POLICY IN GREECE LEADS TO SETBACK
The political crisis in Greece is far from having ended although a stage has just been completed in which the most reactionary forces scored an advance. After two unsuccessful attempts, the king. managed to win a vote of confidence from parliament for the cabinet of Stephanos Stephanopoulos on September 25 by the slim margin of 152 to 148, .
This majority was put together through the usual means employed by bourgeois parties in such situations. Cabinet posts were promised to some, a better income to others, and ex-premier George Papandreou's Center Union party was whittled down like a salami during the 66=day crisis. There is not much point to shouting about the corruption, or to giving way to imprecations. Corruption is one of the constants in the politics of the Greek peninsula as in many other countries, although in Greece it can be said that there is little shame displayed over its rankness. The question that must be asked is why was it possible for the maneuvers of the court and the capitalist circles linked to it to finally succeed after 66 days?
Everyone was aware that more than one member of parliament resisted the "Circe of the palace" (to use one of Papandreou's expressions) out of fear of the popular masses, the street demonstrations in Athens and the vote of the peasants should new elections be held. But this fear gradually evaporated. In addition, the two cabinets set up by the king during this period, while they did not win a vote of confidence, were not inactive while they waited for the balloting in | parliament. They went ahead with "purges" in the army and the administration, Thus the forces of "law and order" were whipped into better shape to intervene with the club,
What did the other side do? The masses demonstrated vigorously and often, Their militancy was growing. They made the court hesitate about resorting to a military operation, and they prevented certain deputies from selling out too hastily. But the Greek Communist party -- which controls the majority of the proletariat -- told the masses to support Papandreou, who wanted to save the monarchy and the capitalist system no matter what the cost. In other words, the perspective . given to the masses by the Greek Communist party was maintenance of the status quo; whereas the crisis originated in the impossibility of doing this. Moreover, due to this perspective, or rather the lack of a perspective, the struggle consisted of a succession of demonstrations, day after day, and not the development of a struggle, beginning with. these demonstrations, that would have extended into a general strike aimed at kicking out the monarchy. In the absence of a perspective and a plan of battle, the mass movement was bound to lose impetus, to begin marking time, a development which the reaction counted on. .
A four-vote majority. That is not much, but it was sufficient to provide a "legal" cover for the measures which Stephanopoulos will undertake. It was this legal aspect which Papandreou and his supporters in the leadership of the Greek Communist party considered to be so sacrosanct. It is certain that the monarchy and its tools will utilize this situation to the utmost to advance their positions in preparation for the next stages. Because the battle is not finished.
The Greek masses are emerging from years of suffering the consequences of the defeat that followed the postwar revolutionary upsurge. The skirmishes that have just taken place did not lead to an immediately successful outcome because of the policy of betrayal followed by their main leaders; but the tests of strength did not end ina crushing counterblow.
- The main problem for the workers, consequently, is to draw the lessons of the experience they have just undergone in order to better prepare for the continuation of the battle.
During the crisis of the summer of 1965, the Trotskyist vanguard attracted youth who want to advance the struggle. Although the’: grip of the Communist party leadership is strong, it is not as strong as it was in the past. Thus favorable conditions exist for assembling a revolutionary vanguard capable of continuing the struggle with much stronger political and organizational capacities.