actionary British weekly The Economist. "These were people working against their own interests, " the magazine said. That is, in fact, the conclusion that emerges from the aborted coup of March 11. Coming in the middle of a broad and growing workers upsurge, the attempted coup stimulated the mobilizafion of the toiling masses, intensified the radicalizafion of the rank-and-file soldiers, and gave rise to a combination of the further development of struggles in the factories and neighborhoods and the emergence of the mass movement onto the political scene. The relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working class was shifted in favor of the workers. March 11 marks a new turn toward the rapid development of the Portuguese revolution. The attack Why was such a coup attempted? For the fime being it is impossible to detail exactly all the mechanisms of the operation. Nevertheless, the meaning of the
PORTUGAL AN UPSURGE OF by AUDRY coup attempt can be illuminated by placing it in the framework within which it developed. The generalization of struggles since mid-December, the mulfiplication of factory occupations, and the emergence of demands for nationalizations (see INPRECOR, No. 21, March 13) were disturbing the bourgeoisie intensely. Such a situation must have been alarming to the putschist sectors of the army. Further, the pressure of the Spinolist elements had made itself felt during the latest elections (March 1) within the Armed Forces Movement. Otello Saraiva de Carvalho, deputy commander of COPCON (Continental Operations Command), had suffered a heavy defeat. On the other hand, General Damiao, the former chief of the National Republican Guard (GNR, one of the main instruments of the Salazarist regime), was elected, as were known Spinolists like Orlando Costa and Salvagueiro Maia. Damiao and Maia were to play important roles in the events of March 11. The former tried to take over the Carmo barracks, the center of the GNR. 5
PORTUGAL The success of the Spinolist current come after the publication of the Program of Economic and Social Policy, which had been adopted by the Council of Ministers on February 7. This program was characterized by "moderation. " The inclinations of Melo Antunes, a leader of the center of the AFM, were predominant in it. On the central questions - banks, insurance companies, agriculture — the views of the Socialist party and the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD - People's Democratic party) held sway. These factors increased the uneasiness among the circles favorable to a putschist solution and at the same time suggested that the relationship of forces in the army would enable such an operation to be carried out successfully. Moreover, factors such as the lack of political sensitivity, the inability to grasp opportunities, and the inability to comprehend social forces, all of which had been generated within the bourgeoisie and the military hierarchy by forty years of fascism, were not the least of those that accounted for the March 11 operation. Finally, it must be stressed that such an attempted coup was an echo of the plans for coup d'etat being hatched among those sectors of society most affected by the fall of the corporatist regime. (See INPRECOR, No. 20, February 27.) It is probable that the "legalist" wing of the AFM knew about the preparations for such a coup. Likewise, given the control they have over the soldiers, it is not excluded that the Carvalhos and Gonçalveses allowed the coup attempt to go ahead in order once again to strengthen their positions in the framework of responding to the putschists. At first glance, the military forces committed to action by the leaders of the coup appear ridiculous two airplanes, a few helicopters, and some paratroops from the Tanco. base in the Tomai region north of Lisbon). But it would be false to reduce the military aspect of the March 11 operation solely to these forces. In many units the officers were hesitating, waiting for the relationship of forces to become clearer, to see whether the initiative taken by Colonel Durao's paratroops would succeed or not. In the Leira barracks, for example, the soldiers put the officers up against the wall and forced them to state their positions. At that point the hesitation disappeared. In the initial phase, the objectives of the putschists were these: To concentrate the attack (after seizing the Lisbon airport) on the Sacavem barracks, where Light Artillery Regiment No. 1 (RAL 1) was stationed; to seize the Portuguese Radio Club and take control of the GNR forces in the Carmo barracks in the center of Lisbon. The soldiers of RAL 1 had demonstrated along with the workers of the workers 6 commissions during the mobilization of February 7. For the Spinolists, taking control of the RAL 1 barracks was thus intended to immediately lend political significance to their operation: regaining a grip on the ranks of the army so as to counteract the tendency toward collaboration between soldiers and workers. They hoped that this would enable them to win over many officers. They were badly mistaken. The Tancos paratroops did not view the soldiers of RAL 1 as an enemy to be slaughtered. The cleavage within the army did not run along the lines anticipated by the organizers of the coup. When the collaboration between the population and the soldiers of the Sacovem barracks showed the paratroops that their attempt had become isolated, they packed up and left rather quickly. The reaction of the soldiers of the Sacavem barracks is indicative of the radicalization that the coup generated among the army ranks. For example, a leaflet distributed by the soldiers and "approved by all the soldiers, sergeants, and officers, " asserted: "We demand that all foscists and conspirators be shot immediately, whether they are in the army or not, whether they are generals or not. The criminal attack that was launched against the soldiers and officers of RAL 1 this morning shows that neither purges nor transfers to the reserves prevent the leftover fascist and reactionary officers of the capitalists and imperialists from preparing the counterrevolufion in order to drown the revolutionary popular movement in blood. " The soldiers were not content simply to hand out leaflets; arms were given to civilians, who participated in defending the barracks. Collaboration between the troops and the population developed in many regions. In most of the meetings being held today soldiers of RAL 1 are taking the floor. This continuous bath in the sea of the people is not without effect on the soldiers, even though relations between the army and the workers are often marked by a certain paternalism. These experiences of soldiers and workers collaborating against reaction are precious for the future. They can provide the material for enabling workers and revolutionary militants to precisely explain the forms of self-organization and linkage between workers and soldiers within the perspective of beating down any new reactionary attempts. Response of the workers March 11 was different from September 28 in that this time it was a movement within the army that provided the point of departure for the attempted coup. Hence, the accent will be placed on the link between the mobilization of the foiling mosses and the ranks of the soldiers, and not on the soldien"
rallying to initiatives taken by the Trade Union Federation and, partially, by the far left, as was the case on September 28. Nevertheless, the mobilizations of March 11 did contain elements that emerged from the September 28 experience - the people's barricades among other things. The Portuguese Communist party and the Trade Union Federation played a decisive role in the organization of the mass movement; this was true both in the Factories and in the demonstrations and organization of pickets to oversee the movement of traffic. In Porto the Trade Union Federation immediately called for a general strike. In a leaflet that was widely distributed the Federation said: "Concentrate on the radio stations, the post offices, and the railroad stations in order to crush the counterrevolution. All united with the AFM, which once again is defending April 25!* In Lisbon the Trade Union Federafion organized strike pickets, people's barricades, and so on. The workers commissions (see INPRECOR, No. 21, March 27) were slower to react and were not able to offer an overall response. The Trade Union Federation was not about to let itself be outflanked by these organizations, and it took precautions. The political weakness of the coordinating body of the workers commissions, broadly influenced by the Maoists of the UDP (União Democrático Popular - People's Democratic Union), appears clearly in the light of this simple fact: The coordinating body was unable to meet until the night of March 11, when the events were already over! A precious opportunity to develop a centralized initiative outside the factories stimulated by the workers commissions and moving in the direction of the establishment of organs of self-deFense was thus lost. Several factors account for the role played by the CP on March 11. Taking the lead in the mobilization strengthened its position and its base prior to the holding of the elections. The CP now appears as the decisive element in the struggle against reaction, side by side with the institutionalized AFM that it supports unconditionally. This role, along with its organizational consolidation, should become the CP's major trump card in its relations with the other parties of the government coalition; the CP will use it to establish a relationship of forces that may not be reflected electorally. Further, for a party that has emerged from forty years of underground struggle against fascism, the "lesson of Chile, " while it is not the same os the one drawn by revolutionaries, nevertheless exists: The leaders of the CP do not wish to be eliminated without lifting a finger in their own defense!
Finally, in face of the emergence of not unimportant Far-left and centrist forces, the CP's giving proof of an ability simultaneously to mobilize and to limit and control a mass mobilization enables it not only to reduce the political room available to the far left, but also to "merit" the recognition of the AFM. The probable entry of the MDP-CDE (close to the CP) into the government tends to confirm the immediate success of this policy and the concurrent political defeat for the bourgeoisie. The initiatives of the workers developed on several levels: 1. Checkpoint barricades were set up along the roads leading out of Lisbon and Porto as well as along the routes running through the regions bordering Spain. The workers, who were rather well-armed, conscientiously searched autos in order to prevent stocks of arms from being shifted about. These barricades also kept watch over major arteries. The workers of a metal factory in Alcântara, for example, set up a barricade to prevent the possible movement of police forces to the barracks of the Alcântara naval station. The workers carried out many actions like that. The workers of Lisnave (in Margueira near Lisbon) not only provided pickets for searching vehicles, but also organized protection for children leaving school. 2. Nerve centers like the post offices and radio stations were defended by the workers. For example, a large picket squad protected the national Portuguese radio and television station. Such an experience can lay the groundwork for the development of concrete propaganda about the function that control of such nerve centers can play in centralizing an offensive of the toiling masses during the organization of a general strike. The example of the restarting of Radio Renaissance, which had been on strike for twenty days, can be similarly used. 3. There were many clashes with the police (the GNR and the PSP) during the demonstrations. The demand for the dissolution of these repressive bodies was faken up in Porto and Lisbon. The dialogue that took place upon the release of General Pinto Fereira, the new chief of the GNR, who had been detained by the putschist mutineers in the Carmo barracks, reflected beth the will of the population to have done with the police and the ambiguity of the people's relation to the AFM. It went like this: The general. 1 am free! The officers taken with me are also free! The people. Victory! Justice! The general. Everyone has heard the speech of
Brigadier Otello (Carvalho). Demo7
Our comrades of the Liga Comunisto Internaciona lista (LCI — Internationalist Communist
(eague), the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, intervened in a massive way during the March 11 events. Three times they distributed leaflets in
30,000 copies. (We are reproducing the second of these leaflets.) They called for support to the demonstrations initiated by the CP in Porto and Lisbon, while the Maoists isolated tenselves through sectarianism and organized their own separate marches. In Porto Comrode Sardo spoke side by side with militants of the CP and the Trade Union Federation,
In Amarante the comrades of the LCI stood at the head of initiatives aimed at developing
HENRECO HEE the LCI JER response
A Reacção ATA CA O RAL-1 E BOMBARDEADO!!! Contra ataquemos os industriais e banquciros!!! CAMARADAS: Desde há cerca do uma hora a mola. o RAL-1 começou a ser metralhado pela aviação ao lado dos roaccionários, procurando generalizar o confronto, asmogar a resposta operária e impôr um Governo Militar do droita. Logo após os acontecimentos de Setúbal, em que a PSP matralhou contenas do manifestantes, logo após o ataque generalizado dos capitalistas procurando a todo o custo impõr pela vitória oleitoral o tim dos dirsitos oconómicos, politicos a sindicais da classa operaria, lançam agora a sua ofensiva militari TRABALHADOR, MOBILIZEMOS ACTIVAMENTE: • Nas empresas, malizando mediatamento assembleias, criando piquetes de irabalhadores armados, centralizando as iniciativas nos Comissões de Trabalhadores eloitas; among others, his speech was broadcast over the radio. a general strike in this large village. 8
50 MEDIATO
INTER
• Nos bairos, Tevantando barricadas a qualquee avanço dos reacciondrios:
• Garantindo o apoio de todos os soldades, marinhe ros a eliciais revolacionbrios:
• Dissolvendo a PSP e. a GNR. todas as ções fascistas (CDS e PDC).
• Prenderdo e julgando publicamente todos os fas cistas,
TODOS CONCENTRADOS NO ROSSIO E A PORTA
DOS QUARTEIS!
Todos unidos para vencermos de uma ver por todas os EXPLORADORES!
UMA SO SOLUÇÃO: ESMAGAR A REACÇÃO
POR UM GOVERNO REVOLUCIONARIO
DOS TRABALHADORES.
O Comité Regional de Lisboa da
LIGA COMUNISTA INTERNACIONALISTA
cratic justice will be handed out to those responsible.
The people.
People's justice!
The general.
The situation is under control and there is no problem. All those who rose up are under control and have been taken prisoner. Justice will be done. The people must have confidence in the armed forces.
The people.
AFM! AM!
The general.
From today on let me work in peace in order to find out what is the situation with the men of the GNR throughout the country. It's my problem.
The people.
It's our problem!
The general.
It is up to me to assume my responsibilities and take up my command again.
The people.
Dissolve the GNRI
The general.
We thank you for your attitude, which was a great help to the movement. It is a great help to see that the people are with the AFM.
The people.
The people are with the AFM! Death to the PIDE! Death to the GNR!
People's justice! People's government!
(From Diario de Lisboa, March 12, 1975.)
4. In many cities demonstrators visited the headquarters of the CDS (Centro Democrático Social -
Democratic and Social Center), the PDC (Partido
Democrático Cristão - Christian Democratic party)
and even the PPD. These actions reflected the understanding that is developing among broad sectors of the population about the relations among the factions and political formations of the bourgeoisie, especially the CDS and the PDC.
5. In responding to the counterrevolution, the employees of the banks and insurance companies initiated actions that culminated in the decision to nationalize the banks. For an initial period, the statements of the union of bank employees were aimed at preventing reaction from being able to use the banks to strengthen its offensive or from massively withdrawing funds in case of defeat. For example, the Porto section of the union of bank employees gave these instructions in a leaflet:
'Close the banks immediately. Don't make any payments. Set up pickets at the doors to check entrances and exits. Watch the telex and the telephones."
Finally, the workers commissions of various newspapers immediately published communiqués in "their"
newspapers. The workers commission of the daily • Seculo asserted: "The revolutionary forces, enemies of the monopolists and latifundistas, must answer reactionary violence with revolutionary violence. Richer than those of September 28, all these actions throw into relief the possibilities of linkup between the workers and soldiers and provide very fertile ground for the propagation of forms of self-organizafion, for the emergence of organs of dual power in the context of a general strike. A political defeat March 11 was a major political defeat for the bourgeoisie. This emerges especially clearly when the events are viewed in the twofold perspective of the successive loss of important trump cards by the bourgeoisie and the dynamic of the struggles of the workers. Confronted by a working class whose combativity was low and whose consciousness was very weak, if not nil, the bourgeoisie initially hoped to be able to carry out a "presidentialist" operation that would give it sufficient time to develop its own instruments of political rule. That was the intent of the "legal" coup of July 1974, Palma Carlos's attempt to postpone the elections and instead hold a plebescite on Spinola. This maneuver was supposed to be combined with the dissolution of the AFM, or at least with its withdrawal from the political scene. But reality worked out differently from the expectations of the bourgeoisie: The AFM entered the government. The CP and the SP had demonstrated their opposition to the Palma Carlos operation and had made their weight felt. Then, in September 1974 there was the "civilian coup d'etat, " the September 28 demonstration that was supposed to somehow ratify the seizure of power by President Spínola. That operation ended with an immense mobilization of the workers and with the strengthening of the Bonapartist role of the AFM. The Portuguese CP and the Trade Union Federation also emerged from that test as winners. Since then, the bourgeoisie had been playing two games. On the one hand, it was consolidating its political parties, especially the PPD, in order to play a real role in the framework of a parliamentary system. On the other hand, because of the extremely unstable character of the relationship of forces between capital and labor, it was compelled to charge the AFM with the task of defending what was essential: capitalist relations of production. In the latest period, since the beginning of January, the role of the AFM as a relatively independent power structure
PORTUGAL has been intensified, with the traditional instruments of bourgeois democracy (parties, the parliament, and so on) increasingly being shunted aside. Concurrently, putschist plans were being worked out among those layers very much attached to the old regime; and there were relations between these sectors and the CDS-PDC (Christian Democrats). After March 11, the AFM appears more and more as the bourgeoisie's ultimate instrument of defense in a situation marked by growing instability in the relations between the two basic classes. The debate on the institutionalization of the AFM was quickly settled: Essentially, the AFM has concentrated power in its own hands. The Council of the Revolution set up after March 11 combines the functions of the Junta of National Salvation, the Coordinating Commission of the AFM, the Council of State, and the government. It thus commands the legislative and executive prerogatives of these various bodies. There is no doubt that the AFM will try to set up a structure permitting the representation of a civilian regime, but that will eliminate none of the predominance of the AFM itself. To respond to the radicalization in the army the AFM intends to create a General Assembly elected by the soldiers, which will replace the Council of 200. As against this concentration of power, a so-called counterpower will be set up, the aims of which are to prevent a cleavage From opening up in the army and to maintain the united famework that is so essential, given the fragility of the situation. For an initial period, the attempted coup has produced a realignment of forces to the benefit of the so-called left wing of the AFM. But it would be wrong to consider this shift definitive. A new shakeup is not excluded, especially since pressures are being exerted by various currents internationally (the Social Democracy, the Christian Democracy, etc.). The AFM has to provide itself with guarantees. The slowness of the discussion on the composition of the new government and the hesitations about suspending the CDS during the election campaign (and the ultimate refusal to do so) are indications of this possibility. In the final analysis, many things will depend on the scope and duration of the mobilizations that developed after March 11. For the -oment, the AFM has also banned two Maoist orcuni-ations, thus applying the method of amalgam used y Minister Jesuino during his March 12 press conference. (The banned groups are the MRPP (Movement for the Reconstruction of the Proletarian party) and the AOC (Workers and Peasants Alliance), the latter a split from the Portuguese Communist party-Marxist-Leninist. For good measure, the Christian Democratic party (PDC), led by ex-general Osorio, a man linked to Spínola, was also suspended. 10
The AFM's control of the election campaign will now be strengthened. According to the new press law, organizations that attack the AFM can be banned. The measures taken against the MRPP and the AOC may presage further sanctions against the far left. There were good reasons why the AFM selected these two organizations to ban. They had isolated themselves by their attacks on the Portuguese SP as "social fascist" and by the AOC's confrontation with the SP in the chemical workers union. The workers response to the bans was thus limited. It is important for revolutionaries to find adequate ways to respond to these challenges to the democratic rights of the workers and to explain to the workers what the dangers of this type of repression are - in spite of the sectarianism of the two groups involved. In the immediate period ahead, the bourgeoisie once again has to bolster the credibility of its parties. For the PPD, this will be a matter of avoiding being confused with the rebel factions, so as not to lose ground electorally. Concurrently, the far right could change its tactics and commit itself to a policy of harassment, provocations, militant attacks, etc. Prolonged instability The abortive coup gave a strong impetus to workers struggles. The most important workers victory so far has been the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies. On March 12 the union of bank employees exposed the complicity of the big financial groups with reaction and demanded the nationalization of the banks. The banks had been under the control of the workers who, after checking through the books, produced proof in black and white of the aid given by the banks to the parties of the right and the far right. The following banks were nationalized: Espirito Santo, Pinto & Sotto Mayor (tied to the Champalimaud group), Portugues do Atlantico, Borges & Irmao, Nacional Ultramarino, Fonsecas & Burnay, and Totta & Açores (tied to the CUF). All these banks have important links in the productive sector, in services, real estate, etc. Imperialist holdings remain unaffected. It is not known whether there will be compensation. The nationalizations had been demanded by the CP in its draft economic plan; but they had not been called for in the Economic Emergency Program. From the objective point of view, the nationalizations do not represent a "revolutionary" measure. On the one hand, they are supposed to allow for centralizing financial resources for projects aimed at equipping the infrastructure and at industrial re-
structuring; on the other hand, they will support the export industry (with credits), which is the key part of the Economic Plan. The editorialist of the newspaper of the large private banks in Geneva understood this. He wrote: "In statizing the banks, they certainly took a 'socialist-like measure'... but this measure is not yet decisive: It does not forcibly enlist private capital. It simply aims at orienting essential financial resources toward activities considered most productive and most necessary. " And in conclusion: "The latter (that is, capital), whether Portuguese or foreign, will at least demand (before investing) some guarantees of stability that only the AFM can provide. " (Journal de Genève, March 19.) But what is important here is less this objective aspect than the understanding by the workers of the fact that these flash nationalizations were the fruit of their mobilization. This has had a stimulating effect on tens of thousands of workers. The demands for nationalizations are being strengthened. They are being combined with occupations of factories, production under workers occupation, and many experiences of workers control, spurred on by the struggle against economic sabotage and by the necessity to carry the antifascist purges through to the end. Many employers are no longer allowed to enter their factories, and managers have been prohibited from taking any documents out of factories or insurance companies. These occupations and demands for nationalization contain a twofold dynamic. Sometimes the workers simply demand that the AFM take over the factory. But increasingly, some actions are going beyond this tendency toward delegating power. The transport workers union, after underlining the central role of transport in the Portuguese economy and the danger of economic sabotage in that area, demanded that the transportation system be nationalized by the end of March. In its declaration, the union added that if this nationalization was not carried out, the workers would have to drive their trucks to the headquarters of the union, which would then set up a new system of transport. That is an example of the sort of proletarian insolence that the Portuguese workers have assimilated. Similar experiences are developing in other areas. The inhabitants of the neighborhoods and the members of the workers commissions of various factories, acting under the impetus of the FSP (Popular Socialist Front), occupied the Muxito Hotel in order to transform it, along with its sumptuous swimming pool, into a vacation colony for the children of the workers of the Setubal district near Lisbon. On Sunday, March 9, a meeting was organized in the hotel and this decision was ratified by hundreds of men and women workers and their children. About fifty doctors got together to launch the Hospital of the People group, which has been set up in the
Clínica da Associação de Coceros Mutuos Amadeu
Duarte. Health care is given freely there and contact has been made with the workers of the pharmaceutical industry. In Cascais a big bourgeois club was occupied and transformed into a day-care center for children. These examples of social control could be multiplied by a hundred. The dominant feature is thus the growing activity of the masses. In face of this pressure from the masses, the CP has to stick closely to the AFM in order to straddle and channel the movement. On the question of institutionalization of the AFM, the CP asserts that "the progressive vanguard of the army has just endowed itself with the means of effective action." The CP's margin for maneuver is very narrow. It is especially narrow in that the CP's control of the movement is not really as tight as it appeared to be during the mobilization against the attempted coup. For the moment, the CP is centering its efforts on the peasantry, calling for more advanced measures in the area of agrarian reform. Once risen to first position, the AFM will have difficulty maintaining its unity in face of this rise of the mass movement. Every time a choice is posed in the economic and social realm, the threat of the crystallization of differences is present. Further, the concessions that have been made in order to channel the movement may also boomerang. While another attempted coup is not excluded, it neverthe less seems unlikely that it could come from the army in the short run. The present crisis of this institution and the lack of control over the rank and file (because of the weakness of the officers control, the leaves, and the fact that many soldiers are billeted at home) make it difficult to use the army as an instrument for a coup. The social and economic crisis will thus deepen. If the period of instability is prolonged, it is possible that decisive advances in class consciousness in the political sense will be made as a result of all the experiences we have just described. As this condition is fulfilled, the variant of a political defeat of the working class (see INPRECOR No. 21, March 13) becomes less probable. The duration of this period of instability will be quite decisive in enabling the workers to maximally assimilete their experiences and in developing a revolufionary party capable both of generalizing these examples of struggle, self-organization, and workers contrul and of making this the basis for setting the example of a revolutionary strategy. Finally, continuance of the instability may lead to a linkup between the fall of the Francoist dictatorship and the rise of workers struggles in Portugal. That would create a more than explosive mixture for the bourgeoisie of the iberian peninsula and for the European bourgeoisie in general. March 21, 1975
11
DENMARK During the past ten months the Danish working class has been faced with two different and difficult political situations. First they had to confront a reacfionary bourgeois government headed by Paul Hartling. During the spring of 1974 Hartling carried out, or rather, tried to carry out, an openly anti-working-class policy. The attempt did not succeed; it was met by an increasing mobilization of the working class, which finally led to the fall of the Hartling government in January 1975. Since then, the workers have been faced with a Social Democratic minority government that in reality is trying to use its traditional influence over the workers to impose a solution to the economic crisis that is almost identical to the one the Hartling government had proposed and had unsuccessfully attempted to implement. The struggle against Hartling During the period of the Hartling government, the Danish working class engaged in a class struggle that definitively broke the long period of