The convention of the Socialist Party is scheduled to take place in early April; the CP convention will be held in May. These two parties are followed by the mass of workers in France. Although they won a slim majority of the votes in the national elections in March 1978, they were defeated in them owing both to the way the districts are carved up and, especially, to the disunity that increasingly afflicted the so-called Union of the Left in the six or seven months preceding the elections.
These conventions will be the first to take place since their electoral defeat, and they will come just before the elections for the European [Common Market] Parliament. There is no doubt about what will come out of the CP's convention, and the same goes for the SP convention. But we should begin by summarizing the political, social, and economic context in which these gatherings take place.
France is being hit hard by the economic crisis. The inflation rate is among the highest in Western Europe. The number of unemployed is over a million and a half and is still rising. The various "plans" the Barre government has put forward have not led to any improvement in the economy.
Since the Union of the Left was defeated and its components had a falling out, Giscard-Barre and the employers believe that anything is possible for them. Under the pretext of defending the franc and stifling inflation, they are trying to lower the standard of living of the workers.
The standard of living was not seriously hit until the middle of 1978, but since then attacks have been taking place on all levels: wage increases held below price increases; heavy increase in Social Security tax and attacks on certain Social Security benefits; new restrictions on unemployment compensation; increase in the prices of public services, rent hikes, elimination of price controls; increase in taxes, etc.
The already considerable discontent of the masses has begun to give way to anger in some industrial centers and in some cities in the regions that are particularly hard hit (Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine). Strikes and demonstrations are increasing and are sometimes taking a turbulent form. The two most telling examples are those in the cities of Longwy and Denain, steel towns, where genuine riots took place, with attacks on police stations that the union leaderships were powerless to prevent.
While there is general sympathy for these local explosions, the tendency for the movements to spread is not yet fully developed. It is true that unemployment weighs heavily on the workers who have a job, but the growing unemployment does not suffice to explain this state of affairs. The electoral defeat has not demoralized the working class nor cut into its desire for unity. The voters ignore the quarrels between the CP and SP when there is a second round in elections.
What weighs most heavily on the workers is that the political perspective of the hope for victory of the Union of the Left has disappeared without being replaced by another perspective. As we will see later, the two traditional parties have now largely fallen back on themselves, each preoccupied with its internal difficulties and its parliamentary cretinism.
The Divisions in the Bourgeoisie
The bourgeoisie is divided on the political plane. We know about the Giscard- Chirac! split. Barely stifled for the period that preceded the March 1978 elections, it rapidly reappeared and became increas ingly sharp.
At the root of this division are two different political conceptions for the future. Chirac wants to maintain the great division that existed in de Gaulle's time: the Gaullists on the one side and the Communists on the other, with the intermediate formations, including the SP, snuffed out, with the result that the Gaullists would remain eternally dominant.
On the other hand, with the help of time and circumstances, Giscard hopes to see a crumbling of the Gaullists, isolation of the Communists, and a coalition of the bourgeois center with a wing of the Socialists who would become convinced that they would have no chance to get into the government as long as they allied with the Communists.
This Giscard-Chirac conflict was developing rather slowly, with the two antagonists preparing themselves for an open contest during the 1981 presidential election.
But in the wake of the growing discontent of the masses, Chirac's RPR wants to differentiate itself as much as possible from the Giscard-Barre policy. It is hindered in these maneuvers because Giscard, the president of the republic, is threatening to go ahead and dissolve the National Assembly and hold new elections if the government finds itself a minority in the Assembly.
Chirac is also trying to stir up public opinion on ultranationalist terms with an eye to the European elections, using themes that find an echo in the backward sections of the working masses and petty bourgeoisie.
Birth and Death of Union of Left
To better understand the questions that will be taken up at the two conventions, we should briefly review why the Union of the Left was set up in 1972 and why it suffered a de facto breakdown in 1977.
The process of politization of the working class engendered by May 1968 surpassed anything in the past. It tended to call into question the capitalist order. The example of the Lip factory occupation was a symptom of this.
Only the mass workers organizations were capable of directing it into parliamentary channels, so as to prevent capitalism itself from being called into question. For years the CP had put forward the idea of a union of the left parties on a reformist program; thus it had a ready-made orientation even though it had neither foreseen May 1968 nor supported this movement.
The problem was more complicated for the SP. Guy Mollet had for years practiced a "third force" policy (collaboration with the bourgeois center) and had paid quite a heavy price in terms of growing difficulties for the SP. These culminated in a disaster in the 1969 presidential election, where the SP candidate got only about 5 percent of the vote.
The SP's crisis came to a head at its convention in Epinay in 1971. There they decided to create a "new socialist party," to be led by Mitterrand, often a government minister in the Fourth Republic.
After May 1968 Mitterrand had proposed a policy that seemed audacious to the members of the Socialist Party.
If the SP were to become strong, he said, it would have to renounce all "third force" tactics and, instead, establish an alliance with the CP with the aim of winning an electoral majority in the country.
Thus he was moving in the same direction as the policy proposed by the CP, even to the point of discussing the content of the Union of the Left's program with them. To those who objected that a party as weak as the SP could not dream of making an agreement with a party as disciplined and strong as the CP, that one couldn't dine with the devil if one didn't have a large spoon, he responded that his policy was the only one that would strengthen the relationship of forces vis-a-vis the CP.
Mitterrand carried the day at Epinay because Mollet's policy was rejected by everyone and because no one else had formulated any alternative.
Mitterrand's projections were soon borne out. In the 1974 presidential election (where there was less than a 1 percent difference between the vote totals of Giscard and Mitterrand), in the local elections of 1976, and especially in the municipal elections of 1977 the increase in the vote for the Union of the Left seemed unstoppable. But while the adoption of the common program in 1972 took place at a time when the economy was strong, this later gave way to the economic crisis. Thus it was necessary to revise the program for the 1978 elections. That is when the tensions that led to the split appeared.
The leaders of the SP wanted to reduce some of the promises in the program without, however, announcing it too loudly. The leadership of the CP had concerns of another kind. In the rise of the Union of the Left, the SP caught up with and surpassed the CP's vote, which, on the whole, was stagnating and even fell a bit in the old bastions of the Paris suburbs.
When the first signs of this tendency became evident, the CP leadership became concerned because in previous big agreements with the SP-for the Popular Front and following the Liberation-it was the CP that had been the major beneficiary.
The March 1977 municipal elections alarmed the CP. On its right the SP was growing and even winning a little at its expense. On its left the far-left slates made relatively impressive showings in the neighborhoods, receiving working-class nearly a million votes throughout France.
We know that this aspect of the situation, which was not mentioned publicly, was carefully examined in the Political Bureau of the CP.
When the discussions on updating the common program began, the CP leadership was ready to make concessions to the SP leaders if, in exchange, they got guarentees regarding the number and nature of ministries that would be given to the Communist Party, the posts it would get in the nationalized industries, and the maintenance of the governmental coalition in case of disagreements.
In other words the CP was ready to carry out a Callaghan-like governmental policy and to face offensives on its left, but only on the condition that it had guarantees that it would be solidly entrenched in the state and para-state apparatus.
When the SP leadership turned a deaf ear to the CP leaders' demands, the CP then discovered that the SP was involved in a "right turn" and went into battle against its "associate" in the Union of the Left. The CP's unconcealed aim was to April 30, 1979
slow down and if possible set back the SP's electoral progress in order to improve its relationship of forces with the SP. We know the results.
Since the electoral defeat relations between the two parties have only worsened, and the two conventions will take place in this context.
The Competing Factions in the SP
Seven general policy motions have been formally submitted for a vote at the SP congress that will take place in Metz. The main ones, four in number, have been presented by Mitterrand, Rocard, Mauroy, and the CERES.? The aim of the others was primarily to prepare for and carry out maneuvers, skillful or otherwise, during the convention. While the SP is continuing to move ahead electorally-the government's policy alone would contribute to that-there is a basic problem posed that is at the root of its present internal struggles, but that is not presented in a clear manner.
What is this problem? Having become the first party in France, the SP cannot remain forever an opposition party. But how will it get into the government? Having no hope of obtaining an absolute majority by itself it must necessarily seek allies, in addition to the handful of "Left Radicals" who are parasites on its body, if it is to build a parliamentary majority and a presidential majority.
The SP cannot dream of returning directly to a "third force" policy-i.e., an alliance with a bourgeois party-without provoking both the loss of the greater part of the ground it has regained through the Union of the Left and an almost certain split in its ranks. This would be an inevitable result under the present political conditions in France. Nor can it accept the humiliating terms of the CP, since this would reduce its audience in those milieux that will only vote for an SP-CP bloc as long as the CP is kept in a subordinate position.
No current, tendency, or faction in the SP is today proposing an alliance with a bourgeois party. Everyone in the party says they are partisans of maintaining an alliance of the "left." But they will not be able to do this unless they can find a way to lead the CP to a change of heart through a superior relationship of forces of the SP to the CP.
This problem is at the root of the internal struggle in the SP, but it is not formulated so explicitly. Moreover, the responses to the problem are muddied by other considerations of an organizational or personal nature.
The fight at the convention will polarize around Mitterrand and Rocard. Mauroy places his emphasis on the need to maintain the unity of the party around Mitterrand, but calls on him to function as a less absolute leader. The CERES denounces the CP's sectarianism, but is defending political positions that are close to those of the CP.
What are the differences between Mitterrand and Rocard, which seem to go beyond what they have said up to now and what they have written in their resolutions? Above all Rocard presents himself as the trained realistic economist who would not forget that in the present economic crisis not all demands can be satisfied. In other words, he wants people to see him, and not Barre, as the number one economist in the country, the only one who can provide remedies to these problems.
Outside the SP, Rocard wants this message to be heard by the new middle layers and those working-class layers influenced by technocratic arguments, such as one finds in a segment of the CFDT Rocard thus seems to be seeking to extend the SP's influence on its right, while ignoring the Communist electorate, which he must feel is irreducible at its present plateau.
The Mitterrand motion is politically situated "on the left." It denounces the Giscard-Barre policy in such a way that its orientation seems close to that of the CP. It also contains a criticism of Rocard's positions without naming him, when it denounces the "supposed' economic laws" that "are in fact nothing but the management principles of the capitaliet system."
It retains very little of the 1972 program. Thus his motion should allow him to garner the support of the CERE's votes, without which he probably could not win the leadership by a majority. This is his objective in the short run, but his longer term aim is somewhat different. In contrast to the CERES, which leans toward the CP, Mitterrand's motions included very strong criticisms of the CP on all the points where it is very vulnerable:
... The Socialists will clearly point out the shortcomings of the CP. They will pose precise questions about the contradiction between democratic centralism* and the demand for selfmanagement, between theoretic internationalism and nationalist practice, between the CP's coming around to pluralism and the Soviet reality, between left-sounding speeches and sabotage of the left alliance, etc. ... The Communist Party will either further seal itself off in its sectarian rejection or come to an understanding of its duty. When that day comes, the SP will say how it intends to take part in the dialogue.
Mitterrand also emphasizes the need to Travail French Democrite Contedatatue du
3. Confédération Française Démocratique
Labor), influenced by the SP.—IP/1
4. Like many others, Mitterrand uses democratic centralism to designate the system of bureaucratie centralism installed in the Communist Parties in Stalin's time. This system has been maintained up to the present with a few accommodations and has nothing to do with true democratic centralism, which involves the most democratic decision-making and discipline only in action.
strengthen the SP's presence in the factories. Thus, in the longer term, he wants to strengthen his party by taking on the CP's claim to be the only working-class party, by eating into the CP's audience and even its ranks. Not very long ago he had said that, in his view, the CP had taken off its "Leninist trappings" (meaning the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.), but that it had not "cut the umbilical cord with the structures, the methods of thinking and organization that produce Stalinism.
In the final analysis Mitterrand is apparently seeking to strengthen and consolidate his party on its left at the expense of the CP, along the lines that he had expressed at the Epinay convention.
At the Metz convention, we should remember, the real differences will not be presented as clearly as we have described them. The maneuvers have already begun and will continue. Mitterrand is going to try to isolate Rocard; once he is a little more sure of the support of the CERES, he will turn his efforts toward Mauroy. The mass media are on the whole favorable to Rocard. Later on we shall examine the attitude of the CP leadership to the internal struggles within the SP.
The Present Policy of the CP
The documents presented by the CP Central Committee for the next convention-the basic content of which certainly will not be changed—are in no way different from the line the party has been publicly following since late 1977. That is to say, uninterrupted fire aimed at the SP, whether relevant or irrelevant. As is increasingly the case with the CP's documents, the draft resolution contains far fewer proofs than peremptory assertions, following the principle that an assertion repeated many times finally equals a proof. "The crisis, while not limited to the framework of our country, is above all national. .:. The crisis is also interna-
.. The crisis is also international. ..
We will shortly look at the reason for "above all national."
Regarding the French political situation, the differences between the bourgeois formations and the SP are muddied as much as possible. The RPR and the UDF are lumped under a single term-Giscardism, the Giscardian forces—although the tension between these formations is consider-
The draft resolution goes even further, speaking of an "attempt at reconciliation" of the Giscardian forces and the SP, "with the aim of a common application of the policy of capital" to which only the CP is an obstacle. The differences inside the SP. including the CERES, are only, in the words of the draft, squabbles over how to apply "the rightward orientation."
Thus the CP leadership presents the French political situation as a concerted campaign by everyone from the far right
5. Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union
Democracy), Giscard d'Estaing's for French party. —IP/1 438
to the SP against the CP, all alone. Here we again see a very old concept in the workers movement, according to which the party of the working class, in this case the CP, will be up against a "united reactionary mass."
From this analysis the CP leadership concludes that while it does not renounce the Union of the Left policy, while that policy remains inscribed in its program, its realization depends on the existence of a strong CP and new agreements for the Union of the Left can only come about "through 'action from below,' which has and will retain a decisive character."
Here we again come across the famous "united front from below," which long experience has shown means the opposite of a united front. In fact, the present policy of the CP recalls something of the "third period," except that what is involved is not an ultraleft revolutionary policy, but rather a reformist policy directed in the first place against the SP. The orders to the CP cells are that they are not to speak to the SP sections but are to rush to the head of any struggle in order to present themselves as the "only defender" of the workers, cutting the ground out from under even the CGT.?
The CP alone against everyone? On one question it certainly isn't alone. On one question it has the same position as ... Chirac. That question is the CP's jingoistic, nationalist, anti-German campaign, which brings to mind the French bourgeoisie's demonstrations between the war of 1870 and the Treaty of Versailles. "National independence" is threatened, France is under Germany's thumb, and so forth.
The CP's campaign for the European elections will be carried out on a slate on which some bourgeois elements are to be found. This shameless nationalism, this flag waving aimed at politically backward layers of the workers is particularly dangerous in this time of unemployment since, whether the CP leadership wants it or not, it is grist for the mill of growing racist and xenophobie campaigns.
Regarding the content of the CP draft resolution, we note the confirmation of the
8. A representative of the CP publicly stated that if the rules of the European Assembly permit, the Communists elected to that assembly would set up a separate group, including the Italian Communists who are elected. This is where the CP leadership's "national independence" winds up.
abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat at the previous convention, and silence regarding "Leninism." "Proletarian internationalism," which for the leadership had meant lining up with the Kremlin's policy, has been replaced by the phrase "internationalist solidarity," whose meaning is as vague as possible and can be used by everyone.
This vague alleged internationalism is, by contrast, very specific on one point: France requires "an independent national defense that can only ... be real if it is based on the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent force." Who still remembers the "Stockholm Petition"?°
Knowing that the party's past slavish attitude toward the Soviet Union serves as a lead weight, the CP leadership is trying to cast off this burden by means of some formulas, as if it could absolve itself of sins that it says were only venial sins anyway. In regard to the supposedly socialist countries, the draft resolution asserts that "socialism exists" and that "the balance sheet of the socialist countries is on the whole positive"
At most, from the past there remain "some practices and some defects" that are not otherwise specified, which in no way implies the slightest idea of "a break with the socialist countries." Obviously there is not the slightest hint of any sort of campaign against these inadmissible "practices," not even against the death penalty recently inflicted on some Armenians, whose guilt has not been proven, for a terrorist act.
Having taken up some of the important political points, let us see how preparations for the convention were handled. One may recall that one of the points raised during the wave of questioning that followed the electoral defeat was the undemocratic regime in the party. The document submitted for discussion declares with an imperturbable seriousness that the internal life of the party is "the most democratic" to be found in France, while neglecting to mention all the criticisms that the members have made of it.
The only perceptible concession to these criticisms is that the new party statutes give the Central Committee the right to decide to open the discussion bulletins outside of periods leading up to conventions if it wants to. It is true that none of the CP members who had expressed their criticisms in the bourgeois press have been penalized, the leadership having even said that no one would be expelled. In the recently opened discussion bulletin there have been some contributions critical of the positions put forward by the leadership, but they were quite timid, more defensive than offensive, and the fulltimers immediately answered them.
When a provincial cell sent a counterdraft resolution to the Central Committee, the CP refused to publish it and Plissonnier, who for many years has been in charge of directing the apparatus, sent them a letter in the name of the party Secretariat, in which he said:
The method of preparing a convention on the basis of several competing documents interferes with the right of each member to participate fully in the determination of the party's policy and to express himself with full knowledge. Because in such a case the only thing a member can do is line up behind one or another banner, without knowing what will finally be the policy of his party. ... Furthermore this demand is even more unacceptable inasmuch as your draft resolution, in its content, tends to call into question the decisions taken at the [preceding] convention, decisions that the Central Committee received a mandate to carry out.
This document is a beautiful illustration of "the most democratic life" that prevails in the party. We understand that the cell in question had decided to circulate its document itself. Furthermore, most of those who presented different opinions the previous year have no illusions about their chances of overcoming the barriers that have been set up and making it all the way to the rostrum of the convention and being able to publish their documents in the discussion bulletin.
A purge is taking place among the fulltimers. Editors of France Nouvelle, the main CP weekly, were led to turn in their resignations, after being told, according to one of them, that "my attitude, my opinion, my speeches, my questions were fine for a 'rank-and-file' Communist, but not for a full-timer, and particularly a leader" (Le Monde, March 10, 1979).
Another example: the discussion that had taken place last year had a slight influence on the leadership of the Paris Federation, which had allowed echoes of it to find their way into the internal discussions in its organ Paris-Hebdo. It was not long before Paris-Hebdo was abolished... for financial reasons. Moreover, on the eve of the opening of the discussion in the party, the secretary of the Paris Federation,
Fizbin, a member of the Central Committee, was authorized to "give up' his position... for reasons of health" to another member of the Central Committee, who is well known for his vigilance."
also ask [André] Marty [also a leader of the 1919 sailors revolt, expelled in 1952] to rise from his grave and do the same? Some oppositionists have raised the question of Marty's rehabilitation, as he was expelled as a "police agent," but the CP leadership has remained silent on this question.
One question again arises regarding the CP's policy—how long will the leadership follow this sectarian policy and who can change it? The main objective of this policy, we have stated, is to reestablish a favorable relationship of forces for the CP with regard to the SP. Therefore the leadership will not be inclined to change its course until it has achieved this objective, something that does not seem close at hand, in fact quite the opposite.
But the situation is not solely dependent on the plans and calculations of the leaderships. The tendency in the masses for united action is strong, and the offensive of the government and the bosses will only strengthen it further. No leadership can continue to ignore it.
Already at the CGT convention, one could see currents that are not ready to follow the CP's sectarian policy, and the leadership of the CGT, at least certain members of it, pretended to take these currents into account. The CP's present policy can only lead to a dead end.
Only One Perspective: the General Strike
In summary, during the next two or three months the two mass workers parties are each going to decide or reaffirm their orientation. Mitterrand's motion and the CP draft contain important demands that are common to both, beginning with the thirty-five-hour week with no decrease in wages.
But instead of preparing for a common struggle to take up this demand, which today is also the common demand of all ship, still numerically very weak, have appeared since March 1978. So far they have developed mainly among sectors of the CP student youth and the intellectuals. This is the case of the students of the Union des Etudiants Communistes [Union of Communist Students] in Bordeaux, the "Althusserian" current, or even the journalists and intellectuals of various CP magazines.
But recently a new opposition has emerged, in the beginning mainly composed of workers, which is publishing a discussion bulletin called "Luttes et Débats." This new oppositional current is characterized by its desire to counterpose a class-struggle political alternative to the leadership of the party. This differentiates it, for example, from Elleinstein, who above all sticks to criticizing the party's lack of democracy, its ties with the Stalinist heritage, and its sectarianism with regard to the Social Democracy; as well as from others who confine themselves to making more or less abstract criticisms of the party leadership without outlining an alternative political line.
The time to examine the contents, themes, and currents revealed in the discussion will be when the discussion has developed further.
12. A body that follows the sales figures of newspapers in Paris has recently reported the figures for average daily sales of [the CP organ] l'Humanité (along with the other dailies) for "Paris surface," meaning the newsstands. They are:
20,849
17,148
January February
21,574
18,210
the workers in Western Europe, these two leaderships are above all trying to maximize their gains at the other's expense, to block and reduce the other's gains. For each, their narrow interests have priority over the interests of the working class.
We can say that, except for the most politicized militants, the workers do not follow these debates and do not understand the motives and results of these quarrels, both the quarrels within these parties and between them. They see no indication, no policy that provides a political perspective with which to carry out resistance to the attacks by the government and the employers.
Such a perspective does exist, however, and is not at all illusory. This perspective is the general strike. Obviously we're not talking about arbitrarily calling a general strike. Rather we're talking about now situating all the present battles in the framework of propaganda for this perspective, situating them in the framework of a generalized movement whose aim would be to sweep away the government, to impose a government of the CP and SP, and to open the way to workers power.
This is not an illusory perspective, particularly in France where the memory of June 1936 and May 1968, as well as the generalized movements of the postwar period (1946-48) are still fresh in the minds of the workers.
It is not an illusory perspective because, in contrast to May 1968, which broke out in the absence of a program of already widely known general demands, such a program does exist now: the thirty-fivehour week with no cut in pay, a substantial increase in the minimum wage, closing the spread of wages and salaries, no attacks against Social Security, stop the nuclear program, increase the budgets for public works, and so forth. All this is seen as a transition toward the construction of a socialist society. Herein lies the substance of the debates that have been taking place inside the French workers movement for several years.
Now more than ever before, the difficulties that stand in the way of pushing forward this perspective do not lie in aspirations and willingness of the working masses to fight; rather they are found in the conformism and cowardice of the traditional leaderships.
But despite these leaderships the turn in the situation will take place. At this point it is impossible to predict when it will happen. But the signs that herald it are increasing. Longwy and Denain bring to mind Brest and Toulon, which heralded to mind Caen,
June 1936; they bring Redon, and the like, which heralded May 1968.
We can be certain that not only will the next assault inevitably take place, but also that it will be much more powerful than those that the workers have carried out in the past.
Notes
1. The rightist mayor of Paris whose RPR (Rassemblement pour la République-Assembly for the Republic) is part of the ruling coalition.- IP/I
2. Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches. et d'Education Socialistes (Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education), the SP "left wing."- IP/I
6. Nevertheless, last year's by-elections gave food for thought to the CP leadership. It saw that staying in the second round of elections against a Socialist candidate who came in ahead in the first round was not supported by the voters, and cost the CP heavily in electoral setbacks. Accordingly, the Central Committee adopted the general rule that in the local elections and the next by-elections the CP would step aside in the second round in favor of the left candidate who is ahead in the first round
7. Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor), dominated by the CP.- IP/I
9. An appeal against nuclear weapons, strongly supported by Moscow and the European CPs and signed by millions in the early 1950s.—IP/1
10. Marchais, who doesn't fear ridicule, went so far as to say that [Charles] Tillon [a leader of the 1919 French sailors revolt and of the resistance during World War II] had never been expelled from the CP and that he could therefore come in whenever he wanted and discuss his return to the party with the "appropriate bodies." Why not
11. Several currents in opposition to the leader- April 30, 1979