PROPOSED CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES
By Pierre Frank
The exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet. conflict has ‘peached the point of a rupture in fact between the Soviet and Chinese tendencies, .While the Chinese have won only a minority of Communist parties, their repeated attacks have placed the Khrushchevist leader- ship in an embarrassing position in which its authority has been undermined, If the attacks do not necessarily strengthen the ranks of the Chinese tendencies, they favor centrifugal currents in rela-~ tion to the established leaderships of the Communist parties,
The Soviet leadership consequently has been led to raise the question of formally condemning the Chinese leadership in order to check the disintegration of its:own authority. . Thus the Suslov report advanced the proposal. to.convoke a new conference of Commun-~ . ist parties to consider the dispute... Under’the present conditions, where no political compromise is possible, this would signify a’. gathering of all the anti~Chinese currents in the Communist parties to vote for the condemnation of the Mao leadership.
But a difficulty arises, — The Communist International no longer exists, The Communist parties are no longer tied to each other by formal organizational. bonds; in 1957-and 1960 the conferences did not create any central body. Before convoking a conference, therefore, it is necessary to obtain the agreement of those whom’ it would be. desirable. to have in attendance, ° .
If Khrushchev'!s policies of "peaceful coexistence," of the "yeaceful and parliamentary roads," etc., are: supported by the major= ity of the leaderships of the Communist parties, more than one is | hostile =~ for reasons peculiar to each case -- to pronouncing any kind of anathema on the Chinese. leadership, The main reason is the resistance to cutting international links which, by force. of things, would give too much weight to the leadership of the Commun at party . of the Soviet. Union.
what is the situation in this regard among the Communist par~ ties?
Outside the workers states, there are ‘three big | Communist parties where things stand as follows:
(1) The French party where Thorez, since an agreement reached with Khrushchev before the Moscow conference of 1960, has lined up faithfully with the Soviet leadership. As'‘a result, Thorez. has been beating the drums for a gathering of the Communist parties in accord= anee with Suslov!s proposal,
(2) The Indonesian. party which is. supporting the Chinese, and which consequently does not want such a conference, oO, -
~ 5m
(3) The Italian organization where Togliatti and most of the members of the Italian leadership, both to the right and left of him, are against an excommunication and therefore against a confer~ ence called for that purpose, An Italian delegation has gone to Moscow, -if the Italian leadership should refuse to attend a conter~ ence, other Huropean partics would certainly follow suit,
Finally, among the workers states of Eastern Europe, the oppo~sition of the Poles, and the less clear opposition of the Hungarians would be reinforced, ©
It is also probable that Communist parties in Asia, Africa and the Americas. would not show up.
‘Under these conditions, to.convoke a conference where, in place: of the 81 parties that were present in Moscow in 1960, only sixty _ odd parties attended, would constitute a serious setback for Khrush= chev. even. before the agenda was voted on, One can be sure that he will do everything.possible to avoid such an outcome, It is safe to conclude that he will conduct hard negotiations, especially with the Italian leadership, which occupies a kind of key position in the situation, in order to find a formula for agreement, a ocomprom ise corresponding both to his own needs and those of the other leaderships who, although they are right-wing opportunists, nevertheless do not tare to recreate » ‘a system which appears to them to | be too rigid, - et
Up to now there is no evidence that would indicate that an organizational compromise at the expense of the Chinese is excluded or that the conference will not take place. Khrushchev needs it badly. He oannot impose it because he lacks the means to operate the way Stalin did, Presumably he envisages paying a high price for what he wants,
This juncture in the Sino-Soviet conflict illustrates, in any. ~ case, the depths of the impasse of the bureaucratic system of the Communist parties on the international scale. In an International with a democratic regime, composed of parties that also have demo~ cratic regimes, the discussion of political differences would have a completely different aspect and a World Congress would be able to reach a majority opinion without being concerned about questions of prestige, of skirting issues, etc. It is true that the discussion in such an International would not remain within a framework imposed by bureaucratic Leaderships whose material means are in inverse proportion to the power of their theoretical and political arguments.
Confronted with this incapacity to hold a free discussion, many a member of the Communist parties is inevitably led to ask if either of the two sides really represents Leninism, Here, too, it is easy to see why the question of Trotskyism, of the Fourth International, has been brandished in the conflict by the two powerful antagonists who are confronting each other.
Sole
WHAT KIND OF UNIONS ARE THEY?
The Soviet trade-union leaderships refused to send a delegation to the May Day celebration in Peking and cancelled the invitation they had extended to the Chinese trade unions to send representatives for the festivities on the same day in Moscow's Red Square, The Chinese trade unions, on the other hand, renewed their invitation to the Soviet trade unions,
The decision of the Soviet trade unions raises a very serious question: Are the Soviet trade