayan experience above requires us to make it clear that we nourish no pessimism whatever about Argentina. We have a profound respect for the aroused Argentine working class in whose depths an ideological battle is being waged. We are convinced of labor's imminent combative rise despite government attempts to slow it down, bureaucratic gags, aggressions of the fascist gangs, and the confusion aroused by its self-appointed "saviors."
We are convinced that the working class will soon take a path that the guerrillas do not envision —the path of the Cordobazos that already overthrew the military dictatorship and won the present democratic gains.
Those Cordobazos will culminate in a socialist Argentina when they are led by a great socialist workers party. Thus, the main task for Argentine revolutionists has the following two prongs:
To discuss and convince the masses themselves to play the leading role in mobilizations and struggles and to construct their own independent revolutionary party. It is the same task that Lenin posed as a priority just a few months before the great proletarian revolution, the essence of which is summarized in his phrase:
"Patiently explain."
And that is how it must be, because without the masses there can be no socialist revolution.
We are totally convinced that the combative upsurge of the working class and the construction of the revolutionary party will lead to a socialist Argentina. That is why we count on the process also saving from the swamp of reformism many young people who have taken up guerrilla warfare.
Since we recognize the anti-imperialist-and in some cases socialist-flame that has been kindled in them, our party is committed to recognizing them as honest fighters in the ranks of labor in spite of their error and irresponsibility. We will fight for them to be viewed as such — in death or in the courts. They should be judged by workers and people's tribunals and not by bourgeois justice, which out of class hatred and even fear, stigmatizes them as common criminals. We will struggle for that to be registered in the coming socialist constitution.
Notes
1. Lorenzo Miguel and Jose Lopez Rega, right-wing Peronist
2. Gran Acuerdo Nacional - Great National Agreement, a classcollaborationist plan developed by the dictatorship to return Argentina to constitutional rule.
3. Leader of the Montoneros, one of the main left-wing Peronist groups.
4. Isabel Peron, former vice president and wife of General Juan Peron, who assumed the presidency upon his death.
5. On September 6, the Montoneros announced they were going underground to resume armed struggle for the liberation of the Argentine people.
6. Confederacion General del Trabajo - General Confederation of Labor.
7. Bodies made up of management and the workers to negotiate contracts and other work-related issues.
9. Scores were killed and several hundred wounded in May 1973 while awaiting Peron's arrival at Ezeiza airport after his exile.
10. In August 1974 guerrillas carried out an abortive attempt to take over a military installation in Catamarca and a successful attack on an explosives factory in the Villa Maria section of Cordoba.
11. General Alejandro Lanusse final military dictator before the 1973 elections.
12. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, former president of Argentina, kidnapped and killed by the Montoneros in 1970.
13. A reference to this year's May Day rally, at which Peron spoke.
14. Arturo Frondizi and Juan Carlos Ongania, two of the presidents who served between Peron's first and second regimes.
15. A reference to the Juventud Peronista's exodus from the Plaza de Mayo after Peron's May 1 attack on them.
16. Oscar Alende a leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria - People's Revolutionary Alliance, a centrist formation.
17. The February 1974 coup that ousted the elected Cordoba provincial governor.
18. Sindicato de Mecanicos y Afines del Transporte Automo tor - Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades.
19. Frente Justicialista de Liberacion Nacional — National Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral front. 1264