DIVISION
THE
RULING
BLOC
ince the end of 19%, when the article below was written by ur Brazilian comrades, the essence of the analysis they put orward has been confirmed by events. The rightist and represive course of the Geisel regime has been intensified with he murder of several leaders of the Communist party of razil (Maoist) by the army. Among those killed were Pedro omar, an old Communist Brazilian leader a CP parliamentary leputy in 1946-47) and Angelo Arroyo, a leader of the etalworkers union of So Paulo. Aldo Arantes, former resident of the National Union of Brazilian Students, was mprisoned at the same time and there has been no word of is fate. The ouster of opposition deputies from parliament is ontinuing, the most recent to be removed being two municpal councilors of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro MDM - Brazilian Democratic Movement) from the state of io Grande do Sol, G. Perez and M. Klassmann. Finally, he minister Severo Gomes, supposedly a representative of he "nationalist" wing of the government, has been discharged y Geisel.
In addition, statements and mobilizations against the military regime on the part of various sectors are increasing: a manifesto signed by hundreds of very well known Brazilian intellectuals (including the architect Oscar Niemeyer, who designed the city of Brasilia, Chico Buarque de Holanda, a popular singer, etc.) demands the restoration of democratic rights, the episcopal conference of the Brazilian church has denounced police violence and social injustice, etc. * * ***** * * * * * The year 1973 saw the beginning of a fundamental change in the direction of the economic trend that had predominated during the Medici government. In fact, the first signs of this process became clear toward the end of that year. Since then the economy has steadily sunk into deeper and deeper contradictions. A consequence of this economic change has been a transformation of relations among the various sectors and subsectors of the ruling classes. Or better, the nearly complete interruption of the preceding growth and the opening of a period of crisis have put an end to the virtually total cohesion which had marked the previous period. A stage has begun in which the trend toward the disintegration of the ruling classes is coming to the fore. The economy was booming in 1973, but signs did appear indicating that coming years would be difficult. In late 1973 serious problems in regard to what is called "repressed inflation" cropped up. In order to prevent a high rate of inflation, the government tried to "repress" (that is, contain) the prices of some commodities. Now, toward the end of 1973 a generalized shortage of certain food products arose, such as meat, beans (the staple diet of the Brazilian people), milk, etc. The declining supply from ranchers, owners of meat refrigeration plants, and farmers reflected these sectors' discontent with the government's policy. Primary materials became scarce in 1974. Production of various industrial commodities, such as refrigerators, motors, paper, textiles, and pharmaceutical products declined because of shortages of primary materials used in the productive process, It was in 1974 and 1975, though, that the economy began to show signs of crisis more serious than these initial indications. An overproduction crisis began to emerge. The previous level of production could no longer be maintained, because of the limits of the market. Overproduction developed first in 1974 for some "popular" consumer goods, including some durable goods purchased by poor layers, such as refrigerators, electrical appliances, portable radios, etc. The automobile industry, however, was still producing at a high level. The situation worsened in 1975. Gross national product suddenly declined after years of very high growth rates. Inflation reached 35%. The trade balance deteriorated and the country's foreign debt rose to astronomical sums: $22,000 million, or 3% of annual GNP. The crisis of the market hit the most modern sectors of the economy, including the producers of durable consumer goods which had been absorbed by the "modern" market and had served as the basis
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BRAZIL for economic growth in the previous period. Automobile production, which had been the central axis of growth, declined radically. The overproduction crisis was generalized and aggravated the problems of the ruling classes. Roots of the crisis In reality, the roots of the crisis run deeper. The factors listed above point to the end of a period of economic growth based on the dynamism of the sectors producing durable consumer goods (and some intermediary goods), on pre-installed productive capacity, and on a world economic situation that favored exports, The gradual exhaustion of existing productive capacity required growing imports of capital goods, which weighed heavily in the trade balance. The relative narowness of the domestic market no longer sustained significant increases in production (at least for a certain period). The world crisis aggravated this situation since it became increasingly difficult to compensate for internal limits by boosting exports, according to the policy of Delfim Neto, minister of finance in the Medici government. The need to constantly increase imports and the impossibility of increasing exports at the same rate generated a sudden deficit in foreign trade. This deficit was exacerbated by foreign debt servicing, the repatriation of imperialist profits in various disguised forms, payments for royalties on patents, etc. For the Brazilian capitalist system to be able to experience a period of economic growth, some changes in the previous "model" of accumulation would be necessary, combined with measures capable of making the market more dynamic, combatting inflation, and reversing the growing trend toward deficits in the trade balance. These transformations and measures could not be carried out without giving rise to conflict and violent clashes among the various sectors of the ruling classes. In addition, far from producing immediate positive effects, they would worsen the economic situation, in the hope that there would be improvements in the medium or long term. The year 1976 clearly showed the development of these tendencies. The measures aimed at attenuating the negative frade balance became increasingly rigorous: 25% reduction in government purchases, extension of the prior deposit period to 360 days, etc. The negative effects of these measures on the economy began to be felt clearly. First, economic growth diminished, especially in the sectors most closely linked to imports: petrochemicals, construction, etc. Second, by raising the prices of imported products, they contributed to increasing and generalizing inflation, which reached 46.3% for the first ten months of 1976. Third, these "sacrifices" were not compensated for by a clear reduction in the trade deficit, since in spite of the reduction of the value of imports (as of 1975), exports did not expand sufficiently: While foreign debt rose 26.7% in 1975, exports grew less than 9% and will probably not exceed that growth rate for 1976 either. The inflationary wave compelled the government to take measures to restrict the money supply. This means that the option of gradual financial suffocation is setting in, causing a reduction in economic activity. In addition, even these "austerity" measures have not produced the expected results,
14 which demonstrates the fragility of the economy and the impossibility of choosing with any security between inflation and growth. Nevertheless, they did shake both the small and middle-sized companies through the reduction in credits and loans, and also created difficulties for financial sectors (bankers). Thus, the crisis has already affected sectors which had been making fabulous profits up through 1975. A "therapeutic shock" - that is, an even more drastic reductio in the level of economic activity in order to reduce inflation rapidly which has been proposed by some technocrats, could aggravate the entire economic situation even more quickly and provoke discontent among industrial sectors, which would weaken the base of the regime. Moreover, the regime needs to find another axis around whic to make accumulation more dynamic, on the basis of investments oriented toward the sector of production goods. But this process is not at all simple and stimulates rivalries among sectors of the ruling classes. Private capital is seeking to force the government to open the field of investment and to limit state investment to the less profitable sectors. The nafional sectors are seeking to negotiate with foreign capital under more favorable conditions, in the hope of expanding their slice of the pie. This is the significance of the criticisms of "excess statification" and the requests for "regulation of foreign investments in the country." The case of Petrobras (the state oil company) shows to what extent the weakness of capitalism in Brazil can make it yield to foreign capital. (Petrobras has signed accords with big companies covering prospecting and extrac tion of oil.) The process of substituting production goods, in spite of its importance for the future of Brazilian capitalism, cannot assure a way out of the economic crisis in the immediate future. On the one hand, foreign competition is still too strong and resistance to import controls intensifies the intern crisis. On the other hand, domestic demand for these products requires a favorable situation for the growth of consumer goods industries. That is, the development of the capital goods sector is dependent on overcoming the crisis in the consumer goods sectors, which are in difficult circumstances because of the reduction in demand. The economic crisis consequently tends to deepen and the internal contradictions of the ruling classes become increasingly actute. Rebirth of the workers movement The mass movement had experienced a constant decline sinc 1969-70, when the ruling classes were more united as a result of the growth of the economy and the struggle against the militarist left. During this period strikes in the factories became increasingly rare, and the "tertiary sector" and the student movement were extremely disorganized. The trade unions fell into the hands of scabs and the trade-union oppositions lost their strength little by little. Apathy grippe the masses and their inability to take initiatives became a dominant feature. The mass movement fell into a period of retreat and disorganization.
situation has been changing since the end of 1973. ious factors account for the rebirth of the mass movement. +, the economic crisis and the divisions within the ruling sses act to weaken the owning classes and the military ime. Second, the masses have seen that it is already sible to take the initiative again and win some concessions n the bourgeoisie. The third factor is precisely this mass iative itself, produced by the conditions of crisis: ability and poverty threaten the masses violently (unemment, inflation, rising cost of living, etc.). e rebirth of the mass movement presents various specific aracteristics which indicate its weakness. The slowness of s rebirth must be stressed above all. Since 1973, when uggles arose again (the movement by São Paulo students in fense of political prisoners, "slowdown" strikes and alysis of some important factories such as, Ford, Chrysler, ), they did not last long and did not change in ality; they remained limited and occasional struggles. is characteristic was less notable among the students, as wn by the ECA strike, which lasted quite a long time i got a broad response.
The mobilizations among the students took on an increasingly political and organized character. The students, along with intellectual sectors, journalists, etc. constitute practically the only manifestation of opposition to the regime (struggle for democratic rights, for amnesty, against torture, etc.). They have tried to create a national organization, holding meetings in Campinas and So Paulo. They now once again occupy a preponderant position in the political situation, mainly during election periods or when important events break out (the death of the journalist Herzog, for example). Among the salaried petty-bourgeois sectors, such as bank employees, reorganization and the first manifestations of opposition have already been felt, although they have not yet gained a national audience. The workers movement has developed continuously since 1973. But while workers struggles have increased quantitatively, they have not taken a qualitative leap. The number of work stoppages has risen slowly from year to year, but without gaining in depth. Brief stoppages, slowdowns, and disordered demonstrations in the workshops and factories predominate. Only in small factories (Saad, for example), have struggles drawn in all the workers at once. This situation clearly shows the organic debility of the working class in Brazil. The unions are incapable of conducting workers struggles. The latter thus develop on the basis of the specific problems of each factory without linking up with the others; there is not even sufficient internal organization to unify the movement. In this sense, the emergence of workers commissions in certain regions, the regional coordinating bodies, and the initiatives to organize trade-union oppositions constitute significant advances in the rebirth of the workers movement. It is this sort of advance that will be able to stimulate and strengthen the rebirth of the workers movement. Finally, it is important to take note of the economic character of the demands of the workers. At no time have any struggles gone beyond this concern to move to the political field. The question of wages and their decline constitute the major axis of the workers mobilizations in the factories. In general, these struggles either win their immediate objectives or result in retreats, without the workers yet being prepared to fight for long periods. In spite of this, the role played by the new initiative of the mass movement in the Brazilian situation should not be underestimated. First, the objective premises at the origin of this rebirth persist and are even deepening. Second, for the ruling classes these manifestations are difficult to avert -because of the regime's inability to make systematic concessions to the broad masses - and not easy to repress, for repression could possibly touch off a wave of protest that might raise the level and scope of the initial struggles. Finally, compared to the potential these struggles have, the present events are only the initial signs of reemergence of the mass movement in Brazil after the consecutive reverses suffered in the past. These first steps are necessary for the
15
BRAZIL reorganization and fortification of the masses. Each partial struggle contains latent explosive potential. Although today they are moving along slowly, in the future they may take sudden leaps forward and come to exert real weight in the situation of the country, for the regime is further eroded and weakened by the economic crisis and the political impasse of the dictatorship, as well as by its inability to resolve the most elementary social problems. Military dictatorship and crisis of the system of rule The 1964 coup marked a qualitative change in the form of bourgeois rule. The populist form was replaced by an open dictatorship directly supported by the armed forces. This change corresponded to a nodal point in the process of modification of the relationship of class forces, a process which began after the second world war, passed through the detour of the Getulio Vargas government and the crisis which led to his suicide, and continued with the intensive introduction of foreign capital during the Jucelino Kubitschek government (1956-60), the Bonapartism of Janio Quadros (January-October 1961) and the crisis which marked his resignation, the return of João Goulart (1961-64), and finally the coup of April 1, 1964. The old populism had reached the end of its rope by 1964. The national bourgeoisie was no longer capable of significantly resisting the total hegemony of foreign capital, both because it had been further weakened with the erosion of the conditions for relatively independent growth (during the years of the crisis of world capitalism, 1914-45) and because foreign capital had intensified its offensive against the dependent countries through direct incursions when the period of economic expansion began with the Korean war. In addition, the national bourgeoisie was no longer capable of containing the mass movement within the limits of populism, as was shown by the radicalization of the movements of peasants, workers, and students. Thus, under these conditions the ruling classes could no longer tolerate a government which relied on the popular masses in order to resist foreign capital, even if in a very limited way. The danger of a socialist revolution was further reinforced by the dynamic followed by the Cuban revolution. The relations among the contending classes had to be changed if the capitalist system was to continue to exist. With the 1964 coup the structure of power based on populism was completely destroyed. The mechanisms formerly used to garner bourgeois support among the popular masses (parties, trade unions, etc.) were used to prevent the mass movement from being coopted. The ruling classes closed ranks, they were radically separated from the popular masses. bourgeois parties lost their entire mass base and the polarization between exploiters and exploited was very intense. Only a layer of the petty bourgeoisie, driven to desperation by the crisis and lacking perspectives, supported the new structure of social forces. Nevertheless, despite all this, the regime received no active support when it sought to prevent any social modification in order to recover its vigor and emerge from the crisis.
The impotence of the civilian social forces and the socia weakness of the bourgeoisie led to a particular for of n in which the armed forces occupied the role of substanti base of the regime and of the bourgeoisie in power. The current led by Castelo Branco (the "Castelists") unde the weaknesses of this form of rule. They therefore propo "redemocratization" as a medium-term objective. At the outset, the preponderance of the Castelist current was asserted, because the reorganization of relations among classes, even within the ruling bloc, required a certain flexibility in order for the bourgeois political currents to able to acquire some means of expression within the cent regime. Nevertheless, the subsequent evolution of the cl struggle did not allow the Castelist plans to be concretiz Popular dissent against the dictatorship, which rose in 15 the disputes within the ruling bloc over the modification the structures of power, and the economic crisis, which still very strong and had disastrous consequences for some sectors of the bourgeoisie, all led the regime to harden s further (laws suppressing political parties, etc.). The Costa e Silva government, which came to power in / 1967, once again promised a "democratic opening" whic would permit the parties to act and correct the major we nesses of the military dictatorship. Taking advantage of + economic recovery of 1968, the government made "popul promises (distribution of profits, etc.) in order to strengt the social base of the regime. Nevertheless, these promises were not kept. After the ev of 1968 (demonstration of 100,000 people, the strikes of Osasco and Contagem, etc.), the regime once again too road of repression, which culminated in the promulgation Institutional Act No.5. (1) Features of the dictatorship The new form of bourgeois rule stabilized and took on its clearest characteristics during the government of Genera Emilio Medici (1969-74). The rightward evolution which marked the previous governments reached its apogee. Un Medici, the dictatorship presented the following charact istics:
1. The state defended the interests of foreign capital above all.
2. The effective base of the regime was the armed for the army becoming transformed into the dominant bourge party.
3. The weakness and virtually uselessness of the civil institutions (parliament, parties, etc.) in the exercise of power were manifest. These institutions were reduced to secondary role and existed solely to discipline the direct representatives of the bourgeoisie and to act as channels pressure as far as possible.
4. Virtually no means of expression existed for many sectors of the bourgeoisie, particularly the weakest ones (the middle layers), which were thus unable to defend th interests against the central power.
5. The social base of support was very narrow; isolati from the working masses and many sectors of the impoveri
itty bourgeoisie was complete. 6. Decision-making power was concentrated in the hands officers, or more exactly the high command of the armed rces. 7. The repressive apparatus was hypertrophied. is sort of structure of power can attempt to stabilize itself aly during exceptional periods. In the case of the Medici vernment, the favorable economic conjuncture and the ut of the militarist left (in which a good part of the volutionary movement was involved), achieved through utal repression, as well as the retreat of the mass movement 1968, were the factors that permitted this stabilization. le economy, both because of its internal dynamic and -cause of the favorable situation for exports, temporarily lified the owning classes, all of whom were able to profit om the situation (profits were raked in at the expense of e workers because of the wage freeze). The timid reactions the least favored sectors of the ruling classes, such as the eners of backward industry, were unable to break the unity the sectors profiting from the situation. In addition, the gime won the support of some middle layers and sectors of e petty bourgeoisie, which also profited from economic owth and experienced a rise in their living standards. le failure of leftist militarism and the inability of the masses oppose this regime of superexploitation and violent pression completed this picture favorable to the solidificaon of the big bourgeoisie and the euphoria of the "modern" tty bourgeoisie. "Social peace" and the "economic miracle" aranteed the stability of an extremely oppressive and pressive regime. hen new trends began to emerge (economic crisis, breakup internal cohesion, renewal of the mass movement), the edici-style dictatorship began to be threatened. Political visions were expressed within the ruling classes around two sic questions: 1) the participation of the bourgeoisie in the ntral power; 2) the form of domination over the working asses. e economic difficulties and the multiplication of distinct terests among various sectors of the bourgeoisie, the fling of the middle layers, the differences on how to overme the crisis (domestic market, limitation of imports, vestments, etc.) - all this intensified the pressure for a dification of the situation in order to facilitate the access "civilian representatives" to the decision-making center. ese pressures were especially sharp from the sectors which d remained further removed from the central decisions, ch as the farmers and the national and middle-sized groups. e most lucid representatives of foreign capital (for example e newspaper Estado de São Paulo) also favored political anges capable of allowing room for the factional interay of the bourgeois forces and avoiding a deep political isis. + the disputes among the ruling classes in the political main developed especially around the social weaknesses of • dictatorship and the forms of dissent that were again beginning to arise among the mass movement and the revolutionary movement. Broad sectors of the bourgeoisie and the military - with the exception of the spokesmen of the hardline groups - believed that repression effected through arbitrary and illegal military-police measures (torture, secret prisons, etc.), the lack of social support for the regime, class polarization, and the inadequacy and decline of bourgeois institutions (parliament, parties, etc.) in the eyes of the masses would wind up constituting mortal dangers, especially if the trends then current continued. This situation indicated that there was a political crisis. The disputes among the political currents that arose around various alternatives for overcoming that crisis were further aggravated by the weaknesses of the bourgeoisie. Fragile, the dictatroship was especially threatened since its greatest base of support, the bourgeoisie, was beginning to divide. The Geisel government In 1974, when Geisel was chosen to replace Medici, an unfavorable situation for the bourgeoisie was already taking shape and pointing to a less promising future for capital and its system of rule. Because of the disputes among military currents (hardliners, supporters of Castelo Branco, nationalists, etc.), and in spite of the lack of public expression by politicians, the military dictatorship did not find it easy to select Geisel. These disputes indicated that the developing economic crisis, the shaking of the cohesion of the ruling classes, as well as the beginning of an unstable period for a Medici-style dictatorship, required a political reorientation consistent with the changing national and international conjuncture. Geisel was chosen against the will of the hardliners and nationalist officers. But he had the support of the Castelists and the ideologically most important officers of the military academy (the ESG). His Bonapartist government project was worked out under these conditions, a project which quickly proved ineffective given the dynamic of events and the class struggle. Geisel increasingly led the government into the camp of imperialism, in opposition to popular aspirations and even to the aspirations of the fragile national bourgeoisie. Economically, the second national development plan (PND) traced out a strategy oriented toward heavy industry, substitution of the import of capital goods (equipment, raw materials and minerals, etc.), and the dynamization of the heavy transport industry (naval, railway, air, etc.). The intent of these measures was to redress the balance of payments situation through diminishing imports of these products, which had such heavy weight in the trade balance. At the same time, the measures sought to create new poles of dynamization of industry and to find a way to a new phase of economic growth. This strategy required a foreign policy aimed at taking advantage of the possibilities of opening up foreign markets and attracting investment. This determined the government's policy of "responsible pragmatism" and the initiatives which astonished the sectors tied to imperialism. Examples of this are the anti-Zionist vote of the Brazilian UN delegation,
17
BRAZIL the rapprochement with Arab governments, the recognition of Angola, the restoration of diplomatic relations with China, and so on. The economic policy of the government did not lead to an equilibrium of forces between national and foreign capital. In fact, it is impossible to surmount the crisis without greater integration with imperialism, without imperialist loans and direct investments in the Brazilian economy. This observation is fundamental. The government has no possibility of maintaining a balance between the forces of imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. In spite of the world crisis, foreign investment is continuing at a rather sustained rate. In face of the insufficiency of resources provided by North American capital, the goverment appealed to the Imperialist countries of Europe (France, Britain, and West Germany) and Japan. Investments of capital from these countries are directed precisely to the sectors considered top priority by the second national development plan. Even more representative of this is the breaking of the state monopoly on oil through foreign investment (risk contracts), which is now shaking Petrobras, stronghold of the nationalist groups. Socially the government's timidity is even greater. The second national development plan stresses the social question, and in its statements the government often refers to "the injustices of income distribution, "the need to improve the situation of the people, and so on. All this indicates the concem of the bourgeois leaders in face of the serious social problems that threaten the regime and deprive it of any social base of support. Nevertheless, the course of the government and the military, and particularly of the Geisel government, continues to demonstrate the regime's inability to overcome the gravity of the social situation and the extreme polarization of social classes in the slightest. The wage increase decreed in 1974 was simply a demagogic measure aimed at the elections of November of that year. The response of the masses demonstrated the insufficiency of these measures. On the one hand, the "very large wage increases" conceded by the Geisel government were not only rapidly absorbed by inflation, but were also unable to respond to the growing difficulties of the masses (increases in the cost of living, unemployment, worsening health care, etc.). These appeals to populism were thus insufficient to win the support of the masses. Under these conditions, the conclusion is clear: In this domain as well, the government does not command the necessary resources to defend class relations. Bonapartism without a mass base is only a caricature of Bonapartism. Politically, the government sought a greater equilibrium of forces. Its initial project placed "the political question" above the economic. That is, from the beginning the government asserted that it was not possible to overcome the economic crisis except to the extent that a political means of strengthening the regime could be found and a social crisis could be averted. "Political détente" was the slogan of the first few months of the Geisel government. 18
The government has to deal with two central political foro the so-called hardliners on the one hand and the oppositio on the other, represented fundamentally by the MDM. (2) hardliners have support in the military camp among the young officers and higher officers who came to the fore during the period of the Medici govemment. The hardline also have a base among the repressive police forces, inclu ing the police or parapolice apparatuses created by the Medici government to fight against the militarist left. Am civilians this current is supported by the industrial and financial groups that had profited most from the repressive policy of the past governments, and their civilian represer tives (the most reactionary sectors of ARENA, the governm party). The interests of this faction of the bourgeoisie wer very well defended by the military dictatorship, and it therefore fears any modification in the regime that could c this state of affairs. Nevertheless, what really characterizes the hardliners is their position on the role of the armed forces within the structure of bourgeois rule. Thus, for the hardliners, the army must remain the political leadership; this role must o no account be challenged. This position is combined with the necessity to repress any threat to this predominance of the armed forces, even if it comes from the ruling classes. In other words, this current believes that given the weaknesses of the bourgeoisie and its parties, it is necessary to concentrate all political decision-making in the hands of the army and to keep the civilian forces removed from the central power. The hardliners are not homogeneous. They include not only nationalist military sectors, but also clea pro-imperialist groups, both political and military. Never theless, these sectors are united on defending the role of t armed forces and the repressive police. In this sense they can have a considerable political function, especially during a time of crisis of the regime. The "opposition line" of the MDB is only weakly represent among the officers. Its support lies essentially among the weakest bourgeois sectors, those always held apart from th central power ("middle layers, *agrarian sectors, scattere elements of the national bourgeoisie), and liberal petty-bourgeois sectors. For these bourgeois layers, the opening of the regime appears indispensable for clearing the way t their own access to decision-making centers and for incre ing their political influence. In addition, these opposition bourgeois factions are concerned about the regime's lack o social support, the class polarization, the erosion of bourgeois institutions, and the fact that these institutions being challenged by broad sectors of the population in the current context of crisis; they also want to coopt the mass movement. They believe that the greatest danger would be precisely to try to preserve the regime through purely repressive means. This fragile opposition bourgeoisie is seeking to gain support among the petty bourgeoisie and both the students and workers (through the workers sector o the MDB, IEPES (3), etc.). Thus, it aims not only at incre ing its own power to exert pressure, but also at taking the lead over the forces of the mass movement which are slowl reorganizing. The party of the bourgeois opposition is thus made up of various social layers with differing political
terests. Nevertheless, bourgeois sectors predominate within he party, while they also integrate the demands of lower ayers in order to avoid fragmentation. In this sense, when e bourgeois opposition calls for the return to a "state of w, " institutionalization of the regime, "direct elections, " even abrogation of Institutional Act No. 5 and Decree 17(4), it is opposing the military government and putting rward, contrary to the hardliners, a proposed resolution of e crisis of the regime based on replacing it with a civilian vernment. ining time e initial political project of the Geisel government thus irresponded to this polarization of bourgeois forces, both vilian and military. The "gradual and definite political tente" constitutes a middle way and reflects the viewpoint the military elite of the ESG, some more enlightened properialist sectors, and a few politicians of the two parties. e project of "political détente" is aimed at strengthening foundations of the regime through working around the rilian institutions (parliament, parties, etc.) and attempting legitimize bourgeois domination, thus offering a solution the two most fragile features that have characterized the ms of rule typical of the preceding government of General dici. This entire project, however, does not provide for adical elimination of the officers from power. On the cony, it is supposed to be implemented precisely under the dership and protection of the armed forces. ing the first several months of his government, Geisel empted to apply this orientation. Press censorship was ed, and even occasionally lifted, at least for the mass ulation media. Parliamentary elections, and their results, e "guaranteed. " Political discussion, sometimes allowing cal criticism by the opposition candidates, developed in tmosphere not seen in quite some time. The exercise unctions by all those elected was assured, despite the ests of the hardliners. The mass movement, coming to again, did not face violent repression. In some cases strike of the bus drivers), mobilizations resulted in al victories. ertheless, the elections served the government as a neter by which to measure the regime's unpopularity -ther, the initial overcoming of the apathy and fear that revailed under Medici. The trend toward the radicalin of the masses was also asserted in the masses' complete ference, expressed in the election results, to the inte" projects of the new government. The elections and efeat of ARENA demonstrated the government's inability vance its project by relying on civilian forces capable ntroling the masses and their demands. The government clearly beaten, cannot furnish such support to the nment project and is incapable of channeling the disnt of the masses. use of this, the government will have to choose between ituating its "détente" project or reversing direction the elections entailed a certain retreat on the part of some very timid attempts. The atmosphere that arose vemment, with a few exceptions. Denunciation of torture and murder in the prisons, the popular demand for official public explanations of the fate of prisoners who have disappeared, and the political discussion in the universities made the government's situation even more difficult. The hardliners quickly picked up new strength and protests arose within the armed forces. The criticisms by the military hardliners were aimed at the government more than at the bourgeois opposition. They were concentrated on Geisel's closest collaborators (Golbery, Azevedo, Silveira), regarded as responsible for the atmosphere of insecurity which is beginning to arise in the country.
The brutal repression of the CP indicates the retum to a
"rightward" course: systematic application of Institutional
Act No.5 and the ouster from office of deputies of the
"authentic" wing of the MDB (Marcelo Gato, Lysaneas, and others). In August 1976 the goverment confimed this "rightward tendency, " renouncing the objectives of the "détente. " The
"Falcao law" regulating use of the means of communication during the electoral campaign proved that the government was weaker than it had been during the legislative elections The government does not possess a political party capable of sustaining implementation of its plans to bolster the regime's base of support. ARENA continues to be an ineffective instrument with limited social impact, incapable of winning any influence among the popular masses. The MDB is regarded as a force that cannot be relied on to change the political regime. The government counts only on the strength of the army in preventing precipitation of a deep political crisis. Whenever political disputes provoke pressure from the hardliners, the government is compelled to yield in order to avoid a division of the armed forces and a military crisis which, under these conditions, would have catastrophic consequences for the regime. The Geisel government has thus succeeded only in preventing immediate precipitation of the crisis of the military dictatorship, but it has been unable to avert the development of that crisis. The government is gaining time, but it is not gaining forces with which the dictatorship could resist a situation marked by the extension of present trends. The bourgeoisie has not yet found a way to avoid the nascent political and social crisis. Even the plans of the present government cannot achieve definitive success in the short run. The present situation may thus turn into a preevolutionary one in the coming period. It all depends on the capacity of the masses (and especially the working class) to take advantage of this possibility. Notes: 1. Institutional Act No. 5 suppressed all constitutional guarantees. 2. See INPRECOR, No. 64, October 9, 1976. 3. IEPES: Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies. 4. Decree 477, which dates from 1969, restored special repressive measures in the universities.
19
The first three months of 1977 have been marked by a new rise of workers struggles in a number of countries of northem Europe. The strike waves in the Netherlands and Belgium, of which we are publishing more detailed accounts below, constitute the most striking manifestations of this. The brief token strikes in the metal industry and public services in West Germany, the discontent the West German trade unions have expressed against government projects to reorganize pensions, the strike of 3,000 toolmakes of British Leyland against the wage freeze, and the solidarity with the printing workers in Denmark may be considered reflections of the same tendency. In itself, there is nothing astonishing or exceptional in this new upturn. Both the purchasing power and jobs of the workers were hit during the two years of economic recession in 1974 and 1975. During the long period of economic expansion and high employment that had preceded the recession, the workers had developed "conditioned reflexes" of struggle for wage increases. The leading cadres at the factory level, the most combative militants had learned how to react to the various maneuvers of the employers and government aimed at blocking such struggles. Forms of organization and struggle adapted to this economic conjuncture were developed. When the recession came, the reformist leaderships yielded to bourgeois pressure and, in practically all countries of northern Europe, accepted the capitalist logic of austerity and reduction of purchasing power under the pretext of lending priority to the struggle against unemployment. The working class became disoriented and had no possibility of responding immediately and spontaneously. For the first time in many years, the "social ctmosphere" was marked by an offensive of the employers on all fronts: ween tearine employment, with layoffs and mosive reductions in working hours;
*offensive against purchasing power, with attacks on the various forms of the sliding scale (wage adjustments linked to increases in the cost of living) in effect in various countries;
*offensive against social security and/or health and unemployment insurance (with despicable campaigns aimed at making the victims of the crisis feel guilty: the unemployed, immigrant workers, women, and youth), and decreases in spending on apprenticeship programs for youth;
*offensive aimed at speeding up the work pace and intensifying "labor discipline";
*offensive against the right to strike and trade-union freedoms. But the employers had ignored the modification in the relationship of class forces provoked in the wake of the reemergence of massive structural unemployment in northern Europe. Unemployment had not been sufficient to undermine the organized strength of the workers movement. In several countries this strength even increased during the crisis. The trade-unions reached the greatest size in their history and the workers' potential for combat remained intact. Under these conditions, a workers response to the blows suffered during the crisis became inevitable. It had to be expected once the economic trend turned around. All that 20
NEW
RISE
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STRUGGLES IN
was necessary was a slight economic upturn. This response fuelled by two essential factors: the desire to make up for losses in purchasing power suffered during the two previous years (or to prevent these losses from continuing for a third year); the development of consciousness of the mystificatio to which the workers had fallen victim when a unanimous chorus (including the reformist leaderships) justified auster policies in the name of the alleged creation of new jobs thanks to an increase in investment and profits. In reality, unemployment has barely diminished, even in countries that have experienced a real upturn, like West Germany. It has remained stationary or even increased. Under these conditions, the workers realized that they had been tricked by an immense political and social con game. They therefore reacted. Nevertheless, the upturn of