social peace so well known in the Scandinavian countries. Under pressure from the extremely grave recession in the economy - with an enormous deficit in the balance of payments, a drastic aggravation of the problems of the export industries, and an increase in unemployment from 3 percent last spring to 12 percent by January - the working class was forced to act to defend its jobs and living standards. There were continual fights in industry after industry, with thousands of workers going on strike in response to layoffs and attacks on their wages. More important, 12
THE END OF SOCIAL PEACE by BENNY ASMAN the class was able to organize three major responses to specific provocations by Hartling: *In May 1974 more than 200, 000 workers went on strike and held several big demonstrations against a reactionary tax reform pushed through parliament by the Hartling government. (See INPRECOR, No. 4, July 18, 1974.) * In October 1974 more than 35, 000 workers went on strike in solidarity with 400 workers who had been fined by the labor court for having participated in "illegal strikes" during the May demonstrations. This response from the workers forced the government to drop its original intention to fine a total of more than 37,000 workers for the "crime" of striking in May. *Finally, more than 120,000 workers took to the streets on November 26 in response to a call from the trade-union and political working-class organizations to protest against the policy of the government and to demand its resignation. In spite of these very clear signs of the fighting spirit and mobilization of the workers, the Hartling government decided to maintain its hard line on wage policies. In reality, the government did not have much choice. The extremely difficult economic situation does not leave the capitalists or their regime much room to make concessions to the workers. This became very clear in the period immediately following the November 26 demonstration. It was then that the national wage negotiations between the LO (Landsorganisationen, the trade-union leadership) and the DA (Dansk Arbetsgivareprening -
Danish Employers Organization) came to the forefront as the central issue throughout the countryThe Hartling government Flatly stated that it was not going to accept any agreement between the LO and DA except a "zero solution, "which means no inreases in wages and the elimination of the existing threshold (cost-of-living) agreements. If the LO and DA did not reach a "zero solution" agreement, Hartling said, then parlament would have to pass a law imposing such an agreement. The working-class parties opposed this position -on various bases. The Social Democrats said they wou ld oppose Harling's plans because his incomes policy was "socially unjust. " The Communist party and the SF (Socialistiskt Folkeparti - Socialist People's party) expressed a more general opposition to the incomes policy being proposed and to the idea of an incomes policy in general. By the middle of December it had become clear that the government wou ld not be able to win a majority in parlament for its position. At the same time, opinion polls indicated that Harling's party (the Venstre, or Left party) had the possibility of increasing its electoral strength. The government decided to dissolve parliament and call for new elections on January 9 rather than go down to certain defeat in a parlamentary vote on the question of the wage policy. Harling's goal was very clear: to rally sufficient bourgeois and petty-bourgeois votes behind the position of his party so as to obtain a bourgeois majority in parlament that would support a "zero solution" interention into the wage negotiations. Hartling failed to achieve this goal, and that was the reason for the fall of his government. The government crisis The Venstre party did indeed increase the number of its seats in parlament (from 22 to 42); but it gained purely at the expense of the other bourgeois parties. In all, the bourgeois parties lost 10 seats (declining from 112 to 102). The workers parties increased their representation from 63 to 73 seats (Social Democracy from 46 to 53, the SF from 9 to 11, the CP from 6 to 7). One remarkable result in the election was the showing made by the VS (Venstresocialisterna — Left Socialists), a left centrist party not previously represented in parlament, which obtained 2.1 percent of the vote and thereby won 4 seats in parlament. The results of the new elections deepened the governmental crisis. On the one hand, it became clear during the postelection maneuvering that Hartling was unable to amass a large enough bloc of bourgeois forces to have a majority behind his plan for a government intervention in the wage-negotiations aimed at forcing a total block on wage increases. On the other hand, the Social Demorats rejected the idea of forming a majority coalition with the Venstre party, because of their differences over the incomes policy. A coalition between the Social Democrats and the other workers parties was out of the question both because of the Social Demoracy's traditional rejection of coalitions with the CP and because of the rejection of the Social Democratic incomes policy by the CP, the SF, and the VS. After more than one month of government crisis, the Social Democrats agreed to form a minority government based on 53 seats out of 175, obviously hoping to be able to play on shifting majorities patched together with other workers parties and some of the bourgeois parties. The electoral results reflected the shift that has occurred in the relationship of forces within the Danish workers movement during the past period. Because of its rotten right-wing policy (which it has attempted to impose at a time when broader and broader sections of the working class are being drawn into mobilization and struggle), the Social Democracy has begun to lose its traditional hegemony over the workers movement. This is now apparent even on the electoral field. There has arisen an opposition that rallies more than 11 percent of the vote nationally and more than 20 percent in the big cities. Even though this opposition has a reformist and electoralist policy, it is seen by a big part of the working class as an alternative leadership in the struggle against the capitalists. This phenomenon is even more prononced in the trade unions and has become a dangerous development for the Social Democrats. It seems unlikely that they will let it go on without making a fight to regain the ground that has been lost, although os yet there are no signs of such a fight. Social Democratic incomes policy Throughout the development of the present economic recession and the period of wage negotiations, the Social Demorals have been urging the workers to bow to the "interests of the country" and restrain their demands for increased wages. They have advocated goverment intervention if the workers try to obtain "too much. " Before the fall of Hartling, the Social Democrats were able to dress up their incomes policy and their opposition to Harling's proposals with the demand for a "socially just incomes policy. " For the majority of the working class, it was not clear what that meant. Only a small vanguard understood that it actually amounted to an attack on the living standards of the workers. Immediate ly after the formation of the Social Democratic minority government, a big show was put on. The LO and the DA began to shout about an impend-
13
DENMARK ing catastrophe on the labor market. The wage negotiations broke down, and LO began to warn of a strike by its more than 300, 000 workers; the DA countered with the threat of locking out the 300,000 workers. Both the LO and the DA rejected the proposal of the arbitrator in the negotiations. The bourgeois and Social Democratic newspapers, along with the radio and television networks, began speaking of economic catastrophe and the specter of 300,000 people out of work. It was in this climate that the Social Democracy took the step it had been preparing. The government adopted the proposal of the arbitrator and placed it before parliament as a proposed law. Obviously, this is what the capitalists had hoped to obtain from the start. The DA's tactic was to reject a proposal that was in reality very favorable to the employers and cause the negotiations to break down, thus causing the same proposal to be odopted by parliament and given the status of a law proposed by the Social Democracy. That the wage agreement is actually in the interests of the capitalists is quite clear. All members of LO working in the private sector have to accept a two-year virtual wage freeze, with only very small changes. The same wage restrictions will be placed on the workers in the public sector. The size of the wage increases to be granted when the cost-of-living index passes the threshold was increased by a small amount; but in reality that prospective increase in wages has already been manipulated out of existence, for the price index was set at 100 for January 1, which wiped out a 2 percent price increase that had occurred previously. Finally, for the sake of "social justice, " the dividend payments will have to be kept at the level it stood at on March 6, a ridiculous measure that every capitalist will find ways of getting around. On March 10 the wage law was adopted in parliament by a large majority consisting of the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties. The other workers parties voted against. Response of the workers The workers response to the Social Democratic law appears paradoxical on the surface, especially when it is compared with the workers responses to Hartling's various provocations during 1974. In fact, the reaction was very limited, coming in the form of some strikes and demonstrations. About 30, 000 workers went on strike for short periods, and not more than 5,000 workers turned out for a demonstration outside parliament to protest against the government intervention. This protest was called by the Førmandsinitiativet (Chairmen's Initiative, an organization of local trode-union chairmen) and was supported by the CP, SF, and VS, the same forces that had 14 assembled more than 120,000 workers to protest against Hartling only four months previously. But the paradox is only apparent. What it reflects in reality is the limits of the development of class consciousness and political experience among the workers. A big part of the class has engaged in trade-union struggles. Against the openly reactionary Hartling government a big part of the warking class could show its militancy. The fact that a much smaller section of the working class saw any reason to demonstrate its militancy against the Social Democratic law can be explained only partially by the constant increase in unemployment (with the consequent fear of loss of jobs) and by the vacillating and unprincipled politics of the other workers parties. The fundamental explanation lies in the altered political framework of the government intervention: This time it is a Social Democratic government that is intervening. Among the great majority of workers, frust in the Social Democracy still runs high. While the response of the masses of workers illustrated the limits of their political development (their inability to see through a Social Democratic parliamentary maneuver), the strikes and demonstrations that did take place illustrated the rather impressive breadth of the vanguard sections of the working class. The shipyard workers stood in the forefront of the strikes. Nearly all the shipyards (including about 30,000 workers) were on strike. Some of the brewery workers in Copenhagen and many of the workers in the construction industry also went on strike. The opinion of these vanguard workers was summarized by Johnny Laugesen, a shop steward at the B&W Motor Company who participated in the demonstration outside parliament: "I call this (the Social Democratic intervention) a treason against the working class. It deserves a response. There is no point in the trade-union movement continuing to give millions of crowns to the Social Democracy while the Social Democratic government makes a law of the arbitrator's proposal. The right to free wage negotiations is now a big illusion. The intervention is carried out with warnings about the grave economic situation. Anker Jorgensen (the Social Democratic prime minister) is thus using the same arguments as Hartling used throughout 1974." What next? In the short term — that is, the coming five or six months - it seems unlikely that there will be big responses by the workers to the attack on their living standards. The political level among the masses of workers is not yet sufficiently high for them to launch a decisive blow against the incomes policy adopted by a Social Democratic govemment. But over a longer period - the two years during which the vir-
tual wage freeze is to remain in effect - the situation must be evaluated differently. It is unrealistic to assume that the law that has been adopted will be respected. It is enough to imagine what will happen when the present international recession gives way to a new upturn. With a new rapid increase in inflation, perhaps as soon as the end of this year, the law will be torn to shreds. The coming period will be a difficult one for the Social Democrats. They will be increasingly torn between their present right-wing policy and the leftward development of the working class. Obviously, their traditional hegemony within the class is at stake, and if they do not make an adjustment to the radicalization of the workers they will definitely lose that hegemonic role. On the other hand, they will soon be forced to confront a demand by the bourgeois parties in parliament that further steps be taken toward easing the economic crisis by drastic cutbacks in social expenditures in the state budget. This may provide the issue around which the Social Democrats try to confront the challenge they face on the left. It is not excluded that they will decide to make a left turn on the question of social expenditures, dissolve the parliament, and call for new elections with a campaign based exclusively around this question. This would, however, open up new possibilities for the mass struggle. In the meantime, some very important struggles have been going on in local areas. For the past two months, sixty-six printing workers have been on strike against threats of layoffs and the selling of the Uniprint printshop. The workers first responded to the threats by occupying the shop and refusing to accept any agreement that did not guarantee their jobs. Because of the form taken by the struggle (the first really militant answer at the factory level to the extremely high rate of unemployment), it was possible to initiate a national movement of solidarity with the printing workers. The first step in this was taken by the workers themselves with the support of the revolutionary left, in particular the RSF (Revolutiondre Socialisters Forbund - Revolutionary Socialist League), Danish section of the Fourth International, and the VS. On February 18 the police intervened and threw the workers out of the shop. The solidarity movement responded by ex panding its activities. More than forty solidarity committees throughout Denmark (and some in Sweden) were set up. The workers printed two issues of a strike newspaper, the second in 200,000 copies. The leadership of the printers union was forced to support the struggle (after having hesitated at the beginning) and declared a blockade against the Whinter company (owner of the shop in order to prevent the company from taking out the machines and doing the work somewhere else. This blockade was endorsed by the international printers union and affected Scandinavia, Germany, Benelux, and Britain. At the same time, the workers themselves set up picket lines outside the factory day and night in order to prevent the owners from removing the machines. The militant action of the sixty-six Uniprint workers has begun to stimulate other workers to act against layoffs. The most important case so far has been that of the foundry workers of Sabroe-Ost, who went on strike against the layoff of three of their comrades. On March 14 the struggle at Uniprint took a new turn. The owner of the shop had announced that only twenty-four of the workers could be rehired. At the same time, a financial committee revealed that Uniprint would not have been in financial difficulties if the other sections of the Whinter company had paid full prices to Uniprint. The immediate response of the workers was a new occupation of the plant. On the morning of March 14 the workers reentered the shop and began production again. That evening the police intervened once again. When some of the workers refused to leave the factory, they were arrested and taken to the police station. (They were released the following day.) This police intervention marked the end of the strike. The relafionship of forces was simply too unfavorable for the workers; the company was too large and the response from the rest of the labor movement was too limited. In addition, it was discovered that the blockade had not been effective; the company had been able to continue its production at another location, although it is not clear where. The workers were compelled to recognize that the struggle to save all the jobs had become impossible. But they refused to break ranks. All the workers refused to go back to work, and the demoralizing effects of the defeat were thus limited. The struggle at SabroeOst, on the other hand, ended in victory; all the demands of the workers were granted. In the present situction in Denmark, it is extremely important that struggles like the ones at Sabroe-Ost and Uniprint end in victory, for their examples could represent a turning point in the fight against layoffs. Up to now, actions against layoffs have been limited and generally defeated. This made the struggle of the workers at Uniprint and Sabroe-Ost especially important. The revolutionary Marxists of the RSF therefore set solidarity work with these struggles as their central task, helping to build the broadest possible solidarity movement and to spread the examples and lessons of the struggles of these workers as wide as possible. •
15
the bureaucracy
The following two articles relating to the situation in Poland deal with structural aspects of
Polish society. In future issues of INPRECOR we will return to the conjunctural problems now faced by the Polish workers, particularly the aggravation of the crisis of food supply to the cities, the long lines that are once again appearing in front of stores, the scuffling and other incidents that have been touched off by this situation, as well as the attitude the regime has