The Chinese invasion of Vietnam, launched on February 17, has now lasted twenty days. While it appears that Beijing's (Peking) forces are now in the process of withdrawing, it is not yet certain that the operation is really over.
A sizable military force was mobilized. According to Chinese sources, 170,000 soldiers entered Vietnam, backed up by several hundred thousand troops massed in the border area. Major weaponry was also brought into the fighting, including heavy artillery, a great deal of armor, and major aircraft consisting of a thousand or so planes (which seem to have been used only for tactical support missions). The Chinese troops entered Vietnamese territory through penetration routes spread along the entire 1,200-kilometer border separating the two countries. They sometimes pushed up to fifty or eighty kilometers inside the country, capturing several provincial capitals.
Obviously, what is involved is not—as Beijing implied at the start of the operation—a "border incident," or an action of "limited" scope aimed at stopping Vietnamese "incursions" and "provocations." It is a genuine act of war. This means that the situation that has been created in the area, with the rapid worsening of border battles between Cambodia and Vietnam, the overturn of the Pol Pot regime by the FUNKSN (Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation) and the Vietnamese regular army, as well as the Chinese intervention in Vietnam, is without precedent in the history of conflicts between workers states.
There is no simple explanation, relying on a single cause, that makes it possible to understand how the situation could have deteriorated so swiftly and completely so soon after a revolutionary victory over American imperialism that remains one of the biggest events in the history of the international workers movement. It is necessary to bear in mind the different factors and contradictions, and the way in which they combined and overlapped with one another to the point of making the disputes between the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Chinese regimes degenerate into military conflict.
The Chinese Bureaucracy's Reasons
While maintaining the fiction of a "limited retaliatory operation in response to border encroachments by the Vietnamese," in various press statements and interviews the Chinese leaders made known several of the reasons that had prompted them to intervene massively in Vietnam. Their aim was simultaneously to:
Retaliate for the toppling of the Pol Pot regime.
Strike a blow at Vietnam's military prestige and capacity.
Weaken the power of the "Asian Cuba."
Limit the influence of Soviet "social imperialism" over its Indochinese ally and throughout the peninsula.
Take advantage of the general relationship of forces in Southeast Asia, a strategic zone owing to the existence of the maritime straits between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
In addition, at a time when U.S. imperialism had just suffered a major defeat in the region, Beijing wished to show the West-whose weakness in Africa and the Near and Middle East was publicly deplored by Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiaop'ing)-that it paid to stand up to the USSR.
Beijing probably knew that its occupation of a large portion of Vietnamese territory could only be temporary. The toppling of the Pol Pot regime, a government that was supported financially and militarily by the Chinese leadership, was definitely a factor in determining the timing and scope of the intervention, if only because the drive into Cambodia by the Vietnamese regular army had given the Chinese bureaucracy-and imperialismthe signal to launch a furious campaign of invective against Hanoi.
But the statements by the Chinese themselves confirm what an earlier analysis of the events of the last few years in Indochina and China had indicated-namely, that the Chinese intervention in Vietnam is basically not a specific response to recent moves by the Vietnamese leadership, but is part of the Chinese leadership's total policy, in the region and internationally. It is necessary to understand the roots of this policy.
The political conflict between China and Vietnam is nothing new. Signs of a budding struggle for influence can be found very early on in the history of the Indochinese Communist movement. Less than a year after the victory of the Chinese revolution, for example, Ho Chi Minh felt the need to point out that the Communist Party of Indochina was numerically the strongest in the region after the Chinese Communist Party, that it was the first to have seized power in Asia (in 1945), and that it would have a special duty and responsibility to aid in the liberation of Southeast Asia (Conference of Party Cadres, January 18, 1949).
For his part, Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung), in a document published in 1939, listed Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Annam (Vietnam's former name) among the "territories" and "independent states" of China that had hoon santured hu the imnerialiet that had been captured by the imperialist forces ("The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"). A map published in China in 1954 reflected the same opinion in graphic form.
But it was during the course of the wars in Indochina that political relations between the two parties gradually became strained. By the time of the Geneva conference, Beijing, together with Moscow, was already pressing the Vietnamese Communists to allow the fate of Laos and Cambodia to be separated from that of Vietnam and to accept a temporary partition of Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel. In the years that followed, the Vietnamese CP was still closer ideologically to Beijing than to Moscow. But in the 1960s, differences began to multiply, hardening in 1971 when Hanoi learned of the Chinese leadership's invitation to Nixon to visit Beijing
The Chinese goal is to weaken the Vietnamese regime . .
at a time when attacks on Vietnam were escalating (see "The Deepening Conflict Between Peking and Hanoi," Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor, October 16, 1978, p. 1138).
From that time on, the Chinese leadership's policy on Indochina combined four elements: (1) the desire to ensure political control over its "own" sphere of influence; (2) the final crystallization of bureaucratic interests in China proper; (3) the worsening of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and (4) the new opportunity for Beijing to embark upon a policy of peaceful coexistence with imperialism, which, because of its difficul ties in Vietnam, had been forced to abandon its policy of "containment and rollback."
From then on, the Chinese bureaucracy followed a policy analogous to the one initiated by the Soviet bureaucracy. Corresponding to the latter's determination to ensure its control over the world Communist movement and to weaken the revolutions and leaderships that did not bend to its dictates was Beijing's determination to do likewise in Asia, to ensure the stability of the bureaucratic regime in its own country. The needs of peaceful coexistence made it all the more important to control revolutionary developments, and made the emergence of independent communist powers that much more threatening. Finally, interbureaucratic conflicts were exacerbated by the rivalry between Moscow and
Beijing for leadership of the workers movement, national liberation struggles, and the third world, and for the good graces of imperialism.
The Chinese leadership has set itself the the Vietnamese goal of weakening regime-not because it has made a deal with U.S. imperialism on this point and wants to prove its good intentions in this way, but because of the logic of the Chinese bureaucracy's own interests. It wants to bolster the stability of its internal rule, while at the same time strengthening its own influence in the region, its capacity to counteract Moscow's anti-Chinese policy (once again, we should remind ourselves that it is the Soviet bureaucracy that bears the historic responsibility for the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict), and its ability to carry on a policy of peaceful coexistence with imperialism.
Only in this way is it possible to understand the importance Beijing places on weakening the Vietnamese regime. The Chinese leadership must pay a considerable price for its intervention in Vietnam. It enables Hanoi to regain the initiative in relation to certain third world countries which had condemned its occupation of Cambodia; it is costly in terms of lives, matériel, and financial resources; it might stir up considerable opposition among the Chinese people, and even within the bureaucracy; and it worries the industrial and financial circles that are investing in China and counting on the regime's stability to guarantee their profits.
The Imperialists' Reasons
If Beijing was able to act as it did against Vietnam, it was also because it had assurances that Washington would not condemn its moves. At the time of Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States-during which he made resounding statements about the need for a China-U.S. alliance against the USSR-it is very likely that he received assurances on this point. The response of the Western capitals to the Chinese intervention did in fact show that the imperialists were not neutral in this conflict. These reactions were not, of course, completely homogeneous. But in general, the major Western powers were satisfied with a few diplomatic protests, often, moreover, linking the demand for withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, which could only make Beijing happy.
In particular, the concrete attitude of the imperialists contrasted glaringly with what it had been in January 1979, after the Vietnamese forces entered Pompenh, and even in January 1978, after the out break of the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict. From this standpoint, it is extremely significant that U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal went ahead with his official visit to Beijing and signed new agreements concerning U.S. holdings in
China, which were very favorable to Beijing. It is also very significant that the British government signed a trade agreement with China, which probably included the sale of the Harrier vertical-takeoff military jet, at a time when battles were raging inside Vietnam.
This does not mean, however, that
Washington is prepared to pay the price of a break with Moscow in exchange for an alliance with Beijing. The fact is that U.S.
CHINA
Deny VIET NAM
HANO
LAOS
GULF OF TONKIN
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
THAILAND
imperialism is following a global policy based on maintaining peaceful coexistence with the USSR, at the same time that it is embarking upon a new policy of peaceful coexistence with China. It needs the USSR for key strategic reasons, having to do, among other things, with the worldwide military balance of forces in which Beijing plays only a small role, and with the need to do all in its power to block serious revolutionary developments in areas where Beijing's influence is negligible, such as Europe, the Near and Middle East, and Africa. It needs China, because the consent of the Chinese leadership is indispensable to the U.S. effort to restabilize its system of rule in East Asia, where its domination has been deeply shaken after the defeat of U.S. forces in Indochina.
Thus, the response of the U.S. government reflects the partially contradictory needs of its international (and domestic) policy. East Asia is one of the great strategic areas in the world today. However, U.S. imperialism's ability to act-and that of the imperialist powers in general—is at present limited there, especially since Washington must concentrate its attention on other areas, beginning with the Near and Middle East.
In these conditions, its pursuit (with Tokyo) of peaceful coexistence with China is doubly important. In this regard, it should be recalled that the recently signed treaties between Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington include the famous "antihegemony" (i.e., anti-Soviet) clause, which the Chinese leadership insisted on including, and which the U.S. and Japan could just as easily have done without (see "Japan-China Treaty a Kick in the Teeth for Peoples of Asia," Intercontinental
Press/ Inprecor, December 11, 1978, p. 1372).
What's true for East Asia is all the more true for Indochina. That is where the imperialist foothold has been most weakened by the defeat of the U.S. expeditionary forces. That is where the gap has been made, and where the danger of a new "domino" falling within a few years has appeared-Thailand, where since 1973 the political and social crisis has been glaringly apparent. It is also-and this is no small fact-where U.S. imperialism was beaten for the first time when it directly committed the full weight of its authority and counterrevolutionary resources.
But just because imperialism has been weakened does not mean that it has become inactive and has pulled back from Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it responded to the victory of the Indochinese revolution the same way it always has in the past-by refusing to recognize an accomplished fact, by doing everything possible to isolate and weaken the new revolutionary regimes. It is this fundamental response of imperialism, aimed at limiting the repercussions of the revolutionary victory it was unable to prevent, that explains the U.S. decision to keep up the economic blockade of Vietnam, to deny diplomatic recognition to the new regimes, and to use Thailand as a base for stepping up its provocations and pressures. And it is precisely because its capacity for direct action remains limited today that it has an interest in letting China pursue (for its own reasons) a policy of strangling the Vietnamese regime.
Historically, imperialism aims, in Indochina as elsewhere, to restore its domination through counterrevolution. The same cannot be said for China, which seeks to ensure its own sphere of influence. But Beijing and Washington have now united on the need to weaken the Vietnamese regime by taking advantage of its economic, social, and internal political problems, the tensions that have arisen within the Indochinese revolution, Vietnam's isolation in the region and internationally, and the possibility for keeping up strong military pressures on its borders. The current crisis in Indochina has become so explosive both because of the gravity of interbureaucratic conflicts in the region, and because the imperialists have kept up their counterrevolutionary pressures.
The Crisis in Indochina
The extraordinary revolutionary dynamism that characterized the liberation struggle in Vietnam, and the potential power of a unified Indochina under Hanoi's leadership, explain why both the Chinese leadership and the imperialist powers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) place so much importance on a new type of containment policy in the area. The gravity of the situation-resulting from the extreme state of deprivation the Indochinese societies are in after a century of colonial and neocolonial domination and forty years of imperialist wars; the sharpness of the tensions that have emerged in Indochina, chiefly because of the importance of the national question, which is visible in many forms in the region; and the weight of the original bureaucratic deformations of the regimes that came out of these revolutions-is such that the effectiveness of the measures both Beijing and Washington are using to strangle them should not be underestimated.
The Indochinese revolutions are now harshly feeling the backlash from the fact that the revolution in the imperialist coun tries has been delayed. The countries of Indochina, which are extremely underdeveloped, cannot look to the highly industrialized socialist countries for fraternal aid. Left to fend for themselves for too long, this cutting edge of the world proletariat, has been exhausted by the unimaginable devastation wrought by forty years of war, including more than ten years of bloody military escalation that is unparalleled in world history.
In face of imperialist intervention in countries where peasants constitute the great majority of the population, these revolutions had to dissolve into prolonged wars of national liberation, a process that, despite its strength, encouraged the development of nationalist ideologies, the preponderance of the military in society, and bureaucratic deformations in the young workers states.
This should be remembered by those in the imperialist countries who are quick to wax indignant over "human-rights violations" in Vietnam, but are just as quick to forget the responsibilities of imperialism; who are ready to denounce the Vietnamese regime alongside the same people who were responsible for the colonial and neocolonial wars; and who do not concern themselves with appeals for solidarity actions, including organizing material aid to these struggling revolutions.
It is impossible to understand either the rapidity with which the situation in Indochina has deteriorated, or some of the choices that have been made by the Indochinese regimes, without really weighing the economic, social, demographic, and ecological difficulties-which, moreover, have been aggravated by three successive years of natural disasters-that these countries had to face upon emerging from war.
For one thing, it is essential to understand these difficulties in order to grasp the importance that the Cambodian question has gained since the victory. The unity of the Indochinese Communist movement could not withstand the unevenness that existed among the revolutionary processes taking place in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In Cambodia, a new leadership was installed in 1960 at the head of the
CP, which increasingly began to come into conflict with the Vietnamese leadership (see "Origins of the Conflict Between Hanoi and Pnompenh," in Intercontinental Press/Inprecor, February 27, 1978, p. 240).
The policy of the Cambodian leadership in the wake of the April 1975 victory combined very thoroughgoing anticapitalist measures (to the point of a nearly total abolition of private ownership and the almost complete elimination of money), the temporary sealing of the country's borders (except for its ties to China), the immediate introduction of terrorist methods of rule (which led not only to the destruction of potential hotbeds of counterrevolution, but also to the deportation and political atomization of the majority of the toiling population), the forced collectivization of economic and social life, and the development of an exaggerated kind of nationalism that provided practically the only ideological cement for the regime, along with calls for productivity.
These measures are not unremindful of Stalinist methods during the period of forced collectivization. They are ascribable to the Khmer Rouge regime's desire to consolidate a very weak social base, given the country's extreme economic backwardness and the Pol Pot leadership's decision to seal off the country and to systematically break the ties linking the Cambodian revolution to the general dynamic of the Indochinese revolution. These policies and methods, put into effect in a country like Cambodia, ushered in a series of deep crises.
• New splits occurred between the socalled Khmer Rouge wing and the "Khmer Vietminh" wing (of Indochinese tradition) within the Cambodian Communist movement, as well as within the Khmer Rouge wing itself. Wider and wider purges swept down on dissidents, who were accused of being agents of the Vietnamese. A number of localized rebellions occurred in 1978 in several regions of the country, particularly in the army.
• The regime benefited for a while from the weakness of the opposition (both bourgeois and working-class), and from the political apathy that the population had been plunged into. But its policy nonetheless endangered the very existence of the young Cambodian workers state that came into being in 1975, based on the collapse of the imperialist forces and the destruction of the social, economic, and political basis for bourgeois rule. The mass disaffection aroused by such a terrorist policy could not, in fact, but encourage the eventual return in force of right-wing nationalist currents, unless an opposition determined to preserve the gains of the revolution while doing away with the terrorist methods of rule gained the upper hand.
• The tensions inherent in the Indochinese revolution were exacerbated by the breaking of ties between Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Not only did this make it impossible to implement joint development plans, but in addition, the common front dissolved in the face of imperialist maneuvers. This was particularly apparent in 1977, when Thailand decided on a temporblockade of Laos, which is heavily ary dependent on Thai supply routes, and when Pompenh openly renounced its ties with Hanoi and Vientiane.
• The political conflict between the Khmer and Vietnamese regimes, which was inevitable under these circumstances, falls within the framework of the interbureaucratic clashes that are tearing the region apart. Despite the deep contradiction between the ideological orientation of the Pol Pot leadership and that of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing in fact decided to give general support to the Cambodian regime, both in the military and in the financial and diplomatic spheres.
Beginning in mid-1977, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly with respect both to relations between Vietnam and Cambodia and between Vietnam and China. In September, Pol Pot made a triumphal visit to Beijing, at the very moment when fighting of unprecedented severity had broken out on the Vietnam- Cambodia border. While unofficially making sharp criticism of the Pol Pot leadership's policy, the Chinese leadership continually deepened its support to Pnompenh.
By the end of 1978, the number of Cambodian troops massed on the Vietnamese border was said to have reached 70,000. The army's military equipment was improved considerably through Chinese deliveries of artillery and plans (MIG-198). Its officers were aided by a large number of Chinese "advisers." Vietnamese casualties were significant, and economically important cities and districts were within shelling distance of the border areas. In several places, the Vietnamese army set up headquarters several kilometers inside Cambodian territory.
In March-April 1978, Hanoi decided to nationalize private commerce in order to smash the social resistance of the Sino- Vietnamese bourgeoisie in the Cholon district of Saigon. Beijing grabbed the opportunity to launch a vast campaign of denunciation against the Vietnamese leadership, and to officially suspend its economic aid. In this climate, 160,000 Hoas (Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry) fled to China from northern Vietnam. Tensions mounted rapidly on the Sino-Vietnamese border. In the international arena, the Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. treaties were signed, while Vietnam joined Comecon and signed a twenty-five-year treaty with the Soviet Union.
It was in this context that, only a few weeks after the official creation of a Khmer opposition front, the FUNKSN, Hanoi sent its regular army into Cambodia and ensured the toppling of the Pol Pot regime.
It was essential to support the development of any Cambodian opposition that could ensure preservation of the gains of the revolution, while promising to do away with the methods of forced collectivization and mass terrorism of the Pol Pot leadership. The future of the Cambodian revolution was at stake, and the program of the FUNKSN includes those two points. But it was necessary to give the FUNKSN time to demonstrate its growing implantation among the masses, to show that it was capable of overturning the Pol Pot regime on its own-with whatever aid, of course, that Vietnam could provide; but above all, owing to the authority that it had gained in the struggle.
However, in December-January, the Vietnamese leadership grew dissatisfied with supporting the FUNKSN's development politically and militarily, and with attacking the battle force massed along its border. It provoked the downfall of the Pol Pot regime, and set up the Heng Samrin regime, by organizing an invasion of its regular troops over the entire country before the FUNKSN had had time to really develop.
The reports that reach us on the situation in Cambodia remain contradictory and difficult to verify. "Khmers Serei," tied to the former Lon Nol regime, and unlikely to be suspected of pro-Vietnamese sympathies, report that the population has given a favorable reception to the Heng Samrin regime. Whatever the case, Vietnam's decision must be condemned. What is involved is not merely a question of tactics and timing, but a deeper issue related to the decisive importance of the national question.
Given the way it was set up, the new regime cannot help but be extremely dependent on its Vietnamese ally. But in any case, the pace at which an opposition to the Pol Pot leadership develops could not be artificially accelerated without doing grave harm to its qualitative political and social strengthening. The only way to avoid endangering the quality of relations between the Vietnamese and Khmer nationalities is to promote the creation of a Cambodian leadership capable of showing in practice that it makes autonomous decisions and is politically independent from the Vietnamese leadership.
Such is not the case today. And we cannot expect a leadership like that of the Vietnamese CP, which, in its own country, defends the monopoly of the bureaucracy over information, discussions, and political decisions, to fully recognize the right of national minorities to self-determination. However, such practical recognition of the right to self-determination on the part of national minorities is indispensable to the establishment of a genuine socialist federation of the united states of Indochina. In these conditions, the intervention of Hanoi's regular forces in Cambodia can only reinforce the power of the Vietnamese bureaucracy in Indochina, nationalist tendencies, and the weight of the military in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
The Indochinese revolutions are going through a period of very great social, economic, and political difficulties. This is true not only for Cambodia and Laos, but also for Vietnam (see "Vietnam-Three Years After Victory," in Intercontinental
DENG XIAOPING
Press/ Inprecor, November 13, 1978, p. 1250). It is these difficulties that the Chinese bureaucracy is betting on in carrying out its policies toward the Indochinese regimes.
The results of its military intervention in Vietnam-at least in the present state of affairs-seem greatly limited. The military "lesson" is not convincing-Chinese casualties appear to have been heavy, and the performance of China's army mediocre, if the voluntary "indiscretions" in Beijing, which Deng Xiaoping will take advantage of to speed up his "modernization" program, are to be believed. As for the Vietnamese, they did not need to mobilize the bulk of their regular troops in headon battles in order to hold back the Chinese forces (except perhaps around Lang Son), and apparently have not withdrawn many of their divisions from Cambodia.
But Beijing knows that the economic and social price Hanoi must pay to defend itself is quite high, and getting higher as long as the military pressure is kept up. The international situation gives the Chinese leadership relatively free rein to follow a policy aimed at weakening, isolating, and wearing out the Vietnamese regime. One of the lessons of the February- March events, in fact, is that the Soviet bureaucracy is not about to stick its neck out too far to help its Vietnamese ally.
In the speech he gave at the height of the Chinese offensive, in Moscow, Brezhnev made it clear that the number-one priority, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, was still peaceful coexistence with imperialism. Following in Deng Xiaoping's footsteps, he proposed an alliance with the West against China. As in the past, during the imperialist war, the USSR gave Vietnam the military aid that it desperately needed. But, also as in the past, the Soviet bureaucracy refused to make a total commitment and to launch an anti-imperialist political offensive capable of forcing the U.S. government to step back in Asia. The USSR wants above all to see the SALT treaty signed, and for the Soviet leadership, as well, the Near and Middle East are now a matter of first priority.
Thus, Beijing knows that nothing threatens to force Washington to reconsider its policy of rebuilding its system of domination in East Asia, and that the USSR will be satisfied with pressure, threats, and warnings to the Chinese leadership "not to go too far." However, the options open to the Chinese bureaucracy in Indochina are sufficiently varied to give it the necessary flexibility to pursue its policy. In the last few years we have seen how Beijing was able to have an effect on the domestic difficulties of the Vietnamese regime (by cutting off aid or playing up the hostilities between the government and the Chinese community in Vietnam), on the contradictions with which the Indochinese revolution is riddled, on the stubbornness of the tribal populations, on the opposition of the ASEAN countries to the strengthening of a unified Indochinese entity, and on Vietnam's international isolation.
Imperialism is profiting from the situa tion to strengthen its hand in Southeast Asia. It has just considerably increased its military aid to the Thai dictatorship. Thus, the liberation movements in the region must now continue their struggle under much more difficult conditions than those that prevailed in the aftermath of the U.S. defeat. In particular, the Thai resistance risks being isolated politically and materially, and its various components may come under heavy pressure to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict (the Thai CP and SP have not taken a position up to now on the current conflicts).
But U.S. imperialism may also try to intervene more directly against the Indochinese revolutions. The return to international prominence of Prince Sihanouk, who has made contact with Thai and Western representatives in Beijing and issued an appeal for the holding of an international conference on Indochina, may enable him to organize a diplomatic and political campaign against Vietnam, and may facilitate the reorganization of counterrevolutionary guerrilla groups based in Thailand. As for Laos, it may suddenly become the scene of new conflicts. The Chinese have strong influence in the northern part of the country, while imperialism may try to reactivate dissident groups starting with the remnants of the Meo general Vang Pao's army, and members of the old feudal caste of southern Laos.
These new threats make it urgent to proclaim our unified, militant solidarity with the liberation struggles in Southeast Asia, and to organize a united front to defend the Indochinese revolutions.