miracle has occurred in French politics. At the very moment when it appeared absolutely hopeless, the "left" found a common can-~ didate for the presidential elections next December 5, Frangois Mitterrand won the backing of both the Socialist and Communist par- . ties and various groups that classify themselves as in the "left,"
' How did it happen that whereas a similar attempt by Gaston Defferre ended in miserable failure, Mitterrand succeeded? To- understand the miracle, we must take into account what is going on among
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the politicians of the bourgeoisie and the Socialist party, on the one hand, and what is in the minds of the leadership of the French | Communist party on the other.
The main operator among the politicians is the general secretary of the Socialist party, Guy Mollet. He began by being over® 21%" whelmed by Defferre's attempt. Defferre was able to get the Socialist party to accept his candidacy. But Defferre understood this to mean his investiture in a Gaullist-type regime, in which the old parties would be brushed aside in favor of a "democratic and Socialist federation" put together around his figure, including the Socialists, Radicals and Christian Democrats. ‘To accept such a federation would have meant liquidation of the Socialist party. On this point, Mollet went to bat and Defferre resigned the nomination.
To maintain the equilibrium of his organization, Mollet could not then support anyone else from his own party. Consequently he turned to one of the bourgeois political figures standing somewhere between the Socialist and Radical parties. Mitterrand did not cone stitute an obstacle to the long-range calculations envisaging the period “after Gaullism." On this, Mollet seems to have a tacit understanding with former premier Antoine Pinay, a typical representative of the right, who, like Guy Mollet -- to their common sorrow today -~ joined in hoisting de Gaulle to power in 1958. Both of them envisage restoring a democratic regime of a kind after de Gaulle passes from the scene. In supporting Mitterrand, Mollet did not hide the fact that he is ready to abandon him in favor of Pinay if the happy event should occur,
Mitterrand is the kind of politician that stops at nothing. He knows Mollet's views concerning him, but, while waiting, he has no compunction against moving into the spotlight. He knows that he can hardly expect to win votes from the Mouvement Républicain Popu-' laire. If he wants to come out not too badly when the votes are counted, he must therefore seek the support of the French Communist party and achieve this without negotiating with its. leadership and without offering the slightest concession in that direction. Unlike Defferre, however, he is not averse to making the few gestures required by the leadership of the French Communist party to be able to say that they are satisfied and that they will appeal to the voters to cast their ballots for him.
Let us turn to the attitude of the leaders of the French Com munist party. They were aware that an agreement duly drawn up, signed and sealed, with the leaders of the Socialist party was exeluded., They also knew that a part of the electorate that tradi-~ tionally votes Communist would come out for de Gaulle in a presidential election and that a Communist candidate, or a candidate supported by only the Communist party, would result in a loss of votes for the party. For a long time they have sought a "left" candidate who would also be supported by the Socialist party and in such a way as to make it impossible to measure the decline in their electoral influence.
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Defferre completely disregarded the French Communist party; consequently he was entirely unacceptable. When the Parti Socialiste Unifié for a time considered running a candidate, the Communist party leaders at once bared their teeth to that possibility. But when Mitterrand personally announced his candidacy on September 9, they said nothing. For them, as for Guy Mollet, the insignificance of the bourgeois organization to which Mitterrand belongs was an advan=tage. Feelers were at once sent out through the proper intermediaries, ’
On September 21, Mitterrand held a press conference. He did not present a platform but offered "options." He tipped his hat to the role of political parties, adding that it was not up to him to determine their mutual relations; however, he was against excluding anyone. At the end of the conference he announced that he had received a letter that very day from Waldeck Rochet, the general secretary of the French Communist party, and that he had utilized the press conference to answer the questions raised in that letter.
Two days later the central committee of the French Communist party met to hear a report by Waldeck Rochet, the gist of which could be stated as follows: Mitterrand sent us a stenogram of his press conference; he's for the North Atlantic treaty and for Europe, but that's not so bad; he's not exactly clear on the need to struggle against the monopolies, but he is against the "personal power" [de Gaulle]; and he does not exclude us from the left. Consequently we must vote for him and make him the candidate of the unity of the demo-cratic forces and thus help forge this unity.
In the political bureau there were partisans, as everyone knows, for running Duclos or Frachon as a candidate; but since they stood on the same program as the others; namely, the establishment of a “renewed democracy," their opposition to Mitterrand did not last long. The political bureau presented a unanimous report to the central committee and the latter approved Mitterrand's candidacy .almost without discussion.
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It is still too early to say how all this will be received among the working masses. Parliamentary illusions, illusions about "unity" across class lines and without a program, favor support for Mitterrand. On the other hand, various feelings -- hostility among some to the former regime of the Fourth Republic which Mitterrand | represents perfectly, instinctive hostility among others to a bour= geois candidate, or sympathy for the anti-Americanism of de Gaulle --~ tell against Mitterrand, either to de Gaulle's advantage or in the direction of abstention. .
But if one judges the situation on the basis of the means through which Mitterrand became a candidate, the following conclusions can-be drawn: mo
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(1) Mitterrand is a bourgeois candidate running on an anti- Gaullist slogan and utilizing the working class as a "basis of sup=port" thanks to the policies of the two big workers parties. -
(2) In maneuvering to get out of a divisive situation in his- - own party, Mollet advanced a candidate to whom he owes nothing and manipulated the course of that candidate to obtain Communist. support without. giving anything in return. In this business, Mollet displayed matchless trickiness.
. (3) The leadership of the French Communist party signed: a blank check, Instead of advancing unity of action, it committed, the party to engage in a campaign it does not believe in, in which the’. enthusiasm that would have been engendered by a Communist candidate will be absent. Even though there will be no exact figures to goby, these leaders will not be able to conceal the decline of the French Communist party in the electoral field.
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