KHRUSHCHEV'S WARNING TO THE U.S. ON CUBA
By Joseph Hansen
At a May Day dinner in Moscow, Premier Khrushchev read the text of a prepared speech containing the sharpest warning to the U.S, government celivered by any top Soviet official since the crisis over Cuba in October 1962, Once again the topic was Cuba and the provocative acts committed against the heroic people of this revolutionary island which again risk setting off a chain reaction that could end in a nuclear catastrophe,
The essential paragraphs, dealing with continued flights of U.S. spy planes over Cuban territory in violation of Cuba's sover-
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eignty and in violation of international law, dealt ostensibly with the interpretation of Khrushchev's policy of “peaceful coexistence,"
The policy should not be misread, said Khrushchev, Rumors had been spread in the United States about an understanding between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the flights of U.S. spy planes over Cuban soil. No such understanding exists, the Soviet premier declared. The USSR supports completely the "five conditions" laid down by Fidel Castro at the time of the crisis created by Kennedy over placement of rockets in Cuba in October 1962, "There cculd never be any question of such an under~ standing," he said, "because the USSR will never reach an understanding with another state to the detriment of a third country, no matter whether it is big or.small,
“We have already said,” he continued, "and we declare once again that a threat to Cuba, the continuation of the violation of its sovereignty, the intrusion into Cuba's air space, can have disastrous consequences,
_"This will be a disaster, first and foremost, for those who carry on a policy of provocations and aggressions against Cuba,
"We wish to say once again to those who are playing with fire, that in violating the principles of peaceful coexistence and in demonstrating a lack of consideration with regard to other sountries, they can drag the world into a new war."
A Blind Reaction
The State Department brushed aside the warning as so much May Day oratory, As the State Department's reply to Khrushchev!s words, press officer Richard J, Pnillips told a news conference that the overflights of the spy planes would be continued.
The White House would do well to consider a bit more closely whether Khrushchev was just engaging in the Soviet equivalent of Fourth of July speech-making in the United States, Johnson, like Kennedy and Eiscnhowever, understands perfcouly that Knrushchev!s basic policy toward the United States is a continuation of Stalin's policy -- he seeks an over-all understanding at the expense of world revolution, Johnson understands this so well that he has indicated that he supports Khrushchev as against Mac in the Sino-Soviet con-~ flict,
The question arises: Is Khrushchev willing to sell-out the Cuban Revolution as part of the payment for an over-all deal? This is what was implied in his denial that any secret agreement exists approving continuation of the flights of spy planes over Cuba.
It is not necessary to argue whether Khrushchev is willing to make a deal at the expense of the Cuban Revolution. It can be
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granted that he would be perfectly willing and even relieved to be able to make such a bargain. This is shown by his whole past which is not one of revolutionary struggle or devotion to revolutionary principles but of careerism in the bureaucratic structure of the USSR under the not exactly moral rules laid down by Stalin.
‘The point is -- and this is what the White House should ponder’ -- can Khrushchev get away with it?
Gould Mean” His Head
‘The. answer is that it would be an exceedingly dangerous gamble and Khrushchev is aware of it.
‘First of. all, the cuban Revolution is headed by independent figures who have displayed political talent and a moral’ stature not — matched since the days of the Bolsheviks,. They.are immensely popu~ lar not only among the Latin-American masses, and among the peoples of Africa and Asia, but among the masses of China and above all = Eastern. Europe and the Soviet Union where they have a special aura,
It would be difficult to conceive a single act in the field of foreign policy that would bring greater discredit to Khrushchev and the group around himthan a crude betrayal of the beleagured Cuban revolutionaries, It could well finish Khrushchev ~- not slowly, but swiftly -- and open the way for genuinely:-revolutionary forces to displace the present regime in the USSR and install a new one with a dynamic outlook like the one displayed in the days of Lenin and Trotsky. Would Prove Mao!ts Thesis
The chances for such an outcome rose considerably with the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Clearly Mao would: not have the slightest interest in acquiescing in a betrayal of the Cuban revolutionary leadership. On the contrary, the Chinese government, representing one-quarter of the human race, would emblazon the be~ trayal on their banners as the most convincing proof of everything they have charged against the Khrushchev leadership,
Their denunciations would find fresh receptivity among the Soviet masses, and the Chinese bid for leadership of the Communist _ parties throughout the world would be greatly advanced despite their bizarre appeals to the ghost of Stalin,
As an old. practical politician, Johnson should be able to grasp that the very reasons impelling him to favor Khrushchev, should also impel him not to force Khrushchev to deliver something that would signify his own swift destruction, Khrushchev, as another old prac= tical politician will draw the line on that. This is the meaning that the White House should draw from Khrushchev'ts warning, It is not just oratory; it is not just bluff; it is very serious,
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