workers struggles in northern Europe cannot be understood and its import and limits cann be measured if one ignores the complex interweaving between what happens in the factories and what happens in th political life of the countries involved. Occasionally subtl modifications in the reciprocal relations between the toilin masses, the organizing cadres of the class, the central lead of the trade unions, and the various factions of the bourgeo are part of the same overall picture. Everywhere the trade-union bureaucracy has rapidly graspe the changed atmosphere in the factories and among the rank-and-file. It has tried to react in an essentially preven manner, in order to avoid being outflanked by direct action Since we are only at the beginning of the upswing of strugg in all these countries (in some cases, like West Germany, after several years of pronounced retreat), and since the temperature is rising only moderately, the bureaucracy, either as a whole or in its "left" wing, has generally been able to maintain control of the situation. There is thus no
Wy EISET MET BEHOUDTVRR
ONZE KOOPKRACHT
H EUROPE
question of explosions comparable to those that have occurred or are now occurring in Italy, Spain, or Portugal. The trade-union bureaucracy stands in a relationship of particular symbiosis with the mass reformist parties, which in northern Europe are essentially Social Democratic parties. In general the bureaucracy is integrated into these parties to a large extent. It takes maximal advantage of their positions in governments which are considered "lesser evil" ones compared to governments of the bourgeois parties, especially during periods of pronounced economic Sirticulties. But at the same time, the bureaucracy is more dependent on the Social Democratic leaderships now than during the 1930s and 1940s, especially since these leaderships now contain an enfire sector which no longer directly represents the workers movement but instead the bureaucracy and technocracy of the bourgeois state. Diverse political situations thus provoke varying reactions from the trade-union bureaucracy. In West Germany throughout the period preceding the legislative elections of 1976 the trade-union bureaucrats turned a deaf ear to any pressure to raise demands, in order "not to frighten the voters. " But contrary to many predictions, maintaining the Helmut Schmidt cabinet in office, even with a reduced parliamentary majority, has not accentuated the trend toward trade-union moderation. On the contrary, during the past several months both the leadership of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB -German Trade Union Federation) and the leaderships of several important individual unions have taken their distance from the policy of the government. It is above all the government's policy in the realms of social security and fiscal policy - in both cases marked by the clearest concessions to the employers — that have been rather severely critized by the trade unions. This end of the honeymoon between Helmut Schmidt and the trade-union leadership threatens to have an equivalent in
Britain, where the practically unfailing support of the big unions to the Wilson-Healey-Callaghan "social contract" policy under the pretext that Labour must be kept in power at all costs and a Tory government prevented, is beginning to run into serious resistance (especially in the public sector). In Denmark since the formation of the minority Social Democratic government, the application of an incomes policy, and the unleashing of a violent attack on the workers by the employers, there has been a series of small resistance strikes, although a central response by the proletariat is lacking. But since February 1, 1977, the conflict which broke out in the country's major printshop, Berlinske Hus of Copenhagen, has created a pole around which working-class resistance is organizing. The workers of Berlinske Hus have been engaged in a long struggle with the employers, who are demanding a 50% speedup, a longer workday, the layoff of 300 workers, and a 10-15% decline in wages. When the workers objected they were locked out. The workers are resisting this provocative aggression, in spite of the fact that the "labor court" has once ogain revealed its class nature by ruling that the lockout is actually a wildcat strike by the workers and by imposing a fine of 300 crowns on each individual worker and 200, 000 crowns on the union for organizational "responsibility" for the conflict. The employers have also tried to break the resistance of the workers by transferring printing facilities to the Springer press in Germany and to the Netherlands. The international printers union has committed itself to halting the printing of this material, but there is a problem here since the Dutch printers union is not part of the international union. The wave of solidarity with the Berlinske Hus workers has spread widely in Denmark. Large sums of money have been collected and several solidarity strikes have occurred in other printshops. This strike wave is gradually being combined with preparation for the next national contract negotiations, in which important layers of workers are opposing a union capitulation of the type that occurred in August 1976. The trade-union bureaucracy has already threatened to launch strikes involving 250,000 workers if the employers do not change their attitude. The situation in the Netherlands is less clear. This country is governed by a coalition composed of the Socialist party, the Catholic party, and a Protestant party, as well as two other small parties. But the Catholic party, the Protestant party (AR), and a more conservative Protestant party, the CHU (which, along with the major conservative party, the VD, is in the opposition), have formed an electoral coalition in preparation for this year's legislative elections. This coalition is clearly aiming at ousting the Social Democracy from the government. Under these conditions, the more offensive position of the trade-union bureaucracy is aimed more directly at the employers than at the cabinet headed by the Social Democrat Den Uyl. The latter has initially taken a "neutral" and "non-interventionist" attitude toward the strike wave. He
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NORTH EUROPE may even hope to profit from the upturn of workers struggles inasmuch as the bourgeoisie may fear that the SP's moving into the opposition would intensify workers combativity. It thus seems that a wing of capital may favor maintaining the present coalition after the elections. On the basis of an opposite situation, a similar evolution is under way in Belgium. This country is now governed by a conservative coalition of bourgeois parties. The coalition has tried to attack the sliding scale and increase the social charges borne by the workers. In 1976 the trade-unions at first reacted hesitantly, but reaction spread in February and March 1977 and has led to a significant strike wave. Independent of its need to channel workers combativity, trade-union bureaucracy wants to overturn the political alliance, replacing the conservative Tindemans cabinet with a Catholic-Socialist government. Early elections are practically inevitable. A significant wing of the bourgeoisie is likewise asking for an end to the present goverment alliance. Another common feature of the Belgian and Dutch situations is a slow radicalization of Catholic trade unionism, which is leading the latter into closer and closer collaboration with the unions led by the Social Democracy. In the Netherlands the two union federations have even founded a formal federation, the FNV (Federation of Trade Unions of the Netherlands), which includes 1 million members and led the strike wave in February. In Belgium the two confederations (which together have more than 2 million members) had hesitated in face of the antiworker offensive of the Tindemans cabinet in 1976, since the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC - Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) was reluctant to act against a cabinet under Catholic leadership. But in February the reflex of unity came to the fore and the Front Commun (Common Front) of the two confederations enabled a broad strike wave to be launched. Similarly, the Catholic unions have taken their distance from the bourgeois Catholic parties in these two countries. The long period during which they were bound to these parties is beginning to end. But for the moment this is leaving them suspended in a political vacuum, which will not be able to last indefinitely. The possibility of the formation of a party of Christian workers is little by little becoming realistic. It would thus be excessively simplistic to analyze the new upturn of workers struggles in northern Europe simply as the result of bureaucratic maneuvers to maintain or return the Social Democracy to power in order to apply its usual policy as "honest manager of capitalism. " This is only one element in a totality of social and political conflict. The discontent of the workers is real. The new rise of combativity, although modest, is also real. These sentiments can be manipulated by the reformist leaders only to a certain extent, especially since the recomposition of the workers movement is continuing and the change in atmosphere in the factories will be reflected in the reformist parties themselves. The gap between the situations in northern and southern Europe remains noteworthy. The events of the past two months 22 have not reduced this gap appreciably. But something has begun to move in norther Europe too. And here again, it only the beginning.
The Strike Wave in th
Netherlands
The official objective of the three weeks of strikes in the
Netherlands in February 1977 - the biggest strikes the country has seen in decades - was to win application of th interprofessional agreement on the sliding scale (which has been in effect since 1971) which the employers have tried eliminate for 1977, and to win a more than 2% wage incre to compensate for previous losses in purchasing power. The sliding scale functions very partially and insufficiently in the Netherlands. The adjustment to the increase in the cost of living occurs with nine months' delay, which in a period of rapid inflation means important wage losses for th workers. The trade-union movement has no possibility of e troling calculation of the retail price index, which is work out solely by the government and is often manipulated in a scandalous manner (in 1976 some price increases were deliberately left out of the calculation of the index; there also a possibility that the recent increase in health insuran payments and hospital costs will also be eliminated from th calculation). Nevertheless, the Dutch workers and unions consider that t gain, despite its inadequacies, does give some protection against the erosion of purchasing power. Thus, when the employers announced during the negotiations to renew con tracts that the July 1 automatic adjustment of wages to the rise of the official price index between October 1976 and April 1977 would not be applied, this was regarded as a re provocation. The second union demand relates to an overall gross wage increase of 2% for the mass of wage earners, an increase which was also rejected by the employers' associations. The associations then broke off negotiations with the unions. The strikes came in two waves. The first was unleashed on February 16. By February 18 some 40,000 workers were on strike. Big demonstrations were held in Rotterdam (25, 000), Utrecht (10,000), and Eindhoven (several thousand) on February 16. The following day there were mass demonstrati in The Hague, and the day after that (the first day of the strike in earnest) there was a demonstration in Amsterdam. This first strike wave had been supported by all the union federations and opposed by all the employers. But the latter were surprised by the combativity of the workers. The paralysis of the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam and the several-hours-long strike of the streetcar drivers in Amsterd Rotterdam, and Utrecht (who do not have the right to strike broke up the employers' front. The KLM airlines company,
with its 17,000 workers and employees, and the Ahold food rust, with employment rolls of 15,000, were the first to capitulate. The strike of several daily newspapers led the employers in the printing industry to reopen negotiations vith the unions. A wildcat strike broke out in three bicycle companies - the only significant instance in which the union eaders were outflanked - and the same night the unions nvolved recognized the strike. The employers then decided to reopen negotiations and gave n on the question of the sliding scale for 1977, while reerving the possibility of bringing the point up again in 1978. ut they refused to grant the 2% increases. hen there was a new surprise: Despite the fact that the rotestant unions broke the unity of the trade-union front, trikes spread in a second wave, affecting selected companies. Vorkers in the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam again played leading role, as they had during the first wave. This time here was no generalized accord, but rather accords by ndustry (and sometimes by company). But in the great majority F cases, the 2% increases were granted. t may thus be said that the Dutch workers won a victory. But he victory is limited, since the demands advanced were aleady the result of a compromise, since the 2% wage increases ave been accompanied by productivity increases that verage 4%, and above all since the trade-union leaderships ppear prepared to negotiate, during the coming year, over imiting the sliding scale to the "purified" index from which ertain price increases (public services, social insurance harges, etc.) have been eliminated by government decision. he workers will thus have to exercise great vigilance to revent new erosion of their purchasing power next year.
The Strike Wave in
Belgium
ince February 25 Belgium has been going through the greatest rike wave since the general strike of 1960-61. The two big ion federations, the FGTB (General Federation of Labor of elgium, led by the Social Democracy) and the CSC (the atholic union federation) had decided to respond to the sterity plan of the reactionary Tindemans government rough fragmented general strikes held on a weekly basis. his austerity plan includes a series of anti-working-class easures among which are the following: *"solidarity" dues payment equal to 0.4% of wages to be posed on workers to finance the enormous deficit in social surance funds caused by the growth of unemployment; *an intensification of selective contral and the requisition unemployed workers; *the creation or extension of workers of the "second zone, " no are compelled to work without enjoying nomal wage hedules (unemployed persons hired by public services, workers on probation etc.);
*taxing of social security allocations (including unemployment compensation!);
*massive reduction of state subsidies to retirement funds;
*reduction of state subsidies to health insurance and the imposition of new charges on insured patients;
*a significant increase in indirect taxes affecting not only gasoline but also cigarettes, drinks, coffee consumption, etc. Against this austerity plan the leaderships of the two union federations launched inter-professional general strikes on five successive Fridays, in two provinces (one Flemish and one Walloon) on each occasion, and one national general strike each Friday in a given sector of public services. On February 25 the strike was in the provinces of Hainaut and West Flanders, and the truck drivers and municipal employees throughout the country walked out. On March 4 the strike was in East Flanders and Luxembourg, and the transit workers in urban areas throughout the country walked out. This plan had the threefold objective of staggering the response in order to raise spirits gradually (with a view toward a "Struggle First of May" or possibly to early elections), to give the government and the employers time to modify their attitude and offer a compromise, and to fragment the strength of the workers by avoiding an interprofessional general strike on a national scale. The specter of 1960-61 is decidedly haunting all spirits. If should be noted that this fragmentation of the workers! strength succeeded only in part, for from the very first day of struggle a whole series of sectors which were not scheduled to walk out moved into struggle anyway. This was particularly the case for most of the workers in Liege, more than 100, 000 of whom went on strike, the dockers of the port of Antwerp, the metalworkers of the south and the province of Luxembourg, several combative sectors in Brussels, some of the glassworkers in Namur, etc. The phenomenon of the central leaderships' being overtaken by the ranks was thus clearer than in the Netherlands, although most of the time it was touched off under the auspices of the regional, local, or sectoral union leaderships. In all, there were more than 375, 000 on March 4. February 25, and more than 200,000 on March 4. In addition, big demonstrations were held on February 25, some of the most massive of which were: 20,000 (but divided between the FGTB and CSC) in Liege; 10,000 in Mons; 3,000 in La Louvière; 6,000 in Brussels; 3,000 in Brugge. The railroad strike was 100% solid and the paralysis of Charleroi, with very dynamic flying squads of pickets, was impressive. After the second strike, the government dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, using the pretext of a quarrel with the Rassemblement Wallon, the smallest partner in the government coalition. The two trade-union bureaucracies hurried to suspend the rotating general strikes that had been planned for March 11, 18, and 25, "in order not to influence the elections." We await the reaction of the workers.
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