ROMAN
First lessons of the revolution in the
Philippines
(This is an edited version of the report and summing up given by Roman in the discussion on the Philipines at the Fourth International's International Executive Committee meeting in June 1987.) This report aims to introduce a discussion on the Philippines. At the last International Executive Committee (IEC), held in the same period as the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, we passed a short resolution. Some discussions have been organised at United Secretariat (USec) meetings concerning the development of the political situation in the country. But this is the first opportunity we have had to discuss the Philippines in an IEC meeting.
The USec, when proposing to put an item on the Philippines on the IEC agenda, envisaged an open debate without any vote being taken. Despite this, two resolutions and a motion have been put before this IEC meeting. I think these comrades—the leadership of Socialist Action (SA) and comrade Brown of the Fourth Internationalist Tendency (FIT), both from the United States-are wrong to proceed in this way. I think it is a very bad way of beginning a discussion on such a question.
I hope the submission of these resolutions does not polarise our debate. Today's discussion must be an opportunity for reflecting on the lessons of stugggles in the Philippines. It is a chance to discuss as concretely as possible the political problems this country's revolutionary left has had to face and also the way we have followed and 'covered' these questions in our press. We should do all this in such a way as to introduce elements of comparative analysis (in relation to Central America, Colombia etc.) through the contributions of IEC comrades.
As for the reference material pertinent to this discussion, much has
98 International Marxist Review already been published in Inprecor and International Viewpoint (articles, documents, interviews, etc). Other material is in the process of being published or will be in coming months.
I would like to insist today on the importance of political debates that have taken place inside the Philippine left over the last two years, but to put this into context we have to first of all rapidly go back over some aspects of the general political situation. 1) Key features of the overall situation From February 1986 to May 1987 there was a political transition between the fall of the Marcos regime and the relative consolidation of the Aquinc regime. Today we see a semi-democratic bourgeois regime in which there are strong repressive elements—-a civilian regime where the army plays an important role. Furthermore, it is a regime whose authority over all the various repressive forces (various army factions, paramilitary elements, regional 'private' power bases, the 'restorationist' far right...) is not firmly imposed. a) The 1986 'February revolution' This was essentially the culimination of a new wave of anti-dictatorial struggles begun in 1983 (Benigno Aquino's assassination). Of course, in an atmosphere of the last days of a regime, the fall of the dictatorship was the stage for a thousand and one manoeuvres, particularly from all the bourgeois socio-political sectors: in the army (where Enrile and the RAM (Movement to Reform the Armed Forces) had been preparing a coup for several months), in the American administration (which was divided), in the reformist bourgeoisie, etc.
It is impossible here to go back over the complex February 1986 events and these manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres. But the key to the February 1986 events remains the massive intervention of the people, the dynamic of the mass mobilisation which turned all the 'scenarios' initially envisaged upside down.
Among the principal features of the situation we should note the following points: • There was a very severe crisis of the regime which made it possible for the dictatorship to be overthrown by huge mass mobilisation. But strictly speaking there was no direct revolutionary crisis-state power could not be immediately conquered by the working class and the oppressed and exploited classes. • There was an unprecedented dynamic of mass mobilisation already started in December 1985/January 1986. But the revolutionary left at that particular moment had lost the political initiative gained in the previous period.
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 99 • The overthrow of the dictatorship in February 1986 therefore represented a great democratic victory, the victory of a massive anti-dictatorial people's movement. But it was Corazon Aquino who drew off most of the legitimacy of this anti-dictatorial revolution. She acquired the legitimacy of the ballot-box (the presidential elections), and of the 'parliament of the streets' (the million on the streets at EDSA). Besides this, the Catholic hierarchy also bestoweded legitimacy on her in a country with a strong religious culture. She also benefited from a previously-gained democratic legitimacy (as the widow of Benigno Aquino), which was renewed with the freeing of political prisoners just after her victory. All this helped turn Aquino, the new president, into a weighty political factor. b) The evolution of the Aquino regime Given the conditions in which the first Aquino government was formed it represented an extremely unstable coalition including forces going from Juan Ponce Enrile (a former and future Minister of Defence, mastermind of martial law) to people like the lawyer, José Diokno-then ill and now dead—an ever-present opponent of the martial law regimes. This unstable coalition did not last a year.
The dynamic of the February 1986 anti-dictatorial uprising had an impact on the first months of the regime. The president took a certain number of radical political measures: • freeing several hundred political prisoners, including those whom the military wanted absolutely to keep inside: José Maria Sison (Joma) founder of the PCP; Bernabe Buscayno (Kumander Dante), a top guerrilla commander in the New People's Army (NPA); Ed de la Torre, founder of Christians for National Liberation; Horacio Boy Morales, former chairman of the National Democractic Front (NDF); • the abolition of the Marcos regime's constitution and the proclamation of a 'revolutionary' government, without any constitutional basis; • the dissolution of the government elected under the dictatorship and the mass sackings of representatives of the Marcos regime (governors, mayors, etc) and their replacement by civil servants named by the President.
These measures and some others went much further than the American representatives, the military and the conservative forces in the government would have liked at that time. However, this democratic dynamic quickly faded at the presidential and governmental level. It ended as early as May 1986. The regime's lack of movement on the social front became more and more striking as the months went by.
From July 1986 the restorationist right had taken some provocative initiatives which weighed in the balance of the internal contradictions of the first Aquino government and over the course of the negotiations with the National Democratic Front. The political crisis at the end of November 1986 ended with a shrinking of the government coalition and, despite the
dismissal of Enrile, a clear reorientation of the second Aquino government to the right. Ministers considered to be the most liberal and awkward were eased out and others had to give guarantees of good conduct.
The institutionalisation of the regime began during the first quarter of
1987 with in February, the adoption of a new Constitution and in May, the election of a two-chamber National Assembly. From now to the end of the year regional and municipal elections are due to complete this
One can say that, in the most obvious sense of the term, the postdictatorship transition was over in 1987. A new presidential regime had taken shape around the charismatic figure-with strong religious connotations-of Corazon Aquino. Each election had been a personal triumph for her. As a result of her popularity, the president has remained the pivot of the coalition which is today in a big majority in the Senate and
House of Representatives. But all this must not be allowed to conceal the
• the presidential majority remains a coalition full of significant internal
• the control of the civilian regime over the various army factions is more
• presidential authority over the political class, including within the governing majority, is much weaker than the Constitution and Aquino's popularity might lead us to believe—the traditional power of the big provincial familes is again coming to the fore and will have a profound impact
• looking at it more closely the fragility of the regime is related to the limits of the reforms introduced during the so-called period of 'revolutionary government'-the army and the police were never seriously purged (hence the arrogance of the rightwing army factions), 'people's power' has remained a dead-letter (hence the dominance of the bourgeois democracy of the big families and of the corrupt distribution of favours).
In socio-economic terms no serious measure has been taken (whether in the rural economy or concerning labour rights) while the country is still dependent on American imperialism, the multinationals and the big creditor banks (this explains the power of traditional economic interests).
The fragmentation and division of bourgeois power still characterises the present situation in the Philippines, despite the presidential nature of
Washington is collaborating closely with the Philippine army and the
Aquino regime to implement a new counter-insurgency policy. Above all, it was necessary for imperialism in 1986 to protect the repressive bodies from any attempts at an over-radical purge to avoid their disintegration and to keep control of the political process of the post-dictatorial
In several regions of the country, such as in Cagayan province, military operations against the guerrilla forces were never interrupted. The peace
100 International Marxist Review process.
contradictions;
apparent than real;
the new regime.
transition.
instability of the new regime. Indeed:
on the functioning of the National Assembly;
negotiations with the NDF were seen as a means of weakening the armed struggle. Today, Washington is seeking to increase the fighting capabability of the army by greatly increasing the number of American advisors and agents in the country, by improving the training of officers and soldiers, by strengthening heavy arms in particular (helicopters, tanks, artillery...) and by injecting new money into the counter-insurrectionary
At the same time, we are seeing a mushrooming of more or less official far-right paramilitary groups, known under the name of 'vigilantes'groups given the assignment of sowing terror in zones where there is clear popluar support for the National Democratic Front. Furthermore, underground military commanmdo units have begun to assassinate cadres from the legal mass movement (leader of the KMU trade union confedera-
On the ideological level, a huge offensive rehabilitating bourgeois democracy and cracking down on radicals has begun inside the Church.
Aquino is presented as the best guarantee of political pluralism while the ecclesiastical hierarchy aims to stop religious personnel getting involved
Today the Philippines are a living example of the theory of 'Low Inten-
'. We must not underestimate the seriousness of the counterinsurrectionary policies presently being implemented in the archipelego.
But the overall coherence of these measures is being undermined by the socio-economic crisis racking the Philippines, the international financial crisis which limits the resources available to imperialism and the corruption and nepotism that continues to flourish inside the regime and the
The militant left in the Philippines has therefore gone through a major
1985-1987 (the overthrow of a dictatorship, bourgeois political transition, the emergence of a new structurally unstable regime, etc). The rapidly evolving situation is today even more complex since it varies, sometimes radically, between the capital and certain provinces, indeed even from one province to another. It becomes difficult in these conditions to define an homogeneous national policy-responding to the variety of regional situations and to the needs of underground, armed sectors on the one hand and legal and semi-legal ones on the other. A number of new problems have emerged-and some more long-standing ones have
2) The politics of the Communist Party of the Philippines
Important debates have taken place throughout this whole period inside the
Philippine left and particularly inside the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the country's main revolutionary organisation. These are the political debates which I now want to go over. They interest us because effort.
tion, Partido ng Bayan activists etc.).
in popular struggles.
sity Conflict' army.
experience in
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 101 been posed in a particularly sharp way.
102 International Marxist Review they are related to questions of strategy and tacties which are the concern of all revolutionary activists.
We know quite a lot about the CPP (its history, activities, documents) and yet at the same time far from enough (the cadres and apparatus). To better understand this organisation, to learn from the Philippine experience and to establish a dialogue with the activists of this country, we must study the political lines followed and the ongoing debates-and to do this we have to face reality as it is. This is one of the first principles of all revolutionaries-to take reality as it is.
However, the reality of the political line followed by the Philippine revolutionary left is grossly misrepresented in the resolution submitted here by SA (US). The resolution proposed by Brown is more prudent. But nevertheless is still gives a clearly distorted image of what actually happened. This way of going about things means it is impossible to discuss the real political problems in the Philippines and it makes our own thinking sterile.
The CPP grew rapidly at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Consequently a certain number of new debates about political line started among still limited circles of cadres. It was only after the February 1986 experience that the discussion suddenly became much broader and was partially conducted in public. At the end of 1986, in the framework of a complex and difficult situation, the debate became restricted again but it had to continue in more discreet ways, This discussion focused on a whole series of tactical and strategic problems. a) The tactical debate: the boycott question In December 1985, the CPP Central Committee's Executive Committee (CC-EC) decided on an active boycott of the 1986 presidential elections. It is around this decision that polemics were organised inside the CP-and more generally inside the Filipino left. Therefore it is very important to understand what the debate was about. It is precisely on this point that the resolutions from Brown and the SA (US) do not provide us with a basis for understanding the terms of the debate.
The resolution proposed by SA (US) peremptorily asserts that:
the key point in understanding the CPP policy is that the boycott was never seriously implemented. There was no active boycott (...) No effort was made to organise large boycott rallies or demonstrations. As opposed to the SA (US) leadership Brown does admit that certain:
elements called for a boycott of the elections. But he notes that these elements:
tended to do so not for genuinely principled reasons ...
(original Brown quote)
These two statements do not correspond to the facts and information in my possession. I have discussed with a very large number of activists, members and non-members of the CPP, who lived through these events.
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 103 We know of the CPP's public documents, but also today we have the 23 December 1985 internal circular in which the CC-EC defines its boycott policy.. Not only is the May 1986 CPP Political Bureau (PB) self-criticism available but also a whole series of internal discussion articles, published in two issues of Praktika magazine. These are serious sources. These documents are presented in the article which appeared in International Viewpoint No. 123 (29 June 1987).
These sources clearly show: • Contrary to what the SA (US) resolution claims, the CPP leadership decided a policy of active boycott. This is particularly clear since the ECCC rejected other proposals: the proposal for 'critical participation' in the Aquino campaign, put forward by many traditional CPP allies, but also the proposal of a 'flexible' boycott combined with a pratical involvement in the Aquino election campaign (a proposal made by certain CP structures). The 23 December 1985 circular spelt it out—it was necessary to mobilise for the boycott and even (the most controversial point) to temporaily break with those 'allies' who wanted to join in the Aquino campaign. • The CPP leadership tried to implement this political line. Especially in the Manila region the polemic against 'critical participation' was organised without fudging and important efforts were put into organising demonstrations in favour of boycott. But the boycott campaign failed-the masses did not answer the call. This was the context in which certain CPP sectors, in disagreement with the Executive Committee, had de facto carried out a 'flexible' boycott policy, to avoid the isolation which had often affected the party in areas where the 'hardline' boycott had been applied. • Contrary to what Brown thinks, the CC-EC did not only justify its policy of active boycott by a (wrong) analysis of the conjuncture. It also used 'principled' arguments—refusing in any way to legitimise the 'electoral road' (counterposed to the revolutionary road), not wanting to contribute to fostering illusions among the masses in the bourgeois leadership (Aquino-Laurel), aiming to unmask the vacuous programme of the reformist opposition, and not downplaying the importance of anti-imperialist tasks • All this is confirmed by the internal CPP debate which followed the fall of the dictatorship. The first reproach many people inside the CPP made against the CC-EC majority was of having shown a disastrous tactical rigidity in defining its policy of active boycott.
If we do not take into account all these facts then it is no use claiming to reflect on the lessons of the Philippines' experience. I am not putting forward an 'opinion' here on what happened. I am outlining the facts at my disposal. If what I say on this point is challenged I want to know on the basis of which sources and documents. It is a serious question. One cannot assert things without backing them up with sources of information. For example, from what sources of information does the SA (US) leadership base its statements about the absence of a policy of active boycott?
104 International Marxist Review •
It is interesting for us to discuss the tactical problem facing the CPP, in December 1985, at the beginning of the election campaign. Here we should keep in mind the two following points: • It was not a traditional electoral farce, in the eyes of the population these elections were the opportunity for a real anti-dictatorial struggle. We can understand why certain CPP sectors may have found it difficult to grasp this (due to the differences in the regional situation and the fact that the CPP had had a long experience of organising the people before it went into struggle whereas on this occasion hundreds of thousands of unorganised people suddenly started to demonstrate in the streets ...). But there were many people, both inside and outside the CPP, who understood a genuine test of strength was shaping up and that it was necessary to be involved one way or the other. • The CPP had been through the experience of the active boycott. It had failed-the CPP was left marginalised and paralysed at a crucial moment. Instead of reducing Aquino's popular legitimacy, the boycott policy actually increased it. Aquino was able to capitalise on all the legitimacy of the February 1986 overthrow of the dictatorship and of 'people's power'. The CPP lost the political initiative at a time when the people were demonstrating in their masses and it is still experiencing real difficulties today in regaining it. The marginalisation of revolutionary forces in February 1986 has had longlasting and serious consequences.
The failure of the boycott campaign highlights, in my opinion, the implications of the position defended by the SA (US), namely the standing of a workers' candidate. In this given context it would have been seen as as direct aid to the dictatorship (which wanted to play on the divisions of the opposition) and would have very certainly led to an even greater isolation of the CP.
Fundamentally the failure of the boycott goes back to what was said previously about the nature of the political situation. There was an open crisis of the dictatorship and a de facto abstentionist position was not acceptable to the masses. Furthermore, the crisis was not strictly speaking a revolutionary one and the call for a boycott could not be the signal for a radical class offensive, combining the overthrow of the dictatorship with the immediate struggle for state power.
The political choice facing the Filipino revolutionary left in December 1986 was difficult. I do not claim to know what was the best decision to take. I do not know enough, for example, about the real state of the organisations concerned. This aspect is important when we are discussing concrete tactics. But after the experience of the overthrow of the dictatorship and the failure of the boycott campaign, we can work out the basic parameters of the problem.
Between de facto abstention and political alignment on the Aquino leadership, there was the possibility of being part of the unitary electoral mobilisation in order to organise the democratic struggle from the inside, develop independent forms of organisation (peoples' committees) and an
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 105 independent programme (radically democratic and anti-imperialist, expressing the social interests of working and poor people. By doing that it would have been possible to play an active role in the anti-dictatorial struggle (the priority objective) while concretely challenging Aquino's pretension of representing the whole of the movement for democracy.
There was a new phenomenon at the end of 1985/beginning of 1986: the anti-Marcos bourgeoisie was in the process of re-establishing its hegemony over the movement for democracy. It had lost its hegemony a long time before, to the national democratic movement. The best way of fighting back against this new bourgeois hegemony over the broad movement for democracy was not to be found in the 'purity' of the slogan on which way to vote but in the practical ability to effectively organise the fight against the dictatorship at that particular moment and in the specific forms taken by the movement. As they were fully involved in the struggle, the revolutionary organisations, together, could have given an organised form to the 'people's power' of February 1986. Such committees could have embodied an important part of the legitimacy of the anti-dictatorial uprising. If such committees had been set up, inside the electoral mobilisation, a lot of things would have changed—including the possibility of fighting later for a representative and popular constituent assembly.
How can this policy be formulated in the framework of the election campaign? Some of the Philippines' revolutionary left forces defended the idea of 'critical participation' in the Aquino campaign (involving an explicit vote for her but coupled with propaganda aimed at putting people on their guard against the illusions fostered by her candidature). Other forces proposed a 'flexible boycott' with the underground organisations calling for a propagandist boycott, but the CPP nevertheless allowing its activists to be part of the unitary mobilisation through the mass organisations and 'alliance' structures.
Some comrades on the IEC have suggested the underground structures could have called for a vote against Marcos without giving any positive position on who to vote for (i.e. without calling for an Aquino vote), while maintaining unity in struggle with those who were explicitly calling for an Aquino vote.
As far as I am concerned I tend to go for the most simple solutions. But the important thing is to recognise the fundamental problem that was posed—to meet its responsibilities in the anti-dictatorial struggle and concretely challenge the Aquino leadership the revolutionary left had to avoid at all costs breaking the unity of the struggle against Marcos. The active boycott line (along with the presentation of alternative candidates) produced this split and threw the CPP into a passive position. The 'purest' political line was not the most effective against the reformist bourgeoisie since in practice it left the field wide open to it!
We can discuss the best electoral formulation with no pretense at resolving everything. But it must be discussed in a correct way. I say this because comrade Joe, who is presenting the SA (US) resolution has stated
here that I gave political support to Aquino. He quoted, in support of this statement, a passage from a letter I had sent on this question to comrade
Brown last October. However this letter says precisely the opposite of
The problem was not to be part of the "bourgeois camp', but to be part of the mass anti-dictatorial struggle which took the form, at this junction, of the
—Being part of the unified mobilisation against the dictatorship did not mean to centre the electoral tactic around a call to vote for Aquino. It essentially
—In any case, voting for her did not necessarily meant giving her political sup-
—Being part of this electoral mobilisation did not mean abandoning the struggle for class independence. On the contrary, it could mean fighting more effective-
The content (revolutionary or reformist) of participation in the united anti- dictatorial mobilisation depended on how it was done and with what perspec-
You can see that the SA (US) leadership has gone straight ahead and totally distorted my position. It is not possible to discuss in this way. I have already called attention to how this method is wrong. In vain it seems..•
Our electoral policy aims to defend and consolidate the class independence of the proletariat and all the exploited from all bourgeois currents. In this way it is part of a long-term struggle of strategic significance to build a class leadership for the revolutionary struggle.
The choice of a concrete election tactic is obviously linked to this longterm objective. This is why our electoral policy often takes the form of standing class-struggle candidates, or calling for a vote for the representatives of reformist workers parties. (In which case a vote for them does not in general imply political support or confidence-in other words necessarily the same thing to vote for a given candidate and to politically
While the choice of a tactic must be situated within a revolutionary strategic perspective, it is determined by the analysis of a given concrete situation. It does not derive automatically from general and abstract 'prin-
. The Philippines' situation was very original—a presidential election campaign was the occasion for an anti-dictatorial struggle of major importance. A response to such a situation could only be an original one.
Being politically rigorous involves looking for a creative tactic, effectively
Consequently the Philippines' debate has once again underlined the importance of the very Leninist dictum of the 'concrete analysis of a concrete situation' in the working out of a given political line-this is one of the
Finally the choice of election tactic is not limited to deciding on who to vote for, especially when mass struggles take on such an unparalleled
106 International Marxist Revien' what Joe claims. Here it is, I quote:
Aquino electoral campaign:
meant not to oppose. it.
port and confidence.
ly for it.
precisely a 'vote without illusions' support him or her.)
ciples' fertile aspects of this debate.
tive. It was a struggle; nothing was settled in advance.
'. Indeed this shows that there is not adapted to the situation and the relationship of forces.
scope! The fight for class independence does not only—and not necessarily principally-come down to who to vote for. Calling for a vote against
Aquino (what I call a political line of bearing witness, so dear to Brown)
It was necessary to put forward an alternative in action to Aquino that could organise and lead forces in the struggle against the dictatorship. We talked about setting up people's committees on a class programme under revolutionary leadership. That is a powerful expression of class independence. And we are talking of a country where there are armed people's forces led by the CPP, the NPA (New People's Army). This is a particularly important factor in the situation. Brown refers to the armed struggle in his draft resolution (guerrilla and insurrection). But the SA (US)
leadership does not have a word to say about it when putting forward its own political line! It's rather incredible from a revolutionary point of
The debate inside the Philippine revolutionary left crystallised above all around the policy of active boycott. But it led to other very important questions. Given the conditions in which the decision for an active boycott was taken (a publication with very limited circulation imposing this line against the opinion of a large number of party structures), the CPP's democratic functioning was widely debated. The 'democratic spirit' was exhibited in an occasionally original way such as with the publication of two issues of
Praktika magazine. More generally, the discussion on election tactics was part and parcel of a debate on strategy-and therefore on the armed struggle, its forms and place in the overall struggle. This debate is particularly
We only have access to a part of this discussion. Straightaway we should note that those who have criticised the 'rigidity' of the CPP's election tactics do not necessarily share the same positions when it comes to the debate on evaluating the CPP's traditional strategy. This is particularly clear if you take the case of Joma Sison and Marty Villalobos-two critics of the active boycott stance-but who put forward different views on the former
For José Maria Sison, main theoretician of the 'new' communist movement, which came out of a split in 1967-68 with the PKP, the 'old' communist party, the traditional position of the CPP on prolonged people's war is as relevant as ever. He insists on the centrality of the armed struggle and the rural sanctuaries or rear areas, on the continuity and progressive development of revolutionary struggle, on the gradual and prudent accumulation of forces and against the urban insurrectional 'adventure' in a
For Marty Villalobos, a cadre working in the urban sector in recent view.
b) The strategic debate on military policy interesting.
question.
country like the Philippines.
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 107 was not effective either in the short or long-term.
rethought in the light on the one hand of contemporary national liberation movement experiences worldwide (particularly in Central America) and on the other hand of the Philippine experience of the 1980s. He thinks it is necessary to break with classic Maoist schemas and to relate political and military work, rural struggle and urban struggle, guerrilla activity and insurrection, in a different way. Changes in the period which can imply changes in strategy must be taken fully into account. Likewise the party had to come to terms with the conjuncture which requires a greater flexibility in deciding on tactics (and therefore in the definition of the 'prin-
Joma (Sison) represents the tradition and lessons that a generation of party activists had drawn from the failure of the Huks' insurrection and the later capitulation of the PKP. Against adventurism on the one hand and parliamentary illusions on the other. A people's army has to be built while respecting the period required for each stage in a necessarily prolonged process. On the other side, Marty Villalobos is looking to bring into the
CPP strategy the notion of crisis and the 'favourable moment' the possibility of relatively rapid victories by combining socio-democratic movements and insurrection. He fears the longlasting consequences of
'lost opportunities' like in El Salvador in 1979-80 and in the Philippines
The revolutionary left in the Philippines is engaged in a fundamental but complex debate on this. I will limit myself here to three comments:
• This debate is fundamental because it leads to reflection on strategy while taking into account all the socio-political, national and international factors. Indeed, in the strict sense of the term, there is no strategy of armed struggle but a global strategy insofar as it includes all the forms and sectors of struggle, a home truth hammered home by the Vietnamese for example. Some of us (including myself) had some difficulty in grasping all the implications when we were discussing Latin America at the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s. As revolutionary activists-even more so as a revolutionary international—we are extremely interested in enriching our strategic thinking. The Philippines is one of the countries where these question are both under discussion and being tested in practice. We must
• This debate is fundamental because we can put the discussion on electoral tactics back in its context. At the beginning of the 1980s, the national democratic movement in the Philippines, led by the CPP, had won the political initiative. However, it progressively lost it, particularly in the second half of 1985 and in December, and it had to respond to events and decisions taken by other forces (the Aquino/Laurel candidates) in a really difficult situation. Cadres from the movement asked themselves why this
Villalobos' answer is interesting. He explains that a real turn in the situation took place in 1983, when Benigno Aquino was assassinated. He
• mautional Marxist Revien years, the CPP's traditional strategy must not only be adjusted but cipal fronts' of struggle at any given moment).
between 1983 and 1986.
not ignore this contemporary experience.
had happened.
', implying
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 109 thinks it was already necessary in this period to reorganise the revolutionary forces in the perspective of a rapid fall of the dictatorship—in other words to broaden the anti-dictatorial front as much as possible while at the same time preparing for an insurrection.
I am influenced by the Villalobos' analyses on this question. I have no 'line' in a real sense (that is in practice) for the Philippines. To have such a line, you really have to have an organisation—or know the state of the organisations that we are talking about. However we have no organisation in the Philippines and we know far from enough about the existing revolutionary organisations. But if you want to discuss my 'line of thinking' on recent years in the Philippines then do not line yourselves up on the question of the Aquino vote. My 'line of thinking' above all focuses on the 1983-1986 period. It does seem to me that the 1983 turn paved the way for the preparation of an insurrectional situation on the military level (involving a partial reorganisation of forces) and on the political level (involving the broadening of democratic alliances by including bourgeois sectors while consolidating the revolutionary leadership of the struggle). This is the working hypothesis I would prefer we were discussing. It would allow us to take up later, on a more political basis, the discussion on election tactics. • Basically this strategic debate is also very complex. It would be a mistake for us to jump to conclusions. In a country like the Philippines where there are armed revolutionary forces, it is necessary both to ensure the continuity of the struggle and process of accumulation of political, social and organisational forces (the NPA has become an element of this continuity) and to ensure flexible tactics and strategy so as to fully take into account changes in conjuncture and period. Obviously this is easier said than done.
It is necessary to know how to fully use-and therefore know how to bring about and consolidate-the emergence of 'democratic spaces' favourable to the more unfettered development of the mass movement. But you also need to be able to maintain the armed forces, their operational character and their political solidity. In the longer term, the combination of political and military struggle, struggle in the 'white' zones and in the "red' zones, legal and underground activity and guerrilla action and insurrection raise concrete problems whose complexity must not be underestimated. Neither should one ignore the inportance of action on the international level—a question where the weakness of the Philippine revolutionary forces is today evident.
So in this area of discussion we have an infinite amount to learn from the Philippine experience as from other countries. We have to reflect about these questions. We can also briefly indicate other areas of debate that we will come back to later in our international press.
Although we have less information on this, it seems clear that the policy followed by the National Democratic Front on the question of negotiations with the government gave rise to disagreements and discussions. Once again we have a situation which gives us the chance to study the political problems that we find in so many revolutionary struggles—when the 'battle of the peace' becomes one of the major elements in the confrontation
The National Democratic Front was able to take the initiative in this domain on several occasions. Government policy clearly aimed at undermining the insurrection. The revolutionary forces firmly rejected any capitulation, specifically refusing to give up their arms and proclaiming the legitimacy of their people's struggle. After the signing of the truce, the negotiations broke down with the Aquino regime saying it would militarily defeat the CPP. The political results of the confrontation between the NDF and the government, on the question of the conditions for a just and lasting peace, seem to have been mixed for the revolutionaries.
Some leaders, like Joma Sison, said the NDF went too far in the compromise written into the 60-day ceasefire agreement. For others, like the underground activist writing under the pseudonym Pepe Manalo, the compromise had been rather too timid. Let us go through some points in this
• The debate on the correctness of holding such talks and the conditions for the continuation of negotiations beyond February 1987 seems to have focused on the results obtained with the ceasefire agreement. Some militants probably emphasised an analysis of the 'material results' were often very limited--the government had been unable to get the truce respected in the highly militarised zones, like Cagayan (where the army had sought to step up the pressure). Other cadres probably emphasised the
"political' results-the battle to win sectors of the population who wanted peace above all else and who were vacillating between the regime and the
NDF. In the first case it can be said that the results were very mediocre.
In other aspects they could be deemed to be more positive but still
• Behind the analysis of the first results of the negotiation policy there are probably different judgements on how best to speed up the process of
'de-legitimation' of the Aquino regime in the eyes of the population. Some cadres, it seems to me, see this process as almost 'natural' the socio-economic crisis, government negligence, corruption and repression. They see time as being on the side of the revolutionary forces and think popular illusions in Aquino will rapidly fade. The new, occasionally bloody, onslaught of repression is a sufficiently weighty lesson according to them. Priority must therefore go to consolidating the NPA.
Other cadres, I think, are more sensitive to the importance of the present political battle. Their argument goes as follows: Aquino and the Catholic
110 International Marxist Revies discussion.
insufficient.
c) The debate on the negotiations between revolution and counter-revolution.
', which
, stimulated by
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 111 hierarchy are trying to refurbish bourgeois democracy as an element in a counter-insurrectionary policy (and in capitalist economic development). The way in which this battle for democratic legitimacy will be carried out today will have lasting postive or negative consequences whatever the future evolution of the situation. It is not enough to wait for the concrete experience of the Aquino regime to bring forth the fruits of disillusionment. Without endangering the armed people's forces, the political initiative must continue to be taken, thereby forcing the regime back onto its last defences on the terrain of the negotiations. In this way, its internal contradictions can be exacerbated (between civilians and military, between the various American agencies etc).
Once again on this I do not propose we aim to have an over-precise opinion on the way in which negotiations must be carried out. Such peace talks between an armed revolutionary movement and a bourgeois government represent a political test which is both very important and complex. We must take into consideration an analysis of the precise concrete situation (and particularly an evaluation of the divisions in the government camp as well as the degree of unity in the revolutionary camp), and the medium and long-term objectives (to judge the place of these negotiations in the overall tactics and strategy). But we must at least study the political parameters of the problem for our own movement. d) The debate on the united front Discussions on the election tactics, political democracy inside the revolutionary movement, political tests like the negotiations, have continued to be stimulated by, and to feedback into, the united front debate.
I do not want to repeat what has been written on this subject in various International Viewpoint articles in 1986. That has been one of the central questions in discussion. I would simply like to emphasise two aspects of the problem here.
To understand the debate that has developed on this inside the Philippine left, it is necessary to start from the traditional CPP position on the united front and not present a travesty of it. The SA (US) resolution clearly implies that the CPP is an authentically 'Stalinist' party, as we understand the term (and not in the sense the CPP might understand it). A party which in terms of alliances hitches itself to the coat tails of various sectors of the bourgeoisie, in the name of revolution by stages. This is an utterly false presentation of the CPP's theses and practice.
The CPP does indeed talk of revolution by stages—-the Philippines being today in the 'national democratic' stage, and not the "socialist' stage. But it thinks the revolutionary party (i.e. itself) has the task of leading the struggle right from the national democratic stage.
The CPP's conception of the united front is a classic Maoist one which I call one of 'concentric circles': the party holds the place of the central
circle in the united front schema with the peasants, workers and popular masses occupying the next immediate circle (the base forces of the UF)
and with the anti-dictatorial allies in a further outer circle. Bourgeois sectors can be integrated into the front but in a subordinate position. There is only room for a single party in the central circle—the CP. The classic
Maoist conception of the united front is different from the Stalinist idea
The fundamental CPP documents are explicit on this question. For example I have been able to consult this party's internal political education manual, Batayang Kurso ng Partido Kumunista ng Pilipinas (Basic Course of the Communist Party of the Philippines), published in 1979. The chapter dealing with the national united front (NUF) makes it clear that one of the principal functions of such a front is to 'win to the revolution the intermediary forces' and that the 'foundation' of the NUF is the
'peasants' and workers' alliance' on basis of which the 'people's army'
The first 'principle' guiding the line of building the national united front is that of the 'proletarian leadership of the party in the NUF'. 'This NUF can only be formed through the leadership of the party' to form alliances on the basis of its own strength' (the force of the revolutionary mass movement, of the people's army, of the party...). This policy of alliances must contribute to carrying forward the cause of the masses. The third principle is to not counterpose unity and struggle inside the united front. One unites with the national bourgeoisie to extent it supports the revolution at a given moment and place, one opposes its reactionary objectives that aim to betray the revolution. Fourth principle-the party must keep its capability and freedom of independent action, it is not bound by the discipline of the front. It remains independent in its ideology, political line and organisation. At the same time it recognises the independence of other organisations which are members of the front.
Again here we come back to the problem of sources. The activists with whom I have discussed, the documents I have consulted and the reality of the NDF as I know it, all show that the CPP considers it its duty to lead the front and to give a revolutionary dynamic to the alliance policy right from the initial stage of the struggle. I ask Joe on what sources does the
SA (US) base itself for asserting the opposite-that the CPP gives over the leading role in the front during the national democratic stage of the strug-
The discussions unfolding in the Philippines-especially since 1985 and the crisis of Bayan—show that the main criticism made by a large number of revolutionary elements against the CPP leadership is of having carried out this united front policy in the 'concentric circles' with sectarianism and rigidity. In favourable conditions, such a conception facilitates a unification of mass work. But it makes any unity between progressive and proletarian political formations particularly difficult (it presupposes in fact
12 International Marxist Review' of the popular front or national front in other periods.
can be built.
must consciously lead the united front'
. Second principle, 'it is necessary gle to the national bourgeoisie?
'the party
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 113 that only one really proletarian organisation exists). As opposed to what SA (US) lightly asserts, the fiasco of the active boycott was definitely seen as the bitter fruit of a sectarian conception of the united front.
Since then the debate on the policy of alliances has become more fertile. I think we can say that Joma Sison still defends the traditional ideas of the CPP on this matter (see for instance his interview we published in International Viewpoint in December 1986). In the discussion article published in Kasarinlan (no 4, Vol 2, second quarter 1987), Pepe Manalo, proposes an alliance policy linked on several levels: the regroupment of Marxist forces (with the small far left organisations which exist outside the CPP in order to strengthen the leadership potential of the revolutionary current over the whole of the democratic movement), the consolidation of a left front (with the worker's and peasant's alliance as its base) and the constitution of a very broad anti-fascist front including bourgeois elements.
As the debate went on it became more complex. It brought in really complicated questions to which there is no simple, abstract answer. I have only outlined here some of the themes since we do not have time nor the necessary documents. Other themes I have left on one side altogether to be picked up again later in another framework-the discussions on electoral policy under the Aquino regime, on the character and role of the coalition government in a revolutionary perspective, etc. I have selected the themes cited above because of the wealth of documentation, but also because they exemplify the type of real political questions facing a revolutionary movement involved in armed struggle in a transitional period between the crisis of a personal dictator like Marcos and the emergence of a new regime like the Aquino one. To have a 'line' on the Philippines in the precise meaning of the term, is to know how to respond to this type of questions. ( Clearly for that you must have an internal, activist knowledge of the situation and the country. No general 'programmatic' knowledge can in this instance replace concrete knowledge. Here the debate does not turn on the 'character' of the Philippine revolution—a process of permanent revolution-but on much more precise questions. This is one of the reasons why it seems to me fruitless to present a 'line' resolution to the vote.
Furthermore, we should note that neither of the two resolutions submitted here answer these questions. The SA (US) resolution quite simply ignores them. It essentially wages quite the worst polemic one could have with the CPP. The Brown resolution picks up on some to them but in an excessively superficial way. It remains well below the standard of reflection and experience reached in the Philippines. Brown is thus led to systematically minimise the scope of militant intervention and political initiatives carried out by the revolutionary left in the Philippines. Unlike the SA (US), he does not define all its components as 'reformist' ('they must be given every benefit of the historical doubt' he writes). But he is careful not to explicitly recognise their revolutionary qualities whereas one has— as far as the CPP is concerned--nineteen years of struggle to judge it. The
114 International Marxist Review general picture of the situation is consequently profoundly wrong. The result is that most of what Brown proposes in his resolution (what the Philippine left 'should' do) has already been done, whether by the CPP, other activist groups, or mass organisations like the trade unions and peasant associations.
This is not how we will enrich our political reflection on the Philippine experience nor will we be able to engage in a fraternal dialogue with the activists and organisations of this country. To do this we have to begin to listen to what they have to say about their own experience, what they are discussing and what proposals they are making. If we have the same ideas they do then it is of no use to try and hide it (for example it seems to me that Brown's position on the 1986 presidential election is very similar to the 'flexible boycott' proposal of various CPP activists and structures).
Above all we have to discuss and polemicise correctly, taking account of people's real positions-and this does not apply only to among ourselves, but also with Philippine activists. I want to isist on this because of what is written in the SA (US) resolution on Bernabe Buscayno. SA (US) state that:
Some of (the CPP) members, a founding member (...) supported Aquino without incurring their slightest criticism. Joe has confirmed that this founding member of the CPP was Buscayno, alias Kumande Dante, NPA leader. Before February 1986, Dante was in prison. He had criticised the active boycott policy in the name of revolutionary effectiveness. Freed after Aquino's victory, he was part of the launch of the Partido ng Bayan in August. This party, rooted in the people's movement, in alliance with two other formations, stood independent class candidates in the senate and legislative elections in May.
Buscayno has in fact committed himself to one of the most dangerous activities he could choose-setting up a Marxist party which fights to win legal status while he is one of the 'symbolic targets' for the far right. Rolando Olalia, trade union leader and Partido ng Bayan chair was assassinated at the end of 1986. As for Buscayno, he has just escaped an assassination attempt—a particularly serious one since several people accompanying him were killed. Can one, without any form of trial, take Buscayno as an example of CPP capitulation to Aquino? We can discuss Buscayno's positions but at least we ought to know about them first. And we should also show a little more respect.
It is impossible here to go through all the 'errors' to be found in the two resolutions put to the vote. There are a lot more in the SA (US) resolution that in Brown's. But we should emphasise one thing-this is denied without foundation in the SA (US) resolution and not really recognised in the Brown one-the NDF definitely did call for independent mass action. The call was clear, such as the day afater the Rolando Olalia assassination: 'Only we can save ourselves' was the title of the NDF declaration mass distributed at the funeral of the assassinated trade union leader.
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution 115 3) The pluralism of the Philippine left Given the place it has in the Philippine revolutionary left and the responsibilities it holds, I have especially presented in this report the CPP and the discussions it has had. The CPP was and remains the hegemonic organisation in the Philippine left-far and away the most important. But this hegemony has changed between 1985 and today. Previously it extended over the whole of the movement for democracy and was practically unchallenged in the people's movement. Today it does not hold sway so decisively in the broad 'anti-fascist' movement and it is more openly challenged in certain sectors of the mass movement.
No one can try and go around the CPP, NPA and NDF. They remain the backbone of popular resistance. No other movement has a comparable spread and roots on a national scale. But nevertheless I believe what we have seen since 1985 reflects a profound reality-the pluralism of the Philippine left. Whatever the relationships of forces between the various organisations this pluralism seems to me to be a key structural factorwhich is evident in many aspects.
On the ideological level, the period of the near monolithic domination of Maoist ideas is over. Everywhere there is a new interest for other international experiences (beginning with Central America) and other • The successith ideological references. The successful launch of the book Fidel and religion (published in English by Pathfinder Press-Pacific and Asia) is evidence of this, with the organisation last August of two meetings with the Cuban ambassador, one at the University of the Philippines, with Bisig, the socialist organisation, the other with priests and nuns, including Father Ed de la Torre. In this context we should note that International Viewpoint is really used by Philippine left activists thanks to the quality of its international coverage.
If the examples of Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador interest the Philippine activists it is because they are countries that are close to the Philippines because of Spanish colonisation and American influence. El Salvador is the centre of important discussions on the military question. Nicaragua offers a very relevant example for the Philippines because of the revolutionary collaboration between communists and christians. This is a key question in the Philippines with the political role of the Church, the radicalisation of priests and nuns, the history of Christians for National Liberation, founding member of the NDF. The lasting importance of the religious radicalisation seems to me to contribute to the structural pluralism of the Philippine left. I think it is unlikely that all this radicalisation could find a home simply inside the CPP or in following its line.
The development in 1985-1986 of new radical left organisations, firstly underground and then legally is very symptomatic-the socialist organisation, Bisig; the Movement for a 'People's Democracy' VPD; the Partido ng Bayan, and a multitude of local groups too. (On the other hand the Social Democrats as an organised current have essentially become part and
116 International Marxist Review parcel of the new Aquino administration.) These organisations are still very small and must still consolidate themselves if they even want to resist a sharp repressive turn in the situation. Some, like the PnB, belong de facto to the national democratic movement in the broad sense. But all already participate in the accumulation of new experiences, contribute to the ideological and political debate, play a certain role in the mass struggles and embody what could be a new, more 'pluralist' united front policy.
This pluralism of the Philippine left is also expressed in the social movements, like the women's movement that is facing difficult tests (the introduction of anti-abortion clauses in the new constitution and the maintenance of the ban on divorce) and are involved in original experiences (like the setting up of the Kaiba, the Women's Party). Important debates about the relationship between women's struggles, popular and revolutionary struggles, and feminism have developed. Let me say in passing, the militant left still hesitates to defend more vigourously the right to abortion (which concerns all women but particularly working class and poor women) perhaps more because of the political weight of the Catholic Church in the Philippines than because of its ideological weight.
I have not dealt here with the development of the political left. However the trade union movement (begining with the KMU) has been very active since February 1986. Significant debates have taken place about policy and intervention for the trade unions as well as an unprecedented discussion for this country on land reform. But another report would be necessary to take up all that.
We must take into account in working out our own policy on the Philippines the existence of an important revolutionary movement and the pluralism of the militant left. As we have written into several resolutions, we must especially show in practice our solidarity with the democratic, proletarian, popular and revolutionary struggles in this country. That is essential. We must then learn from this very rich experience and offer fraternal and unitary dialogue to the various components of the Philippine progressive movement.
We have come up against (particularly in Europe) a sectarian attitude from certain CPP sectors. This will come up again. Such a stance hurts international solidarity when the CPP has the greatest need of it. Furthermore, we have not been able to get involved in as much solidarity work as is necessary. There has however been some progress and we can hope to meet our responsibilties in this area to a greater extent in the future.
We are beginning to understand the situation in the country better-and to be better known by various activist sectors. If we continue to show in practice that we are ready for unitary relations-of mutual solidarity and dialogue-with the various components of the Philippine radical left, while respecting each organisation's political identity and integrity, then the links we have made should be strengthened.
There is no longer any need to demonstrate the international importance of what is happening in the Philippines. It is vital that we continue our
117
The Philippines: First lessons of the revolution reflection and discussion started today on the lessons of this major experience and we reaffirm our solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of the Philippines.
BROWN (FIT, USA)