THE
RECENT ATTEMPTED COUP IN ALGERIA
By Livio Maitan
While some of its particular elements as well as the specific plans of its promoters are difficult to interpret, the aborted attempt to overthrow Boumedienne a few weeks ago [December 14, 1967] enables us to pinpoint the situation in Algeria five and one-half years after independence and two and one-half years after the coup d'état of June 19, 1965.
It was, in fact, a consequence of the revolution falling into a declining curve. The Algerian revolution carried on long years of intrepid armed struggle against imperialism. In the initial phases after independence it acquired not only an anti-imperialist but also an anticapitalist dynamics, and some of its revolutionary achievements justly aroused the interest and enthusiasm of revolutionists throughout the entire world. The descending curve began in the final period of the Ben Bella regime, roughly toward the end of 1963. Then, under many~sided and often conflicting pressures, the Ben Bella leadership began to drag its feet and to accept debilitating compromises, to delay decisions vital to the future of the revolution (most importantly the agrarian reform), and to retreat before bureaucratic tendencies; it began gradually to lose the great prestige which it had won during the great mass mobilizations.
Despite certain covering statements of its leaders and the illusions incautiously harbored by some, the coup d'état of June 19 represented a substantial turn to the right, and its consequences were progressively to come to light. As the Trotskyist movement stressed in its reso~ lution on Africa at the December 1965 World Congress of the Fourth Internation-~ al, the coup's most negative aspect, in the last analysis, lay in the profound effect it inevitably had in demobilizing the masses. As a result of this, the basic force disappeared which might have reversed the negative tendencies already taking form in the final phase of the Ben Bella regime.
Clearly the political and social forces which opposed each other prior to June 19 remained unchanged and thus the same basic conflicts continued to develop. This was reflected for example in the fact that Boumedienne had to partially reassume the mediating role played by Ben Bella, especially after a certain point; and it was reflected also in the fact that certain premises of the postindependence regime have not been challenged, despite the resurgence of the most reactionary and retrograde forces. But these confrontations and clashes unfolded in a
notably altered framework in which the
correlation of forces was different and
distinctly more unfavorable to the work-
er and peasant masses and the more ad-~
vanced political groups.
It would, of course, be wrong to
interpret the course followed by Algeria
under Boumedienne as a continual descent
into the same type of neocolonialism
which prevails in the majority of the
African countries or as a straight-line
development in the direction of unadul-
terated conservatism. In several in-
stances, Boumedienne has taken measures
which -- although within innocuous lin-
its -~ have hit imperialist interests
(the nationalization of the mines, the
state monopoly of insurance, the state
monopoly in financial transactions with
foreign countries, nationalizations of
the distribution networks of the oil
monopolies, etc.); he has also promoted
the development of a vigorous campaign
in favor of democratic or revolutionary-
democratic reforms (community government
reform, agrarian reform), which it is
promised will really be put into prac-
tice in the future.
Similarly, on the occasion of the
Mideast conflict, Algeria assumed, espe-
cially in certain weeks, a vanguard posi-
tion in the Arab lineup, stressing the
anti-imperialist character of the battle
under way. But these measures and posi-
tions -- which enabled some apologists
to refurbish rhetorical variations on
the theme of a "socialist" Algeria and
to compose eulogies to Boumedienne --
proved often emphemeral and purely or
predominantly propagandistic in charac-—
ter. And, in any case, when they were
put into practice it was done in an
economic, social and political context
that shaped their real nature or sub-
stantially limited their importance.
What has been the dynamics of the
development of Algerian economic and
social structures in recent years? This
is the essential point to be determined.
The state sector has clearly gained new
positions and is today certainly much
more extensive than in the initial peri-~
od after independence. This has occurred,
however, both at the expense of the im-
perialist holdings (yet under conditions
generally satisfactory to the interested
parties, since their right to compensa-
tion has been recognized) and the self-
managed industrial sector. This sector
has been progressively reabsorbed through
the formula of national enterprises,
which in reality deprive the workers in
the factories concerned of the voice
which they previously had, at least on
paper, in running these plants. No measures have been taken against Algerian national commercial or industrial capital: it has been the continual object of lavish official praise and encouragement.
It should be added, moreover, that the industrial sectors remain fundamentally under the control of foreign capital and that Algeria has not in fact loosened the oppressive ties which bind it to French capitalism. And in the countryside the endlessly trumpeted agrarian reform still remains distant (even if put into practice, the project which Boumedienne outlined at one time would have only a limited import and, in view of what was reportedly under consideration would probably be more effective in promoting the development of national private capital than in solving the problems of the peasants). Although self-management has not been virtually annulled in agriculture as it has in industry, it has been watered down, distorted and restricted. The trade-union press in particular has continually exposed this.
Taking into consideration also the fact that, despite the official proclamations and some partial achievements, industrial development is still essentially far off, the social consequences of this state of affairs may be easily surmised. For the great mass of Algerians made up of peasants of the traditional sectors, independence and the revolution have been practically meaningless -- poverty, underemployment and unemployment persist. Unemployment, which also strikes the cities, remains the most tragic evil. In this respect it need only be recalled that a few months ago even an official spokesman had to admit that in the total potential work force only “one person in four is more or less employed." As for the workers, their wages are at the starvation level, while their so-called social rights exist only on paper and often not even there. As against this, the big and middle landholders maintain their privileged position; the commercial bourgeoisie prospers and a privileged bureaucratic layer ensconced in the economic and political apparatus of the regime is crystallizing.
From the political point of view, it is in fact the latter stratum that has gradually won ground, consolidating its positions more and more under Boumedienne -- together with the military, it is now playing a primary role. Behind the most phoney ideological pretences, it has assumed the primary role in the struggle to erode the democratic conquests of the masses, to emasculate self-management, to narrowly restrict the activity and potential of the trade unions and to prevent the development of a real vanguard party. (The FLN [Front de Libération National -- National Liberation Front -- the official party in the Algerian one-party state]
remains nonexistent as a real organiza-
tion: it functions solely in a bureau-
cratic-administrative framework, without
any autonomy with respect to the real
power groups.) The bureaucracy has not
hesitated, moreover, on various occasions
to carry out antilabor and antiunion re-
pressions in the national enterprises and
has resorted to the most classical types
of intimidation and even retaliatory fir-
ings.
It is obvious that in such a situ-
ation, in view of the revolutionary ori-
gins of the regime, tensions and conflicts
must continually arise in these groups and
the ruling apparatus. An indication of
this is the simple fact that ruptures,
sometimes clamorous and sometimes silent
but in every case expressions of a con-
tinually deepening malaise, have ensued
among those who organized or endorsed the
June 19 coup.
It is well known that, impelled by
the vitality of sections of the working
class which have frequently engaged in
struggles for various demands and in
strikes, the unions have played a rela-
tively important role. Forces openly
critical of the existing state of affairs
(though cautious in respect to Boumedienne)
have found expression -- legal or semi-
legal -- through the unions. In the gov-
ernment itself there have been frequent
clashes as well as in the party. It has
been no secret to anyone, moreover, that
already shortly after June 19 profound
divergences existed within the officer
corps, which organized the coup and which
now constitutes a privileged element in
Algerian society.
All of this was behind the latest
crisis, which was quite probably initiated
by forces that noted the crystallization
of a situation increasingly different
from what they had looked forward to in
the first days after independence, a situ-
ation in which those who based their
claims on the old struggles wielded less
and less weight. Rivalries of various
sorts, difficult to specify on the basis
of available information, doubtless
played a part in the action of Zbiri and
his collaborators, who imagined that they
could repeat against Boumedienne an ac-
tion which they had carried out against
Ben Bella with a much larger bloc.
It is symptomatic that this crisis
unfolded amid general indifference and
was resolved in the last analysis on the
basis of the correlation of forces which
developed in the army, thus confirmed as
the real prop of the existing regime.
The unions sought to take refuge in an
evasive position but were compelled to
condemn the ill-fated attempt. Despite
all that I have stressed, their potential
for maneuver was and is limited both by
their persistent bureaucratization and
THE CASE OF