The following article has been translated by Intercontinental Press from the November 30 issue of the Belgian Socialist weekly, La Gauche.]
On May 18, 1967, five young men wearing sunglasses and false mustaches, and armed with machine guns, seized a sum equivalent to $1,000,000 from a branch of the Bank of Portugal in the wealthy seaside resort of Figueira da Foz. The entire country was astounded. In fact, the attackers moved with a courage, speed, and precision which could not help but inspire admiration.
Iwo hours later, when the bank manager, who had been locked in the toilet with the rest of the personnel, managed to get out, his first thought was to telephone the police. The line had been cut. He ran to the nearest police station. After hearing the unfortunate manager's story, an irritated police official responded: "Are you pulling my leg?"
When the authorities were finally convinced of the facts, police were dispatched in all directions. However, the attackers must have already gotten far away. Thus it was decided to send out a general alarm so that roadblocks could be set up, and a dragnet organized throughout the country to intercept the daring fugitives.
They found out then that the town was isolated. Telephone connections with the rest of the country had been cut. There was no way out but to send someone in a car to Coimbra to give the alarm.
At the same time, but with less luck because all the service automobiles had been put out of commission, the employees at the nearby airport tried to do the same thing -- once they had come to. Their attackers had not hesitated to knock them unconscious to keep them from causing trouble.
Not much more is known. There was a yacht under Dutch registration which put out to sea under the eyes of the complacent harbor authorities in Figueira da Foz. The airplane was found a few days later in the south. It is rumored that the yacht picked up the sacks of money which were dropped into the ocean by the attackers in the airplane. Ihe latter in turn are supposed to have met the boat a few hours later in the far south of the country.
None of the police forces of the
Salazar government -- including the redoubtable and no less efficient political police (PIDE LPolicia Internacional para à Defesa do Estado -- International Police for the Defense of the Statel) -- had the slightest suspicion of what was being planned. Despite the immense networks of spies maintained by these forces to keep a close eye on everything that happens in the country, no one attracted any attention -- neither the young couple who struck up a friendship with the airfield personnel in order to study this means of escape for the commando team, nor the hardworking student who carried his professional curiosity to the point of taking an interest in the telephone cables in the region.
However, the result was not only that PIDE emerged discomfited from this affair and a seemingly omnipotent regime found itself made ridiculous, with its mystique of invulnerability gravely compromised. The Figueira da Foz holdup had as much of an impact on the opposition as on the government itself. If the government was shaken by it, the opposition organizations were no less so, since their methods of action and organizational routines were suddenly challenged.
What is the makeup of this opposition? What does it represent? What means does it have at its disposal? What is its
"oporientation? At the present time the position" to the Salazarist regime is divided into five basic currents oI parties: the "Democratic and Social" tendency,
"Progressive Catholics," the Socialist the movement, and the two Communist organizations.
The "Democratic and Social Group"
= the Party of Order
Of these groups the "Democratic and Social" tendency is undoubtedly the least vell-delined and most ambiguous in politlcal character. No newcomer to the Portuguese political scene, the tendency has appeared under several designations. However, the rubric "democratic and social" has become a constant. It is organized today in the Acção Démocratica e Social [Social and Democratic Action].
Made up of professors, senior professionals, landowners, and industrial-
. this _party enjoys a very peculiar position. It is not a legal party, or rather it is not recognized by the authorities. The tern "legal" is a misnomer in the political situation in a state of fascist character where the government knows no limits except those it chooses to impose on itself. On the other hand, this party is not "illegal" either, that is, it has not adopted a clandestine or secret form of organization.
Its members are known to the authorities and they do not try to conceal their identity. Although they are closely watched, the adherents of the "Democratic and Social" tendency are tolerated everywhere so long as they do not exceed certain very narrow limits. Beyond these limits the police will intervene, arbitrarily of course and with total disregard for individual liberties but with measured force.
As things stand now in Portugal, the "Democratic and Social" tendency constitutes a quasi-legal party. Its representatives have even been quietly received by the president of the republic, Admiral Thomaz. He has granted them audiences so chat they could communicate to him thei 'concern" about the constitutional irregularity of the situation in Portugal, or to call his attention to "actions by the Portuguese homeland smacking of imperialism,"
and other "errors which were reacted to only too late."*
Virtually the sole activity of the "Democratic and Social" tendency consists of petitions addressed to the chief of state, the texts of which are subsequently disseminated throughout the country in the form of mimeographed leaflets, and of the already mentioned discussions the president of the republic. These petitions are generally lists of grievances written in deferential terms in an esoteric and elegant language adorned with Latin quotations and French proverbs. Altogetheven cultivated Portuguese find them attricunt to digest and tee are totally incomprehensible to the man in the street.
What emerges from these appeals is a demand for freedom of the press, for the unimpeded right to form political parties, for freedom of association, free elections on the basis of universal suffrage, and suggestions for certain economic measures.
While the "Democratic and Social" tendency take their firmest position here, it different matter when they wave boo of "Bolshevism" in front of the regime, which according to them will be the fearful outcome of government policy in Portugal if the liberalization measures they propose are not adopted. since principled anti-Communism is the cornerstone and highest justification of the Salazarist dictatorship, the "Democratic and Social" tendency and the fascists find themselves in agreement on the essentials.
'Acacio de Gouveia, and oy Azevedo Gomes, ¡duardo de liqueiredo Iollowing conversations with Admiral Américo Thomaz on February 16, 1961.
The same holds true for colonial affairs. When the occasion arises, the "Democratic and Social" group does not Angolan terrorism, * or to benem a veiled fail to invoke apology for Portuguese colonialism, while taking the most intransigent position on the means to be employed in suppressing the revolt.
By its attacks on the Communist party, the "Democratic and Social" tendency broke the agreement held tacitly for many years among forces in the "opposition" that they should not attack each other. In doing this it rendered a clear service to the Salazar government. Such statements please the Salazar government, even if it to pay the insignificant price of limiting its attacks against those who
'"right to petition"
exercise the so constructively.
In following this course of action, Acção Démocratica has observed rules set more by the Salazar regime than by itself, thus renouncing overthrowing the estab-
Nonetheless it stands on lished order.
what could be called the "opposition's" minimum program. Since it is not fixed in this, its logic is that of ambiguity.
Up to September when Salazar became physically incapable of ruling the Estado Novo [New State -- the Salazar equivalent of the "New Order"], the tendency's attitude was to wait until they could either convince Salazar by persuasion, achieving approval and even posts in the government; or -- if the regime collapsed, bringing the left and the extreme right into conflict -- step forward as the astute brokers, as the party of national reconciliation, which would then take power to avert civil war. With the pseudo liberalization just initiated by
Social, the Postures Decread its place as a legal and constructive opposition.
The Catholic Opposition and the Socialists
-- the Men of Good Will
The progressive Catholic opposition, although far from enjoying an influcomparable to that of Acção Démocraence tica e Social, has made progress since 1958 when the bishop of 0 Porto blasted the Salazar regime with his criticisms. In contrast to Acção Démocratica e Social, which has a net oi committees scatered throughout the entire country, the Catholic opposition is a more fluid movement lacking unified structures.
Its stand, though often in the style of the "Democratic and Social"
group, has been much sharper and clearer. For example, in 1959 in a blistering open letter to Salazar, well-known Catholic personalities made grave accusations about PIDE's brutal methods. They called attention to the mysterious circumstances in the death of a worker whose body was found on a public road; he was in fact a political prisoner arrested shortly before by the political police.
Since then the movement has apparently made quiet progress in Catholic circles. The government's actions show how strongly it feels it has to fear the Catholic opposition. In 1967, the police closed down the cultural organization Pragma, a cooperative for the "dissemination of culture and for community action" in the spirit of the encyclical Pacem in Terris. Its directors were arrested, accused by the police of spreading "subversive ideas." Vicious accusations have been made by the regime against "Communists who disguise themselves as Catholics," or against "Catholics who as citizens betray the fatherland'* and "as believers betray God. "**
The government's animus is all the greater because some elements of the Portuguese Christian Democracy have chosen clandestine action to develop their propaganda and organization. Their paper Direito à Informação Right to Information] took a particularly aggressive stance at the time of the Pope's visit to Portugal. It did not even hold back from attacking the cult of the Virgin of Fatima -- a cult which the Portuguese government encourages for its political advantage -- they termed "Our Lady of the Cold War."
Nevertheless, the Portuguese progressive Catholics have no program.
For the time being they are only anti-Salazarists. Ihat is already a great deal, above all if you remember that the Estado Novo is not far from the definition given it by the Belgian socialist de Brouckère -- "a dictatorship of the sacristy."
The socialists are scattered in several small organizations formed basically of intellectuals, such as the Revolutionary Action Movement and Socialist Action, the strength of which is difficult to assess but which for the moment appear to be of a secondary importance. The conference which they recently held abroad, while it was rich in interesting single party in the
Portuguese one-party state.
reports on Portuguese and international politics, gave little indication of the road they intend to follow.
The Portuguese Communist Party
-- a Structured Party
No one in Portugal doubts that the Communist party is the major force opposing the fascist regime, against which it stood almost alone for a long time. It has a large membership. The police repression in 1965 showed what considerable numbers it had just in university circles and how firmly anchored it was there.
In fact, the politicalization of the university, which led in 1962 to a protest strike of the three university complexes in the country lasting three months, was due to the decisive role of the Communist party. After these events, which provoked one of the gravest crises the regime has yet had to face, the stulent struggle has not been able to achieve similar scope. However, the students remain in the forefront of the resistance against the regime, and the Communist party is unquestionably largely responsible for this. Furthermore, the big popular demonstrations in the spring of 1962 and 1963 were essentially the work of the Communist party, whose influence among the urban and rural workers is also considerable.
At the present time, the Communist party is confronted with such grave problems as stepped-up repression by PIDE, which is depriving it of a number of cadres and members; the so-called pro- Chinese split; and a certain internal dissatisfaction over its "methods of struggle."
Essentially, the party's strategy as indicated in the program approved by its Fifth Congress is summed up in eight basic points: (1) destruction of the fascist state and the establishment of a democratic regime; (2) elimination of the power of the monopolies and promotion of general economic development; (3) agrarian reform, the land to be given to those who work it; (4) improvement of the standard of living of the working classes and the people in general; (5) democratization of education and culture; (6) liberation of fortugal from imperialism; (7) recognition and guaranteeing of the right of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to immediate independence; (8) establishment of a policy of peace and friendship with all nations.
This is the Communist party's minimum program, established in accordance with its analysis of the Portuguese situation. "The fascist regime," states the program of the Portuguese CP, "is a terrorist dictatorship of the monopolies, which is associated with foreign imperialism and the big landowners. The latter are closely linked with and subordinated to the monopolies. Ihe fascist government's policy is at bottom directed against the interests of all other classes and social strata -- the proletariat (the industrial workers and agricultural wage earners), which is the class hardest hit; the peasants (small and middle farmers); the white-collar workers; the urban petty bourgeoisie; certain sectors of the middle bourgeoisie; and the intellectuals. All these classes and social strata have a vital interest in overthrowing the fascist diotatorship. The national struggle against the fascist dictatorship is an antimonopoly and anti-imperialist struggle."
These eight points then represent a concretization and summarization in the present context of "the great task fallis apt to arouse some skepticism about a simultaneous political and social "escalation" centered in the first case on broadening the unity of the "allied forces" and in the second starting off from modest demands for better wages and working conditions.
There are even those in the ranks of the Communist party and in the periphery around its organizations who advocate adopting "direct action" measures aimed not only at starting to break down the regime morally and organizationally but also intended to give encouragement to the masses, whose lack of revolutionary perspectives can be gauged by the extent of legal and clandestine emigration.
If a good many objections arise over the question of insurrection, the concept of "national and democratic revolution" is no less open to certain criticisms. At the very least this concept lacks clarity. The Portuguese CP proposes that power should first be taken by a "provisional government including representatives of the patriotic and democratic forces." A later meeting of a constituent assembly would determine the organization of the future regime. But the provisional government alone, the program of the Portuguese CP stresses, "would not secure all the national and demothe objectives of cratic revolution."
We know what road this revolution is supposed to open up -- an advanced particular "the democracy involving in elimination of the most reactionary bourgeoisie,"
"nationalization of the basic of the national economy," "turnsectors ing over a large part of the land to those who work it." We do not know, however, how this is to be achieved.
Moreover, the CP's classical system of alliances, extending over a broad spectrum from the left to the non-Salazarist forces on the right, must permit going through the various stages of this process. While it is dubious that the bourgeois forces of the right will support the the masses, it idea of an insurrection by
"less reactionis inconceivable that the ary" bourgeoisie will accept the ouster of the "more reactionary bourgeoisie" with which it has common interests, or that it will look with favor on the nationalization of the basic sectors of the economy or the agrarian policy proposed by the CP. In these conditions, the Portuguese Communist party seems to be the prisoner of tactics and strategy that are mutually exclusive.
The Pro-Chinese Communists
- the Shadow of a Party
The so-called "pro-Chinese" current among the Portuguese Communists emerged from a split in the Communist
Lead the national on side rate evoluto
What form will this national and democratic revolution take? First of all, "the (regime's) determination to resist to the end by means of a terrorist policy makes necessary a solution involving the use of force with a view toward overthrowing it."*
How will this forceful solution be implemented? Since popular insurrection
"the culminating point of a vast and determined mass movement involving a succession of strikes and demonstrations," the general secretary of the Portuguese CP writes that what is needed is "to raise the struggle to this higher level, then to increase the number of revolutionary organizations, steeping their cadres in the revolutionary process. And at the opportune moment the masses must be helped to obtain the necessary arms in order to move on boldly to the violent forms of popular action. At that moment, on the basis of an organization firmly anchored in the popular masses and deeply rooted in the armed forces, we can final- 1y decide when to launch the final assault on the fascist fortress, when the insurrection is to break out."
Nonetheless, some criticize the Portuguese CP for not giving sufficient consideration to the fact that fascism can easily crush in embryo a process which requires at the start a capacity for mobilization that the masses do not have, watched over as they are by the police. In any event, the virtual absence of extensive nonviolent actions by the masses in these last two or three years party which could already be considered to have been carried out in practice in 1964. While violently attacking the Communist party, it has constantly sought to attract the membership of the CP and the organizations under its control.
These dissidents argued for turning to new methods of struggle. However, the organization which they launched, rente da acção Popular (FAP) [the Peoole's Action Front got off to a vers inauspicious start. A bomb exploded in the home of one of its members when he was putting it together. Ihis led to his arrest and that of a number of his comrades.
An attempted bank robbery failed because of unsureness on the part of the squad. They were arrested. Finally satasquad. Iney were arrested. Finally, the noisily announced liquidation of a zar secret police spy brought on the arrest of the FAP's principal leaders and the virtual disintegration of its organization inside the country. After that, the FAP was able to survive solely in the emigration and for merely a short time.
After a rather long period rich in accusations and counteraccusations and all sorts of differences, the Portuguese pro-Chinese Communists decided to reorganize, setting up a movement of "Marxist- Leninist Committees" (MIC). Ihis movement advocates armed insurrection as a means for taking power without having to go through the intermediate stage of "national democracy" proposed by the Communist party, which involves several political groupings sharing power.
For the moment, the Marxist- Leninist Committees are doing, with more or less success, what they have always held to be an excuse advanced by the "revisionist" Communist party for not engaging in immediate armed struggle -- "winforming ning and organizing Communists, Communist committees everywhere." This is
"people's war" Perspective of launchbeing done with the of launching a to overthrow fascism and the bourgeoisie simultaneously.
The road to follow is that of the "mass line." This matches the "mass action" supported by the Communist party
"people's war" matches the latjust as ter's "national uprising." In order to carry out the tasks which flow from this line, the MIC maintains that "no form of struggle should be neglected." Instead, all Iorms must be combined in accordance with the criterion of "revolutionary effectiveness and education" in order
• to orient the working classes and the "inter- Todard "che 111 egal and hi their 1071s 87 mediate classes,
" who are their allies, struggle and politico-military'
political struggle."
Despite the vituperative tone taken toward the "revisionist" Communists, the proposals of the MIC seem most often to echo the program of the Portuguese Communist party. In fact, fundamentally only two real points of disagreement can be found. The CP makes the insurrection conditional on a "ripening of the revolutionary crisis," while the MLC seems to take the view that these conditions have already been attained and are in a sense permanent. With regard to the seizure of power, the Portuguese CP follows a perspective of creating a provisional coalition government while the MLC, in the last analysis, aspires to take power alone.
In practice, the CP always turns toward mass actions even though they are usually minor and of little significance, but on the other hand it shows slight inclination to undertake more radical forms of struggle. However, the MIC is no good at either intere tell rather to par propagandistic activity, primarily in emigre intellectual circles. The MLC press reflects progressive remoteness from the Portuguese reality. It is apt to neglect the struggle of the working classes so as to devote itself primarily to certain international questions or to abstract political reflections.
Perspectives
The lightning attack on the Bank of Portugal could not help but highlight the weaknesses of a fragmented and hesitant opposition. The opposition had not yet recovered from its shock over the affair when on September 17, 1967, another commando group slipped into the headquarters of the third military region and managed to seize a considerable stock of arms •
In the meantime, the authors of these two strikes made themselves known by a leaflet distributed throughout the country. In this statement the liga de União e
Acção Revolucionaria (LUAR)
LLeague for Revolutionary Unity and Action]
declared that it was "not another political party wasting its energies in sterile wrangling or mired in sectarianism," but
"an organization for action"
open to "all those who want to destroy the infamous Salazar regime arms in hand." The LUAR rejected all political education as useless and condemned all polemics among the antifascist organizations. It sketched its program in a few words -- establishment of a democratic order; elimination of the "parasitism of the magnates"; ending the
"economic and social causes at the root of class antagonism";
"organizing a more just society from the human point of view."
If such a contradictory manifesto in the last analysis gives no hint that would permit a better assessment politically of the LUAR, one thing is nonetheless certain, above all if the LUAR continues to harass the Salazarist regime -- the Portuguese opposition cannot continue to exist as it has up until now.
In the more or less near future, the left opposition will find itself forced to take a new 1o0k at its positions and methods of action. It will have to study means for regrouping its forces. Unless it does so, it will risk losing its influence over vast sectors of the population as well as the confidence of its own members.
On the other hand, since the LUAR does not constitute a political party and does not have the support of any party, it also runs the risk of extinction. Ultimately, its survival will depend on its ability to renew itself. But this requires a contact with the masses which is in contradiction to its highly secret character. Barring its forming a new party, whose orientation cannot be predicted, the LUAR could play a useful role if it integrated itself in a larger whole composed of all the forces really interested
[The following statement was made by Bertrand Russell concerning the arrest in Lahore November 13 of former Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the wake of student demonstrations throughout Pakistan.]
The arrest and imprisonment in Pakistan of former foreign minister Mr. Z.A. Bhutto is outrageous and in every sense unjustifiable. There is no reason why he should not be instantly released. It is impossible to explain this imprisonment with reference to any other fact than that he is leader of a serious opposition
President Mohammad Ayub Khan announced December 1 that he was making several concessions to stem student unrest in Pakistan. The most important of these gestures was elimination of a section in a repressive ordinance providing for forfeiture of degrees by students who engage in "subversive" activities.
Ayub expressed the hope that his magnanimity would have "a good effect" on the campus.
He was answered December 4 by striking students in Rawalpindi, the form-
RUSSELL PROTESTS IMPRISONMENT OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER IN PAKISTAN
PAKISTANI STUDENTS WIN CONCESSIONS
RUSSELL PROTESTS IMPRISONMENT OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER IN PAKISTAN
PAKISTANI STUDENTS WIN CONCESSIONS
in overthrowing the Salazar dictatorship. It could then take the place that really belongs to it and become the armed organization of the Portuguese antifascist forces.
For the time being, LUAR is primarily a powerful corrective to the faults and blunders of all those who, although they have shown themselves capable of courageous struggle, are not exempt from a certain indecisiveness which often sinks into routinism.
The great problem of the Portuguese opposition is that once expressed by Lenin in "Dare We Win?" In short, is the Portuguese resistance capable of winning? Will it dare to win?
Having proved incapable of taking advantage of a situation as clearcut as that under Salazar, the Portuguese antifascists will certainly not find their task made any easier by the vague promises of liberalization coming from Marcelo Caetano, the new Portuguese strong man.
to the government of Pakistan, a government which is prepared to use any means to prevent his electoral success. His arrest raises questions both of personal liberty and of overall political freedom in Pakistan.
The allegation that he can be held in any way responsible for student unrest is without foundation since it is manilestly obvious that unrest flows from students' reaction to abuses of government
Mr But way can quen us corters of political liberty and civil rights to protest strongly to the Pakistani High Commission and embassies throughout the world.
er capital of Pakistan. They issued a press release publicly vowing to continue their struggle for educational reforms until complete victory is won, no matter what the consequences.
Agence France-Presse reported the same day that support for the student rebels had been expressed by the chairman of the Pakistani Association of University Professors. Speaking in Lahore, he said that student unrest would persist until the educational institutions were made autonomous and freed from "official pressures."
Notes
* Cf. the communiqué issued to the press
* Cf. the petition addressed to the president of the republic on June 12, 1967.
* Cf. the speech given on July 29, 1965, by Castro Fernandes, the president of the National Union, the
** CI. Diario da Manha, Lisbon, August 12, 1965.
* Cf. "Report to the Central Committee," by the general secretary of the party, Alvaro Cunhal, April 1964, p. 126.