Failures and Economic Contradictions
The year 1970 was the completion date of a major target of the Cuban revolution -the achievement of a 10,000,000-ton sugar harvest. For twelve months everything, in both the political and economic spheres, was subordinated to accomplishing this prime objective.
The goal was not set arbitrarily, or simply to score an important feat; it corresponded to very definite political and economic necessities. In the context of the new orientation worked out after 1963, the Cuban leaders estimated that in the immediate and near future only sugar production could create the exports necessary to finance the importation of the raw materials, foodstuffs, and industrial equipment needed before the construction of a socialist economy could really get off the ground.
Precisely because one is persuaded that the decision to set this goal was unavoidable, one cannot now minimize the importance of the failure to achieve it. This setback will result in a serious slowdown of economic growth while prolonging a dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union.
The situation is all the graver because the failure is not limited to the sector of sugar production alone. Let us recall the following facts particularly. Milk production in the period January-May 1970 dropped 25% below the 1969 level. Meat production has stagnated or declined, and there is no perspective for advances in the immediate future. Despite increases in absolute terms, the levels achieved in the production of rice are "far from satisfactory, both in quality and quantity." The plan for the fishing industry has been only 78% achieved. While surpassing the level of 1969, cement supplies are 23% lower than 1968.
The production of steel ingots has dropped 38%. A decline of 32% has been registered in fertilizer production. The plan for agricultural machinery has been realized only to a pathetically small extent. While showing a rise of 11%, electric power generated has fallen 17% below the increase in demand. Very serious lags have occurred in the manufacture of such essential consumer goods as shoes and textile products. I
What are the causes of such a balance sheet?
First of all, the bottleneck in sugar production did not develop where the Cuban leaders feared it would. According to their expectations, the maximum efforts would have to be made in cutting cane. The major difficulty in the past was most often underutilization of the sugar mill machinery because of an insufficient flow of raw material from the fields. In fact, the cane was cut more or less as expected (the amounts counted on did not prove to be overestimated). But at the milling point, there was a failure (output was greatly below what had been expected). 2
This failure must be attributed to both a hardly rational utilization of investments and inadequate maintenance of certain milling centers, as well as to the poor operation of these centers in general. According to Fidel Castro, the last factor was the most damaging.
The stagnation and decline in the other sectors mentioned above are attributable, primarily, to imbalances created by the concentration of all efforts on sugar production. Among these dislocations was the hardly rational employment of manpower, often indicated as the principal cause of the failure (for instance, the massive mobilization in sugar helped to aggravate the situation in transport).
But, more generally, the Cuban economy is suffering from a failure to apply the economic criteria that are indispensable to any system of planning. This, moreover, is related to a shortage of trained personnel which is both qualitative and quantitative.
In this context, bureaucratic disorganization wreaks havoc, like that denounced at the trade-union plenum held at the beginning of September in Havana. To cite only a few examples, 400 tons of raw material for plastic, unloaded in January, were still on the docks in September. Thousands of bags of jute suffered the same fate, with a loss that stevedore Raimundo Pérez estimated at $70,000. Even the priority given to achieving the 10,000,000 tons did not prevent 45,000 metric tons of material for the maintenance of the sugar industry from being held up.
In the last analysis, these cases are an expression of the more general phenomenon of underutilization, or irrational utilization of existing resources. This has resulted, among other things, in a failure in certain cases to exploit the potentialities of special sectors in time which could have helped bring in the foreign exchange needed to finance imports. 3
Another grave problem is labor output. The productivity of labor, in the context outlined, remains generally rather low, despite the enthusiasm which often marked the mobilization for the giant zafra. This tendency is particularly acute in the services (Castro mentioned the example of Cuban ports, which operate with manpower equal to half that of the British ports handling forty to fifty times the traffic). It has become evident at the same time that volunteer labor, which was strongly pushed during the zafra, has often
• produced quite modest results, involving absurd waste and sacrifices that in the final accounting are fruitless. 4
The problem of low labor productivity has become acute as a result of a further increase of the phenomenon of absenteeism. This is holding back the productive effort of the country, creating serious disorganization, and infusing elements of demoralization into the masses. The Cuban leaders are rightly worried over it and are encouraging discussions aiming at pinpointing its causes and envisaging methods for countering this dangerous tendency.
From the Havana trade-union plenum already mentioned, it appears that poor working conditions, problems of supply and of transportation, and bureaucratic methods of management help to provoke absenteeism. It also appears that the solution is now being sought both in the areas of improving working conditions, transportation, and political propaganda, and the adoption of repressive legislation.
This negative balance sheet and the need to indicate the causes at all levels must not make us lose sight-as the impressionists of all stripes seem to - of two considerations which while elementary are no less fundamental. The first is that the tensions and contradictions in Cuba at this stage are related in large measure to the achievements of the revolution. Fidel Castro was basically correct in saying that while "the revolution is passing through a period of crisis, this crisis is not one of retreat but of advancement." ("Perhaps," he added, "we have advanced too much.")
The problems that exist, for example, in food and housing arise not because consumption has been restricted, but for exactly opposite reasons. Likewise the difficulties in labor productivity as well as phenomena like absenteeism are explained, at least in part, by the radical change in the condition of the worker, who is no longer threatened by unemployment, enjoys rather generous social security, need not pay for a certain amount of recreation, and often has excess cash (because of the relative scarcity of consumer goods).
Even the rationing, which does seriously burden the daily lives of the Cubans, is in the last analysis greatly preferable to the much more barbaric rationing that existed under the capitalist system because of the feeble or nonexistent buying power of the overwhelming majority of the people.
The second consideration is that Cuba must build socialism starting from a backward base. The Cuban leaders probably only now appreciate all the negative implications of this. This situation results in the use of methods that are still only those of craft production, while both the professionals and the workers have not been freed from all the deformations characteristic of an underdeveloped society.
The international context substantially aggravates this situation. Cuba is still being subjected to an economic blockade by its powerful neighbor to the north. In order to comprehend the consequences of this, you need only to note the bottlenecks and paralysis suffered by the Cuban industrial sectors antedating the revolution because of the difficulty, or impossibility, of solving the crucial problem of spare parts.
Bureaucratic Deformations
In sketching a brief analysis of the situation in Cuba a few months ago, I raised the question of a tendency toward social differentiation, toward the crystallization of a privileged layer. This problem is in the last analysis the major one facing the revolution at the present stage.
While there is a void as regards the structures of political power in Cuba, it has been partially filled by the intervention of an apparatus composed of immediate or higher-level cadres. These have either been furnished directly by the army (whose weight has steadily increased in the last years)5 or were part of the state administration and the party. It is these cadres who exercise the real functions of leadership at all levels, using, more and more, administrative methods that are essentially paternalistic or authoritarian.
Behind the screen of unconditional support to the leadership of Fidel Castro and to the directives from the center, this layer is tending to consolidate itself in positions of power, which inevitably involve social privileges. In absolute terms and in comparison with what exists in the degenerated workers states in other parts of the world, these privileges are quite modest. But the essential thing is that members of this layer enjoy living conditions that differ perceptibly from the average conditions of the masses.
In this relative sense, privileges in the area of food, housing and means of transport (plus the manifold advantages linked to the position of leadership, such as trips abroad, parties, etc.) have a significance that goes beyond their intrinsic value. Therefore, they are resented by the masses as an injustice.
If, in addition to the limitations mentioned above, you consider the relative fluidity of the political structure and the still only relative crystallization of the apparatus, the orientations and attitudes of the leading nucleus around Castro and its persistent links with the masses, you must unquestionably conclude that no qualitative leap has occurred and that Cuba cannot be considered as a degenerated workers state in the same category as the other collectivist states.
Nevertheless, bureaucratic deformations have grown dangerously and the relationship of forces has evolved in favor of more or less consciously bureaucratic forces. This explains the note of alarm sounded by Fidel Castro, who, in several speeches, has just revived the themes of the 1962 polemic against Escalante, and the antibureaucratic offensive of 1967. In comparison with the Escalante period, the social situation now seems objectively more difficult.
I have already mentioned the causes of the economic failures. The Cuban leaders must be given credit for not seeking excuses or scapegoats. Not only have they recognized the magnitude of the defeat-without resorting to manipulating the statistics - but they did not hesitate to declare, through Fidel himself, that "the battle of the 10,000,000 tons was not lost by the people, it was we, we who lost it. The battle was lost by the administrative apparatus and by us, the leaders of the revolution."
The Cuban leaders have admitted, more specifically, that administrative methods dominated over more properly political methods of leadership and that the participation of been absolutely the masses in economic management had insufficient. "The mass organizations are lacking," Castro said, "and they are fundamental."
Here, then, is the nub of the question. We are not idealists; we are Marxists, materialists. We by no means ideal-
We know whatever the specific soluthe masses.
ize tions adopted, above all starting off from the level of a country condemned to backwardness by imperialist exploitation, that difficult problems will remain. It is hard to develop all the necessary trained personnel in a short period of time, and the cultural limitations of the masses constitute a major obstacle to their participating in a real way in administering the economy and the broader society.
But to break out of this vicious circle, there is no other way than to strive by every means right from the start to tap the creative potential of the masses. Only by experience can the masses acquire the necessary capacities and concepts, and produce the cadres essential for the overwhelming tasks of real socialist construction.
It is precisely for this reason - and not out of fetishistic attachment to any scriptures or experiences of the pastthat we have always held that a revolution in Cuba, as elsewhere, must find expression in the creation of political structures arising from below, which alone can assure maximum democracy for the workers and peasants.
The absence of such structures, let us repeat once again, has been the Achilles' heel of the Cuban revolution. Now the consequences of this lack should be evident to everyone. If these structures had been built; if instead of relying primarily on their instinct and their direct experiences the Cuban leaders had learned more from the fundamental lessons of the past half century of struggles by the workers movement in the countries where capitalism has been overthrown, it would have been less difficult to achieve coherent planning and avoid the ravages of bureaucratic disorder. It would have been easier to achieve a much more substantial increase in production, to assure a more rational allocation of resources.
What is more, the creation of such structures would have erected much more substantial barriers than the mere combative spirit of a leading nucleus to the tendencies towards bureaucratization which, in a context such as the one in Cuba, is inherent in the phase of transition from capitalism to socialism.
Among the causes of the economic failures and dangerous social developments, the absence of a revolutionarydemocratic organization of the state must, then, be assigned first place. The subjective responsibilities for this failure are all the more real because at certain stages - November 30, 1970
for example, at the time of the fight against the Escalante group - the problem could have been taken up in relatively favorable conditions.
The crucial importance of this problem is all the more evident if you consider that in the framework of solving it, valid answers can be given to some very controversial questions, such as that of material incentives. The Cuban leaders did not wait for Mao's cultural revolution to criticize incentives of this type with arguments that were unquestionably well founded. Recently Castro has returned in more general terms to this problem: "If we use capitalist instruments to solve our problems, how can we create a communist man, a man endowed with a higher mentality, culture, and consciousness? We cannot be socialists with capitalists' methods."
In principle Castro is correct. But it must never be forgotten - as the Cubans seem to do sometimes - that one of the essential features of a transitional society, which is contradictory par excellence, lies in the fact that bourgeois norms continue to exist within the framework of a society that is no longer capitalist. It is only now, after all the tragic experiences of the past decades, that this theoretical influence, which was already known to Marx and Lenin before October, can be grasped in all its richness and concrete significance. 6
If you ponder over the analysis of certain phenomena such as absenteeism, irresponsibility, and other such problems that have been advanced in Castro's last speeches and in the recent discussion, you could legitimately conclude that these manifestations are caused among other things by the inability or incapacity to satisfy the elementary needs of the masses. (This difficulty appears in such areas as working conditions in the plants, consumption, transportation, and similar spheres.)
Moreover, some of the measures envisaged to overcome a situation pregnant with dangerous tensions fall in the last analysis in the category of material incentives. In my opinion, this is absolutely correct. No one disputes the value of ideological education - of appeals to the spirit of sacrifice and to revolutionary enthusiasm, which at critical moments are irreplaceable. No one questions, either, that the cadres and the vanguard layers of the proletariat and poor peasantry must operate primarily on the basis of their consciousness of the historic tasks they are accomplishing.
But in a society that has just emerged from the barbarism of capitalism and that is a long way from the capacity to satisfy all wants on an equalitarian basis, incentives that are valid for the vanguard must not be confused with those capable of determining the attitudes of whole social layers.
It is easy to "denounce" the dangers implicit in the adoption of certain norms. But the following point must be understood. The adoption, for example, of material incentives assumes an entirely different significance and implications depending on whether this is done in a bureaucratized system, which promotes a depoliticalization of the masses and the development of a petty-bourgeois consumer mentality; or in a society organized on a revolutionary-democratic model, where the masses take an increasing part in economic and political administration.
From this standpoint, then, solving the problem of political structures is a precondition for a more correct solution of other problems. If the masses really hold power and can, first of all, determine the fundamental economic choices through the intermediary of democratic organs, then orientations based on priorities contrary to the interests of the masses and tendencies based on creating increasing privileges can be not only "denounced" or stigmatized but combated and counteracted in reality.
A Sharp Confrontation and the New Antibureaucratic Campaign
Cuba has unquestionably entered a difficult phase. In the economic sphere it would be absurd to expect substantial changes in the immediate future. The bottlenecks cannot be eliminated without a long-drawn-out reorganization. Problems such as those in textile production or housing are "terrible," to use Castro's expression. (Regarding housing, he spoke more specifically of a "hypercritical" situation.) 7 For two to four years nothing can be offered in these areas but "palliatives."
As for food products, the Cubans must resign themselves to a continuation of the present scarcity. In such a context, the danger of tensions between the regime and the masses is far from imaginary. In fact, discontent is much stronger than ever in the past. 8
This situation had to be reflected in the party, especially in its leadership. Very sharp discussions have been in progress for some months. Having no special sources of information and being obliged to take only the meager indications of the official press, one can nevertheless gather that two solutions, in principle, are being contemplated and that the debate revolves around these two approaches (or a combination of them ).
The first solution is of a technocratic and authoritarian type. According to this view, in order to rectify things, in order to reorganize the economy, you have to rely primarily on the technicians, the specialists, the leaders who are supposed to be the most competent, and at the same time impose a much stricter discipline on the workers, including by means of administrative measures.
The second solution, on the other hand, would rely on mobilizing the masses, on their participating in a much more real way than in the past in economic and political administration. While not excluding disciplinary measures and tightening work discipline, this approach would eliminate the plague of absenteeism primarily by raising the consciousness of the masses.
The stakes in this confrontation, which seems likely to prove extremely sharp, are in the last analysis crucial for the future of the Cuban revolution. Will Cuba be condemned to growing bureaucratization, or will it be possible to open a new chapter in the history of mass struggle against bureaucratism? The answer depends very largely on the outcome of the present confrontation.
7. The situation has deteriorated with respect to the period immediately following the seizure of power, because the population has increased much faster than the construction of new housing
8. Fidel Castro has spoken of this several times, correctly pointing out that there must be no confusion between the discontent of the counterrevolutionists and the discontent "within the revolution."
Thus far, positive developments must be chalked up on two fronts, first of all in the orientation of Fidel Castro and the group around him. The speeches made by the revolutionary leader in the recent months and his contribution to the discussion at important meetings indicate that he is not inclined to accept the technocratic solution and that he is orienting toward the opposite approach. He wants, in reality, to stand up once more as the spokesman of the masses, as the first to denounce all bureaucratic abuses and chicanery the masses are suffering from, as the first to demand on their behalf their right to assert their will and their needs.
This is why he launched a new antibureaucratic campaign, picking up the themes of the preceding campaigns (in 1962 and 1967 especially) and pillorying the new "exploiters," who enjoy privileged living standards in comparison with those of the masses. He has even indicated solutions pointing in the direction of forming collective leadership bodies in the plants or direct intervention by the workers to solve the problem of allotting available housing.
This is why Castro explained more broadly that it was necessary to develop "a new society based on truly democratic principles —truly democratic principles! —replacing the purely administrative methods of the early years of the revolution. We must substitute democratic procedures for administrative ones which threaten to become bureaucratic." (August 23.)
Secondly, there have been very favorable reactions from the masses. Not only do they support Castro in his campaign but they often get ahead of him, taking the initiative in direct actions against the bureaucrats. Demonstrations occurred during the carnival at Santiago, and in some villages comfortably housed officials have simply been driven out. 9
The discussion at the trade-union assembly in Havana, which I have mentioned several times, was an eloquent expression of the spirit existing at least in certain strata of the masses.
We cannot, however, neglect other important elements. I have already discussed certain phenomena like absenteeism, which in the last analysis reflect a depoliticalization and demoralization not confined to a few asocial individuals. If changes are not introduced in the near future in the political structures, and thus in the relationship between the state and the masses, negative reactions may grow instead of diminishing.
The main question to be answered is the extent of the changes envisaged by Castro. The enunciation of the
9. According to certain reports, some of the participants in the Santiago demonstration were arrested, but later released thanks to Castro's intervention. At the Havana assembly a woman worker related an episode which says a great deal about the relationship between the ranks, the small and middle bureaucrats, and Fidel. A bureaucrat ordered her to be quiet when she pointed out an absurd waste. She replied: "Some day I will get a chance to talk to Fidel! "
principle of electing committees to supervise the allocation of food and housing is obviously important, as well as the affirmation of the principle of recall ("at any hour of the day or night"). It is important also that a clear separation be established between the party and the state apparatus, and that real democratization of the trade unions 'be envisaged. Despite the changes introduced at the 1966 congress, the unions in general have remained ossified and passive.
But the Cubans seem to be still far from having a clear idea of new structures capable of mobilizing the masses and assuring their participation in running the economy. On the basis of what has been said from May to September, we must conclude that they envisage reemphasizing and expanding the mass organizations to which a fundamental role has been assigned.
Castro went so far as to set as a goal in organizing the workers movement, the slowness of which he continually denounces, that it attain the level of the Federation of Women or the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. But the effectiveness of these organizations in recent years is at least open to question and they play no real leadership role.
To remove any misunderstanding, I am not disputing the role of the mass organizations, especially the unions (provided, however, that they are freed from the present bureaucratic straitjacket, a heritage of control exercised by the old Stalinists of the PSP [Partido Socialista Popular - People's Socialist Party].
But what Cuba needs is an all-embracing revolutionary democratic structure based on committees at all levels. These committees must be real organs of power, elected directly by the masses, and subject to recall at any time. In other words, what is needed is reorganization of the state and the government on the basis of soviets.
At the same time, this democratization must extend to the instrument of the organized political vanguard, the party. Promising beginnings were made in this area after the Escalante affair. But since then the Cubans have proceeded very empirically and inconsistently, dragging their feet. (It is symptomatic that the party has yet to hold its first congress.)
If the Cuban leaders want to remain faithful to Leninism, as they claim, they must take into account that one of the pillars of Leninism is precisely the conception of the party - an organized, effective party disciplined in action but profoundly democratic in the formulation and verification of its line. This involves the broadest freedom of criticism, and the rejection of all privileges for the leaders, including rights to information. 10
The Leninist conception of the party requires, moreover, when there are opposing positions, the right to organize tendencies. The old objection, of Stalinist origin, that this right would threaten the effectiveness of the party has been proved false in advance by the experience of the Bolshevik party in Lenin's time. This party debated its problems openly and permitted tendencies in the most difficult years of the revolution and civil war.
Finally, it must be taken into account that there are
The leaders have available special bulletins rect conclusions. • and the foreign press. November 30, 1970
forces in Cuba itself and the world that have an interest in promoting a process of bureaucratization. The whole apparatus spoken of above, composed of a large number of middle and higher cadres who have up till now practically run the state, are not ready to surrender their position in the name of principles. To the contrary, they will endeavor to consolidate their power, to defend and enlarge the privileges they enjoy.
If structural changes are not introduced in a relatively short time and there is a more substantial depoliticalization of the masses, the bureaucratic-authoritarian tendency could even win the support of some strata of the working class - those apt to react against absenteeism, lack of enthusiasm and work discipline— by appealing for administrative measures. The partisans of authoritarian methods might be considered by some workers as intransigent revolutionists.
At the international level, moreover, support will also be forthcoming for the bureaucratic-authoritarian tendency. The influence of the Soviet and East European bureaucracies has increased in Cuba for well-known reasons, These bureaucracies will inevitably offer substantial backing-camouflaged or open-to the forces representing interests similar to their own and seeking solutions in conformity with these interests.
The Fourth International and the Cuban Revolution
The Fourth International has never subordinated its analysis of the workers states and their evolution to any tactical considerations. This is why today we are attempting a criticism of the tendencies operative in Cuba, and pointing out-along with positive aspects —a series of alarming elements. But at the same time we do not forget for a single moment that for Trotskyists, this question must always be posed from the standpoint of a revolutionary organization that understands how much its fate is linked to that of revolutions in every country in the world and how great its responsibility is to make a practical contribution, to the extent of its capacities, to promote certain outcomes.
For some time in intellectual circles and even in the ranks of the European far left, Cuba has no longer aroused any enthusiasm or even interest. It is simply no longer the fashion. In this context, the recent difficulties and failures will serve as a useful pretext for people to move farther away and to justify all sorts of more or less impressionistic or fanciful criticism. Those who bow before the myth of the cultural revolution and of Maoism will be among the happiest to devote themselves to this work. They already have some "serious" writings to quote from in their polemics. 11
Such attitudes are foreign to the Fourth International. Moreover, the Trotskyist movement considers just as erroand assessments on specific points; and still more, Karol's book. After discovering Cuba only in 1961 (page 13 of the French edition), he has now moved away from it, seduced by the sirens of the cultural revolution, as spiced up by the Mao-spontaneists. Karol's conclusions that Cuba has adopted the Stalinist conceptions of the 1930s is simply aberrant and borders on bad faith. What can you say, neous the judgments of those who extrapolate a bit too quickly on the tendencies I have indicated and who carry the implications of some attitudes too far, coming to the conclusion that Cuba has abandoned its policy of support for revolutionary movements in Latin America and accepted an egoistic and conservative outlook.
Cuba remains a rampart of the world revolution. The existence of revolutionary Cuba represents an unceasing source of weakness for American imperialism and an element objectively assisting the Latin-American revolution as a whole. All indications are that the Cuban leaders will be on the side of any revolutionary movement that develops, because they have not forgotten that their revolution moreover, about the temerity of a writer who criticizes the excessive role of Fidel or the vexations to which intellectuals have often been subjected in Cuba and at the same time eulogizes in the last analysis depends on that of the continental revolution. 12
It is our duty, therefore, not only to explain the results of our analysis without any diplomatic or tactical evasiveness. It is our duty not only to indicate by what means dangerous contradictions can be overcome, taking accoun of the crucial experiences of the international workers movement and the struggle of revolutionists against bureaucracy. It is our responsibility also and above all to help in a practical way to reinforce those in Cuba who are struggling against the bureaucratization, and to help in the most effective way possible-that is, by giving impetus to revolutionary struggles and preparing revolutionary victories in the other countries of Latin America.
October 8, 1970.
12. I examined the question of the Cuban leaders' present orientation toward Latin America in my article "Cuba, Military
Notes
1. The figures are taken from Fidel Castro's July 26 speech. The other references, which are not specified so as to avoid encumbering the texts, are from the following speeches: May 20, August 23, and September 3.
2. Output fell below the optimum output of the prerevolutionary period (10.85 as against 12.25, according to official calculations up to May).
3. See the cases cited by R. Dumont in his book Cuba, est-il socialiste?
4. Fidel Castro himself indicated, moreover, that the participation of the students in the zafra had negative consequences for their education and will bring a delay in the training of the technicians who are so necessary. This is an element which should give cause for reflection to all those who approach the question of the link between the schools and productive labor in a too utopian or offhand manner. With regard to his own participation in the zafra, Castro explained that it was impossible for him to go out every day, as he would have wished. "We had the illusion," he said, "of being able to cut cane four hours a day during the entire zafra, of living the utopia of a day divided between manual and intellectual labor."
5. The practice of increasing use of the army in all spheres, and in particular in production, was given theoretical justification by Castro in his November 4, 1969, speech.
6. "Perhaps," Castro said September 3, "our greatest idealism was to believe that a society which has just come out of its shell — in a world which has lived by the law of the knife and the law of the strongest, the law of everyone for himself, the law the lie, and the law of exploitation for thousands of years— that it would be possible to move in one leap to a society where everyone would behave in a moral way." Is this a veiled selfcriticism?
10. The lamentable poverty of the main Cuban press prevents the masses from having all the data necessary to come to cor-
11. I am referring especially to Dumont's book, which, however, contains interesting information