Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Campaign to Free Hugo Blanco

The Internationalist No. 11, 15 May 1963 · pp 5-7 · 1,112 words

Latin America Cuba Germany United States

campaign for the immediate release of Fusco Blanco, the revolutionsry peasant leader of Peru, has alreacy been launched in various countries,

In London two demonstrations were organized in front of the Peruvian umbassy y the first by a newly created "Release Fugo LDlaico Committee." The demonstrators spent two Lours marching outside tke Embassy building with posters demanding "Release DTugo Blance" ené "Land for Feru’s Landless,"

The other demonstration wes organized by the Socislist ia>torr Leacue, alse outside the Peruvian Imbassy in London.

A jcint demonstration is scheduled to be held in Lornécn in the near future.

In Brussels a similar demcnstration was organized by theaeieee oes and students. we In Rome a conpaten: has been “daunchea under the auspices of the University Students’ Association (ORUR). The Communist, Socialist and other youth organizations are participating. A signeture compairs wid be started for an appeal’urging the release of Hugo Blerco. A demand for a public trial with all facilities for an internctioncl ohaenet. lawyers to Sppeee in Bas. Sefense has also bes nade .

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"aa$Peace Hews," a. Gigs tog pr publisned D upporters of the “Conabebe. of! ae! 3€arries a: ae article June 26,

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"He could not be released except on.the order of the covernor of the state, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, one of those who have criticized Mr. Kennedy's Cuban policy with the greatest vigor, the one who may confront him in the big competition of 1964. Mr. Rockefeller granted clenency to the prisoner, at the request of Washington, he said, but no one is ignorant of the fact that the federal government has no power tiat could ‘make it conpel a state governor to Grant clemency to a prisoner. Witk-

uncultivated. - The dominant fact is that, for the first time out. doubt there were-very-imperious reasons that led Mr. Rockefeller to nake .@ gesture that can be held against him in the election cennaicn, and which in any case weakens the effectiveness of his criticisms of Kennedy since in this situation he came to his assistance."

Kennedy has notat all changed his fundamental ain of overthrowing the Castro zegime, Julien points out. "But the style arid the means of a@ policy define it as well as the aims." It makes a difference to Cuba if the counserrevolutionary commandoes are restrained, if the tiny bands of gunmen in the hills find it more difficult to get surplies, if tae popular nilitia sees its task eased. On the other hand “it is certain that Washin;ton will not renounce its struggle against 'subversion' in Latin Anerisa." .

Waet has led Washington to make this shift in policy? Julien cites a-reesnt editorial in the "well-inforned" New York Tines / April 23, International Edition_7 which may "shed some Light on whet the intentions of the government in Washington may be." The cist of this editorial is-an attack on the "ultras" who are shouting for invasion of Cuba. They act as if the Cuban Revolution did not exist and as if the main danger were Soviet troops, says the Times. They act as if the Cuban netic: consisted of the 250,000 emigres instead of the SE nercent who are carsying out & social revolution. The editorial then cises a zecont bocir entitled On Revolution in which the author, Hannah cenit, declares th:t "the most inportent political factor in the world secay is not war tut revolution." To this, The New York Times adits: “Cura is goinr through the egonizing process of a social revolution which, like all sizilar revolutions in modern history. is making a permenecnt imprint."

Claude Julien then outlines his own conclusions abdeut Washingvon's ca:culation:. This is perhaps the most interesting part of his arvicie:

"It is this permanent, irreversible charactor of the Cuban Revslution, which poses problems for Washington. That Mr. Miro Cardona abandoned tc leadership of the counterrevolutionary committes and left the United Stetes for refuge in Costa Rica is minor. Ths inportant, decisive fact is that the land can never be tazen away fron the peasants ani returned to the former owners who left enormous — .

2% their his’ » the Cuban people are go Mekong own destiny themscives --

a $f this destiny displcascs. Washington, the Cuban péople are not

@-to° Let it slip. from their hands. In the same way ho one will

rc Imew how

OG eT a RET NE NT Nee ORT ok DOR Peep ea ee

§ is what Washifeton, it Seens, is now taling into considera-

“that Gowle de Bourficient’ to justify a new policy. Just dare destroy the achievenents of the revolutionary Government: schools, ~- poads, hospitals, homes, etc., vbigh its predecessors nqve

* : “woe -—(=eicthtecen months before the renewal of his presicential nendate. this sennot feil te -~ultiply the obstscles in iir: Lonnedt’s road. Put it is cirficnult to see whet other rov.c te could choose, at least without undertatiin:: the nilitary destruction of Coa, se destruction of which his adversaries can tall: about when they hold no post of responsibility Dut whict they could not untertate if they themselves were ir =ne Write Louse." .

i Waile Clauce Julien's speculations deserve the most sericus attention, they shoulda not leed any partisan of revolutionary Cuba to lower his cuerd. Ii the Cubans have won a breathin> spell it is only beccvse of their vigilance and becase thay verc able to strencthen their Revolution despite the ferocious efforts of the Disenhower and Kennedy adninistrations to stranvle it,

GERIAN MOTAL WORKERS STRIKE .

. The following article was written by our German correspondent before future chancellor Urhard intervened in the strike to bring it to an end, halting it from spreading to the Ruhr and developing into a major test of strength. We have not yet received the views of our correspondent on this settlement, but it appears that the German goverrment, throuck srhard, exerted heavy pressure on both sides in order through a conprorise to avert a situation which would hove paralyzed a considerable sector of the German economy.

In talzing this action, the government in reality expressed its fear of the power of the German working class, which, had it gone ahead oon oh es would have e:rperiencec its bicg;cest combat since 1925-29!

As for the leadership of the IG Metall trade union, althcugh it is today the last bastion of the left in the German labor movement, it was probably fearful of the persnective of the combat and of losing the enormous financial resources which the union has accunulated. It accepted a compromise which pernitted it to save face before the workers

In any case, the

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