Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Bolivian CP View on the Guerrillas and the Death of Che

World Outlook Vol. 5, No. 40, 8 December 1967 · pp 1012-1013 · 1,495 words

Latin America Cuba Communist parties

BOLIVIAN CP VIEW ON THE GUERRILLAS AND THE DEATH OF CHE

(The following interview, entitled, "Bolivia After the Death of Che Guevara," was granted by Jorge Kolle, a member of the Secretariat of the Bolivian Communist party, to Eduardo Labarca, editor of the Chilean Communist daily El Siglo.

(The interview is evidently considered to be of prime importance by the pro-Moscow Communist parties. Translations of it have appeared in the Italian CP daily 1'Unita and the French CP daily 1'Humanité.

(World Outlook does not have the original Spanish text as published by El Siglo and we have therefore made an English translation from the Italian version published in Rome November 17.

{The Italian text included two editorial notes, one of some length. It is not clear whether these were added by the editor of El Siglo or by the editor of 1'Unita.

(The interview is of special inmportance in the context of the general attack now being mounted against the Cubans by the right-wing leaders of the Latin-American Communist parties and their allies and backers in the Kremlin.

(The attack and its meaning is considered by Livio Maitan in an article on page 1,014 of this issue of World Outlook. ]

*x* * *

What role has the PCB played in the guerrilla action which developed in the country and what has been its position toward it?

In the view of the PCB, guerrilla warfare, as one of the forms of armed struggle, within the framework of "methods of struggle" for the seizure of power by the revolutionary forces, has been and still is a method, a tactical category; but, in the PCB's view, its application as a strategy does not suit the concrete historical reality of the country's economic, social and political conditions. The basic fact in Bolivia today is the military government's counterrevolutionary offensive against the people, the working class, its organizations and leaders: the breaking up of the national, democratic, popular and revolutionary forces; government control over the unions; repression and imprisonment of patriots, democrats and revolutionaries.

(Note: The PCB is underground. It was outlawed by decree of the military dictatorship three weeks prior to the first episode in the guerrilla action.)

The PCB believes that we must seriously look toward a period of reorganization and strengthening of our forces: we must create the necessary preconditions for forming a popular, anti-imperialist front based on unity between the working class and important layers of the peasantry which would permit us to confront the tasks of seizing power. And in this we must not underestimate any method of struggle, utilizing them all in mass action and in every concrete case adapting them to the situation.

Guerrilla warfare started off without a proper appreciation of the political and social factors indispensable to its development; it emerged prematurely. Nonetheless, as a matter of principle, the PCB extended solidarity to the guerrillas and supported them with all the means at its disposal, without taking part in an organizational way. And there was a nucleus of our members who, outside the party bodies, took part in the armed actions.

(Note: The role and sacrifices of the Bolivian Communists are not well known. Guillermo Peredo Leigue, called "Inti," who is now leading the survivors from Guevara's group is a member of the Central Committee of the PCB. Communists who died in battle were "Inti's" brother "Coco," Aniceto Reynaga, Antonio Jiménez, called "Pan de Dios" F'bread of God"] and Jorge VAsquez Viana, who received a bullet wound in the stomach, was operated on in Camiri and then killed with a pistol shot in the back by an officer of the Fourth Division for "an attempt to escape"; this pretext was clearly a lie since, according to the medical report, the prisoner was in no condition even to move. Orlando Jiménez Baz4n, called "Camba," who was captured and called as a witness at the Debray trial, is a Communist. After he refused to swear "before God and the sign of the Holy Cross," and swore "on honor and by my fatherland," Camba declared: "I went into the guerrilla action because I am a member of the Bolivian Communist party." Loyola Guzm4n and Paquita Leyton, who are being held in the La Paz women's prison, are Communists.

(All the following Communists are in prison: Pedro Aliaga, Clara Torrico, Olivares, Gabriel Pocel and Fernando Martinez, the chief editor of the Communist party organ, Unidad. Every week the eee omentP arrests more Communist activists).

How do you view the possible consequences of Guevara's death?

We would like first of all to express our admiration and our sorrow: admiration for the revolutionary who gave

his life for the cause; sorrow all the more intense inasmuch as this was a coldblooded murder perpetrated far from the field of battle by the hand of agents of the CIA with the complicity of some Bolivian officers.

The death of Compafiero Guevara and the guerrilla action's unfortunate outcome do not mean, in our opinion, that the guerrilla action was unsound. Perhaps we should speak of a "calamity" rather than of “unsoundness." The consequences are a heavy loss, too much so, for the revolution. They are creating the conditions in Bolivia for a new heightening of the crisis of the revolutionary movement and encouraging the offensive of the enemy, who is today in a position to exploit this "success"; but, in the last analysis, a positive iesson for the revolutionary cause can be drawn from this. Our people were and remain morally at the side of the guerrillas. The unfortunate thing was, as we predicted, that this support could not be concretized in an active manner.

It can be predicted that two tendencies will show up on a continental scale, one current parallel to the Communist movement, the other in opposition to it: on the one hand, development of armed guerrilla movements; on the other, reactionary activity directed by the CIA, which will seek to create provocations and to "establish" responsibility in order to decapitate the revolutionary movement. The main thrust of these attempts is directed against Cuba and the more well-developed Communist parties, like the Chilean for example.

What are the current prospects for the Bolivian people's and democratic movement?

As to our perspective, we will say basically that our people's and democratic movement will surely be victorious. Without question, the forces and also the organization which will clear the way for the struggle and for its victorious conclusion are maturing in the present crisis. For the present, we are passing through a crisis. The enemy has the initiative, but his inner contradictions limit his margin for maneuver; however, if these contradictions develop, they can and should create a situation favorable to the people. This is the period for reorganizing our forces.

What _is your opinion of the news report that the diary of the guerrilla called "The Doctor" mentions. the presence of the first secretary of the PCB in the guerrilla zone and certain conditions which he is supposed to have put to Guevara?

Everyone knows that the PCB's policy consists in uniting the revolutionary forces to present a single powerful bloc against the continental and worldwide activity of imperialism. Nothing will be done by our party which could divide these forces. Furthermore, this is the policy of the Communist parties on this continent in general.

On the other hand, it is our view that the revolution must be an essentially national phenomenon: this is our principled position and it is no secret.

In my view, this is a new machination against our party: since our position is known, no party leader, no party body has been authorized "to negotiate" and could not have done so. Furthermore, there has been such a proliferation of guerrilla "diaries" published by the press and exhibited by the Bolivian high command that, whatever their source, they have lost all documentary or historical credibility. Simple common sense makes it impossible to believe in such a terrific quantity of "historians" for a guerrilla movement. It cannot be taken seriously.

What lessons does the negative outcome of the guerrilla action hold for the revolutionary movement of Latin America?

We reject all generalizations. We are sure of the fact that, in one way or another, the Bolivian case is an experience for the world and continental revolutionary movement. But it is up to the Latin-American revolutionaries in every country where they work, according to the situation in which they find thenselves, according to their own experience and state of development to draw the lessons from the Bolivian experience. None are more qualified or more entitled to do this than the Communist parties and their leaders.

When the circumstances permit, we Bolivians must make our experiences known. I repeat, this experience and its results are ours alone. This does not represent "localism," nor, obviously, any abandonment of internationalist principles, but only our respect for each of our brother parties and the responsibility they assume before their peoples.

← Documents: Concerning J. Posadas · In Reply to the Bolivian CP and Its Backers →

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