RECENT ATTEMPTED COUP IN ALGERIA
By Livio Maitan
While some of its particular elements as well as the specific plans of its promoters are difficult to interpret, the aborted attempt to overthrow Boumedienne a few weeks ago [December 14, 1967] enables us to pinpoint the situation in Algeria five and one-half years after independence and two and one-half years after the coup d'état of June 19, 1965.
It was, in fact, a consequence of the revolution falling into a declining curve. The Algerian revolution carried on long years of intrepid armed struggle against imperialism. In the initial phases after independence it acquired not only an anti-imperialist but also an anticapitalist dynamics, and some of its revolutionary achievements justly aroused the interest and enthusiasm of revolutionists throughout the entire world. The descending curve began in the final period of the Ben Bella regime, roughly toward the end of 1963. Then, under many~sided and often conflicting pressures, the Ben Bella leadership began to drag its feet and to accept debilitating compromises, to delay decisions vital to the future of the revolution (most importantly the agrarian reform), and to retreat before bureaucratic tendencies; it began gradually to lose the great prestige which it had won during the great mass mobilizations.
Despite certain covering statements of its leaders and the illusions incautiously harbored by some, the coup d'état of June 19 represented a substantial turn to the right, and its consequences were progressively to come to light. As the Trotskyist movement stressed in its reso~ lution on Africa at the December 1965 World Congress of the Fourth Internation-~ al, the coup's most negative aspect, in the last analysis, lay in the profound effect it inevitably had in demobilizing the masses. As a result of this, the basic force disappeared which might have reversed the negative tendencies already taking form in the final phase of the Ben Bella regime.
Clearly the political and social forces which opposed each other prior to June 19 remained unchanged and thus the same basic conflicts continued to develop. This was reflected for example in the fact that Boumedienne had to partially reassume the mediating role played by Ben Bella, especially after a certain point; and it was reflected also in the fact that certain premises of the postindependence regime have not been challenged, despite the resurgence of the most reactionary and retrograde forces. But these confrontations and clashes unfolded in a notably altered framework in which the correlation of forces was different and distinctly more unfavorable to the worker and peasant masses and the more ad-~ vanced political groups.
It would, of course, be wrong to interpret the course followed by Algeria under Boumedienne as a continual descent into the same type of neocolonialism which prevails in the majority of the African countries or as a straight-line development in the direction of unadulterated conservatism. In several instances, Boumedienne has taken measures which -- although within innocuous linits -~ have hit imperialist interests (the nationalization of the mines, the state monopoly of insurance, the state monopoly in financial transactions with foreign countries, nationalizations of the distribution networks of the oil monopolies, etc.); he has also promoted the development of a vigorous campaign in favor of democratic or revolutionarydemocratic reforms (community government reform, agrarian reform), which it is promised will really be put into practice in the future.
Similarly, on the occasion of the Mideast conflict, Algeria assumed, especially in certain weeks, a vanguard position in the Arab lineup, stressing the anti-imperialist character of the battle under way. But these measures and positions -- which enabled some apologists to refurbish rhetorical variations on the theme of a "socialist" Algeria and to compose eulogies to Boumedienne -proved often emphemeral and purely or predominantly propagandistic in charac-— ter. And, in any case, when they were put into practice it was done in an economic, social and political context that shaped their real nature or substantially limited their importance.
What has been the dynamics of the development of Algerian economic and social structures in recent years? This is the essential point to be determined. The state sector has clearly gained new positions and is today certainly much more extensive than in the initial peri-~ od after independence. This has occurred, however, both at the expense of the imperialist holdings (yet under conditions generally satisfactory to the interested parties, since their right to compensation has been recognized) and the selfmanaged industrial sector. This sector has been progressively reabsorbed through the formula of national enterprises, which in reality deprive the workers in the factories concerned of the voice which they previously had, at least on
paper, in running these plants. No measures have been taken against Algerian national commercial or industrial capital: it has been the continual object of lavish official praise and encouragement.
It should be added, moreover, that the industrial sectors remain fundamentally under the control of foreign capital and that Algeria has not in fact loosened the oppressive ties which bind it to French capitalism. And in the countryside the endlessly trumpeted agrarian reform still remains distant (even if put into practice, the project which Boumedienne outlined at one time would have only a limited import and, in view of what was reportedly under consideration would probably be more effective in promoting the development of national private capital than in solving the problems of the peasants). Although self-management has not been virtually annulled in agriculture as it has in industry, it has been watered down, distorted and restricted. The trade-union press in particular has continually exposed this.
Taking into consideration also the fact that, despite the official proclamations and some partial achievements, industrial development is still essentially far off, the social consequences of this state of affairs may be easily surmised. For the great mass of Algerians made up of peasants of the traditional sectors, independence and the revolution have been practically meaningless -- poverty, underemployment and unemployment persist. Unemployment, which also strikes the cities, remains the most tragic evil. In this respect it need only be recalled that a few months ago even an official spokesman had to admit that in the total potential work force only “one person in four is more or less employed." As for the workers, their wages are at the starvation level, while their so-called social rights exist only on paper and often not even there. As against this, the big and middle landholders maintain their privileged position; the commercial bourgeoisie prospers and a privileged bureaucratic layer ensconced in the economic and political apparatus of the regime is crystallizing.
From the political point of view, it is in fact the latter stratum that has gradually won ground, consolidating its positions more and more under Boumedienne -- together with the military, it is now playing a primary role. Behind the most phoney ideological pretences, it has assumed the primary role in the struggle to erode the democratic conquests of the masses, to emasculate self-management, to narrowly restrict the activity and potential of the trade unions and to prevent the development of a real vanguard party. (The FLN [Front de Libération National -- National Liberation Front -- the official party in the Algerian one-party state] remains nonexistent as a real organization: it functions solely in a bureaucratic-administrative framework, without any autonomy with respect to the real power groups.) The bureaucracy has not hesitated, moreover, on various occasions to carry out antilabor and antiunion repressions in the national enterprises and has resorted to the most classical types of intimidation and even retaliatory firings.
It is obvious that in such a situation, in view of the revolutionary origins of the regime, tensions and conflicts must continually arise in these groups and the ruling apparatus. An indication of this is the simple fact that ruptures, sometimes clamorous and sometimes silent but in every case expressions of a continually deepening malaise, have ensued among those who organized or endorsed the June 19 coup.
It is well known that, impelled by the vitality of sections of the working class which have frequently engaged in struggles for various demands and in strikes, the unions have played a relatively important role. Forces openly critical of the existing state of affairs (though cautious in respect to Boumedienne) have found expression -- legal or semilegal -- through the unions. In the government itself there have been frequent clashes as well as in the party. It has been no secret to anyone, moreover, that already shortly after June 19 profound divergences existed within the officer corps, which organized the coup and which now constitutes a privileged element in Algerian society.
All of this was behind the latest crisis, which was quite probably initiated by forces that noted the crystallization of a situation increasingly different from what they had looked forward to in the first days after independence, a situation in which those who based their claims on the old struggles wielded less and less weight. Rivalries of various sorts, difficult to specify on the basis of available information, doubtless played a part in the action of Zbiri and his collaborators, who imagined that they could repeat against Boumedienne an action which they had carried out against Ben Bella with a much larger bloc.
It is symptomatic that this crisis unfolded amid general indifference and was resolved in the last analysis on the basis of the correlation of forces which developed in the army, thus confirmed as the real prop of the existing regime. The unions sought to take refuge in an evasive position but were compelled to condemn the ill-fated attempt. Despite all that I have stressed, their potential for maneuver was and is limited both by their persistent bureaucratization and
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