Proletarian revolution and the fight for democracy in the
Philippines
1) Mass upsurge, ruling class crisis The February 1986 'people power' revolution which overthrew the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines ushered in a period of severe political instability for the Filipino ruling classes. Though the section of the armed forces loyal to Generals Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos formally broke with Marcos and placed itself on the same side as the masses in putting Aquino in power, they were never really in agreement with the "liberal' bourgeois political project which she represented.
These previously pro-Marcos elements in the military acted solely out of tear that a continuation of dictatorial rule might lead to a more drastic revolutionary upheaval. They decided, in agreement with the US State Department, that Aquino was by far the lesser evil. This resulted in a situation marked by two basic features: 1) high expectations on the part of workers and others who had mobilised against the Marcos election fraud in the streets of Manila and in other parts of the country; and, 2) deep divisions within Filipino ruling circles, reflected in a coalition government consisting of both the anti-Marcos capitalist opposition and the army of the old dictator.
The Aquino government was extremely popular with working people because the new president seemed to personify the struggle against the dictatorship. Among her initial actions was an amnesty for all political prisoners. A flowering of political organisations, the right to hold meet-
120 International Marxist Review ings, publish newspapers, freely discuss and criticise government policyall of these were real benefits which the masses began to enjoy. In a matter of weeks, however, the rosy view of Aquino taken by broad sectors of the masses proved to be misplaced. The majority of the people of the Philippines, both workers in the cities and residents of rural areas, live in extreme poverty. Wages and working conditions are bad. Malnutrition is rampant-especially in the sugar-growing region where work is seasonal and landowners do not allow subsistence agriculture. The Aquino government-like any bourgeois government in a less-developed country. taced with a crisis-ridden international capitalist economy and a burden of debt to the imperialist banks-was unable to offer a programme to solve these pressing problems.
After its brief initial period of readjustment, the extreme right wing of the bourgeoisie became bolder. It opposed in particular Aquino's overtures for negotiations with the New Peoples Army (NAP), demanding as an alternative a 'crusade against communism'. Enrile, the main spokesperson for these elements, began to openly challenge Aquino,s authority from his position as minister of defense-the same post he had held under Marcos. Aquino, not feeling strong enough to confront the right, sought to avoid an open fight. She did her best to appease Enrile, but this only made him bolder in his challenge.
Finally, the right wing provoked a crisis. The kidnapping and brutal assassination of Rolando Olalia, chairman of the KUM (May First Movement trade union federation) and of the Peoples Party (PnB), followed soon after by open-organising efforts for a coup, forced Aquino to take decisive action if she wanted to remain in power. Key to her ultimate success was enlisting the firm backing of Ramos, armed forces chief of staff, who was able to rally a majority of military behind the government. After the November coup had been quashed, Aquino dismissed Enrile from her cabinet. At the same time, however, she began a clear and open shift to the right in an effort to win the backing of more conservative elements within the Filipino ruling classes. 2) Working class independence Recent events in the Philippines constitute a prime illustration of the necessity for permanent revolution in the semi-colonial world. The mass mobilisations which led to the overthrow of the old government began around the simple democratic demand for a free election, for the right of the Filipino people to vote for whomever they choose, and have that person take office. This demand, in order to find fulfilment, required an insurrection in which working people played a decisive role.
In the course of this struggle and as a result of its victory, a number of other problems began to be raised: land distribution in the countryside, trade union issues among urban workers, etc-the kinds of questions on
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The Philippines: Revolution and the fight for democracy 12/ which mass consciousness spontaneously develops within bourgeois society. But if the masses are to make further gains, if the democratic revolution in the Philippines is ultimately to guarantee even the democratic rights which have been won so far, it needs to go further. When the revolution stops, even temporarily, at a stage which enables the bourgeoisie to decisively reconsolidate its rule, the result can only be the strengthening of counter-revolution and a weakening of the proletariat,s position within the overall social process. This is true whether the counter-revolution is ultimately successful in the form of a reactionary military coup or of a continued rightward drift by a 'democratic' bourgeois government.
The essential task for the Filipino workers, movement after the overthrow of Marcos was to regain and maintain its own independent initiative in the situation, strengthen the role of the toilers within the overall revolutionary process, and begin to create a genuine mass proletarian political alternative with the perspective of winning the peasantry and the impoverished urban middle layers, and counterposing this force to the continued rule of the nation by any wing of the bourgeoisie. The method to accomplish this goal is familiar to the revolutionary Marxist movement: the development of a series of democratic and transitional slogans which could actively mobilise the masses in the fight for their own demands against the programme and perspectives of the Aquino government. These issues included such problems as land reform; the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution or—in particular after Aquino appointed her own commission for that task-the election of a workers' and peasants' commission to draft a counter-charter for the country; the ouster of imperialist military bases; cancellation of the foreign debt; bringing to justice all those accused 'salvaging' or corruption, etc. After the assassination of Olalia the workers would have been totally justified in organising their own investigation into the killing, and their own armed defense guards. The goal of all such activity is the creation of genuinely representative mass institutions of the workers and peasants. In a situation of generalised instability such as existed after February in the Philippines, mass organisation of this kind has the potential to become a genuine counterpower to the institutions of bourgeois rule.
Unfortunately, after the initial victory over Marcos, the independent "people power' of the masses—which had played such an important role in that struggle-did not find a way to consolidate itself and expand its influence. As a result the initiative passed decisively to Aquino. This was not an inevitable outcome under the circumstances. But a more favorable one would have required a fundamentally different strategic orientation by the major organisations in the Filipino workers' movement.
This is not to say that all of the diverse currents which make up the Filipno left were actively trying to sidetrack the mass movement-as Stalinist and social democratic misleadership have historically done throughout the world. The origins and actions of many of these groupings within the recent period of repression and in the struggle against it, their appar-
122 International Marxist Review ently sincere efforts to advance the cause of the workers and poor peasants, mean that they must be given every benefit of the historical doubt. But experience has shown time and again that simple sincerity and dedication to the cause of the working class are not enough. What is also required is a basic proletarian strategy for revolutionary change, and this was tragically lacking in the Philippines. The working class forces reacted in an empirical way to unfolding events. While the most farsighted of them were even able to forsee the future evolution of the Aquino government, none projected a political approach in the early stages which could have prepared the masses to effectively combat that future evolution.
This ability-to prepare for the future, to try to shape it through present actions-is precisely the advantage of the historical dialectic over pragmatism. The pragmatist-even the pragmatic revolutionist, a not unfamiliar phenomenon these days-relates primarily to reality as it presently appears, trying, in the best of circumstances, to turn it into something that seems to be most in the interests of the workers and poor peasants. The dialectician, on the other hand, is constantly attempting not only to foresee future events, but to act today in such a way as to influence their outcome. That approach is the only one which can reliably prepare the preconditions for the proletarian revolution-in the Philippines or anywhere else.
The entire leadership of the Filipino workers' movement adopted an attitude which ceded the initiative to the bourgeoisie-both in its extreme right-wing form and in the form of the Aquino government. They accepted a framework which posed only two choices as truly realistic: Aquino or a return of the right. No proletarian alternative was actively projected. This broad crisis of perspective on the left was clearly visible as far back as the election itself, when many gave a 'critical endorsement' to Aquino's campaign, thereby calling on the masses to vote for the rule of the 'liberal' bourgeoisie. Even those elements which did not take this line, who called for a boycott of the elections, tended to do so not because they truly understood a principled proletarian electoral policy, but because they underestimated the actual significance of the contest-seeing it as simply another fraud by Marcos which would have little long-range impact on the country. This, in turn, reflected the rural armed struggle strategy of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which was not flexible enough to adapt to opportunities which opened up in the cities in the early 1980s, particularly after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983. This led to a degree of triumphalism toward other forces, and made it more difficult to forge an anti-Marcos united front under the hegemony of the workers and peasants. The stage was set for the isolation of the left during the 1984-85 election campaign which culminated in the 'February revolution'.
The underlying political confusion is best illustrated by the later self- criticism of the CPP, which had been one of the main organizations calling for the boycott. The fact that prolonged people's war proved unnecessary
The Philippines: Revolution and the fight for democracy 123 for the overthrow of Marcos led to a certain ideological indecision in the organisation. The CPP found itself unable to find a genuine, principled alternative to a tactical approach which had resulted in its isolation from real developments. Instead it endorsed the mistaken position of 'critical support' to Aquino during the voting, extending backhanded political support thereafter to the 'anti-fascist' elements in her government, until the Mendiola Bridge massacre of January 1987.
In the elections, as during the post-February period, revolutionary elements within the workers' movement had the task of orienting to the concrete reality—in which the workers and poor peasants had overwhelming confidence in Aquino-without either capitulating to the illusions of the masses (or worse, contributing to those illusions by calling for a vote, 'critical' or otherwise, for the liberal bourgeoisie) or placing themselves in a sectarian posture of standing aloof and lecturing from the sidelines. This was not easy given the circumstances, but it could have been done-through participation in every way possible with the masses in the effort to guarantee a free and fair election, while at the same time refusing to endorse either of the two candidates of the capitalist class. Only those on the scene of action can resolve the concrete tactical problems inherent in such a situation, but a positive alternative to 'critical support' for Aquino was a necessity, whether this took the form of a ditferent sort of boycott tactic or of an independent candidate representing the workers and poor peasants.
Despite the extreme importance of the electoral tactic during this period in the Philipines, it nevertheless remained true in this case (as in all others) that the problem of how to orient toward the bourgeois election had to be subordinate to an overall class-struggle perspective. What was most crucial was that any electoral tactic be combined with an agitational campaign on real issues of substantive importance to working people. After the vote, when the mass 'people power' revolution itself broke out-insisting that Marcos abide by the decision of the electorate (a simple democratic demand)-the revolutionary left could have and should have participated without reservation, attempting to provide leadership for the mass movement. 3) Guerilla struggle and peace negotiations The activites of the NPA guerrillas led by the CPP-both before and after the February revolution-demonstrate the genuine dedication of a significant layer of revolutionary fighters in the Philippines. The inability of Marcos to deal effectively with the insurgency was one of the major factors which destabilized the old regime, ultimately convincing Washingtoi of the need to dump the dictatorship.
The guerrilla struggle was created and fuelled by the extreme conditions of poverty and corruption under Marcos, along with a severe repression
124 International Marxist Review which made it difficult, if not impossible, to campaign legally for social change. The transition to the Aquino regime brought with it no change whatsoever in the economic hardships of the masses. It did, however, cut down on the corruption and make possible, for the first time in years, legal oppositional political activity. This, along with the 'peace offensive' of Aqunio, raised important questions for the NPA.
The leadership of the CPP and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which supports the NPA, were not taken in by the democratic pretenses of the Aquino government or by her appeal to lay down their arms and reintegrate themselves into society. They responded to the new situation with a propaganda offensive of their own, and with demands that Aquino show the substance of her interntions: by curbing the continued abuses of the armed forces and beginning to meet the needs of the masses. After November, when a cease-fire was finally arranged, the NDF and CPP used the truce to good advantage-staging demonstrations, appearing on television and radio, opening a public office in Manila, etc.
Yet despite these efforts, which were designed to win greater support and sympathy within the population as a whole for the political goals of the guerrilla movement, the NDF/CPP propaganda offensive, like the initiatives of the Filipino left in general during this period, did not offer an active alternative for workers and poor peasants. There were few opportunities for the masses themselves to participate in demonstrating their support for the social goals of the insurgency thereby putting pressure on the government in the negotiations. Most importantly, there was no vehicle by which they could help to create a viable independent political pole. The masses continued, for the most part, to be spectators, with the NPA and the government occupying centre stage.
Under these circumstances Aquino, who remained under severe pressure from the right wing, took a hard line in the negotiations. The government refused even to discuss the important social problems which were on the agenda of the NDF representatives. The negotiations quickly broke down, and the war between the guerrillas and the army has resumed. The degree of Aquino's success in her continuing effort to consolidate a reasonabley secure bourgeois-democratic government and to control the military will have a big impact on the future of the guerrilla movement. 4) Constitutional referendum The possibility for the establishment of a stable Aquino government received a big boost with her dramatic victory in the constitutional referendum on 2 February. This triumph reflected continued illusions in Aquino among the masses. But far more important than this, it reflected the inability, already discussed, of the workers' movement of the Philippines to construct a viable alternative to Aquino during the course of the previous year.
The Philippines: Revolution and the fight for democrac! 125
Aquino campaigned for the new charter primarily on the basis that a "no' vote would mean the continuation of instability and political anarchy in the country, or else a strengthening of the right and the return of tolalitarianism. This argument carried considerable weight in a situation marked by three failed attempts at a military coup in less than a year. Had the leadership of the workers and poor peasants been able to point to a different alternative, a proletarian alternative, then another solution to the crisis of the country might have seemed realistic in the short to medium
As it turned out, however, the constitutional referendum, like the electoral contest between Aquino and Marcos, confronted the workers' organizations with another no-win proposition. A vote against threatened to strengthen the rightists, who had succeeded in establishing a clear alternative power base in the figure of Enrile and in the ranks of the armed forces.
But a vote in favor meant an endorsement of Aquino. The most radical wing of the left-the KMU, the CPP, and ultimately the NDF-did campabsence of any viable alternative, was clearly revealed by the outcome of
Other left groups, like the socialist organisation BISIG, chose to call for
. While recognising the pro-imperialist and pro-capitalist nature of the constitution, this tendency within the workers' movement cited the guarantees given in the charter for democratic rights as a basis for its policy, along with the basic nature of the referendum as a choice between 'democracy' and totalitarianism. This line of reasoning, however, reveals severe constitutionalist illusions concerning the future course of
Democratic rights cannot be secured as a result of the adoption of a constitution—-no matter how democratic. The liberties exercised by the
Filipino people since the February revolution were not won through a formal legal process, but through the struggles of the masses themselves in the streets. These actions-in the historical backdrop of two decades of dictatorship—forced the Filipino bourgeoisie (and imperialism) to grant a measure of democracy. If democratic rights are to be maintained and expanded in the country, if the right-wing danger is to be combatted effectively, then the key is the continued independent mobilisation of the
The victory of Aquino's constitution, by reinforcing illusions in her government and in the bourgeois-democratic process in general, will nost likely dampen the mobilisation of the masses rather than stimulate it. It has already made it easier for the army to relaunch a military offensive against the NPA, and will make it easier in the future for the government to begin a campaign of repression against the workers' movement as a whole if that
The victory of the new constitution was not primarily a victory for democratic rights, but for the bourgeoisie's continued domination of the Philterm.
aign for a 'no vote' the balloting itself a 'critical yes' the struggle for democracy in the Phippines.
working class and its allies.
. However, their political weakness on this front, in the becomes necessary to maintain bourgeois rule.
126 International Marxist Review ippines. Sections on democratic rights included in the charter make it easier to gain the collaboration (or acquiescence) of the exploited masses in the overall political project of the liberal bourgeoisie. But if the political domination of the liberal bourgeoisie becomes reasonably secure, that class will prove no more faithful a guarantor of democratic rights in the Philippines than it has anywhere else in the world. 5) Future possibilities Though Aquino clearly has the upper hand today in her efforts to consolidate power it is important to keep in mind that the Filipino workers and poor peasants have not suffered any decisive defeat. There have, in fact, been few real battles since the February revolution itself, merely a skirmish or two in which the government came out on top. The poverty of the masses continues, and this consitutes highly combustible fuel for social unrest. The NPA guerrillas have resumed their struggle without any indication that they were weakened by the government's political maneuvering during the cease-fire period. In short, all of the social problems of the Philippines remain, and there is a limit to how long Aquino can continue to maintain her support simply on the basis of promises and on her identification with past victories. The task of the Filipino workers' and peasants' movement remains to begin the process of creating a mass political alternative to continued bourgeois rule, with the goal of achieving a situation of dual power. The initial post-February period, during which such a strategy might have succeeded in the short-term in creating the objective and subjective conditions which are a prerequisite for bringing the proletariat and its allies to power, has passed. After the overwhelming victory of Aquino in the constitutional referendum and the Senatorial elections there can be no doubt that she has, at least for now, decisively consolidated her rule. But the continuation of economic and politial problems which plague the Philippines means that another opportunity for the workers' and peasants' movement could easily arise with little advance notice. It is necessary to prepare the masses, and especially their political vanguard, for such an eventuality. The potential combination in the Philippines of an insurrection led by the urban working class with a pre-existing guerrilla movement of considerable strength in the countryside provides a particularly pregnant opportunity for printarian revolution. 6) Role of the USA Not surprisingly, the hand of US imperialism was obvious behind the scenes throughout events in the Philippines. It was the decision of Reagan to jettison Marcos which was decisive in convincing Enrile and Ramos to
The Philippines: Revolution and the fight for democracy 127 support Aquino during the crucial days in February 1986. The continued commitment of Washington to Aquino was one of the prime reasons that the pro-Enrile (pro-Marcos) forces fell short each time they attempted to stage a comeback. The US government's refusal to back the coup attempts was most dramatically expressed in late January when the Immigration and Naturalization Service blocked Marcos from returning to the Philippines on a privately chartered jumbo jet to link up with the latest rebellion.
As long as Aquino can control the situation in the country, the appearance of a 'democratic alternative' to 'communism' provides a good image booster for US imperialism, something which Reagan and his cohorts can point to in an effort to distract attention from their continuing (and extremely unpopular) policies in Central America and Southern Africa. In that sense, Washington's support for Aquino is genuine—no matter how hypocritical the commitment to democracy in the Philippines might be.
There can be no doubt, however, that much as the US State Department would like the forces loyal to Enrile to keep cool for a while, it still views them favourably, as a possible future option should Aquino lose her balance. In the long run, the structural problems of a dependent economy in the Philippines, combined with the ongoing crisis of world trade and international debt, dictate instability and crisis. Having a strong right-wing military is a handy insurance policy for Washington. It will certainly be cashed in should need arise. 7) International solidarity The Fourth International pledges itself to participate in a campaign of international solidarity with the workers and poor farmers of the Philippines. Initiatives which our sections and sympathising organisations can take include speaking tours in different countries by representatives of the Filipino workers' movement; active defense of mass leaders victimized by right-wing violence or by the government; publication of articles explaining the cause of the workers and poor peasants in that country, etc.
There can be little doubt that as the war between Aquino and the NPA heats up US imperialism will become more deeply involved in providing military aid, training, and potentially even tactical support, 'advisers' , and troops to the government. This will create the conditions for an international campaign against US intervention in the Philippines, for the right of the Filipino people to self-determination, similar to the movements which currently exist around the world focused on Central America/the Caribbean and Southern Africa. If Washington does opt for a return to totalitarian rule, shifting its backing to the forces presently grouped around Enrile, a strong movement of international solidarity will be required to defend the workers' movement in the Philippines against repression and victimisation.
128 International Marxist Review The dramatic events of 1986-87 in the Philippines add an important dimension to the overall international proletarian revolutionary offensive against the bourgeoisie, an offfensive which has made significant advances in recent years. A victory for the socialist revolution in the Philippines would strengthen the cause of working people the world over, bringing that much closer the day of liberation for all humanity.
SOCIALIST ACTION (USA)