Elections Suarez Style spain
BY Michel Rovère he June 15 legislative elections in Spain are the crowninc
• touch of the institutional and political process that goe: under the name "reform" and was set in motion by the Suárez government immediately after it took over ten months ago. But contrary to what is claimed by the international press and the government itself, these elections will not be free, nor will they elect a parliament with the powers of a constituent assembly. They will not be free because:
*Most of the workers parties remain illegal despite the legalization of the Communist party of Spain (PCE); a number of popular organizations also remain illegal, such as neighborhood associations, women's organizations, youth organizations, and so on.
*Freedom of expression is not fully guaranteed. The "antilibel" press law, which was adopted more than a month ago, for example, prohibits dealing with the key political questions, which have been declared "reserved subjects. " These include the monarchy, national unity, and the army.
*Youth have not been granted the right to vote or organize.
*More than a hundred political prisoners, members of the ETA-V, the FRAP, the LKI, the GRAPO, and the ORT, continue to be held in prison or have been expelled from the country, such as five of the six prisoners condemned to death during the Burgos trials of 1970.
*The principle of the two-chamber legislature, the electoral laws, and the method of proportional representation by province do not respect the principle of "one person, one vote. " This has been done to aid the bourgeois formations to the detriment of the workers parties. In the agricultural and sparsely populated province of Soria, for example, 33,500 votes will be required to elect one deputy, whereas 141,250 votes will be required in Madrid. For members of the Senate, which according to the institutional rules that have been drawn up will have the power to veto decisions of the lower house, the gap is even more enormous: 25,000 votes for each of the four seantors from Soria; 1,130,000 for each of the four senators from Madrid.
*Finally, these elections are not free because of the enormous resources the government and the rightist election coalitions command, because of the shameless discrimination in the use of the mass media, and because of the use that has been made of all the material resources of the state and the Francoist Movement to the advantage of the government and the bourgeois formations.
Nor will these elections result in a constituent assembly. They will not pave the way for completely demolishing the institutional edifice inherited from Francoism. A two-thirds majority in both houses will be necessary to modify these institutions. And that is not all; the principles of the monarchy and the "unity of the fatherland" have been declared inviolable in advance.
These elections are the culmination of the political "reform" undertaken by Suárez, for they will legitimize the stabilization of a constitutional monarchy intended to be the pillar of the new strong state the Spanish bourgeoisie has been dreaming about. The Arias Navarro government fell in July 1976 because it failed to understand that the existing relationship of social and political forces in Spain ruled out any attempt to simply patch up the regime after the death of the Caudillo by relying on the cohesiveness of the Francoist political movement and while allowing the majority forces of the workers movement, especially the PCE, to be thrust to the sidelines. For seven months, from the coronation of Juan Carlos to the resignation of Arias Navarro, the "butcher of Malaga," events demonstrated the inanity of such a project. There were strikes waves in January and February 1976, the general strike in Euskadi after the Vitoria massacre in March 1976, campaigns for amnesty in June and July 1976, and so on. Conditions for Suárez's success The two preconditions for the success of the Suárez operation were the maginalization of the Francoist political apparatus and the prime minister's capacity to renew the dialogue with the entire opposition, including the reformist workers parties. The government cleverly played on a systematic policy of naming, changing, and retiring ministers and officials in order to establish a series of loyalists and supporters in the upper reaches of the administration, especially in the general staff of the armed forces. This government grip is far from complete, as is attested to by the "blemishes" the government is prepared to cover up, especially as far as the task of maintaining law and order is concerned. The events of the second week of May in Euskadi illustrate this dramatically.
SPAIN But it was primarily through blazing a path through the constitutional labyrinth of Francoism that the Suárez government managed to politically marginalize the political apparatus of Francoism. The Francoist "bunker, " the Phalange, the Federation of Giron Veterans, and the activist groups like Fuerza Nueva collapsed in a matter of weeks: between the failure of the November demonstration in Madrid's Plaza de Oriente commemorating the first anniversary of the death of the dictator and the 3% of the vote won by the Francoists in the institutional referendum held December 15, 1976. The final stages of this collapse came with their attempts to draw the army into action, first in autumn 1976, when the coming legalization of the trade-union federations was announced (although legalization was actually granted only on the eve of May 1, 1977), through the affair of Generals Santiago and Iniesta Gano, and then at the end of January 1977, during the "black week" of the massacre of Atocha. Neutralization of the « neo-bunker » -The success of the Suárez operation also enabled him to neutralize a good part of what is called the "neo-bunker" in Spain, the Alianza Popular (AP — People's Alliance) led by former Minister of the Interior Fraga Iribarne. Created at the beginning of last autumn, when broad sections of the bourgeoisie were not yet convinced of the full success of the Suárez operation and feared the fever of a "hot autumn, " the Alianza Popular claimed to be the party of order and of last resort. It drew behind it the men who had been the pillars of the Francoist ministries throughout the past fifteen years, all the Francoist heavies of the Spain of the depths. The success of the Suárez operation rapidly ate into the maneuvering room of Fraga's men. The attempt of the Alianza Popular to mobilize the army against the legalization of the Communist party in mid-April (which included the resignation of Admiral Pita da Veiga and the meeting of the High Council of the army) finally ended in failure. The formation of the Center Democratic Union (UCD) by the "civilized right" of the Camunas, Carrigues Walters, and Pio Cabanillas, followed by Suárez's decision to take over its leadership, will cut the Alianza Popular's electoral score to the bone. According to all the latest polls (which must be taken with a grain of salt, of course, since there is no tradition of polling in the country), it appears that the Alianza Popular is tending to stagnate, if not decline, from week to week. In spite of the gerrymandering from which the AP will benefit, it now appears virtually certain that the AP will not be able to act as a minority with veto power after the June 15 elections. From the " democratic break » ... But the government's ability to marginalize the bunker and the neo-bunker has also rested on the opening of a "dialogue" with the "democratic opposition" first assembled in the Democratic Coordination and later expanded to the Platform of Democratic Organizations and finally to the Commission of Ten. It must be acknowledged that the democratic opposition has taken more small steps toward the goverment than
4 the government has toward the opposition. Last autumn the Democratic Coordination dropped the demand for a "negotiated break" with Francoism in favor of the demand for "negotiated reform. " In the process the demand for a "provisional government of national unity" was also dropped. After the constitutional referendum on the reform (which the reformist parties were induced to boycott since they had not been legalized), the release of PCE leader Santiago Carrillo from prison last January and the formation of the Commission of Nine (which became the Commission of Ten), marked the transition from the "negotiated reform" to pure and simple "reform, " Suárez's reform that is. Moreover, the negotiations were quite limited, since they dealt only with points both sides felt were indispensable for the smooth holding of elections in June: amnesty, legalization of all the parties, and minimal democratic guarantees for holding the elections. The final balance-sheet of these "negotiations" demonstrates how the "democratic opposition, " which in this case had been broadened to include the formations of the "civilized right" (the liberal Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats of Gil Robles), purely and simply yielded to the government. The Communist party was legalized on April 9, but all the other organizations of the far left, including those which had been part of the Democratic Coordination (the PT, ORT, MCE) remain illegal. The same goes for the Carlist party, which had the misfortune to challenge the legitimacy of the Bourbon royal family. In spite of all the verbal promises relayed by Julio Jauregui, the representative of the Basque Nationalist party in the negotiating commission, there was no total amnesty. On the contrary, none of the promises for a royal indulto (pardon) for the prisoners accused of "crimes of bloodshed" or for prisoners awaiting trial on such charges were kept. It took seven dead in Euskadi during the May mobilizations before five of the six prisoners sentenced to death in the Burgos trials were banished to Belgium. Other revolutionary nationalist militants remain in exile. Finally, there was no discussion of the electoral law or the mode of representation. The balance-sheet of this "negotiation of the reform" bears some resemblance to the biblical parable about Abraham's sons and the plate of lentils. The legalization of the PCE was part of the Suárez reform project in any case. If the June elections are the needle's eye through which the government has to pass to make sure that its project for the construction of a strong state gets the stamp of popular legitimacy, then the legalization of the PCE was inevitable. Without this legalization the Socialists, and even the Christian Democrats and the liberals, would have refused to sanction the electoral operation. In that event the entire operation would have foundered lamentably. ... to the constitutional pact Thus, it was the reformist workers parties and their Christian Democratic allies of the moment which assured the success
of the Suárez "reform" through their successive capitulations. But these capitúlations were not limited to the institutional domain. Not content with sanctioning the Suárez project and assuring its success through their own participation in the elections, the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers party, the largest Social Democratic formation) and the PCE went even further in the "Spanish compromise" by proposing the establishment of a "constitutional pact" and a "social pact" after the June 15 elections. The idea of a "constitutional pact" was first raised by the Socialists of Felipe Gonzales and was then forcefully taken up by the PCE last April 15 at the end of the first legal meeting of the PCE Central Committee. The entire analysis developed in Santiago Carrillo's introductory report to the Central Committee may be summed up in just a few sentences: "To obtain national reconciliation, a real entente between all Spaniards and democracy, the Alianza Popular has to get the lowest possible number of votes in the coming elections. " "If it (the AP) gets a high vote, everyone will suffer, from the government to the opposition." From this analysis flows the proposal for a "constitutional pact" that would include all forces from the PCE and PSOE through the center, even the "reformers" and Suárez. The precondition for realization of this pact is recognition of the state as it now exists, which means the Juan Carlos monarchy ("we will pronounce ourselves for the monarchy, for the constitutional monarchy, if it continues to apply a reform policy"), the blood and gold flag, the principle of the Unity of the Fatherland which it represents against the aspirations of the oppressed nationalities. This is what the party of Santiago Carrillo proclaims loud and clear. This is what the Socialists of the PSOE accept. There is no doubt that the legislature that emerges from the coming elections will be "at best" a center-left parliament, with strong representation for the Center Democratic Union, a good proportion of PSOE deputies, and a smaller allotment for the PCE, the Christian Democrats, and the Alianza Popular. The corollary of this "constitutional pact" which would run from Suárez to the PCE is the establishment of a "social pact." The word has never been used by the reformist workers parties, but this is clearly what is involved when the PCE speaks of a "policy of national responsibility. " It is unlikely that there will be Communist ministers in the first cabinet formed after June 15, Carrillo explains, "but even without ministers, we can exercise real participation, not so much because of the numerical size of our future representation in parliament as because we represent the living and most dynamic forces of the country, without whose participation it is impossible to resolve the great problems of Spain. " (From Carrillo's speech to the Central Committee.) And also: "Without the big workers parties, the center would be incapable of governing the country. " The electoral program of the PCE says in black and white that the solution to the serious economic crisis racking Spain (18% inflation in 1976, a record in the OECD countries, and nearly one million unemployed) "consists of a policy of national responsibility which distributes the burden throughout all society. "The meaning is clear, even if it is added as window dressing that the burden should fall "primarily on the sectors with the highest incomes. " The PCE also writes in black and white that it will be necessary to hitch the unions to the wagon of the "social pact": "If it is possible, before or after the elections, to arrive at an accord that extends from the democratic center to the Socialists and the PCE, then in this framework it would be possible to work out, in agreement both with the unions of workers, peasants, and professionals and with the employers' associations, a four- or five-year plan, which, in the perspective of entry into the EEC, • • • would permit the development of the economic sectors and enterprises that are decisive for the whole country. " (From the electoral program of the PCE.) But this open policy of class collaboration is being applied even before its post-electoral concretization. Making maximum use of the excuse of the division of the union movement and the delay in the organizational construction of the workers movement, particularly the union movement (at the beginning of May there were a total of 300,000 members in the Workers. Commissions, the UGT, the CNT, and the USO), the reformist leaderships have allowed the governmang sottache on the ride plan decided on
The only comprehensive response was the national general strike last November 12(2,500, 000 strikers throughout the state), which was called around purely economic slogans. Sabotaging the workers response But there was no follow-up. On the contrary, the Socialist UGT and the anarcho-syndicalist CNT erected many obstacles and pitfalls, using the excuse that the unionists of the Workers Commissions and the USO had refused to resign their posts in the vertical unions. Moreover, these difficulties were exploited by the PCE leadership of the Workers Commissions and the USO leadership to limit generalized actions as much as possible. It is true that this policy particularly corresponded to the orientation of the leaderships of the reformist workers parties, the PSOE and the PCE: no mobilizations before the elections. This policy of capitulation reached its peak during the Atocha massacre in late January, when the union federations refused to raise the slogan of a general strike, and especially during the recent May events in Euskadi. Explaining that a call for a general strike throughout the Spanish state would be a factor of "destabilization" and "could permit a coup d'etat against democracy, " the leadership of the Workers Commissions and the PCE refused to support the slogan raised by the far left and taken up rather symbolically by the UGT, USO, CNT, and PSOE: For two days of struggle in solidarity with Euskadi. In the Basque country itself the Communist party, which had initially called for the general strike of May 9, wound up withdrawing its support, even though five people had been killed between May 5 and May 7. Other examples could be added: the isolation in which some workers struggles have been left (Roca, Tarabussi,
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SPAIN Aurrera, etc.); the policy of strikebreaking (the construction strike in Barcelona); the failure to prepare the days of action on April 15 (throughout the Spanish state) and April 22 (Euskadi); the lack of a united and centralized response to the ban on May 1 demonstrations. All this illustrates the practical effects of the class collaboration policy of the reformist workers parties. Weakness of the bourgeois political apparatus But this objective aid the government has received in implementing its reform still leaves a great number of unsolved problems for the Spanish bourgeoisie. In this article we will not go into the contradictions the "social pact" policy of the reformists will run into in the working class. These contradictions stem from the very combativity of the working class and from the weight the far left has already acquired in social struggles. Although Suárez's Center Democratic Union seems to have made a real political breakthrough, and probably an electoral one as well, it has not yet managed to completely overcome the political fragmentation of the bourgeoisie inherited from the Francoist void. According the pre-election polls mentioned above, on the level of the Spanish state as a whole the Center Democratic Union will get six times as many votes as the Christian Democrats or the coalition of "Social Democrats" (the Union of the Center Left made up
Social Democrats). But for the moment the Spanish bourgeoisie commands only electoral teams and not real parties. Simply the weight of the national question, which the Suárez government has deliberately decided not to broach before these elections, compounds the difficulties of political unification for the Spanish bourgeoisie. Suárez's electoral grouping will be completely flattened in Galicia by the Galician bourgeois formations, in the Basque country by the Basque Nationalist party, and in Catalonia by the "Democratic Pact for Catalonia, " which is led by the banker Jordi Pujol. In all, the bourgeois "autonomists" who call for strict application of the autonomy statutes which were in effect under the Second Republic, may control from 50 to 60 of the 450 seats in the new Cortes, perhaps even more if the Andalousian, Valencian, and Island "regionalists" are included. The workers movement and the elections The Spanish Socialist Workers party (PSOE) will most probably make an important electoral breakthrough which will undoubtedly make this formation the largest Spanish workers party from the electoral standpoint. The party of Felipe Gonzales has already succeeded in making some breakthroughs among the nationalities, in Euskadi and especially in Catalonia, where it has allied itself with the Catalan Socialist party (Congress) of Joan Reventos. But in spite of
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into the balance to aid Felipe Gonzales, the PSOE has not succeeded in unifying the dispersed Socialist family under its own banner, as it had wanted to do before the elections. The Popular Socialist party (PPS) of Professor Tierno Galvan, which arose out of a split in the PSOE interior branch against the exiled leadership during the 1960s, has formed an electoral front with what remains of the Federation of Socialist Parties, which includes the "regionalist" Socialist formations of Joan Garces. The PCE, along with the PSOE, has held the largest election rallies. But the leadership officially expects to get only 10-15% of the vote in the coming elections. This electoral modesty will not challenge the hegemony the PCE has gained within the workers movement among the combative workers and the natural cadres of the class who have emerged during the past fifteen years of struggle. It is likely that the meager score the PCE will achieve, and especially the lack of any short-term prospects for membership in the goverment, may make it more difficult to implement the "social pact" policy, in spite of reformist blackmail about "destabilization" and possible military coups. Electoral policy of the revolutionary organizations Some revolutionary currents and organizations are calling for a boycott of the elections, basing themselves on the fact that the elections are not free and that the Cortes will not have constituency powers. This is the position of groups such as the Communist Organization of Spain (OCE), Bandera Roja (Maoist), the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, and the small Lambertist current, but also of the Liga Comunista (Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR - Revolutionary Communist League), the other sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, has taken a different approach. The comrades of the LCR have explained that there should have been a united response of the workers formations to the limitations placed on the elections by Suárez, a response which should have taken the form of United Workers Candidates around a four-point minimum platform:
*For total amnesty and unrestricted democratic rights and freedoms;
*For the right of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities;
*Against any form of social pact and for free and united negotiations over the demands of the workers and people;
*For free elections to a constituent assembly which would proclaim a republic. The decision of the PCE and the PSOE to present separate slates, their commitment to the "constitutional pact" and the "social pact," and their refusal to accept the principle of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities immediately rendered this perspective of a united battle of the workers movement null and void, even though it was required by the objective situation.
Unity was also impossible among the various forces of the far left that decided to run in the elections. The Labor party (PT), which is running a slate under the label Front of the Democratic Left (FID), has gone even further in its rightist evolution with the search for systematic alliances with the so-called democratic bourgeoisie. This has led the PT in Catalonia, for example, to ally itself with the Esquerra Republicana and the Estat Catala and to defend Tarradellas, the old president of the Generality in exile. The Revolutionary Workers Organization (ORT), continuing its sectarian evolution, has decided to present its own slate, alone or nearly so, under the label "Independent Workers Candidates. " These electoral options are fully in accordance with the recent evolution of these two Maoist organizations. The position of the Communist Movement of Spain (MCE) is more complex. Since autumn this organization has been waging a united fight along with our comrades of the LCR in the Unitary Current of the Workers Commissions and has often been in the forefront, along with the LCR and the OIC, of the economic and political battles against reformist capitulations in recent months. The MCE had decided to press for United Popular Candidates (CUP), explicitly patterned after the Dynamization Groups of Popular Unity that were formed around the candidacy of Otelo de Carvalho in the Portuguese presidential elections of June 1976. In addition, the CUPs were to be formed in a totally decentralized manner, region by region. An accord between the CUP and the Front for Workers Unity (FUT), made up of the Communist Action organization (AC), the LCR, and the Organization of the Communist Left (OIC), finally became impossible, for several principled reasons:
*the ambiguities of the CUPs on the unconditional right of self-determination of the oppressed nationalities;
*the demand for the autonomy statutes of the Second Republic and the slogan for an interclass "provisional goverment";
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*the ambiguities of the CUPs on the slogan of the constituent assembly. Behind these differences on slogans, there were also differences over relations within the CUPs between the "independents" and the members of organizations, as well as over the future of the CUPs. The MCE favors transforming them into a permanent movement of "popular unity" after June 15. This involved totally irreconcilable differences between the MCE and our comrades. But it remains true that the discussions that have begun among the various components of the far left, both inside and outside the FUT, between the organizations that participate in the elections and those that boycott them, will be decisive for the future possibilities of unity in action and independent intervention of the far left against reformist misdirection. These discussions will also have effects on the inevitable possibilities of reshuffling and recomposition of the far left which are looming for coming months and years. June 1, 1977
Platform of the Front for the Unity of the Workers
We are publishing below the text of the