The first four months of 1980 marked a major evolution of the situation in Nicaragua. The departure of Robelo from the Government of National Reconstruction, which followed Violeta Chamorro's resignation, along with the changes that flow from that in the political relationship of forces and in the governmental leadership, open a new stage.
The purpose of our article is to examine and analyze the factors behind the April 22, 1980 crisis since those factors will inevitably cause new confrontations and new crises, even in the relative short run.
Economic Perspectives and Tensions
We will not deal with the general thrust of the economic plan, since we have already dealt with that elsewhere.! Suffice it to say that this plan-which for good reason is called a "reactivization plan"- establishes some generally limited objectives. The production goals it sets forth are considerably lower than the average levels of production in the "normal" period before the insurrection.
The plan does not contemplate any spectacular progress in 1981 either. New capital accumulation through enlarging and rationalizing the productive apparatus is not projected to begin until 1982 (see Programa de reactivación económica, p. 113).
It is hard to tell the extent to which the objectives of the plan have been achieved during the first three or four months. In the May 26 issue of IP/1, Charles-André Udry quoted statements by Federico Cerda, the vice-minister of planning, concerning the serious difficulties encountered in getting the industrial facilities operating again, as well as Henry Ruiz's comments on the delays in agricultural production.
At an April 21 conference Ruiz reported the generally favorable results on i achieved, while at the same time noting that the goals might not be reached in regard to construction. On that occasion, a representative of the planning body stated that employment had risen by 25,000 in the space of four months, which would make it possible to achieve or even surpass the goals if that pace is maintained to the end of the year.
Difficulties could develop in the service, transport, and construction sectors. In any case, the sole specific fact was that 7,000 additional jobs were created in industry under state control. A small-scale investigation of a limited number of nationalized enterprises revealed serious delays. But all these estimates should be taken with a grain of salt.
The increase in tax payments and bank deposits are a positive factor that give the central government greater room for maneuvering. On the other hand, the thirteenth-month operation has so far been a failure.? According to the reports covering the period prior to April 20 (the deadline had been projected for Decmeber 31, 1979), the fund for jobs under state control only received 66 million córdobas instead of the 180 million initially projected. The deductions from wages were made, but the employers did not send in the amounts that were collected.
The text of the 1980 program points to the following "critical points" in its conclusion:
1. Maintenance of the people's consumption at the planned level through the planning of food supplies, wage controls, and vigilance against speculation, without which defense of the "people's wage" would prove impossible;
2. Control over imports, without which it would be impossible to limit foreign indebtedness and nonessential consumption;
3. Increased tax revenues, without which there cannot be monetary stability;
4. Rationalization of economic relations between the public sector and private sector;
5. Timely correction of disequilibrium through an information network whose efficiency is dependent on reorganization of the statistics system, tied in turn to "people's participation."
The state undoubtedly has at its disposal tools that can facilitate overcoming or at least mitigating these critical points. These tools include control of the banks, of basic exports through the monopoly of foreign trade, and the ability to influence the prices of consumer goods.?
But, according to statements by those responsible for planning, the activity of these instruments is limited due to the lack of a statistical system of even limited effectiveness and due to insufficient means of financial and economic control. In this area as well, the new regime is paying a very heavy price for the backward conditions inherited from the past.
In regard to the second "critical point," we should add that an additional difficulty might arise from the fact that basic cereal imports have tended to be higher than projected (there has been official talk of $45 million; some estimate that these imports will take up about 20 percent of the total loans from abroad).
Moreover, it is possible that difficulties in actually carrying out the investments specifically projected in the agreements could hamper the utilization of lines of credit obtained internationally. According to sources in the Ministry of Planning, in recent months there have been delays at that level in the infrastructural sectors.
Internationally the situation appears considerably more favorable than in the first period after July 19. We stressed this point in the previously cited Rouge article.*
We do not mean to minimize the political as well as economic significance of the suspension of the $75-million loan by the United States. This would result in a reduction of about $30 million for investments in the infrastructure, since some 40 percent of the loan was targeted for that area. As far as the other 60 percent that was destined for the private sector is concerned, the government seems to have committed itself to finding other sources for the loans. At any rate, the suspension of the U.S. loan has largely been made up for by the unquestionable success of other international operations.
These successes were seen particularly in March, when one important delegation was sent to Eastern Europe while another delegation made the rounds of capitalist Europe, and later, through expanded agreements with Latin American countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, and even Brazil.
The agreements that were reached should make it possible to confront the urgent needs regarding investment and consumption, to finance specific campaigns such as the literacy crusade, to assure more diversified markets for Nicaraguan products, and to finance long-term industrial projects."
5. Here are the most important loans or donations (in chronological order): $10 million from Mexico for a sanitary program, urban transport, fertilizers, ete.; $75,000 through the FAO for the dairy industry; $30 million from Italy for preinvestment studies of cotton processing, for foodstuffs, and medicines, $11 million from the Netherlands for balance-of-payments equilibrium, food and medical aid, and for the literacy campaign; $10 million from AID; $14 million from West Germany for balance-of-payments equilibrium and various projects; $8 million from Sweden for the construction of a hospital and for forestry projects; an unspecified sum from Augtria for an alcohol plant and for a wood-
According to the minister of FIR, Al. fredo Cesar, there are in all about $400 million in long-term loans at favorable rates (including loans that were negotiated before July 19 and then "redirected").
In conclusion, if we take another look at some of the indicated critical points of the 1980 program, it is possible to note the following tensions on the economic plane:
• Between the objectives that were established by the plan and the choices that will be made by the capitalist economic forces that predominate in industry as well as in agriculture (in particular, the decision of the cotton producers regarding the question of planting will weigh very heavily);
• Between the objectives set and the extent of "social" toleration of the effort demanded of the working class, the peasants, and the middle layers;
• Between the plans and the ability to effectively exploit the unutilized or underutilized productive potential; as well as between the available financial resources and the practical utilization of those re sources (including the foreign loans);
• Between provisional calculations and actual world market prices in the months to come.
Overcoming or ameliorating these tensions will, in the final analysis, depend less on the economic dynamic in itself than on a number of political factors. The Workers and Peasants Mobilize
In the first quarter of this year, the working class and peasants have mobilized in major actions and struggles. The result has called into question the equilibrium previously established. They wanted to use the new relationship of forces created by the July 19 victory and the installation of the Sandinista regime to begin to change the miserable conditions they had been condemned to under the Somoza dictatorship and under the hold of imperialism.
We should not forget that, first of all, the qualitatively and quantitatively limited agrarian reform could not satisfy the land hunger of the majority of peasants. Nor could it in any way improve, over the short run, the living conditions of even the peasants and agricultural workers involved in the reform.
As a result, there has been a tendency for sectors of the peasants to mobilize to take the land from the former landlords without paying too much attention to the distinction between Somozaist landlords and anti-Somoza landlords.
New land occupations in fact took place processing plant to make cellulose; $11 million from the European Economic Community. Venezuela will supply Nicaragua with oil for $23.50 per barrel instead of $26, and the amount to be paid will remain at Nicaragua's disposal as a loan. We do not have specific figures for the aid from Eastern Europe, except for Czechoslovakia, which provided a $20-million line of credit.
in February and March and, at the same time, peasants refused to return previously occupied lands, even when the legal system determined that those lands should not have been expropriated
On February 24, for example, the San Luis estate (168 manzanas) was occupied.® On February 18, peasants reoccupied the El Cañón hacienda, which had been confiscated by INRA on October 23 but later returned to its owner. In early March peasant delegations from the communities of Posoltega demanded that INRA distribute the lands they had been occupying for some time.
Other occupations took place a little later in the San Ramon area, despite intervention by the army. It is difficult to determine the real scope of such movements. At any rate, even if they have not become a general phenomenon, they provide a clear indication of the temper of the peasants.
The agricultural proletariat-which is closely tied to the working class, especially in the sugar mills-was in turn driven to mobilizations by the low wage levels and wage inequalities (major differences sometimes exist within the same sector and by subhuman living conditions.
The problems of wages and of certain glaring inequalities were also behind struggles of important sectors of the industrial working class. Wages remained very low and were, moreover, reduced by inflation in the absence of any mechanism for automatic readjustments in wages.
According to estimates in a document published by CAUS, which was presented to the ministry of labor and was not refuted, since 1972 the cost of living has risen 300 percent while wages have only risen 50 percent. The minimum wage in the Managua region was 29.50 córdobas (in February 1980) and 75 percent of the workers received the minimum wage, which was not always respected.
According to someone in the Ministry of Planning, the minimum wage vacillated between 20 córdobas for a skilled worker and 31 córdobas for a miner. On the national level, 30 percent of the workers got the minimum wage or even less. A survey done in Managua indicated that 29 percent of the workers in the city got less than the minimum. We should add that although the inflation rate has been substantially reduced, it is still expected to run 20 to 22 percent this year.?
Another reason for discontent and conflicts is that many employers are still using authoritarian methods in their plants, or laying off workers under various pretexts.
Thirdly, the workers mobilized to occupy factories when they felt that the employers were in the process of liquidating their companies (practicing what has been called "decapitalization") or were not producing as much as their existing potential. Quite often the occupations continued even after the competent bodies had ruled that "decapitalization" was not taking place.
Finally, there were a series of conflicts over "representation rights" for one or another union, or over an organization's right to participate in negotiations as a representative of the workers involved or as an adviser.
To relate the most significant examples, an initial major conflict erupted between construction and public workers and the Managua municipal junta. The great bulk of these workers were organized by the SCAAS, under the hegemony of the CGT(i), while the CST had organized a competing union, which was quickly recog nized by the labor ministry (the secretary of the SCAAS, who is a member of the PSN and had rejected the ministry's decision, was held in custody for several days last October).
On January 9, several thousand workers gathered at the Ministry of Labor to demand that the SCAAS be recognized. Tomas Borge and Dora Teller met with the demonstrators and proposed negotiations and promised an assembly would be held at the end of the month.
On January 14, about 4,000 workers from this sector, especially Velasquez Park workers, again mobilized to demand wages equal to those of other workers in the sector. Their demand for equal pay was rejected on the basis of the argument that lower wages would make it possible to employ a certain number of unemployed people.
On January 17, there was a new demonstration of about 1,500 workers, during which SCAAS leader Solorzano and FO leader Isidro Tellez spoke. The most frequently heard slogan was "Workers and Peasants to Power! Down With the Bourgeoisie!"
After several days of strike, the municipal junta agreed to increase wages on the basis of the contract and to open a canteen and a store selling basic goods. At the same time, the CST union in the sector renounced the judicial status it had been given, leaving the way open for recognition of the reunified SCAAS under Solorzano's leadership.
At about the same time a strike broke out among 400 agricultural workers at the Amalia Sugar Mill over "wage readjustis 15-17 per dollar). It should be noted that tenants have benefited from rent reductions of up to 50 percent.
ments." Those workers received 8 córdobas per ton, while others were getting 10.8 The CTN had preponderant influence there. Wheelock intervened, acknowledging that the demands were reasonable, but condemning the strike. An agreement was worked out.
At another mill-Monterrosa-where there had been a daylong strike in December for wage equality, a conflict developed over the question of whether FO should participate in the negotiations. One hundred workers wanted to go to Managua but they were stopped. Finally an agree. ment was reached: there would be an assembly to settle matters. Some workers wanted to continue the strike until the FO militants who had been arrested were freed.
Struggle around wage questions, with quite heated assemblies, also took place at the privately owned San Antonio Sugar Mill, which is the largest in the country. According to Daniel Ortega, before the revolution wages at San Antonio were the highest in Central America (the situation had changed after July 19), and the FO as well as the CUS had some influence.
Despite Ortega's intervention, a threeday strike took place over application of the contract and demands for improvements in the weighing system. There were some incidents during the strike. These were attributed to people from FO who denounced the arrest of some of their comrades and questioned the validity of an assembly at which a new leadership committee was elected, given the arrests that had taken place."
Finally, there was a strike in early March at the Zeledon mill, where the CTN
influence. The workers de had some manded raises of up to 100 percent (50 percent for the cane cutters), improvements in work conditions, and the replace. ment of the administrator. The CTN, which was excluded from the negotiations, mobilized the workers at the Amalia mill, who challenged the CST secretary. An agreement was worked out on the basis of wage readjustments, raises at a later date, and the formation of an administrative council including a representative of the INRA and representatives of the various sections of the mill.
In early February it was the turn of the health workers. Their main demands were for leveling out wage differences, for a drastic change in the attitude of the leaders, and improvements in social allocations. A few days later the struggle moved to a series of Managua factories. On February 7, according to the organizers, 4,500- 5,000 workers marched in front of the
8. Accordi the to statements made during an
8. According to statements made during an cane per day.
9. When tensions were at their height, Borge had threatened to send in 300 soldiers (Barricada, February 1).
Ministry of Labor in support of the demands put forward by the CAUS in the name of more than a dozen factories. These demands included calling for 100- percent raises.
Toward the end of the month, a strike took place at Fabritex, a mixed-capital textile factory. Fabritex employed almost 1,000 workers. Already in August there had been a mobilization demanding the immediate discharge of an administrator who had been a Somoza collaborator. Following the mobilization a government "intervener" was sent in. The strikers were demanding wage hikes and a revaluing of jobs with a wage readjustment.
An intervention by Carlos Núñez and by delegations from the CNI, including members of the PCN, seemed to open the way to an agreement: the strike was temporarily suspended. But the Minister of Labor, the liberal Godoy, rejected any agreement and the strike began again. Some twenty other factories organized solidarity strikes. Work did not begin again until March 3, following partial accords.
raises (without any raises for the highestpaid workers, who in some cases even saw their wages reduced), a commitment to improve working conditions, and the granting of loans to the workers.
An especially interesting case is that of Caracol, a food processor employing 130 workers, owned by the Campos family. Most of the Campos family had gone abroad after July 19. The bosses apparently wanted to provoke bankruptcy, after they had received a loan from the government. On January 14 the workers began an unlimited strike. Their demands were dismissal of "so-called comrades who are negative for the process," compliance with the contract, rehiring 28 workers who had been laid off, and revision of commissions for salesmen and drivers.
Later they made a self-criticism of their having gone on strike. On February 19, by a vote of 121 to 10, they decided to occupy the factory to force its takeover, which occurred several days later. Production continued without interruption, and in fact even rose. The workers were rehired.
The workers in the gold mines, where the working conditions are absolutely horrible, mobilized in turn. Immediately after the mines were nationalized, they demanded wage increases and regular supplies. Later the Bonanza mine went on strike and similar movements were seen in two other mines, Rosita and Suna. The administration agreed to move toward wage readjustments, with the workers collaborating in determining scales.
In conclusion, we can lay out the following picture:
• The workers struggles that have taken place have been quite widespread; some struggles play a key role as a result of the importance of the enterprise and the coor dination that is established between various enterprises; often the struggles are led by the union in the enterprise without any political initiative; sometimes there are spontaneous or partially spontaneous movements that go beyond the intentions or plans of the trade-union federations (not just the CST).
The attitude of the FSLN and the organi. zations under its hegemony, including the CST, is not always the same, nor is it excessively rigid. In principle they hail those struggles and occupations that do not involve suspending work, and that call for "interventions" or expropriations. Moreover, they often acknowledge that the workers' demands are justified.
However, they systematically and usually strongly oppose strikes, especially the most important strikes. This does not prevent them from seeking a dialogue and negotiations with the workers involved, nor does it prevent them from generally accepting some of the demands of the workers in struggle, including wage demands.
In other words, the Sandinista leadership wants to avoid confrontations and breaks with sectors of the masses, even at the price of granting major organizational concessions (as in the case of the publicworks union in Managua). 10
We should not, however, remain silent about the fact that on several occasions rather violent attacks and repression have been launched against union and political organizations that were rightly or wrongly considered responsible for certain strikes and demonstrations. At the end of January the attacks were concentrated on Frente Obrero, along with the shutdown of El Pueblo." Demonstrations were organized twice in Managua, León, Jinotepe. FO activists were arrested.
A month later, following the strikes at Fabritex and other factories in the capital, attention shifted to the CAUS and the PCN, a number of whose leaders and cadres were imprisoned (around 60). Managua, León, Chinandega, etc. were the sites of even more violent demonstrations than those against FO, ending in occupation of headquarters, the expulsion of militants found inside, and the burning of furniture, newspapers, books, etc. The CAUS was eliminated from the CNI and the PCN was eliminated from the Bloque Popular Patrió- tico. Both were attacked in the press as CIA agents, without the slightest factual evidence being presented.
On March 22, about 300 people demonstrated in Managua for freedom for the prisoners, and later family members of the prisoners demonstrated.
At the same time, the fact that the CAUS was finally admitted to membership in the Council of State indicates that the accusations leveled against it were not taken seriously and that the Sandinista leadership's attitude toward organizations trying to place themselves to the left of the FSLN is subject to a number of changes.!? The Lists of Grievances and the Bourgeoisie and Middle Classes
For the period we are dealing with, it would be wrong to think that the former ruling classes have adopted a homogene ous and clearly defined attitude. It is clear that the layers that have so far been hardest hit (aside from the expropriated former Somozaists who have fled abroad)-that is, the landowners and the urban real-estate interests who have had their rents drastically reduced-do not accept the framework of the new regime.
A segment of the industrial bourgeoisie and the agricultural bourgeoisie is also not ready to commit itself to the country's reconstruction and has taken the path of obstruction, if not sabotage, that has been described, and is practicing "decapitalization" by seeking in every possible way to send capital out of the country. Moreover, there is a rather steady exodus that is revealed through the economic advertise ments in La Prensa and elsewhere.
It is hard to tell to what extent such attitudes involve a final decision and to what extent they represent a means of applying pressure. At any rate, it is clear that particularly since March, even those bourgeois layers that have been most
CAUS's version, presented in statements to La Prensa and in a statement by the Central Committee of the PCN, is that at Fabritex an agreement involving raises of up to 40 percent had been reached and that the breakdown was provoked by the attitude of the minister of labor. Even afterwards, CAUS and the PCN sought to convince the Fabritex workers to suspend the strike, but they refused to stop the solidarity strikes. In early April, six members of the PCN were sentenced in León to a year doing public works for breaking the public-order law and illegal possession of weapons.
ready to collaborate have begun to put forward their demands more and more sharply, and increasingly have been taking public positions. In fact, a veritable movement has been established, with the various employers' organizations playing the leading role.
These employers' organizations (the association of cotton producers, the association of coffee producers, the federation of cattle raisers, chamber of commerce) have organized conferences and assemblies and placed paid ads in the press. The COSEP itself organized a reception for Venezuelan President Herrera Campins, during which Herrera laid out his concept of the guarantees for maintaining "pluralism" (without, however, entirely succeeding in reassuring those in attendance, some of whom, undoubtedly also under the influence of libations, did not hide their discontent).
The theme of all the positions put forward by the employers' organizations was: we accept the socioeconomic framework established by the plan, but we demand that the "rules of the game" be unambiguously spelled out and respected, without being changed in the middle of the game. This would mean respect for private property within the limits established by the plan, an end to "interventions," expropriations, and land occupations, the adoption of a ley de amparo, meaning a kind of habeas corpus. The decrees in early March against "decapitalization" and regarding the expropriation of lands that had earlier been provisionally confiscated were seen by the employers' organizations as a violation of the "rules of the game."
In April a wave of polemics on the same theme was launched following the expropriation of a portion of the shares in the Victoria Brewery in Managua, which were held by José Ignacio Gonzales, and the confiscation of the Toro Blanco farm in the León region. 13
In regard to the petty-bourgeois layers the situation clearly seems more differentiated and uncertain. In the countryside, the small proprietors or the producers in the basic sectors are generally still under the hegemony of the big growers. They do not hide their discontent, which is especially fanned by their feeling that they are being discriminated against since the Sandinista cooperatives get a lower interest rate on loans than their cooperatives (which are actually simply consortiums for loans, purchases, and sales). The difference is minimal (7 percent interest versus 8 percent), particularly when you take the inflation rate into account, but they attach a symbolic importance to it.
The attitude of the poor peasantsamong whom the ATC has unquestionable influence-and especially the attitude of farmers who have benefited from the reduction of farm rents,* is quite different. They are fundamentally favorable to the revolution. The evolution of these layers and subsequent differentiations among them depends by and large on the new regime's ability to concretely aid the peasants in overcoming their situation of backwardness and distress.
The problem of their getting access to land remains on the table, and it cannot be resolved without a much larger and more deepgoing agrarian reform than has taken place thus far, in the context of a reorganization of agriculture, which in turn is linked to overall economic development. As long as this problem remains, broad layers of the peasants and rural petty bourgeoisie will be susceptible to shifts, even sharp shifts, and not necessarily in the direction of the revolutionary process.!
In the urban economy, the most important petty-bourgeois layer is the small- and medium-sized merchants, of whom there are around 150,000. They are affected by the price maneuvers that the big bourgeoisie and wholesalers carry out, but they run the risk of being seen by the masses as the ones responsible for high prices. Moreover, they feel threatened by ENABAS, despite the fact that in principle it should benefit its activity in blocking them through wholesale prices.
In fact, the spread of ENABAS sales outlets and of factory stores need not involve a restriction of the small and medium merchant's sphere of activity. The discontent of these layers has already been expressed on several occasions, especially at a demonstration criticizing ENABAS, which on March 9 drew several thousand people in Managua.
in March the "anti-
All the same, Somoza" bourgeoisie began to beat the drums on the political level. It felt it needed an organized political force that could intervene and make its weight felt, especially when important decisions were to be made.
This was expressed in a number of ways: in an effort to revitalize bourgeois parties, which until then had had only a shadowy existence; through the demand that the Council of State begin functioning and have a composition that would allow the there are about
15. According to Wheelock,
100,000 small agricultural producers, amounting to a little less than one-third of the active population in agriculture. (Small producers are defined as peasants having an annual income of up to 18,000 cordobas). They make up only a small portion of those involved in cotton and coffee growing, while they are a majority in the cultivation of basic grains (La Prensa, March 6).
Notes
1. See our article in Rouge, January 18-24, 1980 and "Class Polarization Deepens in Nicaragua," by Charles-André Udry, in IP/1, May 26, 1980.
2. In November it was decided to withhold the thirteenth-month bonus for workers who earn more than 1,500 córdobas.
3. Through the intermediary of ENABAS, whose range, however, remains limited. According to official reports, ENABAS's share in the distribution of various items is 8 percent for sugar, 14 percent for cooking oil, 17 percent for eggs, 15 percent for salt, 15 percent for beans (plus 22 percent of imports). See La Prensa, April 13.
4. See also the previously cited article by Udry.
6. It is interesting to note that while members of the ATC participated in the occupation, the local CDS lined up with the owner.
7. Some examples of prices of basic foodstuffs (official prices, which are often not followed): beans, 2.85 córdobas per pound; corn, 1 córdoba; rice, 2.45 córdobas; cheese, 9 or 10 córdobas; salt, .60 córdoba; sugar, 1.45 córdobas; butter, about 5.50 córdobas; cooking oil, 184.65 cordobas for five gallons; milk, 2.85 córdobas per liter; eggs, 9 córdobas per dozen (the official exchange rate is 10 córdobas to the dollar, but the unofficial rate
10. Concerning land occupations, the AT's attitude has varied depending on the specific case. In general, the ATC favors them when they involve uncultivated land. The April 21 Barricada published an interview with the organizational secretary of the ATC in which it is said that "the ATC does not demagogically encourage the occupation of lands. ... If land occupations take place in an indiscriminate form, there would come a time when we could not control them and that is precisely what groups like the CTN, the CUS, and the MORE are trying to do. They orient towards occupations of lands in places that are in the process of producing, in such a way as to make things worse."
11. The current represented by El Pueblo and FO requires a more specific analysis than has been sketched out here. We will try to do that on another occasion.
12. The review of the demonstrations against FO and the CAUS was initially provided by the Sandinista press, which does not dispute any of the facts. We should note that the March 5 demonstration in Managua had been called as a demonstration against the CIA and was to have marched to the U.S. embassy. En route, the target was changed and a portion of the march went to the CAUS headquarters. The CST's paper, El Trabajador, devoted its issue number 4 to the theme "CAUS, agent of the CIA."
13. It is possible that the polemic focused on
14. The maximum rent is now set at 100 córdobas per manzana for grain lands, and 300 córdobas per manzana for cotton lands. For further details about the bourgeoisie's economic and political campaign see our articles in the April 11 and April 18 issues of Rouge.