[Livio Maitan is one of the leaders of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups), the Italian section of the Fourth International.
[We are publishing the interview in four installments, of which this is the first. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
Question. There has been a lively discussion in the workers movement about how to characterize the current situation in Italy, especially since the June 20 elections. This discussion has been particularly animated among members of far-left organizations. Do you think there have been prerevolutionary situations in Italy over the last eight to ten years? How would you judge the period as a whole?
Answer. I think that a distinction can be made between the general characterization of the period and that of more specific phases. Revolutionary Marxists think that the crisis of the entire system that broke out in 1968 can be compared only with two other major crises in the history of capitalist Italy: the one in 1919-20, and the one in 1945-47.
However, the crisis at the beginning of the 1920s lasted only two or three years-fascism took power in October 1922, but the retreat had already begun in the autumn of 1922—and the crisis at the end of World War II ended with a relative stabilization of the system, as early as 1947-48.
The present crisis has been going on for nine years. There have, of course, been conjunctural ups and downs. Nonetheless there has been no stabilization-not even a very relative one, such as followed May 1968 in France. And there has been no retreat by the Italian working class comparable to that of the British working class beginning around mid-1975. These comparisons in themselves highlight the exceptional nature of the Italian situation.
One can say that in Portugal the crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus has been more marked, and that there organs of revolutionary democracy, embryos of dual power, have emerged on a notably larger scale than in Italy. Still, the flare-up in Portugal was much more short-lived. After November 25[1975], all of the objective and subjective limitations that in the most explosive phases of the crisis had been only partially felt began to operate more and more perceptibly, opening the way for the present downturn.
Today, it is in Spain that the mass movement's potential is the greatest. There the mass movement is going through exciting experiences. And it confronts a ruling class that has not yet solved the problem of how to carry out the transition from a fascist dictatorship to the institutionalization of bourgeois democracy. But in any case, this crisis is of more recent origin, and it is too soon to begin to draw general conclusions.
Thus, up to now, it is in Italy that the crisis of the 1970s has been the deepest, has lasted the longest, and has been the most pervasive. This general assessment must be made more specific by saying that in 1969-70 and in 1975-76, prerevolutionary situations began to take shape.
Q. If this is true, it seems to me to be necessary to grasp the specific factors that are at the origin of such a development. What do you think these are?
A. This has been a topic of wide discussion in Italy from several standpoints.
Generally speaking, particularly around the time when the Center-Left coalition was beginning to take shape, there was a current of economists and sociologists that held that Italy was still a backward country, that it was out of step with the other European capitalist countries, that its experience with democracy had been too short, and that it was technologically and culturally unripe. They drew the conclusion from this that "rationalizing" and democratizing the regime, and remodeling it in the image of the most "advanced" western European countries, was a necessary task. These ideas were most clearly expressed in an essay by a well-known economist, Paolo Sylos Labini, whom I undertook to answer in a small book on the dynamic of social classes in Italy. Such a notion, it must be said, was not far removed from those held by the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano-Italian Communist party], which, throughout the postwar period, based its strategy on this type of analysis. In 1944-47 it was the "progressive democracy" strategy, and today it is the "new stage of the democratic and antifascist revolution."
For thirty years revolutionary Marxists have polemicized against such ideas, which had little basis in reality even in 1944- 45, and are completely indefensible today, now that Italian society has gone through the development of the 1950s and 1960s. But recognizing the fact that Italy is a modern capitalist country in every way does not involve denying or underestimating the real specific factors that have operated here and continue to play a role.
In the first place, in no other Common Market country does the problem of underdeveloped areas weigh so heavily. This encompasses an entire region of the country. In this region, and this is what is peculiar to Italy, elements of historical backwardness combine with the obstacles to development posed generally by the imbalances characteristic of capitalism today. Such a tendency occurs in other countries too, but in Italy, at the present juncture, the problem is much more acute.
More specifically, as regards the rural areas, it should be remembered that, despite the flight from the countryside, the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture remains higher than in the other developed European capitalist countries, including France. In the growth of the tertiary sector itself two different factors are involved: On the one hand, a genuine modernization of the economic structures. On the other, the persistence of a precarious market for a labor force that has been pushed out of agriculture and that industry is unable to absorb.!
Second, the prolonged boom period was marked by a real shakeup in the work force as a result of large migrations. In the fifteen years following 1951, four million people left the rural areas. During the same period, a total of about 100,000 persons were involved each year in movements from one part of the country to another. The numbers involved in emigration were on the same order.
On several occasions since the end of the war, the ruling class has been forced to draw up plans for reformist rationalization projects. The first of these operations was carried out, under the impetus of an upsurge of the landless peasant movement, at the beginning of the 1950s, when De Gasperi "centrism" introduced a measure of agrarian reform. Despite its serious limitations, this reform dealt a blow to the big landlords, particularly in the South.
The second project was set in motion beginning in 1962, when the "centrist" government was replaced by the Center-Left coalition. The Center-Left had ambitious plans. It sought to eliminate or reduce a series of persistent imbalances in the system; to coopt a section of the working class, represented politically by the PSI [Partito Socialista Italiano-Italian Socialist party], into a long-term stabilization plan; and to isolate and significantly weaken the Communist party.
The results of these projects are clear. The two operations have
" and failed even more dismally failed to achieve "rationalization, to bring social and political stabilization. Despite the partial defeats of 1947-48, and the relative downturn of struggles in the second half of the 1950s, the Italian working class has maintained its strength and has suffered no major defeats comparable even to that suffered by the French working class in 1958.
I would like to point in particular to a serious objective difficulty that blocked the bourgeoisie from making the most of the political victories it won on several occasions between 1947 and 1955. The specific social weight of the working class was beginning to increase at the very time when it had been pushed onto the defensive and was losing ground politically, when the unions in the biggest industries were being hit hard, when the divisive maneuver of setting up company unions was producing some results, and when the unity in action of the PCI and PSI had been broken by Nenni's move. This increase in the specific social weight of the working class was the result both of its numerical growth and greater concentration and of the decrease, due to emigration, in the size of the reserve army of labor.
Q. Would you go into more detail about the development of the working class from a social standpoint, and what role this played in the 1968-69 upsurge?
A. Let me fill in some facts about the social transformations. Between 1951 and 1971, the percentage of the active population represented by the working class went from 41.2 percent to 47.8 percent. In the same period, the number of industrial workers rose by about a million and a half, and the number of construction million. Meanwhile, great industrial workers by almost a concentrations emerged, or were quantitatively and qualitatively strengthened. This played a tremendous role in shaping the overall sociopolitical dynamic. (Examples of such industrial complexes are Fiat in Turin, Alfa Romeo in Milan, the chemical industry in Venice, Alfa Sud in Naples, Italsider in Taranto, and so on.) There are two other phenomena which are not exclusively Italian, but which took a more concentrated form in Italy. The working class became more and more homogeneous as the old trades and categories declined and the reproduction of labor took place under more uniform conditions. Moreover it underwent a great process of renewal both as a result of the generational turnover and of the massive influx of new labor power. All of this paved the way for the 1968 upsurge and for its sustained character.
Q. But the crisis in Italy was also a result of the role played by other social forces...
A. That is correct. The radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie was a very widespread phenomenon, sometimes taking a very spectacular forum. In fact, explosive contradictions erupted on pratically every social and political level. Without the radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie and the very deepgoing crisis of the ruling ideology, the crisis of the state apparatus, for instance, would not have gone as far. We must not forget that the social transformations had shaken up the intermediate classes as well. Generally, between 1951 and 1971, these layers experienced both
. This was the result, in fact, of an absolute and a relative decline.
the interaction of two opposing trends: the decline of the so-called traditional middle classes-whose numbers were virtually halved, dropping by more than 4 million-and the growth of the "new" intermediate layers, which increased by 1.4 million. Teachers, for example, numbered 325,000 in 1951, 600,000 in 1971, and today number more than 700,000.
Nevertheless, the central role to be played by the working class in the crisis of the system—which so many "theoreticians" had challenged before May '68—has rarely been revealed so clearly as it has in Italy over the past decade. True, the breakdown of stability came first in "peripheral" sectors. The student movement, in particular, led the way. But the working-class upsurge followed fairly soon after, within a matter of months, and it was unquestionably the great working-class struggles of 1969 that shook the country and led to a prerevolutionary situation.
It was the successive waves of proletarian mobilizations in the years that followed that brought about the downfall of attempts to
Italy
22%
Agriculture
42%
Manufacturing
32%
41%
26%
37%
Services France
27%
:
Agriculture Manufacturing
36% 37%
Services in Italy and France, )
1974-75
17%
44%
39%
12%
39%
49%
achieve relative stabilization, such as the one made by Andreotti add another in 1971-72, or by Fanfani in 1973-74. Let us consideration. In the period marked by the Reggio Calabria uprising, the fascists, who had managed to make some headway, had set a goal of provoking a Reggio Calabria-type situation in Naples, a city of key strategie importance. The fact that this plan failed miserably-the PCI got 40 percent of the vote on June 20- must be attributed to the role of the working-class layers concentrated in the city and surrounding areas, who carried out very combative struggles and impressive demonstrations on more than one occasion. Furthermore, the fact that the student movement in Ital maintained itself over a longer period, continuing for years as a factor contributing to political instability, is due to its closer convergence with workers' struggles than in other countries, and to the duration of these struggles.
Finally, it was the weight of the working class and
• the organized workers movement that prevented the various "protest" or "plebeian" movements from taking on fascist-like or Poujadist characteristics, and helped them to incorporate conceptions and methods of struggle similar to those of the proletariat, and to polarize politically around the workers parties in the 1975 and 1976 elections.
Q. There have been some discussions, particularly on the far left, about how to characterize the situation since early 1975. What do you think?
A. The discussion can be summarized as follows: Could we once again, as in 1969, speak of a prerevolutionary situation? Personally, I think we can. But at any rate, the most important thing to keep in mind is that the crisis which began in 1968 has so far not been overcome.
I think that our international movement has at times been loose and imprecise in its use of such terms as
"revolutionary situation," "prerevolutionary situation," "revolutionary upsurge,"
" "qualitative leap which
"potentially revolutionary situation, could enable a revolutionary crisis to mature," and so on. We had a discussion about this last year in Bandiera Rossa, the paper of the Italian section. I cannot take up this question here, but in general, I think that the problem stems from the fact that, in both Lenin and Trotsky's writings, the characterization of a revolutionary or prerevolutionary situation is more often than not a descriptive one. (One of the most famous quotations from Lenin, cited in the last issue of Critique Communiste, refers to
"symptoms of a revolutionary situation.") Furthermore, Lenin and Trotsky applied their criteria somewhat broadly. For example, Lenin spoke of revolutionary situations in Germany in sai hot only in Spain,
1860 and in Russia in 1879-80. Trotsky considered that there was a prerevolutionary situation in 1931 not only in Spain, but also in Germany and England. By extension, one might say that the situation in Italy has been prerevolutionary ever since 1968-69. But a characterization so general would have questionable practical value.
To summarize, we can say that a revolutionary situation exists when the contradictions inherent in the system, on the different levels of the socioeconomic and political structures, are no longer latent but break out openly, shattering the former equilibrium, and when no short-term possibility exists for establishing a new equilibrium. In such a context, the ruling classes cannot exert their domination as before, the proletariat is no longer willing to put up with the old forms of exploitation, and the intermediate classes themselves are desperately seeking a way out. When such a situation becomes generalized, concentrated in a definite space of time, and gives rise to movements which in fact pose the question of power, a revolutionary situation exists. When such phenomena emerge only in an incipient or partial form, and when the dynamic of a general confrontation over the question of power has not yet clearly emerged, a prerevolutionary situation exists. In a prerevolutionary situation, it is necessary to emphasize transitional objectives and take advantage of all opportunities to promote the formation of organs of proletarian democracy that could become elements of dual power. In a revolutionary situation, the question of taking power has to be posed as a concrete and immediate perspective. As a precondition for this, every effort must be made to politically and organizationally unify the organs of proletarian democracy, which are already an expression of dual power. The problems of self-defense and the arming of the proletariat must also be posed in immediate terms as an urgent necessity.
The experience of the postwar period—in several Latin American countries during the 1950s and 1960s, and today in the European capitalist countries-has demonstrated the possibility of prolonged crises involving embryonic or incipient forms of dual power, whereas before, similar crises were overcome much more rapidly.
Returning to the most recent period in Italy, it has to be noted that, since mid-1974, the crisis of the system has been even more deepgoing than in 1969. This is due particularly to an unusual, almost unprecedented convergence of the social, political, and economic crisis. This has brought the social movements, democratic movements, and central struggles of the working class together in an all-embracing political movement that has an anticapitalist dynamic.
In particular, it is the economic crisis that has made a general political solution objectively necessary, while at the time forcing a subjective realization of this need. The electoral victory of the PCI on June 15, 1975, and its recent gains on June 20, 1976, are, in the last analysis, the reflection of this situation. Conversely, in this context, the crisis in the DC [Democrazia Cristiana-Christian Democracy] has become more and more violent, reflecting the breakup of the political and social bloc established thirty years ago. The big industrial bourgeoisie, hit by falling profits and beset by recession, is less willing to share the spoils with other sections of the ruling class. So they are discovering "parasitism,"
and focusing their fire on malfunctions in the political apparatus, denouncing the government's inability to make coherent political choices.
The technocratic and bureaucratic bourgeoisie sees a threat to its patronage system, and is refusing to be sacrificed on the altar of the struggle against "parasitism" and inefficiency. Rather than accept the role of scapegoat, the financial and speculator bourgeoisie is resisting all attempts to impose rationalization and discipline, and is taking fullest possible advantage of the freedom to maneuver provided by inflation and the international monetary crisis. The well-to-do middle classes have no intention of giving up the privileges they acquired during the prolonged boom and are blocking even the weakest reform measures. The rural petty bourgeoisie, which is being squeezed tighter and tighter by the mechanisms of the national and international market, is beginning to question the political structures and policies that they have supported for decades. The urban middle layers, who are being hit by inflation and whose standard of living is threatened, are also ceasing to act as defenders of the status quo. The layers of the intelligentsia, the liberal professions and so on, who are seeing the roles on which their social prestige was based lose their sacrosanctness, are more and more beginning to reflect the crisis of traditional values and ideology.
Q. Could you give some examples of the crisis of ruling-class ideology? On what levels is it found?
A. I will give three examples.
The first concerns the big newspapers. Helped along by a very deep recession, a process of concentration is taking place in Italy too. A few powerful trusts have taken over almost all the major dailies. However, the rights and powers won by journalists, typesetters, and so on have severely limited the bosses' freedom of action. At times they have not even managed to get their own newspapers to adopt the conservative policies that they advocate.
Moreover, the crisis of traditional values is so widespread that journalists and writers are often unwilling to play the role of defenders of the government and the status quo. The case of
Corriere della Sera is a good illustration of this. Over the last several years, this newspaper, which has just marked its hundredth anniversary, and which belongs to a clearly conservative, even reactionary tradition, has undergone a considerable transformation. By journalistic standards, it has now reached a level not at all inferior to the [London] Times, the Guardian, or the Frankfurter Allgemeine, although it is still below Le Monde. What is interesting is that it opens everything up for discussion. It systematically and aggressively polemicizes against the status quo, the government's policies, ruling-class mores, ideological mystification and traditional rhetoric. During the meeting of the DC national committee in the summer of 1975, and the DC congress in March 1976, the Corriere published vitriolic articles that were masterpieces of political satire. Guest columns were offered to all political and ideological currents, including the far
A second example: the judiciary, a traditional bulwark of conservatism and reaction, has not been secure against the storm. It is openly and deeply divided. It now includes many supporters of the workers' parties and even some far-left organizations, who expose the class role of the courts in explicit, militant terms. (Marrone, a young judge indicted for such a denunciation, has just been acquitted.) One of the most important consequences of this change is that, unlike in the past, when labor conflicts come to court—particularly cases of workers being fired for union activity, absenteeism, and so on-they frequently end with the workers being reinstated and the bosses being condemned. In one case, a judge went so far as to declare that the firing of several Alfa Romeo workers was illegal, because it was a maneuver aimed at dividing the working class.
Finally, the crisis of the Catholic church is a worldwide phenomenon whose origins are well-known. Still, it is significant that this crisis has hit very hard even in Italy, home of the Vatıcan, where the church played a central role in the postwar period of capitalist reconstruction. The defeat suffered by the Church and the DC in the 1974 referendum on divorce was the most striking expression of this crisis, which has taken innumerable forms. During the recent elections, a series of prominent Catholic intellectuals were included in the PCI's list of candidates, and some were elected. The cases of individual priests defying the authority of the hierarchy and the Pope-their point of departure being diametrically opposed to that of Monsignor Lefevre [a French priest opposed to modernization of the church]-are quite numerous. The example of Don Franzoni is only the most well known. There have also been some sensational incidents: priests who announced, during their Sunday sermons, that they were going off to join the PCL.
Q. Did the June 20 election results make it necessary to revise any of these assessments? After all, the DC regained some of its strength, and the left did not win a majority.
A. June 20 represented a new shift in favor of the workers movement, as a whole, although a modest one. After the June 15 [1975] jump, which was unprecedented in Italian electoral history, it was unlikely that there would be another jump of the same proportions, although the possibility of the left winning 51 percent of the vote could not be ruled out. Does this mean that we have overestimated the depth of the crisis? I think not. I do not believe, anyway, that winning an electoral or parliamentary majority is a necessary precondition for a victorious struggle for power by the proletariat. Even in the depths of a crisis, the macinery of the system serves a function. Let us not forget that the Bolsheviks were a minority in the elections for the Constituent Assembly several weeks after taking power. . ..
It is true that in the present context, if the workers parties had won a majority, this would have considerably deepened the political crisis of the bourgeoisie, and given further impetus to the combativity and rising political consciousness of the masses. The recovery of the DC and the fact that the PCI did not obtain a plurality, as its members had hoped, tends to have the opposite effect. This is because the masses did not see realized what seemed to them to be a realistic perspective; the general political solution they were looking for did not take shape.
Q. The formation of the Andreotti government marked a turning point. For the first time since 1947, the PCI ceased being an opposition party. •What is the dynamic and what are the dangers of this new situation?
A. The fact that the elections ended in an impasse has already resulted in one negative trend that it would be dangerous to underestimate. The PCI's decision to open the way for the formation of the Andreotti government has already had a concrete negative effect on the development of working-class struggles. The same goes for the attitude displayed by the union leaderships, who are trying at all cost to avoid a major confrontation with the government and the bosses. However, the bourgeoisie is looking for a test of strength, in the sense that for the first time in ten years, it hopes to be able to slash the standard of living of the masses and take away some important gains. It has already scored several points in this area. The question, therefore, is whether the bosses and the government will succeed in carrying out their plans without running into mass opposition, without encountering serious resistance, or whether there will be a new wave of struggles, which is the precondition for a counterattack by the working class. The strikes, demonstrations, and mobilizations in the workplaces and in the streets during the first half of October have demonstrated that the masses' capacity for struggle has not been exhausted, and that the vanguard can play a decisive role in organizing the mass response to the government and the bosses. However, unless there is a reversal of the present passive, wait-and-see attitude on the part of the traditional organizations, unless there is at least a partial turn by the union leaderships, it will be very difficult for broad movements to develop successfully on a national scale. And local movements arising in this or that sector will be utterly incapable of resisting the onslaught of the enemy. This means that, in the short run, the bourgeoisie has a certain chance of winning a major battle, of dealing a sharp blow to the working class for the first time since 1966, and thus of creating the conditions for an ebb in the mass struggle. It is likely that, even in that case, things would not return to the pre-1967 situation, to stability. But, of course, there would no longer be any kind of prerevolutionary situation, and the ruling class and its political apparatuses would once again enjoy a considerable margin for maneuver.
I should add that several disturbing symptoms have appeared in other areas. The student movement, which went through a difficult period last year, has not yet recovered. It is feeling the negative effects of an impasse in the fight over the traditional issues as well as of the difficulty of establishing short-term objectives for mobilizations that would converge in a real sense and not merely a propagandistic or abstract one, with workers' struggles. Forms of demoralization and virtual social disintegration are taking place among the youth, with tendencies to turn away from political activity, put the emphasis on personal consciousness-raising, and give primary importance to what is "individual" and "personal."
I cannot go into such a big subject as the women's movement here. In certain respects this movement is going through its "1968" in Italy right now, with the reemergence of spontanéist currents. This upsurge is very rich in emotional and moral élan, but it also carries with it a good part of the mythology of that famous year. It is disturbing that precisely at this crucial point, when centrifugal tendencies are intensifying and weakening the far left in particular, the women's movement has so far been unable to mobilize broadly around the central political issues of the day, such as abortion.
[To be continued.]
Notes
1. Change in Distribution of the Work Force 1955-1974-75 (based on EEC statistics for 1975