Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Bonn's Ascendancy in the Common Market

· Intercontinental Press vol. 8 no. 1, 14 July 1969 · pp 12-14 · 2,577 words

Where this article begins and ends was found by machine from the page layout and has not yet been checked against the scan. The printed pages are in the scanned issue at themilitant.com.

World economy France Germany Australia and New Zealand

[We have translated the following article from the December 20 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly La Gauche.]

To judge the results of the Hague conference, * precise answers must be given to certain questions concerning the European Economic Community (EEC], that is, the Common Market. These questions are more complex than they might seem at first glance.

Socially, the Common Market is a "superstructure," that is, a body of legal institutions of a semigovernmental type set up by the European bourgeoisie to defend their interests against their enemies (the working class and the noncapitalist states of East Eusopmi

KIESINGER: "Deutsche Mark Uber Alles" - especially Gen. Charles de Gaulle. 12

rope) and their competitors (above all, American imperialism).

Economically, the Common Market is an expression of the growing international interpenetration of capital in capitalist Europe. It is therefore a product of the international concentration of capital which existed to a certain degree previously, and at the same time it serves as a stimulus in bringing this concentration to a higher level.

Juridically, the Common Market is a peculiar form of international capitalist "integration" limited to six countries and supported by specific institutions (a common external tarifi, agricultural protectionism, etc.), which are the result of laborious negotiations among the various bourgeois classes belonging to the EEC.

Politically, the Common Market reflects a pattern of forces, which are very tangled but which in general have been frozen on the basis of the relationships existing among the classes and imperialist powers in 1958.

For years we reached the same conclusion in our analyses. De Gaulle was "working for the King of Prussia."* The Hague conference has confirmed this once again.

A year ago, at the time of the November 1968 monetary panic, various European journals appeared simultaneously with the headline "Deutsch Mark, Deutsch Mark Uber Alles." After the Hague conference, most commentators noted that West Germany has now established a discreet political leadership within the Common Market. Some romantics attribute this to the disappearance of "General de Gaulle's strong personality" from the European political scene. Obviously there is nothing to this.

It was not the disappearance of de

POMPIDOU: Can a winning smile make up for a losing hand?

Gaulle that opened the way for the drab Willy Brandt to become the "leader of free Europe"; it was the rise of German imperialism toward political hegemony in Europe that was one of the reasons for de Gaulle's disappearance.

If a section of the French bourgeoisie decided at the time of the last referendum to rid itself of de Gaulle, it was because the general had "obstructed" the functioning of the EEC in such a way as to directly threaten survival of the Common Market. Blackmail is, in fact, a weapon that can be used on both sides of a negotiating table. And it happens that the French bourgeoisie today needs the Common Market more than do the West Germans.

The French capitalists sell 45 percent of their exports in the Common Market area, the West Germans only 37 percent. In view of the different starting positions of the two capitalisms, the race was decided in advance.

The rise of West German imperialism in the past ten years has been primarily a result of its economic and financial power. It has been realized despite pronounced military weakness and despite a crisis of political leadership which has long hampered Bonn's diplomacy within the framework of the imperialist world.

Now, ten years after the Treaty of Rome (which provided for the establishment of the Common Market by stages) went into effect, the relationship of forces is no longer the same as in 1958. Despite its very French atom bomb and its "own" submarines, French imperialism has been far outdistanced by its West German ally and rival.

In 1958 West German and French total exports were valued respectively at $6.4 billion and $4 billion; in 1968 this proportion had become $15.5 and $7 billion. Some unkind observers even say that this was because of "the general's personal gadgets," because, if French capitalism had invested the money wasted in building the "force de frappe" [striking force] in ultramodern factories and machines, it would have been better able to get the jump on its competitors.

West German imperialism's economic and financial dominance has, moreover, had another unexpected result. During these years the Gaullist regime sought to be the champion of a "détente" and "technical collaboration" with the USSR. But in this affair as in many others the general's eyes were bigger than his stomach (or his treasury).

All that was necessary was for Brandt to succeed Kiesinger and for West German diplomacy to shift its line slightly, and Moscow agreed to open up its doors to a promising East- West trade, which has brought the Mannesmann trust the biggest order the USSR has ever given to a Western capitalist firm (including the famous FIAT order). As can be seen, in commerce as in war, God is definitely on the side of the biggest battalions.

The delicate compromise the Common Market was based on included the following quid pro quo: "We (the French) will let 'your' (German) industrial products enter duty freewhich will cost us a part of our domestic market-on condition that you pay substantial subsidies to 'our' big cereal producers and sugar-beet growers, including those who impose their tribute on these products (the sugar industry, the big agricultural exporters, the food industry, etc.)."

This compromise also reflected com- January 12, 1970

plex relations of forces in France, an unstable balance among various social forces, that made Gaullist bonapartism highly sensitive to the reactions of the "notables" who politically controlled the French countryside.

Now, ten years later, the relationship of forces within the Common Marhas deteriorated markedly from ket the standpoint of the French bourgeoisie. Now, in order to get what it had already gotten in 1958-i.e., a common agricultural policy - French imperialism had to make an important additional concession.

The French imperialists had to agree to open negotiations in the near future with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway for membership in the EEC. In place of the general's flat "nyet," there was Pompidou's sullen and reserved "oui."

Of course, the matter is by no means settled. The Six must negotiate with each other on how the negotiations with Great Britain are to be carried out. In the debate among the Six, French imperialism will stand virtually alone against the desire of its partners in the EEC to broaden the Common Market.

The reasons for this alignment are diverse (in the case of Germany, and partially Italy, the hope of winning new markets; the Benelux countries want special ties with British imperialism; the Italians and the Benelux countries hope to "neutralize" German or French dominance through the British role, etc.).

But this alignment is a fact. It does not leave Paris much choice since the obstruction has been eliminated. Either French imperialism, putting up a good front, will end by accepting expansion of the Common Market, once again at the expense of sectors of its internal market, or it will have to pull out of the game. The latter possibility is by no means excluded.

The paradox in the situation is that while French imperialism is sacrificing a part of its industrial interests to defend those of the richest layers of the French peasantry (and industrial and financial cireles specially linked to these layers), the mass of the French peasantry is more discontented than ever and has entered into almost open rebellion against the agricultural policy of the government and the Common Market!

This, moreover, is one of the reasons why there has been a shift in the economic imperatives of French imperialism, the interests of the export industries holding assured outlets in the EEC exerting today a greater

With most profitable contract ever awarded by Moscow, Willy Brandt now rates as "free" Europe's top salesman.

weight than those of the big peasantry in determining the attachment to the Common Market.

Therefore, it is within French industry-in the conflicts between the firms and sectors facing the risk of losing their outlets if Great Britain joins and those facing the risk of losing their outlets in the Common Market if it breaks up- that the future of the Common Market is being decided today. The rest is just rhetoric, even when the "loftiest sentiments" are invoked.

The future of the Common Market obviously does not depend solely on the conflicts of interest within the EEC. It depends also on developments in a broader context.

Two movements have been in progress for some months in the international capitalist economy which in part determined the attitude of the participants at the Hague conference-the beginning of the American recession and the drop in the price of gold. These two movements are linked together.

The start of an American recession is inspiring hopes in the other bourgeoisies that the inflation of the dollar will soon be halted. As a result the demand for gold is diminishing. The revaluation of the deutsche mark and the (temporary) reestablishment of the British balance of payments has done the rest.

But the link between these two movements, which has been producing a "détente" in the international monetary crisis, is entirely temporary. The dé- tente hinges exclusively on the minimal character that the recession has had so far in the USA.

If this recession does not deepen, there is no reason for storm signals to go up in Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, or the City of London. If the American recession were to worsen, instead of producing a détente, it would cause a profound crisis of the international monetary system and world trade.

A deepening recession in the United States would have the initial effect of reducing the market in America and several Third World countries for exports from Great Britain and the EEC. The reestablishment of the British balance of payments would be finished. The expansion of Common Market exports to the USA would be finished.

An intensified recession would have as its second effect a resurgence of inflation of the dollar. It is unthinkable that American imperialism, hard pressed everywhere, would assume the additional burden of millions more unemployed (and the social crisis this would involve) for long. But renewed inflation of the dollar could not help but revive the international monetary crisis.

All these perspectives- and some others besides - are chilling to the experts of the European bourgeoisie. To prevent the worst, to check new assaults of speculation, to prevent a general panic in the event of a deepening American recession or monetary crisis, these experts would like to open up a process leading to the creation of a European currency. Appeals along this line have steadily multiplied for years in the most "responsible" imperialist circles.

At the Hague a modest "first step" was made toward a Buropean currency. But it was a first step that could be withdrawn at the first pretext. Here also no definite commitments were made and nothing was definitively decided -everything depends on the struggle in the months and years to come among antagonistic social, political, and economic forces.

In this struggle, the European working class has not yet made its collective and international voice heard. The international of the trusts and the bankers is still ahead of the mass international of the workers. But while the capitalist international is by nature divided, riven, and rent by the imperatives of profit and competition, the workers international, in spite of a multitude of obstacles and difficulties, is relearning the basic lessons of international solidarity.

The workers movement is paving the way through the French May which has spread in a special form to Italy. It is paving the way by the

Australia Anetamlin

By lvan Dixon by Ivan vixon

O'Connor

The Australian trade-union movement has marked its first effective action against the Vietnam war with a strike. Waterside workers in the port of Sydney refused to unload the Vietnam supply ship Jeparit, later modifying their action to agreement to unload but refusal to reload the ship with supplies for the Australian troops in Vietnam.

(The Jeparit has been manned by a navy crew for two years, since seamen refused to man her for the Vietnam run.)

The government has since backed down, by commissioning the Jeparit as a navy ship, thereby making it possible to use servicemen to load and unload it.

A widespread strike was threatened on December 18 when the navy attempted to use civilian tugs manned by naval crews to move the Jeparit from berth to berth in Sydney harbor. In the face of union threats, the navy backed down and called in a tug belonging to the army.

On December 15 a meeting of 200 shop stewards from twenty-six of the largest and most militant unions took place in Melbourne. The shop stewards passed a resolution calling on factory occupations that are continuing in France. It is paving the way through the still timid and hesitating contacts developing among the automobile, chemical, electrical, construction and dock workers in various countries, who are threatened by dangers, manipulated by the same trusts, and subjected to the same diktats from the same capitalists.

Tomorrow this advance will lead to joint actions by workers in several countries. The day after tomorrow it will lead to a combined struggle for a socialist United States of Europe. It is this Europe and not the Europe of the Hague that will attract the hopes of the workers and the young revolutionists of our continent.

December 15, 1969.

conscripts in Vietnam to "lay down their arms in mutiny against the heinous barbarism perpetrated in our name upon innocent aged men, women and children in Vietnam." The meeting was presided over by the Victorian president of the Australian Labor party, Mr. G. Crawford, who is also state secretary of the Plumbers and Gasfitters Union.

This resolution was later supported by a petition circulated amongst dele gates to the annual conference of the New South Wales Teachers' Federation. Some 180 out of the 550 delegates supported the unionists' stand.

In reply, the government announced that it was investigating the possibility of charging the unionists under the Commonwealth Crimes Act for inciting troops to mutiny. The penalty for conviction under this statute is life imprisonment.

Victoria Labor party president Crawford was reported to have said that he was not worried by these threats and that the government would not be wise to proceed with them as its position on Vietnam was not supported by the majority of the Australian people.

In the same week Prime Minister Gorton announced that Australia

Trade Unions Join Antiwar Action Trade Unions Join Antiwar Action would withdraw 1,000 of its 8,000 troops from Vietnam by July 1970. The Canberra Times of December 17 reported that this news was greeted with shouts of jubilation by the Australian troops in Vietnam. The army quickly banned comments by soldiers on the withdrawal, but as it promises to be a long tedious process, inte grated with Nixon's plans, the attitude of the troops could be guessed with some accuracy.

Notes

* The December 1-2 meeting of representatives of the governments of the six Common Market countries. - IP

* "Working for the King of Prussia" is a French proverbial expression meaning to work for poor wages. It derives from the fact that the kings of Prussia were notoriously stingy patrons. - IP

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