IN REPLY TO THE BOLIVIAN CP AND ITS BACKERS
By Livio Maitan
While revolutionists the world over anxiously wonder about the fate of the guerrillas in Bolivia following the death of Che Guevara, the offensive mounted by adversaries of the revolutionary line is being broadened and sharpened more and more.
Certain organs of the Latin- American Communist parties have even used their funeral eulogies to the guerrilla leader to stress their differences with his concepts and to insinuate, more or less implicitly, that his death, in the final analysis, was the practical result of a false orientation.
A few days after Fidel Castro's official announcement, Pravda opened its pages to two of the most hostile enemies of the Cuban line -- the Argentinian Ghioldi and the Chilean Corval [see World Qutlook November 10, page 912] -- enabling them to level an attack which, behind an obviously hypocritical screen, aimed in reality at the Fidelista leadership and its present orientation. It is thus clear that the leaders of the Latin- American CPs, in a very uncomfortable situation since the polemic over the activities of the Venezuelan CP broke into the open and they were nailed to the wall by the outcome of the OLAS [Organization of Latin-American Solidarity] conference, judged that the time for the counterattack had come.
The interview which Rodney Arismendi granted to the Italian CP weekly (see Rinascita, November 17) was another element in this generalized offensive, although Arismendi continued to stand on the ground which he had chosen at Havana, trying to play the role of a centrist moderator. The secretary of the Uruguayan CP stated in his opening observations that "the process underway in the Latin- American continent has all the characteristics of a prerevolutionary situation," but he was far from drawing from this the necessary conclusions; and in fact he once again resorted to his polyvalent formulas the aim of which is to cover up all kinds of opportunist adaptations.
It is significant moreover that he explicitly held out the perspective of a victory for the left in the next presidential election in Chile, bringing out at the same time with a certain pride that as for him, he had already been elected seven times to parliament in his own country, thus becoming the dean of that body.
But the interview granted by the leader of the Bolivian CP, Jorge Kolle, is the item that in particular marks a new stage in the offensive of the pro- Soviet CPs (the interview appeared in the Chilean CP daily, El Siglo, and was immediately reprinted in the daily newspapers of the French and Italian CPs).* Kolle made sure to stress that his party had expressed its solidarity with the guerrilla struggle and that Communist militants had played a very important role in it. But at the same time he confirmed in essence what has been clear for some time in the light of a series of reports and declarations (including, particularly, the declarations made by Régis Debray) and which was prominently indicated in addition in the account from La Paz which World Outlook published in its issue or November 10. In short, Kolle's statements constitute further evidence for the following conclusions:
(1) The Bolivian CP -- reference here is obviously to the pro-Soviet CP -- did not favor guerrilla struggle, which it considered more or less a method to be used contingently within the framework of a more general strategy.
(2) When the CP understood that the struggle would be developed despite it, it sought to gain the controlling positions, utilizing top level leaders in an attempt which did not succeed owing to Guevara's opposition.
(3) When this attempt failed, the CP adopted a more and more critical and hostile attitude toward the guerrillas.
(4) Some of the Communist militants and leaders did play a major role among the guerrillas, but in opposition to the party line and by breaking with the party -- whether formally or in practice. (Kolle tries to make his readers believe that some of those who fell in the struggle or who are still carrying out leadership tasks in it remained members of the party, whereas in reality they left it.)
(5) Given its orientation, the CP did absolutely nothing to mobilize and help the guerrillas win; on the contrary the party did its best to put obstacles in their way and sabotage their action in every possible way. Kolle's statement: "The unfortunate thing was, as we predicted, that this [popular] support could not be concretized in an active manner,"
* For the full text of this article see World Outlook, page 1,012.
constitutes nothing but revolting hypocrisy.
It should be noted, finally, that in concluding, Kolle indicates that when the time comes his party may adopt new positions -- which could be a way of already indicating a new phase in the anti- Castroist offensive.
Within the framework of this whole operation of the Latin-American CPs, which from all the evidence has been worked out in consonance with Moscow, the attitude of the Maoist leadership assumes a significance not to be minimized. It should be noted that the Chinese have remained completely silent on the polemic between Fidel and the Venezuelan CP, on the message from Che Guevara and on the OLAS conference, while at the same time remaining reticent about the guerrillas in Bolivia, at times publishing some indirect commentaries critical of the Cuban orientation (some Latin-American, and not only Latin-American, groups openly supported by Peking have gone so far as to formulate quite explicit attacks on the "revisionism" of Fidel Castro).
The enormous fact should now be underlined that during the days and weeks in which the entire world followed the events in Bolivia, the Chinese press quite simply ignored the death of Che.
There is no need for us to insist on the fact that such an infamous attitude reveals a sectarianism carried to such an extreme that one can scarcely conceive it, and it says much about the concept held by the Maoists on relations within the international workers movement, But it is above all clear that at the root of such an attitude is a profound difference held by the Chinese with regard to the revolutionary strategy of Fidel Castro, Ernesto Guevara and the Latin-American vanguard. How otherwise can it be explained that people who polemicize every day with the Soviets and the CPs under their influence on practically all questions evade condemning the current offensive against the revolutionary road and guerrilla struggle and do not breathe a word on the events and conflicts of the highest degree of interest to the revolutionists of Latin America?
In reality, it is absolutely necessary that the revolutionary movement in Latin America and particularly in Bolivia reply in a resolute way to the questions that have been posed, meeting head on the attack of the adversaries of the revolutionary road and the guerrilla struggle.
This signifies, above all, recalling the essential aspects of the analysis of the situation in Bolivia in the years 1965-67 as outlined by the Bolivian vanguard (see the many articles which have appeared in World Outlook up to the account from La Paz published in the Novenber 10 issue). From this analysis, it follows without any possibility of ambiguity that the initiative taken of unleashing a guerrilla struggle was not artificial or premature, but corresponded to social and political dynamics that made it possible and necessary. The fact that the guerrilla struggle was greeted with enthusiasm by certain sectors and with sympathy by others and that it contributed immediately to greater sharpening of the contradictions faced by the regime and Bolivian society is an additional confirmation of the correctness of the fundamental choice that was made.
More generally, it would be completely arbitrary to draw from some grave setbacks or even the possible failure of this experience the conclusion that the concept of armed struggle and guerrillas is erroneous and must be abandoned. Defeats are always possible and guerrilla war likewise is a method of struggle that does not assure success on every occasion.
But what happened or may have happened in the current guerrilla struggle in Bolivia does not in the least change the fundamental tendencies of the Bolivian and Latin-American situation and it is these tendencies on which the revolutionary strategy of the Cubans and the vanguard throughout the continent is based.
The gentlemen leading the pro- Soviet CPs ought, moreover, to explain why in this case they rush to draw conclusions allegedly based on experience, while they pay no attention to the negative experiences of the "democratic" or "peaceful" road going back for decades.
This does not at all mean that we want to disregard the necessity for a precise analysis of the causes of certain setbacks. The analysis of the Bolivian guerrilla struggle must be made and will be made; it goes without saying that the first who should speak are not the strategists of the Latin Quarter or "cultural" circles somewhere in the world, but the organizations and the groups which have been participating in the dramatic struggle that is continuing against the Barrientos regime. We repeat -- a struggle that is continuing and which the revolutionists throughout the world are duty bound to support and help with everything in their power in these crucial weeks.
November 20