DANGER OF A COUP, DENA RISES IN ARGENTINA a
[the following article ‘has been’ ‘translated by. World. Outtook from the March 28 issue of the Buenos Aires La Verdad, the weekly
Abie. 6
newspaper of the Partido Revolucionario. fe, 108 Trabajadores (Workers Reyprutionary party). i ed
In the past three weéks, items in various journals; tie .com- ” fomenting subversion ‘of our institutions, ". the declarations of ..,.Balbin [Ricardo Balbin’ of “the UCR -~ Uniét Civica Radical’ del Pueblo] “stone the same lines (although intended to deny the possibility: of a coup d'état), and a whole series of incidents and gossip, ‘Have given. substance to the rumors about the perspective | of an abrupt “. change in the present administration.
We ‘should like™ to go beyond the ‘rumors: . asd determine just what the*chances are for such a turn? Sy Pos.
In our opinion a coup d'état is now being considered. In con “trast to thé: Situation two or three months -ago wher We Last dis- ‘cussed the ‘possibility “and came ‘to the ‘ednélusion ‘that it was not
. somewhat .. posed in an ‘immediate’ way, today an analysis of "the situation leads us ‘to admit that it is possible, altHough ‘we do not believe it is the most probable variant. Let us see if wé‘cdan~clear-things up
“Te ‘Ls not news that the country is suffering fron: a chronic crisis “involving | every sphere: from the economic level ‘to the. ‘politi- “eal; ‘including the social and institutional. “THé économie crisis has dragged ‘on _sincé-¥930., From that titie up té/néw no suceéss has. been achieved ‘dn “bringing up the country's basi€ area’of prodwétion °-oe agriculture. The figures today stand below those of the years pre- ‘ceding the - ‘cétebrated crisis that initiatéd thé so-called "infamous decade." No-inérease in the number of dattle,: no increase tin’ the production of wheat, corn or flax, no increase in the sale: -Of ‘wool, “and ‘the. same goes. for the other branches.
“In the ‘political field, despite ‘the ‘pélative stability < of ‘the - past. two years, we must recognize - ‘that: this relative equilibrium: ‘is extraordinarily deliéateé’: The very fact that we shouid have
aa
a “£9, , Cyaluate the possibility” (Of BO Gotip’ a! état téstifies to this. “oe To get an idea of the! ‘depth of the social crisis it is. only necéssary to skim a daily paper andinote the number of problems irritating the country -~' from: Tacuman where the newspapers report soup kitchens to alleviate hunger among the people in San Antonio, to conflicts initiated by the “transport workers and numerous strikes involving various unions, we have a gamut of facts indicating the gravity of. the crisis.
~L2-
In the institutional . field, the successive, divisions within the different political parties, the ‘threats of intervention in different provinces, and the conflicts involving the authorities that; have-occurred in Jujuy, Santa Cruz, Chubut. and. Tucuman constitute additional Signs of what we are talking about.
ack ‘these ‘phenomena form a ‘background for the permanent. ‘possibility of a coup in Argentina. But in the past two years the relatively high business level (due to the price of meat abroad and good harvests), have attenuated the threat. Whenever the economic situation., has, Amproved.,;the, possibility has been weakened.
"But. cat. present,;. we are of ‘the opinion that the possibility of, ja@-coup -d' état :has been placed on the, agenda in advance of the . deepening sof ‘the recession that has, begun to, be. felt. in the economic” field. Le ~ ee ree . ~~
Any conjunctural event, without involving the structure, can * precipitate a coup. And at the present time there is a conjunctural event --. the 1967. elections, which will bring the tensions and contradictions among the various forces. at work in the country to a maximum pitch.
On this foundation. of. bankruptcy, of permanent. ‘crisis which we have indicated, an incidental voccurrence , like the élections, and the differences among ‘the. ; ‘various forces or interests at work | in the country, can set off an, (explosion that will completely upset ~ the unstable equilibriun. a / .
The various sectors which feel they are not represented by “~~ the. present government , and which constitute a big majority, are ite:And if any-of. ‘them are issuing ; ‘warnings that the possibilities ~ are narrowing.,or. ‘being blocked, they are or could be elements we inclined to fake. a road that is not specifically electoral. atic The Agales [partisans of General Ongania] in their aifferent ~ variants; the. Integrationist sectors; the UCRists whom we noted earlier; ” Aramburism itself which already sees a decline in the . electoral following it needs to continue playing the role of arbiter: in national politics; the attitude of the military chiefs, who after ten years: have again established contacts with Peronism through a banquéti staged by the Light and Power.union.for an army officer; the declaration of the Conservatives accusing the government of: | having violated the constitution; the attack launched by the indus-—~trial sector linked to automobile production, alleging that the government is constantly injuring its interests; the Colorado opposition: which also has its plans for a coup d'état; and the refusal _ of the: army and air forces to reestablish a dialogue with Peronism -- alisconstitute elements that have sharpened. current tensions and | incfeased the possibility of a coup. -
We do not claim that a coup is inevitable. Still more -- - we believe that this possibility is not the most probable variant, but
in’ tontrast;.to the situation of two.or three months ago, we believe that ‘the tensions have become: so. great that- at 28 Now posed cone; cretely.: POP a, 8 . . mbar sees
c The difference then is that ‘we - now. believe = in contrast ‘to.
aa existe that: favor. it; ; although, we: ‘repeat, “this. outcome is not. the most probable among others that are also posed -- elections with . "suarantees" against Peronism, or sectors of it, or a coalition government that would sinstitute- “a change in course,,economically in a cold: way, ‘etc. ets. cept weet, vous
The statement -is welt: ‘known about the posses. ‘in. their opposition to the workers: movement: always having the possibility. ; of. finding a solution to a crisis. oday the various boss sectors, jare. posing . their respective "solutions." Among these solutions, we hold that two.or ithree remain jposed for an entire stage. In relation with this we note sin our anakysis several items involving the possibility. . Of . a coup; the utilization of the elections by various boss sectors and the path indicated at present by Perén, and, as a corollary, .. what the working: class should do in face of the various alternatives. of a capitalist nature offered up to now. rr
t
The banquet staged last Friday by the Light and Power unior,*” for Colonel Ileal was one of the most notorious events in the current scene. For the first time since the downfall of Perén, the top leaders of the Vandorist sector and a prominent leader.of.the Alonsist sector, Pepe, sat down together with.a. delegation... of high officials heated by the general of Alejandro Lanusse!s division, at:a not very. proletarian table (from red. saimon and caviar up to- ten : :kinds of cakes sprinkled with fine wines y ‘champagne and whiskey).
The Monday edition of La. Razon- tried. to picture this meeting. as a big dinner reestablishing diplomatic. contacts. and. nothing, more 3 but the magazine Primera Plana cast doubt-on this.. : baw:
We have our own interpretation. Since Peronism turned. over . a "new leaf" in the Chamber of Deputies, we have been warning of the possibility.at the present stage of a reedition of the National and. Popular Front headedi by. Solano Lima and Begnis and have ‘indi-. . cated the different: variants:;that could occur, among others. the one of. Ongania running as the main eandidate for the elections in. 1967. ody The: Priday dinner ‘at. ‘which Vandor, Tzzetta, Cavalli, Donaires, Roséndo'Garcta and Niembro were present besides the heads of. the Light. and! Power: union;:was:to.us not a mere national get- together. Independently of:the. observations of La. Razén about the army officers® declaring» that “the-Armed Forces would view with great. dis-. favor. the.union:movement,;ccnsciously or unconsciously, permitting anyone to infiltrate it with speculative, ideological or political | aims," this dinner had a much deeper-significance. It was, the public launching of an ideological and.political front integrating the trade-union leaderships and sectors of the army.
A14-
*-. No one should be fooled. In politics naivité is usually.costly. To be on guard concerning the possibility of such a front/iis:.-. insurance against being taken in. If Vandorism did not have concrete plans with regard to the future, it would not adopt a public position that is to its disadvantage inthe internal struggie for party control. This dinner, in our opinion,iwas a giveaway... Vandorism is | Pe, with the’ ‘Adee Of a Front with’ ‘the participation of ‘the | army O89 ee a iho is going 0 control: this Front? We. are unable to: say, “put we do not doubt that this is what Frondizi and Frigerio are. working for. This does not mean that the Front has already been set up and that it is dominated by Frigerism. The Front can be wider than is “now “envisioned and'-include sectors ‘without. any perspective ‘Like the: UCRI- ‘(Union Civica ° Radical Intransigente]> and Udelpa. :
But what rust ‘be noted is that Vandorism is. Leaving out the. possibility: of taking-the class road 'in its factional struggle in the Peronist movement’ and is deciding to continue the boss politics followed by the united movement. A National Front with the army and “the church is not’a road favoring the workers movement. It is a repetition of attempts already made to remain within the structures created by the bourgeoisie, by the bosses, in order to prevent the workers movement from-taking an. “independent road. The Vandorists did not sit. down: to" ‘dinner Friday evening solely to eat salmon. a “We! catindt We! ‘Pure , we. ‘repeat, that such a Front will actually t Be formed. Among other things it can be proscribed, or blocked by a coup*d'état, but we do-not-doubt that. the ‘army and the Vandorist leadership: ‘of Péronism are working toward.this perspective. | And just as-we-eritically favored the Vandorist positions involving leadership of the Peronist movement, so today we do not hesitate in the ‘least in denouncing once again what we havé' already denounced before.-The policy of integrating the: leadership of the Vandoristmovement with the army is not thé road réquired.by the workers. ! movement. This boss Politics must be repudiated | by the whole work-_ ers. movement: :
‘No one doubts: “that Pebon decided. ‘to provoke the present oy division in the Peronist movement. But why did:he decide to précipitate a.rupture at the present moment? We -have: already. explained: .. why. The bureaucratic trade-tnion structure is now at its weakest ;thanks to a policy of systematic capitulation. When he was in power Perén had his own apparatus and big sectors of the bourgeoisie that served him as a counterweight to the influence’ of the workers move= nent, which was brought” into the state at the time through the CGT (Cohféederacién General: del Trabajo].:When a bureaucrat like Cipiano Reyes’ tried to move out and:follow a more or less independent policy, Perén blocked him. In exile, Perén today does not have this control over the movement or over its leaders and he has lost part of the support which was formerly: given him by ‘the well-to-do and proindustrialist bourgeoisie. As a consequence, Perén more than ever. requires a monolithic movement that can be maneuvered. Vandorisn,-. with its independent line, constituted an obstacle to this game.
Consequently Perén utilized the most opportune moment -~ the decline of the workers movementj:as evidenced:by its.bureaucratization -- to provoke a fissure within ‘the Peronist- movement and the workers movement as a whole. MLE ae oem gprs
But the question ‘that must: be asked is whether. or not the split is progressive. Is it favorable to the workers movement and the popular. Sectors?
Our answer is. “no: -Perén- dia. ‘not break with Vandor. in “order to give the Peronist and workers movement a further impulsion toward the left, not to speak of a revolutionary direction. The split involves control of the party but in order to continue the politics of integration with.the regime, of parliamentary opposition and nothing more -- not to resume the road initiated in 1955 when the "Liberation" placed the movement before the alternative of resisting “or disappearing, or’the decade before that in. 1945 when.it faced the -- entire oligarchy bound . UP with imperialism under the slogan of; Sraden or: Peron.
We have said before; various times;,. particularly,in reference to some sectors of the left who have--recently. "discovered" - Peronism ‘that we seek to-avoid drawing: conclusions. from, personal impressions or false sentimentalism; we are guided by. the. anterests of the workers movement. Those who think that these are identified with Alonsism, do not see the contradictory character of the phenom- ‘enon. Périén did: mot split the Peronist movement. in order to prevent Lt froin ‘falling: into popular frontism, since that policy began. with Cooke: and with his complete agreement. And the position of Peron himself favoring Frondizi is well known. -Consequently, pain: ud. as it maybe, it is necessary to call a spade -a spade. Perdén's. present policies similarly do not aid the workers movement. Peron proposes to maintain the Peronist party without its being able to organize and retdin for itself, or whomever it designates, the exclusive privilege of determining what policies it should follow. That is, he wants to maintain the policy followed up to now. -- the. leadership. decides and the masses must obey.
‘We are saying” ‘this not for the first. time ;. Since - 1955" and with "eteater ‘emphasis since- 1958, when confidence began to be placed in Frondizi, we have been saying: to measure up to-the requirements of the situation the Peronist movement must change its methods and deepen - its: program. ‘it has not: done this and. it is not (Soing to do it. ; .
In our:opinion, there is only one road for the workers and that is the independent organization of the: working class, a road which at present necessitates reconquering the unity that has been lost.
We are’‘aware of the: difficulties but clarity is required. The working class must act dndepéndently on the union front and in the political field, applying a class program, so that if today a.step backward has been’ taken, provoking a new division, the slogan of
the workers movement cannot be anything except to regain unity. The winning of unity is also the best Way of assuring independent poli~. ‘tical action, whether through opposing the coup d'état, which -can ~ be done by preparing a line of action aimed at defeating the present government, or by defeating the variation of a front that seeks to tie the workers movement to: ‘the army Oe
Let us guarantee the unity of the workers ‘movement as: the =~ best way of assuring that the entire working | class expresses itself in an. independent way ‘through its own party.
SHIPDIN ATTITUDE OF SHORE ROVARD_BOUNBUTENIE © =
° . OA perceptible ‘