One of the main axes of the theses presented by the party leadership for approval at the upcoming Fifteenth Congress of the Italian CP is an attempt to define the concept of a "third way," which the authors of the document offer as something original. (In fact, this notion was utilized in other periods, notably in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, by Socialist or centrist tendencies.)
A "third way" is supposed to be justified historically by two parallel facts. In the first place, the experience of the USSR and the other "socialist" countries has been marked by "limitations, contradictions, and errors." And "the models followed in these countries cannot be offered as a guide for the socialist transformation of countries such as those in Western Europe."
On the other hand:
While the Social Democratic parties, notably those who have headed or are heading governments in a number of European countries, have brought about important improvements in the economic and social conditions of the working classes, they have not led society outside the logic of capitalism.
The interpretation of these historic experiences is supposed to be the source of Eurocommunism, which Thesis No. 7 defines as follows:
Eurocommunism is not a movement in opposition to the Communist parties and the revolutionary and progressive forces in other countries. Nor is it a movement that claims to offer universally valid solutions. The real situation is that the worldwide movement for emancipation is polycentric. Eurocommunism seeks to offer a specific contribution to the overall process of the affirmation and development of socialist ideals in Europe and throughout the world.
Eurocommunism and Social Democracy
The Italian CP's theses provide new elements for the dossier on the question of the "Social Democratization" of the Communist parties, which, beginning in the 1930s, underwent the process of Staliniza. tion. This document tries, in fact, to draw a dividing line between the Italian CP and the Social Democracy. The keystone of this differentiation remains the position taken toward the October revolution, the USSR, and the other "socialist" countries. Thesis No. 6 states:
The October revolution and the building of new societies first in Russia and subsequently in other countries represented a historic breach in the system of imperialism and capitalist exploi-
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BERLINGUER: Extols austerity as road to "healthier. freer way of life."
tation, giving impetus to national and social revolutions. Great gains were achieved in economic, social, and cultural development. The states that emerged from this revolutionary process have played a decisive role in the world and their contribution is essential in solving any problem.
In other words, for the leaders of the Italian CP, the existence of "socialist countries" continues to constitute an eminently favorable factor for the Communist parties and for the workers movement in general.
Moreover, the Italian CP does not seem ready, at least for the moment, to hold its
, Bad Godesberg congress, that is, to own explicitly remove all references to Marxist theory. It is true that Thesis No. 15 says that the formula used in the party statutes is "restrictive," explaining that the thought of Marx, Engels, and Lenin must not be conceived of as a "doctrinal system." It says, also, that "the formula Marxism-Leninism does not reflect the full deepen their knowledge of
1. Article 5 states that members are expected to "acquire and
Marxism-Leninism and apply its teachings in the solution of concrete questions." Article 2 affirms, on the other hand, that membership in the party is not denied to persons with religious beliefs or with non-Marxist philosophical ideas.
richness of the party's theoretical and philosophic heritage."
But this thesis rejects the fundamental idea of the old and new revisionists, of the theoreticians of a "crisis of Marxism," of the "new philosophers," that is, that the main cause of the degeneration of the USSR and the other "socialist" countries lies in the thought of Marx and Lenin itself.
With respect to Lenin in particular, who in recent months has been the favored target of the Socialists and of a number of Italian intellectuals, Thesis No. 42 says:
Lenin's theoretical and political work must also be examined with a rigorously critical spirit so that its limitations can be understood. But Lenin remains the greatest revolutionist of our century, and his teaching remains essential for studying reality and for attempting to transform it.
Leaving aside the banality of these remarks, there is an obvious concern for maintaining the identity of the Communist Party as distinct from the Social Democracy.
It should be noted that this document tries to offer a little more precise assessment of the process of degeneration in the USSR than other similar texts. It repeats the well-known comments of the French CP on the "limitations" of the critique made in the Twentieth Congress [of the Soviet Communist Party] and about the course culminating in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Among the causes of degeneration, it mentioned the backwardness of the old Russia and "the failure of the socialist revolution in the West."
It deplores the "defects and errors" in the course followed and in the economic and political orientation, such as rigid centralization of planning, total state control of the economy, the forms and tempos of collectivization in agriculture, the fusing of the party and the state.
Thus, the Italian Eurocommunists draw on the legacy of critical analysis left by the oppositions in the USSR in the 1930s and by the principal Marxist historians of this period. But they do not drop the term "socialist countries," which represents an apology for the bureaucracy. What is more, they still consider the bureaucrats who run the Soviet state and CP as the force with which they want to maintain a special relationship. They seek to "normalize" their relationship with these bureaucrats, although in forms different from those of the Stalin era.
The differences between the Eurocommunism of the Italian CP and Social Democracy are less perceptible in the section of the Theses devoted to the party's politicalstrategic perspective.
regards Europe, the
First of all, as document repeats all the themes that the Italian CP has been pushing for years, and which can be summed up as a concept of "democratizing" the Common Market. This is supposed to take the form concretely of endowing a future European parliament with "powers necessary to take initiatives, set political orientation, and exercise supervision over the executive bodies," that is, the form of a supranational state, or at least "a new supranational authority." In this area, there are no differences with the ideas put forward by a certain number of Social Democratic parties.
A no less important point of convergence with Social Democratic parties lies in the fact that while the Italian CP calls for "gradually overcoming" the division of Europe into opposing blocs, it does not challenge "the need for Italy to remain in the Atlantic Alliance." I might add that the Italian bourgeoisie is not going to lose any sleep over the document expressing hope that Europe will abandon "all forms of neocolonialist policy" or its vague references to the celebrated "new international economic order," which now has become a leitmotiv in the ceremonial speeches of heads of state and peripatetic ambassadors.
In the area of national objectives, the document introduces no changes. It combines an ahistorical notion of democracy ("political democracy is the highest institutional form of state organization, including for a socialist state") with the perspective of a mixed economy lasting for an indefinite period. A public and private sector are supposed to coexist under the aegis of "democratic goal setting."
If this perspective were realized, which I think is unlikely in the present stage, even in the form of the "historic compromise," it would not amount to anything substantially more than the British Labour Party, for example, tried to do in its best days.
The essential continuity of this doeument with the past of the Italian CP also shows up in the area of norms for the party's functioning. Thesis No. 16 talks about "new steps forward" that "have to be taken," and Thesis No. 84 indicates the possibility that "the results of consultations and positions taken" will be reflected
"also in rules of the day and documents" that the leading bodies will have to exam. ine and communicate their opinion to "those concerned."
However, the stress is put on reaffirming democratic centralism, as it has been traditionally interpreted by the bureaucrats, needless to say. This means that the right to organize factions or tendencies is explicitly denied under the pretext that they would harden divisions and corrupt the life of the party, by obstructing a "real democratic dialectic."
In fact, the leading group, with a massive and complex apparatus at its disposal, is the only force that can put up an organized fight to put over its point of view. Its critics can express their disagreement only in very small units of the party, or in articles in discussion columns that are few and far between.
Theorizations and Real Context
The authors of the document could not avoid giving a balance sheet of the period following the 1976 elections. They note that there is a serious crisis in the country, specifying that "one of the causes of this crisis lies in the fact that changes in economic policy and political leadership have not been as extensive as required or carried out in the necessary way." That's putting it mildly.
In reality, the Italian CP is going through one of its worst times in the entire postwar period. This is because since it has joined the majority in parliament its conceptions and its orientations are being put to a more rapid and clear test in practice.
For a long time, the leading group in the Italian CP has been presenting its strategy for reformist rationalization, which is often outright minimalist, with a fanfare about "democratic renewal" that is supposed to be prelude to socialist transformation. These declarations are subject to being interpreted in accordance with the most disparate aspirations and desires.
But now, the direct responsibility that the CP has assumed for the decisions in parliament and by the government itself has revealed more and more clearly the gap between the proclamations in the party's documents and the actual context of its policy. Here are a few of the more significant examples.
The Italian CP has traditionally pushed the notion that "rank-and-file democracy" and "representative democracy" are complementary. However, this combination was supposed to involve a certain hierarchical order. So, Thesis 76 explains, in relation to the initiatives taken by the unions on the political level, for example in connection with the economic "plan" presented by Treasury Minister Pandolfi, that in the democratic system "national decisions" have to be made by the parliament.
Thesis No. 59, which deals with the participation of workers in making economic decisions, specifies that "in the process of setting goals for the country, the fundamental decisions must be made in elected assemblies, ultimately, in parliament." Thesis No. 75 says, moreover, that "mass movements have their own independent role to play." But it adds that "the task of making a synthesis and of giving political leadership in the interests of the country belongs to democratic institutions acting in accordance with the will of the majority."
All this means that any bodies that the working class might have or create (delegates councils, producers conferences, etc.) can play only a consultative role. It means, despite all the denials by Lama and company [the CP union leaders], that at best these bodies will not be allowed to do anything more than operate within a framework of "joint labor-management decision making."
A second example concerns the policy of alliances. Thesis 53 proposes for the dozenth time "an alliance between the working class, the poor masses of the south, the masses of women, the young generations, the productive middle layers in the cities and in the countryside, and the intellectuals." This discreet term, "the productive middle layers," is used as a cover for collaboration with broad sections of the bourgeoisie. This is to be done both through collaborating with the most representative bourgeois party [the Christian Democrats] and in more direct forms, which are now being openly tried.
On a third theme, one that has been traditional for thirty years, the need for unity with the Catholies, the document says absolutely nothing new. However, recent practice has shown, more clearly than in any other period, that the CP leaders seek to solve this problem essentially on the level of an alliance with the Christian Democratic Party.
To achieve this, they are even willing to pay the price of compromising their chances for working with Catholics who are breaking away from the ruling class, and partially at least, from their organizations and their ideology. The obfuscation in the Italian CP's theories lies in the use of an ideological concept-Catholics-to fuzz over or hide the concrete social and political content.
Since the end of the Second World War, the Togliatti and post-Togliatti leading group has covered up the essential fact that the Christian Democratic Party was the main political instrument of the bourgeoisie, just as it is now glossing over the fact that for a third of a century it was the backbone of the system. The idea that such a party can become the joint partner in a strategy for democratic renewal opening the way to socialism is a theoretical and political monstrosity. It shows once again that the opportunists' so-called realism hides a real utopianism in the strategic perspectives.
The fourth example is the CP's attitude to the question of austerity. Thesis 54 says:
Austerity has been proposed by the Italian Communist Party as an instrument for a policy of transformation. It has been proposed as a means of changing the condition of the broad masses in the direction of a healthier, more civicminded, and freer way of life. We see it as a means of eliminating the waste, due among other things, to the practices of the government. It is a way to change the mode of functioning and the social end-results of the economic mechanism, the orientation of investment, of production, of public expenditure, the quality of consumption itself. It is a means of influencing the way of life linked to these factors, the models of culture and behavior of whole sections of Italian society.
This borders on the grotesque. One would like to ask the authors of these theses either to find another word to express all this extraordinary content, or to demand that the dictionary definitions of "austerity" be revised. Jokes aside, it has been shown all too clearly in practice what is hidden behind these conceptual and terminological games.
The government that the CP has supported has made it clear that it has a very commonplace notion of what austerity means, by making repeated attempts to cut the workers' standard of living. If it has succeeded only partially in this, it is not because the Italian CP managed to gain acceptance for its fantasies about what austerity should be, but because the workers put up stubborn resistance. Moreover, the document contains an inadvertent admission. It endorses the party's attitude during the past year of favoring "wage restraints."
As I mentioned, these theses raise the problem of the difficulties that the workers movement and the Italian CP must confront. They point up in particular the "fragility" of the unions and the youth organization-that is, to put it plainly, their failure as mass organizations. As regards the party itself, the theses refer to "limitations in the understanding of the new phase of the political fight and of the possibilities and demands it involves.
The theses also mention "a disproportion between the attention given to work within the institutions and to the relationship of political forces, on the one hand; and to initiating united movements by the broad masses for concrete objectives and to deal with concrete problems, on the other." They also talk about "difficulties in maintaining and consolidating the relationship between the party and the various layers of the working population in every phase of the struggle.
What the authors of the document do not recognize, or pretend not to recognize, is that the difficulties they point to are directly linked to the line the party has followed, especially after July 1976 [the
Likewise, last parliamentary elections].
they fail to recognize that the "disproportion" they refer to cannot be so easily overcome in actual day-to-day work as it can in their conceptual gymnastics.
When a party is part of a parliamentary majority that passes laws that do not change the status quo in any way, and supports a government that the Italian CP leading group itself had finally to attack and provoke a governmental crisis by doing so, it is difficult to promote or lead big mass mobilizations. And it is hard to "consolidate the relationship between the party and the various layers of the working population." Those mobilizations that have developed could not help but have a dynamic conflicting with the strategic options taken by the Italian CP, and the same will be true for the mobilizations that have been put on the agenda by objective conditions. This is the source of the party's difficulties and the reason for its loss of influence.
The French CP's Draft Resolution
The French CP draft political resolution for the party's Twenty-Third Congress, which was adopted by the Central Committee about two months after the theses were approved by the Italian CP Central Committee, also presents a continuity with previous documents in recent years. On three points, it stands on the same ground as the Italian theses: on the attitude taken to the October revolution and the "socialist countries"; on the norms of party functioning; and on Marxism and Leninism.
"Socialism exists," it says in the section entitled "The Socialism that We Want." It continues:
Socialism became a historic reality in October 1917, when the Russian workers and peasants, led by their Communist Party, won power and abolished capitalist exploitation. After the Soviet Union, other countries went through this decisive transformation....
To the question of what contribution socialism has made to the historic movement in the countries concerned and to humanity as a whole, we answer: The overall results in the socialist coun tries have been positive. Neither recognizing this nor taking account of the necessary diversity of the forms of socialism means that we are trying to blot out what people have gotten into the habit of calling "Stalinism."
During the period in which it was headed by Stalin, the Soviet Union experienced massive repression, authoritarian leadership in the party and the state, the development of dogmatism in thought, and grave errors both in the method that were used to build socialism and in applying the rules that must govern the relations among Communist parties.
After Stalin's death, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to try to put an end to and these crimes, which it dethese errors nounced in its Twentieth Congress in 1956. Moreover, there are in the Soviet Union and also in other socialist countries problems whose scope we think is related to a persistent failure to recognize the full importance of the universal demand for democracy which is embodied in socialism.
The Italian CP's analysis is more precise and the general characterization it gives is more nuanced and cautious. But both parties regard the Soviet Union and East Europe as socialist countries, whose existence represents an essential element of strength for the workers movement and the Communist parties. The French CP draft says:
Loyalty to the line of the Twenty-Second Congress leads us to reject any idea of breaking with the socialist countries and falling back on ourselves.
This means that the French CP continues not only to regard the states in question as "socialist countries" in general but that more concretely it considers their and allies, leaderships as its partners regardless of the criticisms it makes of them. It means that all the French CP's efforts to put an end to the "practices and defects that we condemn"
are placed within the context of the existing political and institutional framework.
As for the internal functioning of the party, the French CP draft reaffirms the norms in force, explaining that "tendencies, or attempts to form tendencies, could only divide and weaken our party, paralyze its democratic life, and its revolutionary effectiveness." In presenting the document, Marchais did not hesitate to give himself a gold star for deportment, exclaiming: "It is our party, in fact, the Communist Party, that has the most democratic internal life, and by far."
Finally, the preamble to the proposed modification of the statutes reaffirms that the French CP "bases itself on the scientific socialism founded by Marx and Engels and later developed by Lenin and other leaders and theoreticians of the workers movement." (The discreetness of this formulation "other leaders and theoreticians" will not go unappreciated!) This has not kept the French CP from following a course in practice for decades that had nothing to do with Marxism and Leninism, and it is not going to prevent the continuation of this course in the future, regardless of the fact that the language used is sometimes a little less openly "revisionist" than that of the Italian CP.
As all the commentators have pointed out, the draft involves no change with regard to the conceptions of the democratic road to socialism, the union of all the people's forces, and the Union of the Left. On this level, both major similiarities and some partial differences may be seen with respect to the Italian CP document.
Over and above the variations in terminology, the French CP also maintains a perspective of what the CPs since the end of the war have been calling "progressive democracy." What we could call it today is a perspective of reforming and rationalizing the system. This is made unmistakably clear in the section entitled The Socialism that We Want," which says that France needs "economic democracy" and "political democracy."
Although the French CP document does not use the expression "third way," it is clear that it traces an overall strategy that corresponds essentially to that of the Italian CP. You have only to consider the series of statements about the need for "reconstructing" the public institutions and about regional autonomy; the allusions to a democratic transformation of the European Community, the use of the concept of a "new international economic order" and the adherence to a conception of internationalism that limits this to solidarity, or at most occasional convergences.!
This is the context in which the differences between the two parties, which have now become known and are confirmed by the two documents, must be seen. Over and above any immediate needs of the situation, the Italian CP seeks long-term collaboration with the largest bourgeois party. The French CP, on the other hand, opposes the "Giscard bloc," which includes the two main political formations representing the ruling class.
The Italian CP accepts NATO as an established framework that is not to be put in question. On the other hand, the French CP is opposing the attempts to reintegrate France completely into this framework. It is obvious that these are nuances that do not imply any fundamental difference in strategy. The conception of a union of all the people's forces does not exclude bringing in bourgeois formations, quite the contrary (in fact, at least the "progressive Gaullists" are included). The Union of the Left included the Left Radicals. In the area of international policy, the French CP bases itself to a large extent on the options taken by de Gaulle. It need only be noted here that the document comes out explicitly for maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent force.
It should be added that an analysis of the document reveals a combination of schematism and opportunism. It is essentially schematic to talk of a "Giscardian bloc" without mentioning its Gaullist component and the serious internal crisis within the bloc. Its opportunism rests in the fact that its conceptions concerning Europe (to which we will return) closely resemble those of the Gaullists. In fact, the leaders of the French CP do not seem to regret very much a possible convergence with the Chirac reactionaries.
It is above all on Europe that one of the greatest differences exists with the Italian CP. The French Communist Party does not hesitate to utilize the ideas and even the terminology of the chauvinist conserva-
4. The Italian CP document talks of a "new internationalism" that assumes a "process toward rapprochement and collaboration with respect for the autonomy and independence of each party and each movement" and a "critical free, and constructive comparison between different experiences and assessments."
ent experiences and assessments.
tives, by raising the bogey that "France is dictated to by foreigners" and that France is becoming "the doormat of German imperialism." It does not shrink from saying that "the French people have an interest in spain
MARCHAIS: Urges workers of France to unite-against German imports.
opposing the scheme that aims to scuttle our country in a Europe of austerity and unemployment"-as if "independence" would allow France to be an island of happiness in a Europe ravaged by austerity and unemployment!
The French CP goes so far as to offer the following theoretical justification:
Our nation constitutes the most propitious framework for the realization of a relationship of political forces favorable to the satisfaction of the needs of the people of France and to a socialist transformation. The attachment of our people to their independence, their patriotism, constitute a precious basis for unity, a force for rejuvenation. The productive forces in France are structured along their own lines, with specific national characteristics, They form a unique whole that, along with the weaknesses stemming from bourgeois policies, offer unexplored possi bilities for development."
So here we have a new version of the theory of socialism in one country that Stalin borrowed from the German Social Democrats of a century ago; here we have a shameless manifestation of a veritable messianic nationalism!5
We should note in passing that it is probably on the altar of their anticampaign for "national inde- European pendence" that the leaders of the French Communist Party, contrary to those of the Italian CP, have sacrificed the expression "Eurocommunism," which is no longer used in their documents.
The second important difference between the Italian and French documents concerns their attitude toward Social Democracy
On the international plane, the Italian CP, in spite of the historical balance already referred to, insists on the possibility of future rapprochement and collaboration. The French CP, on the other hand, puts its emphasis on denouncing the "active participation [of the Social Democracy and the Second International] in the strategy of counteroffensive of the forces of capital."
On the national level, things are even clearer. The Italian CP, while criticizing the SP leadership's (real) offensive against it, preaches collaboration and unity in action. The French CP, on the other hand, has returned to all the refrains of two years ago. Following the logic of that orientation, the French CP concludes that it is through "action from below" that unity will mature. This recalls in particular the "united front from below," which was one of the classical Stalinist distortions of the concept of the united front developed by the Third International in the epoch of Lenin and Trotsky.
Finally, the French Communist Party austerity, continues to declare war on ignoring all the subtleties of its Italian sister party. The reason for this difference is evident. The French CP has not had and does not have the parliamentary and governmental responsibilities that have been assumed for nearly three years now by the Italian CP. That allows it to play the opposition game.
More generally, the French CP's attitude toward austerity is determined in a more immediate manner than that of the Italian CP by the necessity of safeguarding and renewing its relations with large sectors of the masses and defending itself from the attacks of the SP, which has already gained a lead on the electoral plane and is seriously threatening the CP's dominance within the working class. That is why it very explicitly underlines, in its congress document, the need to "retain and highlight" its "revolutionary character."
It may appear paradoxical but the Eurocommunist parties, at the very time they are striving to maintain their identity, continue to slide down the slope of Social Democracy. As they accentuate their inte gration into the system and affirm their strategy of a "democratic" and "national" road to socialism, they have a tendency to diverge from each other even more with regard both to national conditions and to differentiations among their own national bourgeoisies or sectors of those bourgeoisies.
Notes
2. Thesis 37 calls for the elaboration of a common electoral law for the entire European Community.
3. It is necessary to state that the criteria of the Italian CP on the subject of neocolonialism are not very rigid. For example, it has made many favorable references to the Lomé Convention, which was concluded between European capitalist countries and African neocolonial regimes.
5. It is worthwhile to emphasize that for the authors of the French CP document "the attachment of the peasants to national independence no longer constitutes a decisive basis of their alliance with the working class."