The twentieth anniversary of the Cuban revolution was celebrated in a somewhat paradoxical situation. Those who had been its most enthusiastic supporters in the 1960s kept silent or issued summary condemnations whose recurrent theme was that Havana is the same as Moscow. At the same time, eulogies of Cuba and its leaders were spun by those who for years had made no secret of their mistrust, and indeed, hostility, particularly the bureaucrats in Moscow, Prague, and East Berlin, and those leaders of the Latin American Communist parties who continue to hold some of the more orthodox Stalinist views.
However, the real record of the workers state's twenty years warrants neither blanket condemnations nor apologetic judgments. We will strive to show this in the remarks that follow.
A Synopsis of the Record
To begin with, we must not forget the impaet of a revolution that can only be compared, in the history of this century, with the Russian and Chinese revolutions. The victory of the July 26 Movement qualitatively transformed the country's socioeconomic structures, sweeping away the old ruling classes and bringing an end to all forms of oppression and exploitation by imperialism. What remains of the classes representing the old regime, essentially in agriculture and commerce, has absolutely no specific weight such as constitutes a danger for the collectivized economy born out of the destruction of the old state and the thoroughgoing expropriation of capitalist property, both foreign and native-owned.
Second, we must not underestimate the fact that the very existence of the Cuban workers state implied and implies a struc. tural weakening of imperialism in that part of the world. Nor should we minimize-after the fact-the impact the Cuban revolution had on the evolution of the political relationship of forces throughout Latin America and on the subjective maturation of significant sectors of the working class, peasantry, and radicalized petty bourgeoisie.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the victory of the rebel army, the mass mobilizations that accompanied it, and the revolutionary social measures adopted in 1959 and 1960 gave an unequivocal practical reply to a question that the Latin American workers movement had been discussing for decades-whether it was possible to launch a revolution in a region most directly under the control of U.S imperialism, and to ensure its victorious outcome.
Finally, let us remind ourselves again that, despite all the difficulties that we have analyzed elsewhere and which we will come back to further on, Cuba has experienced an economic and cultural growth that has no equivalent among other underdeveloped countries, in Latin America or on other continents, which have remained in the capitalist framework.
Here are a few brief figures having to do with the increase in production from 1958 to 1977: steel, 11.5 times; electricity, 4.3 times; cement, 3.6 times; oil refining, 1.7 times; fertilizer, 5 times; nickel, 2 tımes; citrus (1976), 4.3 times; eggs (1962-78), 10.4 times; milk (1963-77), 4 times; ice (1976), 7.6 times; tractors (1975), 6 times; construction (1976), 6.5 times; fishing (1976), 8.8 times; merchant marine, 14.2 times; exports (1976), 5.4 times; imports (1976), 6.4 times.
It should be added that, using 1958 as the base year, some of the operations involved in sugar production began to be mechanized (the indexes for 1978 range from a low of 29 to a high of 98).
As for education, it is sufficient to recall that before the revolution, secondaryschool students numbered 85,000, and university students 15,000. In 1978 they numbered 1,043,000, and 145,000 respectively.
I would like to underscore a fundamental point. Cuba has not been able to go beyond the condition of a country that essentially has a one-crop economy, despite its success in exporting nickel, tobacco, and fish. Sugar still represents more than 80% of its exports (90% of sugar production is exported). However, especially in the last five years, the price of sugar on the world market has fluctuated drastically (in 1973, by international agreement, it went from $.0325 to $.0515 per pound; the following year it hit $.60, and in 1977 it plunged again to a level between $.06 and $.11, with a bracket between $.11 and $.21 as the basis of the international agreements). In a colonial or semicolonial country, with a "free" market economy, such fluctuations would have caused terrible economic and social dislocations.
Cuba, on the other hand, was able to such as the bottlenecks and pressures, we will limit ourselves here to mentioning a few of the significant problems in different areas.
we note weato the heedidieunded at
First, if we look at the building industry,
100,000 housing units per year-is not expected to be met until 1985. In 1978, the goal of 24,500 units was not even met; only 16,000 were built (the failure is officially attributed to weather conditions as well as to late deliveries of materials from abroad).
Everyone knows that to promote housing construction, "minibrigades" were used, that is, brigades formed in the workplace which were supposed to provide additional labor. But in practice, in a number of workplaces, the "minibrigades" were organized out of the excess labor force. Thus-to use Castro's expressioninstead of having an excess of work, they had an excess of workers. So a solution was worked out that revolved around transforming the "minibrigades" into government brigades, with the advantage that the housing they built would be distributed to any citizen, whether or not they belonged to a given workplace. But this ran up against major resistance, mainly from workers who did not want to leave workplaces where they earned higher wages?
It should be added that another difficulty in the area of housing lies in the fact that rents are not sufficient to cover either construction costs or maintenance costs. That is why the decision was made to change one of the basic standards of the urban reform law. For new housing, the principle that rent corresponds to a percentage of the wages earned by the head of the family unit will no longer be applied. These steps will result, among
, other things, in increasing the variations in the real standard of living among the workers.
A whole series of problems have persisted in the area of factory management and the organization of labor. As we have mentioned elsewhere, the criterion in effect is one of "individual responsibility combined with collective leadership." In fact, the manager is the supreme authority; he is designated by higher bodies and sisted by a management board that includes the trade-union leadership.
Workers' participation in discussions of the plan, analysis of the results, and the use of funds to provide material incentives is guaranteed by "different ways and forms" (especially by mass assemblies). In the final analysis, this participation does not include any real decision-making power over crucial issues; we are closer here to the Soviet than to the Yugoslav "model." Moreover, it should be recalled that while enterprises have their own status in the eyes of the law, they are under the control of the state, which supplies their basic means of production and working capital in the framework of centralization.
One of the features of the new direction taken after 1970 was that a system of production norms was brought into general use, while at the same time a priority was placed on material incentives. Such a system can, of course, ensure an increase in labor productivity, but it involves serious drawbacks, tendencies liable to cause tensions. In his speech to the trade-union congress at the end of 1978, Castro gave a fairly clear picture of the problems that had arisen.
To begin with, the norms remain very uneven. In some cases they are fairly mild
"The revolution has left behind it certain Idealist stages ..."
(for example, in agriculture), while in others they are too harsh.
Second, as a result, tangible wage differentials persist and are even sharpening, so that, on the one hand, it is difficult to find workers to fill certain jobs (machinists' helpers, for example, and on the other hand, one-way transfers take place (for example, as a result of the pay increase given to college professors, it is now difficult for JUCEPLAN, where salaries are lower, to hire economists).
Third, there is an incipient tendency for historically new wage levels to be created, that is, privileged wage levels compared to the average. In addition, what happens is that the wages paid are either higher or lower than they should be in relation to the work actually accomplished
Finally, one of the consequences of these problems and tensions is what in other latitudes is called "alienation in the workplace," in other words, the tendency to arrive late and be absent frequently without sufficient reason. Neither Castro nor the reporter Roberto Vega spared their criticisms of managers and cadres who, for the sake of avoiding trouble or not disrupting friendly relations, look the other way.3
We mentioned earlier, in regard to agriculture, that sugar production is still the decisive factor. But Cuba's agricultural economy is running up against a further obstacle of a structural nature. Thirty percent of the arable land still belongs to the private sector. This is partly subsistence farming. Still, this sector produces nearly all the coffee and tea, and about 25% of livestock raising, 20% of deliveries to the sugar industry, 50% of fruit and vegetable cultivation, etc. The last congress of the peasants association (ANAP) in May 1977 criticized all of the drawbacks of such a situation, such as the difficulty of promoting efficient mechanization. It decided to build up the cooperatives, but without much success; cooperatives are being formed at a fairly slow pace (by the time of the congress there were only 43 cooperatives; a year later there were 136, including a total of 21,500 hectares and 3,650 peasants).*
Finally, in a few years Cuba may find itself facing the same problem China has had for a decade, that is, the disproportion between a growing number of graduates and the relative scarcity of available jobs. Castro is concerned with this; he has indicated some of the difficulties that already exist (for example, the impossibility of granting everyone who receives a diploma from the Facultad Obrera admission to the universities), and he is starting to say that it is good for everyone to be able to get a college education, but that this does not imply that everyone can have a job corresponding to his or her degree.
The leading group is seeking a solution to the multiple tensions we have just mentioned, and to the problems of economic growth in general, putting the emphasis on the need to further step up production. For instance, it is insisting on the need to raise labor productivity still further, both through tighter discipline and stricter supervision by the managers and cadres, and through increasing material incentives. The leadership explicitly states that consumption must be subordinated to the needs of accumulation. It is, in fact, outlining the prospect of sacrifices and of a very modest improvement in living conditions for the present generation, which-as the recent trade-union congress made clear-must devote itself to development. Holding down consumption will make it possible, within the scope of the planning now under way, to export more industrial products (such as cement and textiles) and thus to raise necessary imports.
To use Castro's expression, it is unquestionable that "along the way, the revolution has left behind it certain idealist stages, certain utopian, unreal stages. Unfortunately, it has done so, and is increasingly doing so, by adopting, in theory and in practice, conceptions and methods that have already been triedwith what results!-in the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe.
Institutionalization
Beginning in 1976, the institutional structures spelled out by the new constitution began to be set up. Therefore, it is possible to outline an initial assessmenteven if it is only a rough one—of how these bodies (municipal assemblies, provincial assembly assemblies, and a national elected by the municipal assemblies) have functioned. Each district was made up of a relatively small number of voters (from a minimum of 250 to a maximum of 3,000), and each voter cast a ballot for a single delegate from the list of candidates in the district. A total of 10,725 delegates were elected. Those who got more than 50% of the vote on the first round were elected immediately; in districts where no candidate received a majority of the votes cast, a second round was held. The first variant occurred in 7,888 cases.
There were 30,000 candidates, that is, three times as many as the seats to be filled. Two significant details were that 70.4 percent of those elected were members of the Communist Party or youth organization, and that the delegates had to take an oath, in which they promised to "consciously and freely submit to the leading role that the Cuban Communist Party plays in society."
The national assembly, whose members, like delegates to the other assemblies, are recallable, is the supreme institutional body, according to the constitution. But how does it really function? In 1977, it held two sessions (in July and December), which lasted three days each and dealt with a huge number of problems. For example, at its July session, after having elected some twenty-odd commissions, the national assembly unanimously approved a number of proposals in the space of one morning. These had to do with protection of Cuba's cultural heritage, national monuments, military tribunals, and the organization of the court system.
On the following day, it passed four other bills, including one on the family code. At the same session, it was decided that deputies should report back to their constituents every four months-instead of three, as previously planned-and that the plenary sessions of the municipal assemblies should be held four times a year instead of six. Sometimes there were amendments passed by majority vote. At the December session, the seventeen points on the agenda were discussed, including the plan for economic development, the government budget for 1978, and the new criminal code.
It is clear that under such conditions the assembly cannot really exercise its decision-making powers in areas that it should have jurisdiction over. The fact that the party Central Committee-which also met twice a year during the same period-decides the same questions in advance (at least in the most important cases, such as the plan) says a great deal about the assembly's real role. It should be added that the last three plenary sessions of the Central Committee lasted only a single day, which shows that this "supreme body" does not have substantial powers either.
The lower-ranking assemblies and delegates do, of course, have more direct ties with their constituents and make real decisions in their respective areas. Furthermore, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), in which more than four million citizens are active, according to official figures, are continuing to funetion. However, they carry out circumscribed tasks that require nothing more than horizontal forms of democracy. It is significant in this regard that the first national congress of the CDRs was not. held until 1977, that is, seventeen years after their formation!
In an article published at the time, we analyzed the preparations for and conduct of the Cuban CP congress, which was held for the first time at the end of 1975 (see Intercontinental Press, April 26, 1976, p. 698). The least that can be said is that propagandistic and ritual aspects distinctly prevailed over real democratic debate.
In 1977, the Union of Communist Youth (UJC), whose membership had gone from 122,000 to 411,000 since the previous congress (1972), convened its third congress. The role that such an organization could play is shown by the mere fact that 45% of the country's labor force is under thirty years of age. In fact, the UJC congress was not very interesting from a political standpoint.
The speeches by representatives of the party-Perez and Raul Castro-were marked by moralistic and paternalistic tirades and by worry about the dangers that would await the revolution in twenty or thirty years if a stubborn struggle were not carried out against all the "revisionist" and "antisocial" tendencies to which the younger generation might fall victim.
Raul seized the opportunity to illustrate his conception of the "three pillars of the Cuban revolution," namely,
"internal unity of the party under its first secretary, Comrade Fidel; indissoluble unity between the party and the people; and the unity of all Cubans with the USSR, birthplace of the great October revolution and of the brilliant Lenin." A Stalinist or Brezhnevite bureaucrat would not have put it differently.6
The congress of the trade-union federation (CTC-Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions), held at the end of last November, did not add anything new or make any changes in the conceptions and practices brought to light by the previous congress. From the official reports, it is clear that orchestration and propaganda played an inordinate role. (Castro personally chaired most of the sessions.) A detail whose exact significance is hard to grasp is that during the election of the leadership by secret ballot, ballots were cast against certain prominent leaders. The announcement was greeted with a few murmurs from the audience, but Castro commented favorably on what had happened.
As regards the role of the trade unions and their relations with the state, the documents and speeches repeated the formulas ratified by the previous congress, combining correct observations about the need for a distinction between the trade unions and the state, and on the trade unions'
particular task of protecting workers' rights against "all kinds of incomprehension, arbitrary acts, and injustice" with the clear reaffirmation of the party's leading role in relation to the trade unions and other mass organizations, and an idealization of the "socialist" state in its present form.
"What happens is that under socialism a miraculous identity and identification comes about between the interests of the workers and the interests of the entire nation, which is, of course, a nation of
," Castro said. In this framework, workers, he next conjured up the bogey of economism, while adding that the problem does not arise in Cuba, and ruled out as absolutely fantastic the possibility of strikes taking place: "Strikes? Who talks about strikes in a revolutionary process, in a socialist process?"
Unfortunately for Castro, the experience of all transitional societies to this date, including Cuba, shows'that things are not that simple, and that the "miraculous" identification of the workers' interests with those of "their" state has still not occurred!?
The conclusion that can be drawn is that the process of institutionalization and restructuring of the mass organizations has not culminated in a situation identical to what exists in other workers states. For example, despite the obvious parallels, the functioning of the assemblies is not characterized by the same bureaucratic rigidity as the "assemblies" in the USSR or Bulgaria. There is, in fact, much more living contact between elected officials and their constituents-because of the smaller size of the election distriets, for one thing-and there may be a choice of candidates.
Another example: the ideology and practice of the trade unions is not identical to those of the degenerated and deformed workers states. As we have shown, there is a combination of conceptions and methods involving differences of emphasis, if not of interpretation, and thus, a broader latitude in practice.
The result of all of this is that forms of "horizontal democracy" exist in Cuba that either do not exist in other workers states or have existed only at certain conjunctures and in certain sectors (i.e., during the rise of self-management in Yugoslavia, or in the period of the gravest crises of leadership and biggest mass mobilizations in China), and that the ties between the leaders and the masses remain more direct and alive than in any other country.
Still, as to whether there exist in Cuba political structures and mass organizations such as would ensure genuine socialist democracy-that is, the exercise of decision-making power by the masses, along with real democratic debate on the big economic and political issues, the reply can only be negative. It is not necessary to point out that the lack of such revolutionary democratic structures has a much more serious meaning and impact today than in the wake of the victory of the revolution in 1959-60.
Matters are certainly not helped by the unconditional hymns of praise the Cuban leaders and press continually sing to the USSR and other bureaucratized workers states, nor by the arbitrary, indiscriminate condemnation of the dissidents in Eastern Europe as a group in terms reminiscent of the Moscow, Prague, and East Berlin press. This is all the more true since Cuba still systematically uses Soviet texts, both from the Stalin and post-Stalin eras, for the ideological training of cadres and activists. A mere reading of the press is sufficient to grasp this.
Meanwhile, any conception or position representing a revolutionary Marxist or far-left point of view (or that is presented as such) is belittled and falsified in a purely Stalinist style. Trotsky himself has continued to be the target of virulently polemical articles that monstrously distort his ideas. The police conception of history, which detects agents or spies everywhere, has found fervent followers in Cuba as well.
Cuba, Moscow, and Africa
We cannot analyze here in detail Cuba's international policy in various corners of the world. We will limit ourselves to a few major points.
First, it should be recalled that Castro gave as early as 1972 a clear explanation of the turn that had been made. As a "small country surrounded by capitalists and blockaded by the Yankee imperialists," Cuba could not wait for the revolution to conquer the rest of Latin America in "ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five, or thirty years." It was forced to enter the "socialist camp" and enlist in political and diplomatic maneuvers with bourgeois governments in Latin America and elsewhere. This policy has been followed systematically ever since.
It could be argued that, in the realm of theory, documents written by the Cuban leaders have stated the need to give an international dimension to the construction of socialism, and, above all, that Havana's most important foreign-policy initiatives over the last three or four years were motivated by an internationalist conception of the struggle against imperialism. ° We neither deny nor minimize such aspects; in particular, we in no way question that the Cuban intervention in the Angolan war, and Cuba's aid to the Ethiopian revolution, have helped to weaken the foothold of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism in general in Africa. But this overall judgment cannot make us lose sight of a number of other elements.
1. Cuban foreign policy follows that of the USSR as far as the major questions are concerned. For years it has been impossible to detect the slightest criticism or reservations toward Moscow on the part of the Cubans. The Soviet Union and its loyal allies are glorified in extravagant terms and held up as a beacon of internationalism and socialist democracy.
Here are two examples among the many
Lack of revolutionary democratic structures is a serious problem ...
that could be given. Granma has not hesitated to describe the Soviet constitution as "a monument to fundamental human rights" without worrying about whether the proclamations in that constitution are actually carried out!
During his visit to Moscow in February 1979, Raul Castro made this statement to the head of the Soviet bureaucracy:
You are the highest-ranking leader of the party that is leading the Soviet state toward new and higher peaks of progress and prosperity for the people, and that practices a Leninist foreign policy in the interest of the peoples, of peace, of security, and of the future of humanity.
The positions taken toward the United States in a more recent period have not involved any concession that can legitimately be criticized. But they fall within the framework of peaceful coexistence, which has traditionally been the recurring theme of the Soviet bureaucracy's policies.
2. The Cuban leaders have renounced all criticism of the Communist parties of Latin America, whose strategic conceptions and tactical approaches are presented in a favorable light, and with whom they have signed joint documents. Occasional hesitations-for example, in regard to the Argentine CP's attitude toward Videla''-have never been translated into explicit criticisms, and, in any case, they change nothing in the overall picture. This picture includes the Cuban CP's acceptance of the policy of collaboration with sectors of the "national" bourgeoisie and with governments that reflect their interests, and, what is even worse, the glorification of bourgeois movements, governments, and individuals as revolutionary (Peru is a classic example of this).
3. While during the 1960s the Cuban leadership clearly explained that the Sino- Soviet conflict, because of the forms it had taken and its dynamic, was having a negative effect on the anti-imperialist struggle, particularly on the struggle of the Vietnamese against U.S. imperialism, it later took the side of the Soviet bureaucracy without any reservations, becoming a leading participant in the polemic against Peking (in his twentieth anniversary speech, Castro compared China to Hitler's Germany).
4. The Cuban leadership not only maintains cordial relations with the capitalist countries of western Europe, but it also hands out good marks to some of their representatives. For example, during the visit of the Spanish premier to Cuba, Castro said verbatim: "The transition in Spain is being carried out in a brilliant and progressive manner. Spain's future seemed doubtful at first, but it has become clear that nothing amiss is happening there. ... Suárez is a capable and brilliant man, and, together with Juan Carlos, has written a very important chapter in Spanish history." This indicates, for one thing, that Castro no longer has any reservations about the policy of the West European Communist parties, particularly the Spanish Cr except, of course, where their attitude toward Moscow is concerned).
But let us examine Cuba's policy in Africa. Castro's view that Africa is now the weakest link of imperialism is at least disputable. But this is a secondary question. What is not secondary is that the Cubans present as socialist or "working toward socialism" not only Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia, but also Benin and Guinea. (With regard to Ethiopia, Castro characterized the revolution in that country as a combination of the French and Bolshevik revolutions.) Even more serious is their acceptance of one of the founding principles of the Organization of African Unity, a veritable "holy alliance" in Africa, namely, the principle of the inviolability of borders determined as we know, by the interests of the colonialists and neocolonialists without ever consulting the peoples or nationalities concerned.12
The Cuban intervention in the Angolan
Ir played, we terent an ingressive role var plaved It was motivated by an internationalist impulse. But the same cannot be said for the presence of Cuban troops in Angola now. The Angolan regime, which signed agreements with some of the most reactionary neocolonial regimes, and established a modus vivendi with imperialism itself, notably in regard to the oil reserves in the Cabinda enclave, is a neocolonial regime and in no sense a workers state. It has not hesitated, nor does it hesitate, to harshly repress its left opponents, who have ties with sectors of the masses and speak for their legitimate struggles around economic demands and democratic rights. Whatever the subjective intentions of the leaders-and that goes double for the sentiments of the Cuban masses-the Cuban contingent is objectively helping to build or consolidate a neocolonial regime.
Similar considerations apply to Ethiopia. The Cubans must be given credit for intervening, with heavy sacrifices, to support the struggle of a neocolonial country against imperialist attacks or maneuvers, direct or indirect. But their participation in the military operations in the Ogaden already raised questions, inasmuch as a national question might have existed (it is necessary to consider how independent the Somali question was or could have been, in the broader context of an operation in which reactionary forces hostile to the Ethiopian revolution were unquestionably involved).
In any event, when the war shifted to the north, with the objective of crushing the Eritrean fighters, no more doubt was permissible. The Addis Ababa regime was denying the right of self-determination to a people who had been struggling for their independence for about twenty years. Of course, Cuba partly took its distance by not participating directly in the military operations, and by declaring on several occasions that the Eritrean question had to be settled through negotiations. But such a declaration was by and large theoretical, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it maintained its military support to the Ethiopian regime, allowing it to concentrate its efforts in the north, and on the other hand, it stated that a political solution could not put the unity of the Ethiopian state in question. Since the crucial point is precisely that the Eritreans do not
The Cuban intervention in the Angolan war played a progressive role ...
want to remain within that state and are struggling for their independence, the Cuban position in fact took the side of the Addis Ababa regime.
The question of whether or not Cuba acted independently of Moscow is, from this angle, relatively unimportant. In the specific case, Moscow's and Havana's positions are not entirely identical. It is probable, furthermore, that the decision to intervene in Angola was originally made independently of Moscow. But in the first place, an independeni decision does not signify a conflicting decision. Second, and more importantly, Cuba could not and cannot get involved to the degree it has without an agreement with the USSR, which it heavily depends on, from the economic as well as military standpoint. In the last analysis, whatever the partial differentiations, Cuba's international policy today is, on the whole, part of the international policy of the Soviet bureau-
The repeated proclamations of friendship and loyalty are not just rhetoric tailored to the occasion, but reflect a real situation. 13 Cuba and the Other Workers States:
Similarities and Differences
In a 1975 article (see "Problems of the Cuban Workers State," Intercontinental Press, March 15, 1976, p. 408), we drew attention to the fact that "aside from some differences stemming from specific factors (socioeconomic context before the revolution, the formation and evolution of leading groups), largely analogous conceptions and methods have tended to prevail in the transitional societies that have emerged to date." Since then, this tendency has intensified further, not only in the macroscopic case of China, but also as far as Cuba is concerned.
We will not go back over the typical features of a workers state, which naturally show an identity between Cuba and the other workers states. But increasingly close affinities are appearing in other areas, such as forms of economic management that exclude real participation by the masses in the major decisions; the priority placed on material incentives; acceptance and even attempts at theoretical justification of the supposed inevitability of variations in income and standard of living within the working class and all the more so between working classes and other social layers.
Still more important is the fact that, although to a different degree and as a result of different processes, Cuba, like the other workers states, is characterized by the absence of institutions of socialist democracy. The big decisions remain the prerogative of small leading groups that dominate the state and the party. Then, like the other workers states, Cuba theorizes about and practices the principle of the single party and its leading role in regard to all the mass organizations and political and social structures. Within this party-as in the trade unions—it is forbidden to form tendencies or groupings. Finally, whatever the nuances of expression, the construction of socialism is conceived also by the Cuban leaders within the framework of a national state. Hence the inevitable tendency to subordinate the interests of the world's struggling masses to the needs of maintaining and defending that state.
Some will counter this assessment by recalling the specific historical origin of the Cuban revolution and the Castroist leadership, the role that they played in the 1960s, and the subjective intentions of the leading group, including up to the present. 4 But the decisive criterion is: What mechanisms were or are operating, what results have they produced, what is the dynamic that is taking shape?
We repeat: It is a primary observation that, twenty years after the victory of the revolution, a genuine socialist democracy does not exist. Historical experience has demonstrated that it is precisely the lack of organs of socialist democracy-or the crushing of them-that opens the road to bureaucratization. Especially in a country still marked by poverty, despite the progress made, bureaucratization is inevitable within the framework of a national state and the given political conditions. The problem is to find out what proportions this phenomenon has reached, whether or not the bureaucracy has become a genuine crystallized social layer, cut off from the working class and other working layers; whether it is now essentially conditioned by the desire to defend by any means necessary its powers and privileges.
Revolutionary Marxists have always tried to distinguish the different phases of a process, not to confuse the seeds of a phenomenon with its full flowering, or incipient tendencies with their culmination. At the same time, they have rejected any and all fatalist attitudes; sociopolitical processes do not take place with the inevitability of meteorological occurrences. It is a well-known fact that Trotsky began to criticize tendencies toward bureaucratization beginning in 1923 (Lenin did so as well), but it was not until the beginning of the 1930s that he postulated the qualitative degeneration of the workers state, and then stated the necessity for a political revolution against the bureaucratic regime. He did this on the basis of an overall assessment, taking all the factors of a combined process into account.!5
We say explicitly that we do not possess all the necessary data at the present time. There is a particular deficiency in regard to a crucial point-the extent of bureaucratic privileges. Still, there can be no question that such privileges exist, and that the bureaucrats-not necessarily the central leaders-enjoy a higher standard of living than the masses from all standpoints. It also seems clear to us that the bureaucrats generally tend to defend the positions of power or authority that are the source of their privileges. The fact that it is the middle-echelon bureaucrats who play the most conservative role has only a relative importance; the same phenomenon occurred in the beginning in the Soviet Union.
But we consider that at the present stage the privileges have not assumed the proportions they have in the other workers states. What is more, the extent to which there has been a crystallization of bureaucratic layers and their powers is smaller beyond comparison. This is also reflected in the fact that the leaders have and tend to maintain relations with the masses which, while marked by paternalism, do not exhibit the same authoritarian traits as in the other workers states, and the fact that the masses do not, in general, consider their leaders as an alien or hostile group.
Moreover, there is not and has not been the same type of repression in Cuba as in the USSR, Eastern Europe, or China. The political prisoners—whose number is rapidly diminishing-are nearly all actual counterrevolutionaries, usually guilty of concrete actions against the workers state. In addition, as we have said, the political structures are not completely ossified, and do allow for some partial forms of democracy.
Finally, despite its alignment with Mosmentioned previously.
cow and a number of positions taken in the course of the last decade, the Cuban leadership has not shown itself to be insensitive to the needs of internationalist struggles. Above all, it has never been guilty of any crime or betrayal comparable to those the leaderships of other workers states and Communist parties have been guilty of. What Attitude to Take?
Some will say that if the tendencies we ourselves have pointed to continue to develop, bureaucratic degeneration in the strictest sense is inevitable, and that there is little evidence pointing to the possibility that these tendencies will be reversed in the short or medium term.
We repeat: any and all fatalist approaches must be rejected.
In a 1933 article on the class nature of the Soviet state, Trotsky wrote:
Can it be cured? Will not further attempts at cures mean a fruitless expenditure of precious time? The question is badly put. By cures we understand not all sorts of artificial measures separate and apart from the world revolutionary movement but a further struggle under the banner of Marxism. Merciless criticism of the Stalinist bureaucracy, training the cadres of the new International, resurrecting the fighting capacity of the world proletarian vanguard-this is the essence of the "cure." It coincides with the fundamental direction of historic progress.
During the last few years-appropriately enough-our opponents have told us more than
"are losing time in vain" by once that we occupying ourselves with curing the Comintern. We never promised anybody that we would cure the Comintern. We only refused, until the decisive test, to pronounce the sick as dead or hopelessly ill.™
Such a methodological approach is needed today in regard to Cuba. The point is not to draw conclusions on the basis of insufficient data, or to declare that, in any case, the process of bureaucratization is irreversible. It is practice that will decide, and it is precisely the possibility of a test of practice that exists.
The characterization of Cuba, not as a degenerated workers state, but as a workers state with very grave bureaucratic deformations, in no way prevents us from affirming the need for a struggle against the bureaucratic tendencies and methods that have existed for a fairly long time now. It does not prevent us from making a critique of the crucial questions, condemning whatever gets in the way of building a genuine socialist democracy, or fighting for substantial changes.
This means that, in the field of propaganda, revolutionary Marxists must explain all their conceptions of the structure and functioning of a society of transition, including, in the first place, freedom of expression, the press, organization, and so on. Moreover, to demand the right of organization-in the framework of a new society, and with obedience to its basic laws-does not automatically mean one favors the formation of a new Communist Party, just as the struggle for the right to self-determination does not automatically imply the goal of separation.
In an arena of more immediate struggles, it will be necessary to fight for freedom of discussion of all economic and political questions at all levels (including the right to be informed about discussions that take place, including in the top leadership bodies), and for the freedom to publish newspapers, books, journals, without any censorship whatever. At the same time, it will be necessary to fight for real democratization of the trade unions, for their real independence from the party and the state, for the right to form tendencies while adhering to discipline in action. The same right must be demanded inside the party.
On international questions, there will have to be a struggle for a clear distinction to be made between the foreign policy of the government and the international policy of the party. If, for example, the government considers it tactically useful to establish good relations with Peru or Panama, this should not involve praise of the governments or leaders of those countries in the party's propaganda.
Cuba must continue to engage in internationalist actions against imperialism and the native ruling classes, but it must refuse to offer any military or political aid that helps to consolidate neocolonial regimes. In the case of Ethiopia, it will have to recognize that the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination takes priority over maintaining the unity of the Ethiopian state, and that goes double for the "principle" of the inviolability of African borders.
Finally, Cuba will have to establish normal relations with all the workers states, and, linking up with Che Guevara's fight during the 1960s, take the initiative in the struggle to reconstitute a united front of the workers states against imperialism, putting a stop to a division that has already had tragic consequences, and is giving rise to an even more dangerous dynamic.
A struggle for such goals would allow for the test of practice we have spoken of. If it had an impact on sectors of the masses, it would inevitably have repercussions on the cadres and the leadership itself, leading to differentiations and realignments. This is an extremely difficult perspective to implement, given the subjective forces. But it is a matter of a potential created by objective conditions. It would be an error to ignore it and resign ourselves in a fatalistic way to an "irreversible" process of bureaucratization.
Notes
1. All these figures were published by the Cuban press, including Bohemia and Granma, for the twentieth anniversary.
2. The housing problem was discussed on numerous occasions. See, for example, Castro's speech to the trade-union congress (Granma, December 17, 1978).
3. See Granma, December 12, 1978. Cases of school absenteeism were also condemned.
4. See Granma, No. 4, 1978.
5. For information on the composition of the CDRs, etc., see Granma, Nos. 40 and 41, 1977.
6. In his speech on the anniversary of the revolution, Raul Castro used a similar formulation in regard to the "three factors that explain the consolidation of the revolutionary government in Cuba," namely, "party internal unity based on democratic centralism and the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles; unity of the people around the party and the supreme leader of the revolution, Comrade Fidel; unity of all Cubans with the socialist community, and above all, with Lenin's great homeland, the Soviet Union" (Bohemia, No. 1, 1979).
7. See also the speech by Jesús Montané, member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, and head of the Central Committee's bureau of mass organizations. Montané reaffirmed the leading role of the party, while adding that "the party has a special interest in seeing to it that the mass organiza. tions generally maintain the independent functions and authority that belong to them." To make this more specific, he added that it is necessary to follow the example of Lazaro Peña. The reference is anything but reassuring; Peña has long symbolized the Stalinist trade-union bureaucrat, and in 1966, he was relieved of his functions.
8. See, for example, an article by Jesús Orta Ruiz, published in Granma, November 12, 1977, which we commented on in Rouge, December 27, 1977. (See "A Question for Fidel Castro," by Livio Maitan, in Intercontinental Press/Inprecor, January 16, 1978, p. 52.)
9. See Castro's speech on July 26, 1972.
10. See, for example, a text published by Granma, December 11, 1977.
11. Nevertheless, the Cuban press has published analyses such as the following: "Some sectors within the government try to enforce the ban by prohibitions, arrests and other such measures, while other officials (including President Jorge Videla) have held certain limited forms of dialogue with politicians and labor leaders" (Granma, December 31, 1978).
12. See Granma, December 11, 1977; May 22, 1977; and July 17, 1977.
13. A recent confirmation is provided by the complete identity of views on the Indochina crisis of the end of 1978 and beginning of 1979. It is significant, among other things, that Raul Castro paid a visit to Moscow at the height of the armed conflict between Vietnam and China.
14. We should explain, in passing, that changes in the composition of the leading group from the standpoint of origins are not in themselves decisive. In other words, we do not believe that coming from the "historic Castroist" movement is an absolute guarantee and that coming from the PSP is a danger. To our mind, a man like Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has shown himself on several occasions to be less "Stalinist" than Raul Castro.
15. See also, in this context, my 1975 article
16. "The Class Nature of the Soviet State," in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1933-34), New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972, p. 105. It should be recalled that at the time, Trotsky had not yet called for political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy.