Q. I would like to go back in order to raise a question that many comrades are asking. After the huge wave of struggles over the past ten years, at a time when the crisis of the system has become generalized, how can we explain the fact that, far from losing their hegemony, the reformists have even gained some new ground?
A. This problem had already been posed in 1968-69. Among the nuclei and currents that later gave rise to the far-left formations, there was almost unanimous agreement that the PCI was condemned to an irreversible process of attrition, and that it had in fact already missed the boat. Although our assessment was a great deal more sober, we too underestimated the bureaucratic leaderships' capacity for recovery, as well as the possibility for a new broadening of the PCI's influence. We had too mechanical and short-term a view of the consequences that would result from the contradiction the PCI was caught in, a contradiction flowing from its desire to carry out a reformist strategy at a time when the system was in crisis and a revolutionary or prerevolutionary situation was beginning to take shape.
Q. There has been much discussion of the special features of the PCI, in the context of discussions about what is special about the Italian situation. What do you think of this?
A. The specific features of the PCI's history, its leading group and the training of its cadre help to explain its strength, which has no equal in the Communist movements in the advanced capitalist countries. You would have to go back even further and remember that, before and during the first world war, the Italian working class had a very strong Socialist party that did not identify with the positions of traditional Social Democracy. With reference to a more recent period, however, we can point to several factors that have characterized the Italian CP, and these have been analyzed several times by Italian revolutionary Marxists. Among these are the PCI's lesser degree of Stalinization compared with the PCF [Parti Communiste Français-French Communist party], for example; the type of bureaucratic central ism sui generis that "Togliattism" represents (for example, the attempts to tone down the more repugnant features of Stalinism, using Gramsci as a counterweight to Zhdanov, acceptance of some opposing views within the leadership at certain times, and so on); the strength of "national" roots, as well as theoretical and political flexibility. The farsightedness-from his point of viewwith which Togliatti approached the "de-Stalinization" turn, way ahead of the PCF as well as of the PCE [Partido Comunista de España-Spanish Communist party], enabled the PCI to adapt better to the "national" needs, and at the same time to cut the ground out from under the Socialists. In 1956, Nenni had hoped to take advantage of the crisis of Stalinism to drive the PCI into a corner, and thus reverse the relationship of forces in the workers movement in his party's favor. (The rapprochement with Saragat was also seen as a step toward this goal.) But this plan fell through, while in France, Mitterrand's effort to relaunch the SFIO [Section Française de 'Internationale Ouvrière-French Section of the Workers' International, the Social Democratic party] met with undeniable success. I think that the PC's delay in carrying out the "Italian turn," its lack of dexterity, the different character of its veteran cadres, as well as the demagogic hollowness of some of its leaders, were important reasons for the different evolution of the organized workers movement in France as compared with Italy.
I repeat, all the special features that I mentioned played a role. But that was not the essential thing.
Once again, we must go back to the dialectic of partial victories in order to explain the phenomena that have bewildered and demoralized a fair number of far-left activists.
The balance sheet of the 1968-76 period can be drawn from two different starting points.
If we take as our starting point the potential which existed at the time, the possibilities opened up by an unprecedented crisis, then it has to be admitted that these possibilities were not exploited to the fullest, and that the question of power was not even posed as being on the agenda. This is the viewpoint not only of revolutionary Marxists, but also of a very large portion of the far left and the more advanced layers of the social vanguard.
But, on the other hand, we could ask whether the working class, while not overturning the system, has, as a result of the struggles in recent years, gained anything concrete, won any victories. This is the standpoint from which the masses look at the question, particularly those who have become politicized over the last decade.
Q. What is the verdict, from this standpoint?
A. Since 1969, the working class has succeeded in overcoming some of the previous inequalities, by eliminating geographic wage differentials and by bargaining for equal raises for all. It has won substantial wage increases and improved the mechanism of the sliding scale. It has won a reduction of working hours for all workers-in other words, it has forced a certain redistribution of income in its favor.? Through its struggles, it has established a new situation in the factories, breaking down the tyranny of the bosses. The workers have won some real measure of control over speedup, working conditions, hiring policies, and so on, and exercised a kind of veto power over economically as well as politically motivated firings. They have been able to obtain legal sanctions for some of the rights they won by having them incorporated into the labor laws.
Along with this, the mobilizations of the working class, the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, the student movement, and the women's movement have achieved democratic gains such as the right of divorce and a revision, now in progress, of the old antiabortion law. These mobilizations have largely swept aside the authoritarian and anti-democratic restrictions imposed on us by the D.C. regime in 1948, and have made Italy, in practice, one of the most advanced bourgeois democracies. In the schools and for example, by
1969, a year when significant increases were won, metalworkers): agriculture, from 100 to 221; manufacturing, from 100 to 231; transportation, from 100 to 202. Under the impact of inflation, which was felt chiefly at the end of this period, consumer prices went from 100 to 170. With respect to the sliding scale, the last agreement concluded involved the establishment of a unified threshold, with an advantage for the lesser paying categories. As regards the workweek, it is forty hours for all the major categories, and even a bit shorter for certain sectors.
universities, the ingrained reactionary customs and traditions have been largely swept aside; the authoritarian forms of organization have broken down. Profound changes have occurred in the outlook, behavior, and values of a great many people. The political and trade-union organizations of the workers movement have been greatly strengthened.
It is all these gains that are at the root of the relations that now exist between the masses and the reformist organizations. In the eyes of the broad masses, the PCI and the trade-union organizations do not appear as the gravediggers of a revolution that was within reach, but as the tools which have enabled them to win some significant partial victories.
Q. Doesn't a balance sheet like this raise doubts about our previous assessment that objective conditions have narrowed the objective room for a reformist policy?
A. The question of how much room is available for a reformist policy cannot be posed in absolute terms in an "objectivist" way. In the concrete case of Italy, as well as in other places and at other times, the partial victories represented much more a byproduct of mass struggles that had an anticapitalist dynamic and revolutionary potential, than the achievement of a general reformist strategy. As a matter of fact, between 68 and '76, the working class won more significant gains and "concessions" than in any other period of modern Italian history. Even during the Giolitti period in the first decade of this century, which historians consider to be the high point of the reform era, the reform movement's achievements were more modest and its life was shorter.
Finally, we should consider that, just like the dialectic interaction of economic crisis and working-class struggles, dialectic between concessions and working-class struggles cannot be reduced to a rigid, one-dimensional schema. Depending on the concrete circumstances, a crisis may result in either a stalemate or an upsurge of struggles. Concessions can sometimes help stabilize the situation and pave the way for a "democratic counterrevolution." In other circumstances, on the other hand, they can further destabilize the system, increase the self-confidence of the masses, and inspire a new round of mobilizations with more advanced goals. The second variant is what occurred in Italy.
Q. Do you think that the PCI will be able to maintain its hold over the working class in the next period also, without facing severe problems?
A. First of all, one clarification. In recognizing that the PCI remains dominant in the working class, we do not overlook the fact that for almost twenty years, a shift has been taking place in the relationship between the bureaucratic leadership and the ranks, between the party as such and the social vanguard, and between the party and the masses. In the aftermath of the defeat of fascism, the PCI was seen by the great majority of its ranks, as well as its supporters, as the party that, whatever its tactical oscillations, was preparing the way for the revolution. It was seen as part of an ideologically and politically unified world Communist movement. This is why the masses had total confidence in it.
Today, the situation is radically different. The broad masses, and sections of the social vanguard, see the PCI as the only political instrument available to them, and support it for lack of a credible alternative. Among the PCI's supporters, only a minority think the party has a viable strategy for the transition to socialism that it will be capable of carrying out. Under these circumstances, the party's political moves sometimes encounter strong resistance, even more or less open opposition. There have been some incidences of this over the last few months in response to the PCI's decision to give the go-ahead to Andreotti and his austerity policy. Many leading cadres and rank-and-file members of the PCI took part in walkouts, actions organized outside the union structure, and so on. There have also been cases where PCI members defended their party's line in plant assemblies, and later told our comrades: "Don't put us on the spot in these assemblies. We agree with you; inside the party we said the same thing"
Q. What do you think will happen in the coming stage?
A. For us it is axiomatic that concrete gains can only come out of a crisis in the relationship between the PCI's leading group and the ranks and between the PCI and the masses insofar as a credible alternative emerges. So far, such an alternative has appeared only here and there, during partial struggles on the factory level, or within the "peripheral" mass movements.
In terms of the next period, the PCI's chances of keeping its influence relatively intact depend largely on its ability to help defend the gains won by the working class and perhaps achieve other partial goals. This will be difficult, very difficult, especially if the PCI and the union leaderships stick to their present political orientation and tactics. But there is another consideration which should not be forgotten. The PCI uses the following argument to justify its current policies: If there is no austerity policy, if there is a drawn-out governmental crisis, inflation will leap out of control, and there will be a violent social and political crisis which could mean the end of democracy. Now, revolutionists by no means overlook the fact that, in the given circumstances, if the government and the bosses do not succeed in putting their line across, if the working class scores some victories over the austerity policy, the economic situation could further deteriorate, and this would inevitably have political consequences. But this is no reason to exhort the working class to remain passive-just the opposite. It is one more reason why we must explain that partial victories are not enough, that they should only be considered the basis for a new working-class offensive, which can lead to more important tests of strength, and, in the final analysis, pose once again the need for an alternative political leadership, pose the question of power.
The reformists reject this perspective. They do not want to put themselves forward as an alternative to the bourgeois parties for leading the country. They can only conceive of the "transition to socialism" in terms of the broadening and gradual transformation of bourgeois democracy. From this point of view, their present positions have a logic, the logic of the lesser evil, which is not new, but which, as experience has shown, is in some way convincing. The problem, I repeat, is to build a credible revolutionary alternative. However, in the absence of such an alternative, Berlinguer's argument has some weight.
Q. Is it possible for the present situation to lead to a realization of the "historic compromise," with the PCI participating in the government?
A. If the Andreotti government, or another government with the same policies, succeeds in carrying out the maneuver I have outlined, and which is under way, namely, slashing the masses' standard of living and wearing out the credibility of the PCI, and especially the unions, then the bourgeoisie might decide that the historic compromise, as a solution of last resort, is no longer necessary. In any case, if the PCI entered the government at a time when the mass movement was worn out or in retreat, the historic compromise would have a different dynamic than in a period of a new upsurge of struggles: it would then pave the way for the "democratic counterrevolution."
The Transition to Socialism: Gramsci, the PCI, and Its Social-Democratization
Q. The PCI has developed an overall strategy that has exercised a force of attraction for the international Communist movement. According to the PCI's leaders, this strategy has been proven correct in practice, since the party has grown and plays a central role on the Italian political scene. What we know today as "Eurocommunism" would not exist without the theoretical and political efforts made by the Togliatti and post-Togliatti leading group. What do you think are the key points, as well as the contradictions, of such a strategy?
A. We can easily make an analogy between the ideas of the PCI and those of traditional Social Democracy about the transition to socialism. What is involved is a gradualist approach, which is often reflected not only in the ideas themselves, but also in the terms used to express them, which are similar to those used by reformists of the old school. But it is not enough to limit ourselves to such an observation.
The "classical" general formulas of Social Democracy predate World War I. Thus, they were based on an historical experience that was limited in time (a few decades) as well as in space (a few West European countries), and on an incomplete knowledge of the writings of Marx and Engels, which, moreover, had been partially falsified. In formulating its theories, the PCI has been obliged to take note, in its own way, of the great experiences that the working class has gone through on a world scale for the last sixty years, the experiences of successful revolutions in Europe and elsewhere, and of all the episodes in the degeneration of the workers states and the Third International. It has been able to draw a balance sheet (again, in its own way) of the new period of prolonged capitalist economic boom and of the new, powerful upsurge of working-class struggles in Italy and Europe. It can pride itself on a certain historical continuity. On the other hand, any attempt to gloss over the Stalinization of the PCI, as shown, for example, by its acceptance of the "third period" aberrations, would come under the heading of apologetics. Still, some of the PCI's current theories can, with a modicum of legitimacy, be traced to Togliatti's early Bukharinism. At any rate, there is, in fact, a line of continuity between the theories of the popular-front period and the historic compromise.
Along with this, the PCI's current theories reflect its position as a party exercising a strong political dominance over the working class and other exploited social layers in a country where the workers have fought great political battles over the past eighty years and have reached a highly advanced stage. Nor should we forget that, in the postwar period, Marxism has had a tremendous and growing influence on the education of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of intellectuals, who have aligned themselves with the workers movement. I am convinced that when the history of the workers movement in this century is written, the last twenty years in Italy will go down as a period of a great flowering of Marxist or Marxist-oriented thought. It is true that there have been no original contributions like Perry Anderson's Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the Absolutist State, or Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism. However, even leaving aside Gramsci's masterly contribution to Marxism, substantial and profound work has been done in a whole series of fields, and a large number of intellectuals and activists have absorbed materialist conceptions and methods of analysis. A cultural climate has developed that is a reflection of the struggles that have shaken the whole society, and in some ways it has even served to spur these struggles on. The PCI could not but play a role in this, despite the fact that it has acted as a brake on the most critical and iconoclastic work, and despite its attempt to skirt certain issues. One very clear illustration of this is the publication of a weekly like Rinascita, which is almost the only one of its kind, combining political analysis and high-level theoretical and cultural discussion. The fact that a magazine of this type is read by 100,000 people every week points up clearly the PCI's ability to exercise an ideological dominance as well as the high political level of the Italian workers movement.
Q. How could you sum up the PCI's main theoretical and strategic conceptions?
A. They fit into a unified framework held together by an increasingly rigorous internal logic. This is not always apparent from Berlinguer's official writings or public statements, which introduce tactical mediations in order not to offer any openings for criticism, either in Italy or elsewhere. ... Advance patrols, while a bit unorthodox, often indicate the thrust of the PCI's positions, the party's Weltanschauung, so to speak, more clearly.
Look at it in the historical context. The PCI, which was fairly quick to draw the lessons of the Twentieth Congress [of the CPSU], could not stay within the bounds of the cautious criticism and the vague formulas that were put forward in 1956. It was forced to meet the problem of Stalinism head-on. It was not the party as such, but one of its most prominent intellectuals and activists, who did this work in the field of history. Giuseppe Boffa wrote a book on the history of the USSR which harshly condemns the Stalin period, and makes every attempt to project an alternative course. Boffa's thesis is that this "alternative course"
Thus, outlined by Bukharin.
Bukharin's moderate "Enrich yourselves"-and his gradualism-as expressed by opposition to forced collectivization would link up with the PCI's own gradualist and pluralist conception of a transition to socialism without major explosions.
Let's look at it from another angle. What is the socioeconomic conception behind this idea of a prelude to the transition to socialism, a preparatory stage that might begin in Italy in the near or relatively near future? Claudio Napoleoni, a PCI deputy who is not a member of the party but who carries a lot of authority, outlined the idea of "guided capitalism" (that isn't the term he used, but it conveys the substance of what he said.
"This crisis," the deputy writes, "has not yet produced the conditions for an immediate transition to a superior form of social organization, which, of course, remains the fundamental goal of the workers movement. ... In this situation, the problem of economic recovery (which must be solved, in order to prevent a worsening of the political as well as economic situation) can only be approached in the perspective of a period of transition, in which capitalist efficiency and market mechanisms will have to coexist with important elements of political guidance of the economic process." In Italy, the precondition for this process consists in the fact that "the changes introduced into the labor market ... especially as a result of union struggles struggles... have proved irreversible. However, since the labor market, as Marx taught, is not just any market but in fact is the foundation of all other markets, changes in the labor market represent changes in the functioning of the system."
Even more explicitly, Napoleoni says that we are already "in a situation of an objective duality in the social order" and that "the problem is one of how to turn this duality to the benefit of the workers, when, for the time being, we cannot and need not overcome it. ... The bosses are in no position to reject the political platforms that the people's forces can present to them. It is quite true that Marxism did not foresee such a situation; but this, in my opinion, is the situation which must be faced" (Rinascita, no. 45). Napolitano, one of Berlinguer's closest collaborators, explicitly endorsed Napoleoni's theory, while at the same time taking his distace from Napoleoni's terminology, which obviously would be of little use in mass work.
I will not dwell on the political-institutional aspects of the PCI's theories, which are more familiar. Basing themselves on the democratic gains actually won by the working class in the immediate postwar period and over the last ten years, a series of political leaders and intellectuals, from Ingrao to Cerroni, have projected the theory of a specific type of "advanced democracy" for which the 1947 constitution is supposed to provide the framework. This system would be marked by a symbiosis of parliamentary structures and organs of direct democracy (such as workers councils), of nationally centralized and local structures, of structures for discussing and deciding the broad questions, and structures representing the social and economic forces in their own right (such as a revitalized CEEL-National Economic and Labor Council). There you have a picture of a "pluralistic" society, where not only different parties but also mutually antagonistic social classes would coexist. In this context the gradual transition to socialism would take place through a gradual infusion of "elements of socialism." Here, there is a striking analogy with the terminology used by traditional reformism. Such a conceptionwhich, projected to the international level, leads to the idea of Europe-wide unity and democratizing the Common Market-is coming more and more explicitly into conflict with Leninism.
Q. But simply reaffirming the Leninist strategy does not remove the problem. After all, even Gramsci, who never accepted reformist or gradualist theories, pointed out that West European society was very different from the Russian, and that a different strategy for the struggle for power had to be envisioned here.
A. There is a famous passage in Gramsci's writings that has been exploited by the followers of Togliatti, and since the publication of the Quaderni del Carcere it has been considered basic by some militant intellectuals who do not subscribe to reformist strategies. Perry Anderson, for one, has cited it in his studies. In a recent essay, he came back in particular to the need to give a new theoretical dimension to the question of what form the transition to socialism will take in the West European countries. He says that, so far, Marxism has not even produced a theory of the nature and structure of bourgeois democracy. The theories of Lenin adopted by the Third International are supposed to have only a limited value because of the fact that tsarist Russia was a feudal state, even though the capitalist mode of production was predominant in Russian society. Clearly, on the basis of such views, fundamental Leninist conceptions could be put in question. There are more than a few people who think that Gramsci offered some valid suggestions for doing this.
[To be continued]
Notes
2. Wage increases in the major industries were won both by means of national contracts, and by supplementary contracts on the plant level. According to Ministry of Labor statistics published in January 1977, the minimum hourly wage rose as follows in the 1970-75 period (not counting