Il Manifesto's publication of the theses of the tendency it represents has aroused a very lively interest in Italian political circles. The magazine, which has been appearing for fifteen months, is a center of regroupment for leaders and cadres who have broken from the Communist party.
The speculations of the sensationalist press and the bourgeoisie's natural desire to exploit this split in order to weaken the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano] have played a role in this. But that does not diminish the intrinsic importance of the initiative the editors of the magazine have taken, which has already had very wide repercussions within the various "splinter groups" of the revolutionary left.
The launching of the operation was unquestionably well timed. The Maoist groups are in continual crisis, seriously reducing their ability to engage in effective action. The spontanéists have also suffered setbacks and many of them are questioning the basis of their conceptions. A considerable number of far left militants are reflecting on the lessons of 1969. Above all, they are pondering the reasons why a very powerful mass movement, in which the revolutionary left played an important role on several occasions, did not produce any political results - and why it did not cause a dislocation of the traditional apparatuses, which were considerably weakened from several standpoints.
The il Manifesto group grasped the situation and figured that there were possibilities which it could exploit. It broke with the hesitations that characterized its attitude for a whole period and took the initiative by formulating these theses in hope of functioning as a catalyst.
The analytical starting point of the theses is indisputable- that is, that the objective situation in Italy requires the formation of a revolutionary party and that subjective forces have existed for some years, not only in the student movement but in the working-class vanguard, that could make a start in accomplishing this task.
It is also indisputable that the PCI and the unions retain their predominant influence and that "without a fruitful crisis in the majority organization of the working class it will be impossible to construct a new revolutionary force capable of leading the movement and testing an adequate strategy."
Il Manifesto's bid, in which the publication of its theses is only the first step, is aimed precisely at regrouping the forces of the revolutionary left, which have been fragmented up to now, and drawing groups of critical cadres and activists out of the PCI and the PSIUP [Partito Socialista Italiano d'Unità Proletaria - Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity, a left Social Democratic formation in the orbit of the PCI].
In this way, the il Manifesto tendency hopes to create an organization capable of serving as a pole of attraction and taking political initiatives both nationally and in various sectors, thereby opening up widening breaches in the control of the big apparatuses.
The theses call on the revolutionary left groups and all those who recognize the necessity for a deep-going renewal of the workers movement to develop a common debate "without sectarianism or narrow tactical considerations," a debate which would not be limited to theoretical confrontation alone but would involve testing theoretical positions in action.
Such a debate could have two different outcomes: (1) the creation of "an initial common organizational structure" uniting all the forces that accept the same strategic line; (2) the continuation of discussion and unity in action "not only on specific points or defensive issues, but also on platforms promoting strategic unification."
After all the ravages of sectarianism, we would be the last to minimize the merits of such language. There is a real need for a political and theoretical confrontation in which debate would not be replaced by an exchange of epithets and insults, and every possibility of unity in action corresponding to a real necessity would be sought. This is why the Italian section of the Fourth International has decided to accept the invitation offered it by the editors of il Manifesto to join in this confrontation.
But what conceptions and orientations does il Manifesto propose in its 200 theses? It is obviously impossible either to summarize these theses or analyze them in the limits of a single article. I will try, then, to establish a few fundamental points.
Il Manifesto's analysis of the world situation revolves around two axes - condemnation of the Soviet leadership and adherence to the Chinese cultural revolution. More specifically, their analysis claims that the Soviet Union has switched camps, that its social nature has changed, and that "the Chinese revolution represents the only alternative to the crisis of Soviet strategy and the Communist movement, the international reference point for the revolutionary forces throughout the world."
It is worth pointing out that, insofar as we can tell from the theses, il Manifesto accepts none of the many conceptions of capitalist restoration in the USSR that have circulated up till now. But while outlining the well-known arguments that others have advanced, il Manifesto sought to add an "original" interpretation. The restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, according to the theses, is developing as the result of "annexation to the imperialist world market," of the "massive extension of trade," and a "substantial homogeneity in the type of development and level of productivity."
The least to be said about such a line of argument is that it is downright ludicrous to think that trade, which is so low even in absolute terms, could have had consequences of such importance. At best the il Manifesto people are confusing a possible long-term tendency with an actual reality. Their "innovation," then, cannot be taken too seriously. 1
Il Manifesto's attitude toward China fundamentally follows the same logic that inspired the attitude of a large part of the international workers movement toward the USSR during the 1930s and 1940s. When these comrades explain that it is impossible to envisage the construction of a revolutionary party without an international "point of reference," we of course agree with them. We founded the Fourth International precisely because we were convinced that it was impossible to develop a revolutionary strategy without a worldwide perspective, that it was impossible to create real revolutionary parties on a purely national scale.
We Trotskyists, moreover, have no need to review our appraisal of the historical portent of the Chinese revolution and of the importance of the existence of the Chinese People's Republic. Nor need we even go back over our evaluation of the significance of the Chinese leaders' polemic against the leaders of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and other CPs.
However, the il Manifesto comrades make their methodological error above all in abandoning the materialist criteria for analyzing Chinese society. This leads them to an interpretation of the cultural revolution and the situation in China that does not correspond to the reality. The political reflection of such a method is an attitude of uncritical support, although this was not typical of the il Manifesto tendency in the first months of its activity.
Thus, the theses declare the universal validity of the conceptions of Mao and the cultural revolution; they consider that a real proletarian democracy exists in China and that the Chinese leadership is manifesting a "new internationalism" that "relies on the coherence and richness of revolutionary growth (in China) and the autonomous and parallel growth of revolutionary initiative in other sectors of the world."2
All this, among other things, is in contradiction to other parts of the document that expound conceptions differing palpably from Maoist conceptions, especially regarding the structure of revolutionary society and the conception of the party. If in fact the Maoist experience was of universal validity, why did they have to reject it on such fundamental points?
It is not without significance that the theses do not say a word on the position taken by the Vietnamese leaders vis-à-vis the conflict within the Communist movement and that they discuss Latin America without mentioning Cuba. This point is revealing both of a tendentious impressionism in analysis and a desire to avoid expressing any differences with the Chinese positions and attitudes.
A part of the theses to which the il Manifesto comrades obviously attach a central importance deals with the ripeness of the conditions for establishing communism. "For the first time in history," thesis No. 71 explains, communism in its radical meaning, and thus socialism as a transitional phase, has become an immediate question and a possible political program." And in thesis No. 79 communism is presented "as a concrete political program in whose name the working class struggles and demands power."
From these premises, the il Manifesto group derive -- most importantly -- the general strategic line they hold to be generally valid for the present stage. The justification for such an orientation is that a "qualitative leap" has occurred in the development of the productive forces and that "human society in the most advanced countries has reached a level where the decisive source of expanded production is, or could be, not direct human labor but the social patrimony of knowledge."
All this theorizing is expressed in sufficiently elastic and imprecise forms to permit a "flexible" defense against the criticisms the authors could easily anticipate (some of them were not trained in the school of Togliatti for nothing). But beyond a few more or less happy formulations, the very clear tendency of the theses is to minimize the problems of the transitional phase precisely because they assume that the advance to communism - and it is in fact communism that they have in mind — will be relatively rapid. (In this, let it be said in passing, they are not orthodox Maoists.)
Likewise, the theses underestimate the necessity of objective preconditions for building a communist society (making apparent concessions to pre-Marxist methods) and overestimate the level attained by the productive forces. In other words, the theses confuse possibilities with realities and build a strategy for achieving communism on such an extrapolation. In this, they link up with formulations that can easily be traced to the "theories" of the spontanéists of the new wave.
We are entirely in agreement with the comrades of il Manifesto when they reject the conceptions of the parliamentary road, the "model of development," and the whole arsenal of reformism and gradualism that distinguishes the theory and practice of the Italian CP. Likewise, we note with pleasure their clear affirmation of the irreplaceable role of the working class in the advanced countries. We also largely share their appraisal of the significance of the 1968-69 upsurge in Western Europe3 and of the present situation in Italy and its most probable tendencies. However, some important observations must be made.
In the first place, the theses treat the problem of taking power in too summary a manner. Marxists have never indulged in the sterile casuistry of trying to envisage all possible specific variants. But Marx and Lenin established in the clearest way a series of criteria and guidelines of universal validity -- that is, the need to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus, the inevitability of revolutionary force, the transformation at a given stage of the class struggle into an armed struggle and a civil war, and so on.
Thesis No. 87 blurs the lines of the problem, reflects a centrist conception, and reveals a vaguely Luxemburgian underestimation of the need for concrete preparation for the revolutionary confrontation. This is expressed also in an underestimation of the problem of dual power - which is decisive in any revolution, no matter what its duration- as well as in a refusal to conceive of workers' councils primarily in connection with a dual-power situation.
As to the conception of the structures of a society emerging from a proletarian revolution, we agree on the primary role of workers' councils and on other criteria noted by the theses. But the comrades of il Manifesto neglect to discuss the unions, which must, however, play an important role, according to the conceptions expressed by Lenin in the debate at the beginning of the 1920s and later repeated by Trotsky. More importantly, they should clarify their position on the question of the right to form parties within the context of respecting the legality of the new society, and on the right of tendencies within the revolutionary party. The theses, in their present form, are not clear on this essential point.
Finally, while they rightly reject the PCI and old- and new-style reformism on so-called intermediate objectives, the theses do not comprehend the necessity of a transitional program taking its inspiration from the criteria of Lenin and the first congresses of the Communist International.
This omission represents in part a concession to ultraleft orientations that reject any idea of transitional objectives as "reformist." But it also fits in with the general conception of the ripeness of conditions for establishing communism and of the ways for taking power that I have already mentioned. It corresponds also to a certain confusing of the general socialist aspirations and consistent anticapitalist orientation of the vanguard strata with a decision by the masses to actually mobilize in a struggle to overthrow the system.
As I said in passing, the line of argument of the theses correctly highlights the role of workers' councils both in the struggle for power and in the organization of the new society. Likewise the theses reaffirm, in opposition to spontanéism, the need for a party. And they stress the role of the party even after the taking of power. With regard to the unions, the formulations are ambiguous, however. The editors give evaluations, which we share, on the state of the Italian unions, and the possibilities the contradictions of these unions offer for intervention by revolutionists. But they give the impression of thinking that the unions, as an instrument of the working class, are outmoded, or are tending to become outmoded.
In fact, after noting that "the distinction between the unions and parties was one between the social and political movements," thesis No. 83 explains that "in advanced capitalism the distinction between economic and political struggle is tending to disappear." As a result, you might say, we have a withering away of the unions. I do not need to show here how false such a perspective is (even though it starts from the correct perception that in a period of revolutionary tensions the ties between economic and political struggles become increasingly close).
The conception of the party in the theses is also faulty. Thesis No. 100 rejects democratic centralism ("as it was manifested in the Third International and as it is manifested to this day"). But this thesis does not specify what alternative it proposes. As if all the experiences of the international workers movement and all the revolutions of our century did not make it possible to settle this question, this passage ends simply with the half-eclectic, half-banal reflection that: "different situations require different institutions and the same structure may have different meanings in different contexts."
The confusion that exists in other parts of the document is especially obvious on the problem of the party, that is, a confusing of Leninism and Stalinism. (In order to slur over this problem, the theses use the expression "Third International" various times without specifying which Third International they refer to, the International of Lenin or of Stalin. In not a few articles that have appeared over the last years, however, some of the authors of the theses have demonstrated that they are not unaware of the distinction they deliberately blur here.)
This result is produced at the same time by presenting some of Lenin's conceptions in deformed, or even caricatured form; by giving an outline of the history of the USSR in Stalin's time that has very little in common with the historical reality, and performing a similar operation with respect to the history of the PCI in the same period.
The il Manifesto comrades take a very severe attitude toward the current tendency of the PCI to collaborate with the Christian Democrats. But they dispute the fact that the Popular Front policy was conceived in a reformist perspective. And they go as far as to justify or forget the actual governmental collaboration practiced by the PCI in 1944-47.4
All this is at the same time wrong and quite unoriginal. In particular, the tendency to equate Leninism and Stalinism has always been the favorite argument both of the bourgeois spokesmen who want to denigrate communism; of the currents that justify Stalinism; and of all those in the workers movement who endeavor to see degenerate conceptions and organizational forms, that in reality had very precise social roots, as deriving from some abstract logic.
It is still too early to attempt to sum up the initial results of the debate launched by il Manifesto. To judge from the first reactions, there are no far left groups or movements that are ready to accept a real dialogue and join with il Manifesto in moving toward theoretical, political, and organizational unification. All the responses I am aware of so far have been marked by sectarian self-defensiveness.
Even when these responses have been aimed at real contradictions and weak points, they have been expressed in a sterile form showing a desire to cut off the debate before it has even had a chance to develop. It must be recognized, however, that, over and above sectarianism, there is a political logic behind these reactions.
The il Manifesto comrades declare their apparently uncritical support of the Chinese cultural revolution. But they are necessarily considered as not very consistent people or as heretics by the Maoists who swear by Mao Tsetung Thought and will not accept the slightest bending away, even if only implicitly, from Maoist orthodoxy. Likewise there are a few notions and nuances with a spontanéist flavor in their document. But this is very far from meeting the requirements of the real spontanéists.
The most probable alternative, then, as it looks now, is that the il Manifesto group will not succeed in its project of unifying the revolutionary left groups or a part of them. Consequently, the polychromatic panorama, so confusing to foreign observers, to say nothing of impressionistic political tourists, is destined to persist for a long time and grow even more complicated.
The result will be that the new political formation- if it actually sees the light of day— will have great difficulty in building a base among the students and even in establishing sufficiently solid ties with the layers of the working-class vanguard where the far left movements already exercise an influence. 6
As I said already, the Italian revolutionary Marxists decided at a recent session of their central committee to accept the invitation to discuss tendered to them by the il Manifesto comrades. In their organ Bandiera Rossa they have stressed the importance of a theoretical and political confrontation accompanied by a practical test of ideas. They have also emphasized that if the revolutionary left proved capable of a general discussion on the key problems of revolutionary strategy and of breaking with a tradition of sterile sectarianism, that would unquestionably represent a step forward no matter what the political and organizational results of such a discussion.
At the same time, the Italian revolutionary Marxists decided to clearly express the differences they have with the theses on fundamental problems that prevent them from envisaging the possibility of a unification or of participating in the political operation underway. But these differences do not exclude seeking concrete points of agreement, constant debate, and unity in actions not limited solely to defensive campaigns. The experiences of the coming months will show to what extent this perspective can be concretized.
October 19.
Notes
1. It is curious that this line of argument on capitalism being restored in the USSR seems to have been discovered by the authors of the theses in the two weeks between the drawing up of the first draft and the publication of the final one. The first draft did not explicitly espouse the capitalist restoration thesis.
2. It is a significant detail that the first draft carried a criticism of China's Indonesian policy. This reservation has disappeared from the final draft. Were the il Manifesto comrades convinced, in the time between the publication of the two drafts, that Aidit's line, which was supported by the Chinese leaders, including Mao, was correct?
3. It should be pointed out, however, that the theses place exaggerated emphasis on favorable features peculiar to Italy, thus implicitly underestimating the implications of May 1968 in France and seeing only in Italy aspects that also exist in other countries.
4. Thesis No. 114 claims that the Togliatti-de Gasperi agreement involved a "mental reservation." Thus, political judgment is replaced by a psychological judgment that is, moreover, questionable.
5. We have noticed several times that so-called serious magazines have generously opened their columns to representatives of virtually nonexistent groups or to intellectuals offering advice that nobody takes seriously in Italy. We agree that everybody has the right to express himself, but a completely false perspective should not be given or pictures presented that do not have the least correspondence to reality. I am thinking in particular of the last issue of Les Temps Modernes. This issue included articles by figures who have no following in Italy and do not represent even the most modest organized force, figures even who are discredited because of their frequent shifting from one group to another, as, for example, Luca Meldolesi. After playing the role of a student leader tinted with spontaneism in 1968, in 1969 he went over to the miserable Maoist sect, the Unione, and in 1970 he joined the Lotta continua group. Here then is someone qualified to clear up theoretical questions and spread "new" ideas! Has Andre Gorz definitively forgotten his old acolytes, like Foa, Trentin, and company, whose praises he sang not so long ago? Has he new favorites on the peninsula? A little less subjectivism, Monsieur Gorz, if you please!
6. It must be acknowledged that the lukewarm reaction of the far-left groups is justified insofar as the theses devote no attention to analyzing their positions, mixing them all up together too nonchalantly.