LATIN AMERICA 1962
STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS AND ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES
By Livio Maitan movement has the certain prospect of being obliged to live to continue to vegetate in the countryside in. America vated, or to go to the urban centres, with light the growing alteration between its is known our not failed to underline it in the texts of its World Congresses-that in severat countries of Latin America, the economic development and progress of industrialisation has been on the average more important than in the countries of Asia and Africa. Certain countries in particular-sometimes on the basis of a structure already well advanced—have progressed perceptibly so that this advance, linked with the reinforcement of national bourgeois layers, has posed and still poses the problem of their specific characterisation: does it mean that they are still semi-colonial countries or countries which have reached the capitalist stage properly so-called? However, this economic development has in no way ellminated nor even impared the basic structural contradictions which can be synthesised as follows:
(a) The rate of economic progress, if it exists, is partially or totally annulled by the very considerable increase in without stable resources in horrible shantylowns-the tragic halo around the most part of the great Latin-American capitals; (e) the domestic social structure and the persistent grip of Imperialism is obstacle No. I to much more ample and harmonious economic progress since obviously in these conditions, the economy can have only an unequal, unilateral development related to the needs and interests of foreign investors and limited layers of the indigenous dominant class, while the so-called "liberalisation" of commerce, the absence of control over foreign exchange etc. favour foreign the squandering of reserves competition, with all the consequences that one can easily imagine..;
(f) last but not least,. the real Achilles' heel of the Latin American countries remains the structure of their production and surplus-value in favour of foreign capital- their foreign trade. The drainage of the fact of the population;
(b) Industrialisation remains concentra- on the one hand and industrial products on ted in certain regions and is limited generally to certain sectors, so that the greatest part of the territory subsists on a backward agricultural economy;
(c) the unemployment and under-employment continues to be an open wound which relegates to the margins of economic and social life literally dozens of millions of human beings;
considerable sectors of the very population in the majority of the countries find themselves before a dramatic choice: conditions which do not cease to be aggraism is extraordinarily accentuated by the evolution of the prices of primary products
Revolution which, above all, starting from the end of the Korean War boom, has not ceased to produce a disadvantage for the most economically backward. From the confessions even official sources, the decline in the price of primary materials is of a nature to cancel the possible effects of all the economic "aid" in the framework of the "Alliance for Progress".
All these difficulties and contradictions, in themselves explosive, operate in an even more aggravated form in so far as Latin cannot escape an international confrontation which puts under the spot-
33 economic development and its level of life, and the development and level of life both of the advanced capitalist countries and the Workers States' on the other hand.
Leaving aside the conjunctural aspects, however disturbing, in certain states (economic paralysis in Argentina, financial difficulties and currency devaluation in Chile and Brazil, decomposition in Bolivia, where there is being carried out a veritable dismantling of national industry), the short and middle term perspéctives throw even more gloom over the scene. Frem all evidence, since without major revolutionary upheavals there is not the least chance that the structural contradictions will be, if not eliminated, at least mitigated, the place of Latin America in international commerce is destined to be degraded even more, above all following the progressive development of the European Common Market and the liaisons of it with a series of African countries.
The data which demonstrates the decline of Latin American trade in the context of world trade is well-known and incontestable. The progress of the Common Market also on the plane of agricultural productionand the protection, both direct and indirect, that the Community assures to its products, has already obliged certain Latin American countries to lower the prices of certain products, with an inevitable fall in returns, which created for them not only difficulties on the European Markets, but also in the countries of the third world where the European countries have attempted and still attempt to penetrate even with their agricultural products.
On the other hand, the Latin American countries risk seeing themselves struck severely by the more favourable conditions which will be enjoyed in the Community Market by the rival products provided by the African countries tied to France.
In this sombre perspective, the financial and technical aid that the countries of the European Common Market have declared themselves ready to accord, will not represent a valid compensation, most of the Latin American countries seeing themselves menaced from outside to the neuralgic point of their present economy (I). More generally, as we have already underlined, the unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade on the world market for the underdeveloped countries-and a fortiori, if the new difficulties are accentuated-will remove all the real efficacy of the effort American Imperialism could make in the direction of Latin America in the interests of safeguarding one of its vital bastions. THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE RULING CLASSES: The prolongation and aggravation even of the structural contradictions which constitute henceforth, in the majerity of the countries, an. impasse with little escape, translates itself ento the political plane under the form of (soto say) sublimating itself into a crisis of leadership which reaches a stage of paroxysm. With some exceptions in the course of the last months, nearly all the countries have known changes of government, most often sharp, with coup d'etats, spectacular retirement or resignations, and dramatic vicissitudes. Is it necessary to recall the chronic crisis of power in Argentina, the departure of Quadros and the tense fight between the different classes in Brazil, the Domingo, the extreme shakiness of the upheavals in Ecquador and St. Betancourt regime, the military coup in Peru ?
The most significant element and one which is most full of consequences is, basically, the wearing away more and more rapidly of nationalist movements and national revolutionary movements which, at a given stage, polarised the majority or even the totality of the mass movement. The process reached its critical point in Peru, where the APRA lost its majority influence in two-thirds of the country and faces the progressive liquidation of its trade union rampart. In Venezuela, the harsher and harsher repression and a certain rural demagogic reformism-whose swindle is evident-are no longer able to camouflage the bankruptcy of the Democratic Action of Betancourt, which has already registered many splits and departures. In Bolivia, it is only the absence of any concrete alternative in the short run which permits the giving of the false impression of a certain stability of the MNR which in reality, has
34 lost in large measure its prestige in the eyes of the masses, as was demonstrated among other things by the elections of June 1962, a veritable Pyhhric victory for the Movimiontistas. (2) Basically, it is as a matter of fact the access or collaboration in power on the part of these movements which has forced them to choices which they were not capable of making and which pushed them to evolve openly towards compromise with American Imperialism, which from now on considers -correctly from its point of view-the Hayas de la Torre, Betancourt and Pax Estenssoro (with his "leftist" appendage, Lechin) as among its most certain allies in Latin America.
Of all the nationalist movements which, beyond their specific traits have a common objective matrix, Peronism alone has saved itself so far from decline. It maintains its hold on the masses and evolves even in a different direction. It is sufficient to recall the inextricable difficulties before which Peron had found himself placed in the years which immediately preceded his fall and the passivity seizing even Peron and his General Staff before the perspective of a return to power, to understand that it is as a matter of fact the withdrawal from power— with a certain halo of the martyr-which saved Peronism from decline and which permits it to still look for a stage with considerable opportunities.
Concerning Chile, the present leadership around Alessandri bases itself on a coalition of forces which can recall more certain European experiences than the experiences proper to other countries of Latin America (which is naturally a reflection of the economic structure and of the particular social composition of the country. But this leadership is also worn out and it is improbable that it can survive as such with the difficult tests which await it in the coming two years. The country is in reality installed in a very delicate transitory phase, where all the forces prepare themselves for the date of 1964 which it would be superficial to judge as being purely electoral, and in this perspective the Chilian bourgeoisie and Imperialism can with difficulty undertake a pure and simple maintenance of the present precarious formula, which loses ground continually even on the electoral plane (3).
In the Latin American storm which rages at its height, the relatively stable situation of a big country such as Mexico represents an important exception. It is however quite clear that the origins of this situation are found precisely in the revolutionary upheavals that Mexico has known during the Under the pressure of these upheavals and Mexican bourgeoisie went far on the way of this bourgeois democratic revolution, which went almost totally by default in the rest of Latin America, by developing even a struggle against important positions of American Imperialism. The revolutionary crisis of thirty years, with its mobilisation of the masses, implied naturally the objective possibility of a socialist result. But this result failed to materialise due to the lack of leadership of the proletariat and peasantry, The bourgeoisie has pronted, by assuring itself a large control over the movement of the masses, above all in the towns; by creating for itself a quite considerable economic base; by acquiring a political clarity and flexibility inconceivable for those traditionally conservative Latin American layers, which live timidly under the shadow of American Imperialism and which satisfy themselves with the crumbs from its table. It goes without saying that the foundations of the Mexican bourgeoisie remain in all ways limited, above all in the countryside where there are permanent forces of grave conflicts, even at the present stage. But it would be erroneous to ignore or to underestimate the very specific traits of the Mexican situation and above all not to take account that their existence goes determine in large measure the forms of the new rise and maturation of the mass movement in the country.
In their crisis of leadership lies an extremely grave threat for the indigenous leading classes It has on the other hand, in effect pushed towards new and relatively original experiences. These experiences merit being mentioned all the more as they imply a certain evolution of sectors of the army which would break with a tradition of reactionary and routinist conservatism.
Thus, the military coup of July 1962 in Peru was not, in effect, a reactionary type of
coup and should not be compared, for A wing of the army concentrated above all
35 example, with the coup of the Argentine militarists after the March elections. The junta of Perez Godoy was installed to some extent against the oligarchy and against the compradore bourgeois strata and with manifest hostility-at least at the beginning —of American Imperialism which openly supported Haya de la Torre. It is moreover significant that the junta has been supported by the candidate Belaunde, bearer of the aid on the part of the more advanced" sectors of the national bourgeoisie, interested in a certain industrial developmentand in a certain amelioration of the general standard of living. (4).
At the same time, the government of Godoy is the result of the reinforcement of certain renovating tendencies which have seen light of day in the army and which are stimulated above all by a certain modernisation of the army itself in step with the evolution of military techniqu?. It expresses above all the exigency of a general modernisation of the country, and it is not
La struggle to obtain the minimum efficiency of the military instrument. A certain number of officers, above all the youth, are taking account of the obstacles which prevent any reform and are disposed to fight against the reactionary sectors more closely tied to Imperialism, which render impossible all progress. From this fact there exists on the part of the military some reformist aspirations and express nationalist sentiments not exempt from a timid anti-imperialism: certain among them do not hesitate to wish for nationalisation and for an agrarian reform. It must be added that, from the subjective point of view, there are a growing number of officers who in no way like being reduced to the role of butchers, in stifling by repression the upheavals that the weaknesses and blindness of the conservatives precipitate.
To put it another way, we see in the Latin American countries the emergence of the outline of a Nasserite military tendency. This tendency has been manifested recently also in Argentina, where the colonel Juan Francisco Guevara has so far been its most active spokesman. In Brazil, the phenomenon is older and already more important.
in the state of Rio Grande du Sud, has decidedly left nationalist positions and openly opposes itself to the out-and-out pro-imperialist tendencies, both political and military. (5). We shall see later the perspectives in each concrete case. It can be said that in general, all these attempts have only a very limited bearing, the margin of manouvre being objectively and even subjectively very limited. In a continent where the economic perspectives of the base are those that we have outlined, in the framework of a situation where the Cuban Socialist Revolution exercises more and more its influence, where the leading forces are divided and worn out in the face of the masses, there is no chance that "new" formulae will succeed where the old formulae have failed, notably when these formulae dream of military Bonapartism in which the masses would have only a passive role or become fatally the object of reprassion if they refuse this role. The true terms of the problem present themselves under a • different form. The economic situation is even more on the down grade. There can be no equilibrium, social or political. But will the proletarian and peasant masses, be able to find rapidly effective revolutionary leaderships, which will be capable of regrouping them, of organising them on a national scale and of leading them in a decisive revolutionary struggle? Or indeed will the lack of such a real leadership and the prolonged sterility and paralysis of old formations be a major obstacle for a whole period?
In the first case, the perspective for the formation of other Workers' States in Latin America, even in the short run, would be perfectly realistic. But if the present situation in relation to the leadership factor should continue, it can have the result in certain countries of a prolonged decomposition of the situation, a veritable growing economic social and political disintegration. This has happened and is happening in Bolivia, where the economic situation is worse than ten years ago; where the social crisis remains acute; where the masses are always ready to fight and are fighting effectively; where in conclusion
36 there are forms of duality of power which have existed for several years. However, despite everything, the bourgeoisie and Imperialism remain standing without the forces opposing them being able to overthrow them and conquer power. This is a dramatic example of a variant which must not be considered as completely unique and exceptional. THE PEASANTRY, THE POOR MASSES OF THE CITIES, AND THE INTELLECTUAL PETTYBOURGEOISIE.
While the ruling classes are shaken by their crisis, the mass movement continues to progress both on the plane of a large mobilisation and on the plane of the rapid and progressive political maturation of a series of layers of the vanguard. It would 'be, of course, erroneous, even naive, to conceive of this process as rectilinear: it can go here or there effectively, with conjunctural set-backs, through Zig-zags, with confused fermentations which find no concrete result, or with premature ruptures which, beside the subjective intentions, implies a dangerous dispersion of forces. But, in general, for instance during the last two years, the march has been incontestably going forward with new acquisitions which can have a very great importance even in the coming period.
The capital factor which, in the given objective context accelerated the whole process, was, naturally, the Cuban Revolution. It represented and still represents for Latin America, Mutatis mutandis, what the Russian Revolution represented for the European Workers Movement. After the victory of Castro, and the embarcation of Cuba along the road of Socialist Construcfion in the continent became clear and pro- the social and political demarcation found, not only in the eyes of the vanguard, but also in the eyes of large masses.
Thus the sentiments of hostility to American Imperialism became more conscious and more implacable and, what is more, the consciousness acquired by it that the anti-imperialist struggle can be completed even now in this period with the defeat of the giant with feet of clay. Thus the perspective of socialism has ceased to appear as a far-distant historical struggle. It clarified itself in a concrete issue, realisable in the short run; it swept away even in the guard layers so-called, all the contusion, equivocations, hesitations at "necessary" stages of the Latin American revolution and on the "not realistic" character of a struggle for workers' and peasants' power at this stage of this part of the world.
The influence of the Cuban revolution operates above all among the peasent masses propelling among them the process of maturation which has already its own. objective bases. If as we have recalled, there was a certain industrial development and certain modernisation in the urban sector, the countryside, with the exception of the very limited zones, remains immense territory of stagnation, of misery, of hopelessness. Following process in many ways classical, tied to the development of capitalism, to its penetration (even though it be slow and unequal) into the countryside itself, (and following more precisely from the profound and irreversable crisis of traditional peasant agriculture which, in the last analysis, cannot escape from the consequences of phenomena proper to the world agricultural production at this stage, following even the growth of population) any former "equilibrium" is no more possible. Hunger, far from being mitigated, becomes a more direct reality for a growing number of peasants who on the one hand, are pushed to fight in some way, on the other hand leave the villages to pack together in the urban shanty-towns.
By multiple ways-those people who live in the towns but maintaining relations with parents and friends remaining in the villages, and the students who return during the holidays to their home-the peasants of Latin America, even in the most backward zones, receive the news of Cuba, on revolution which took place there, on the radical agricultural reform etc. Thus their traditional spirit of revolt, stimulated powerfully by the relative and even often absolute worsening of their material conditions, has found a clear ideological expression: it is necesary to do as in Cuba. Even more, in larger and larger layers is clarified the con-
sciousness of methods necessary to attain this problem-it
37 .. the "Cuban" struggle: the armed revolutionary struggle, the guerilla war. The conviction that it is necessary to undertake such forms of struggle is currently expressed by the peasants above all in the countries where a pre-revolutionary situation existed or developed rapidly.
It is necessary to add that the extreme material poverty and hunger on the land are not the only factors which nourish the spirit of revolt among the peasants. In the last analysis, the reflection of the maturation of the movement is found in the fact that even in the zones where the problem of is in these circles that are developed at the present time passionate discussions on the concrete ways for the revolution in the different Latin American countries. The problems which are posed are real problems, and revolutionary Marxists will not be able to ignore them, without committing a grave error, tor these layers can give an essential contribution in cadres to the revolutionary movement. It must not be forgotten in particular that, as we have mentioned, in the secondary schools and universities there are thousands of youth of peasant origin, who, all studying in the towns, continue to spend part of the year in the villages, or, at least, to mainthe land or of physiological subsistance is tain contact with those who remain there not posed in an acute form the peasants are mobilised, are stimulated by the Cuban example, because they hope to ameliorate radically their human condition; to be able to escape from their ignorance, to have schools, and no more be struck off from the progress of modern life, which implies above all the distribution of adequate means of communication. There is no doubt that in Latin America also one of the attractions of the city, above all among the young generation, is the hope it gives to break out of the rural isolation and to participate in the collective life of the towns where the contact with progress, (if only with its crumbs, its more malodorous sub-products) is possible even for the miserable occupants of the shanty towns.
Among the petty-bourgeois layers of intellectuals and students the influence of a le one with can son
Cuba is equally active. These people have for a long time sought their way. tented with a society which cannot assure them a dignified future, revolted by all the misdeeds of Imperialism and of the indigenous ruling classes, frequent experience with the nationalist movements and having been deceived by them, they have hesitated in the absence of proletarian revolutionary organisations capable of expressing a clear orientation. The Cuban Revolution gave an impetus also to the students intellectual, who become "castroist" in considerable numbers, and in their own countries attempt to organise stata which would follow the example of Fidel and his companions. Despite all the errors and possible limits—we shall return again to and represent therefore a capital means of liaison with the peasant movement, for a penetration in the countryside, into the communities etc., of revolutionary ideas and orientations. Finally, in the framework of the revolutionary crisis of Latin America, a particular role can be played, in certain countries at least, by masses not strictly proletarian, but declassed or more generally poor, who group in the miserable quarters of the big cities. The dozens and hundreds of thousands of disinherited beings who live out a less than human existence in the barriadas of Lima, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or even in certain quarters of Santiago are not separated from the radicalising current which flows through the Latin American masses and in the last months have made felt menacing rumblings. In the given situation, they can represent a rupturing force. The youth can above all become the agitators in the brusque outbursts of anger and revolt. The underemployment which has no chance of diminishing the chronic unemployment, the miserable conditions arrival contingents worsens continually. etc., justify the hypothesis this explosive potential will be still more compressed. If only for the numerical force of these sectors. It would be erroneous to ignore them, to consider them a little traditionally as social sub-products in the margin of a society politically and economically active, or to underestimate the potential they can have as a factor in a revolutionary crisis, even if all evidence is that they will not be the essential motive force. understanding of this possibility implies the
more or less openly, a reactionary choice, and of the Betancourt regime.
38 accomplishment of tasks of propaganda, of agitation and of specific organisation. immediately at the present stage. OLD LEADERSHIPS IN AN IMPASSE AND NEW FERMENTATIONS.
A forecast of the perspective in the short and middle term, starting from the basic elements that we have analysed, should not fail to take note of another capital element: the situations and the orientation of the organisations which have the support of the working class and the peasantry ie. the situation inside the vanguard. On this plane, if there exists, on one hand, a very great fermentation with positive tendencies and symptoms, on the other hand, are seen elements less favourable for a victorious issue in the short run of the big struggles of the masses.
The traditional parties of the working class which are the preponderant influence in other parts of the world command except for some well-known exceptions very limited forces which are often insignificant, in the most favourable case, and subsidiary only. If however they could benefit relatively from the radicalisation of the situation and from the repercussions of the Cuban Revolution, they have not been in a condition to draw the essential lessons of that and it is not around them that the majority of the mass movement will polarise at this stage.
On the other hand, the movements or organisations proper in a whole series of Latin American countries find themselves, understandably, in a critical situation. tially, these organisations represented, at different stages and forms, a revolutionary nationalist current, composed at the base of the rural and urban masses and led by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois elements, whose action became objectively to undertake a limited anti-imperialist fight in the interest of certain layers of the industrial bourgeoisie. In face of the crucial development of the last years and above all with the formation of a Workers State in the Carribean all these organisations find themselves some temporary choices. We have already seen that in certain countries they made, paid for it by a fall in their influence, In others, different objective conditions permitted them and still permit them to manouvre and still guard their control over the masses. This is above all the case with Peronism in Argentiana, which, not being in power, has not been obliged to make any immediate concrete choice, and, on contrary, can place itself quite freely for the moment, with a demagogic high-bid. It is in a much more limited way, the case of the Brazilian Labour Party whose weight has remained quite considerable through the vicissitudes of the last fifteen months.
The consequence of it is that the masses, for example in the two biggest countries find themselves largely blocked or detoured by their traditional organisations. In Brazil, if the influence of the latter, let us repeat, is much less limited, there is a fragmentation of the movement, with different influences in different regions of the country, without there being a really united movement, an organisation which can mobilize nationally a majority or quite a considerable part of the workers and peasants. Everyone on the other hand, takes account of how easily the low level of leadership of the political instrument caused it to play a fundementally negative role in the crisis that Argentina went through in the immediate recent period.
The most negative thing is that the crisis of certain nationalist organisations has not had the consequence of the decantation of new movements, of new leaderships capable of doing what the others have failed to do, by playing a decisive role at the present stage. Thus, to take only some examples different variants, the forces that left APRA in Peru forming the Rebel APRA (presently the MIR) have remained extremely weak with contradictory orientations, without a real mass influence In Bolivia, any new pole of attraction in a condition to win the confidence of sectors disgusted with the MNR has not emerged so far. In Venezula, where however the MIR had a sudden rise, this same party, blocked by divisions and splits by its lack of ideology and policy as well as the acceptance of the guardianship on the part of the CP, has also been incapable of effectively leading the masses to the taking of power, despite the growing disintegration
contrary, whether it shall only act as a subsi- of these parties, their political line, by atdiary force of the decisive struggles of the tacking them openly before delegations that
Finally, in a whole series of countries there is an abundance of groups and organisations who assemble valuable, subjectively revolutionary elements, but who still operate on the plane of the vanguard layers, without mass influence and with no possibility of effective action must be adder on the political reality. It that there is often a very prejudicial dispersion of forces with seperations and divisions which find no justification in fundamental political divergencies. In some countries at least, a work of regroupment could represent the first useful preparatory phase.
But the weakness and the fragmentation of these groups must not make us forget of the influence of the Cuban Revolution and provoke in the vanguard sectors a promising political and ideological fermentation. That is all the more appreciable as the discussions and polemics which have developed are in no way academic, but most often pose the real problems of the revolutionary Latin American struggle at this stage or in the approaching stage.
Along the lines of the Cuban Revolution all these groups have reached the conclusion that the traditional leaderships, both those linked to international experiences and those proper to Latin America, have failed and that it is necessary to start again from a new basis. Even limited groups can play a decisive role, if they know the outlines of a revolutionary orientation and employ the necessity of a revolutionary rupture, they organise more precisely the revolutionary armed struggle on the basis of the peainsurrectional struggle in the towns. sant guerilla with the prolongation of an
In a still more detailed way, in these groups composed in general of very young elements, but which sometimes include also militants who have had and still do have experience in the traditional parties, it is discussed whether in the specific reality of such or such country the role of the armed peasantry will entirely predominate or, on the
39 masses. The more often one estimates that even where the social composition of the country excludes the first variant, some military actions in the countryside could represent a necessary stimulant for an urban movement which one could consider sometimes as steeped in the routine imposed b the traditional leadership. In countries where the objective conditions are more matured, even this discussion seems outdated, the general solutions being accepted. The efort of analysis is orientated above all towards the specific concrete forms in which it shall be possible to effectively commence the guerrilla, not in demanding teams which arrive from outside, but in close liaison with the struggles of the peasants. Groups with such a composition and such a nature are naturally all exposed to the danger of the development of adventurist and purely activist tendencies. It is not we who will contest the necessity of the armed struggle's preparation right now, above all in certain countries, which implies a series of measures necessary at this stage already. But it will be necessary to criticise all artificial and fanciful initiatives detached from the real movement and more strongly all premature actions devoted to the failure and the sacrifice of their authors or every kind of amateur or even burlesques enterprises.
The more matured militants seem conscious of these dangers and serious criticism can be heard from their part of some actions even of a certain scope, for example, some insurrectional episodes in Venezuela. It is not in the framework of this article that we can examine the delicate and complex question of the relations of the revolutionary : organisations, formed or embryonic, with the Cubans. It is no secret to anyone that the Fidelist leadership interests itself more and more directly in the development of the Latin American revolutionary movement, and that the more dynamic and best orientated leaders of these parties have no intention of linking up with the CP and of putting themselves least of all under them. On the contrary, they do not spare from their criticisms the leaders
fundamental SPECIFIC REALITIES AND
40
Cuba. Following line of the Havana Declaration, they insist on the idea of the necessity of a revolutionary rupture, on the role of the peasantry and of the guerilla struggle, in rejecting the "peacefull" ways and the alliance with the national bourgeoisie. That does not signify that the Cubans tie themselves now to such or such a group: they give the impression of acting still on different levels, by propelling left tendencies inside the traditional organisations.
In these organisations themselves, despite the attempts of many leaders to try to reduce the Cuban affair more or less to a question of general solidarity or of propaganda, the Castroist influence is extremely important. In Argentina the differentiation inside Peronism was accentuated; in Brazil the movement of Juliao receives a supplementary impulsion; in Chile the repercussions inside the S. P. and in the trade unions are real ones, not to speak of other countries such as Venezuela for example.
In the Communist Parties, in particular, the Cuban experience has already stimulated groups and left tendencies which sometimes have separated from the official party (6). It is clear that the bureaucratic leaderships find themselves placed before a major contradiction: on the one hand they can only praise the Cuban Revolution, its leaders and documents such as the Second Declaration of Havana, on the other hand they wish always to impose a political line which is even a negation of the Fidelist orientation, of the basic orientation of the Declaration of Havana. We do not doubt the manouvering skill of the opportunists at the head of the CPs; but by persisting in their attitude, they cannot prevent themselves from being isolated and sterilising their organisations (which can only at the most rally themselves at the last hour as they did in Cuba) or even to see themselves struck by some grave crisis from which left tendencies can emerge. If in a country such as Chile a possible process of this nature would have obviously a very great importance for the formation of a revolutionary movement, having given the force of the Chilian C.P., even where the Communist Parties are very small, the acquisition of cadres and devoted and subjectively revolutionary militants with a correct orientation would have an importance that should not be underestimated.
PERSPECTIVES
The common general traits that one.can abstract from the present situation must at no price mean an under-estimation of the specific elements. In reality, in the framework of a very general common evolution there are national situations entirely differentiated, and these differentiations become essential for an understanding of the concrete reality at this stage and for deciding the perspectives of the short and middle term, and more importantly, to express a tactical orientation efficacious in relation to the given process of maturation of different sectors of the mass movement. A very rapid appreciation of the conditions of some countries, chosen a little empirically, confirm these truths. In Peru the crisis of the ruling classes has led to the solution of Perez Godoy, of whom we have already spoken. He provides however a solution eminently transitory, and crucial problems of leadership will be posed again in the short run (for example before the elections, if they take place.)
But the principal interest resides in the are now taking place inside the mass move developments which were produced andin both the towns and villages. crisis in APRA, already open for some time, has been precipitated by the electoral set-back and still more by the lamentable failure of the genere strike called by the Trade Union Central in support of Haya de la Torre. Thus the APRA, which no more majority influence except in north of the country is on the way to losing its majority on the trade union level, and in fact a certain number of important trade unions have left the C.T.P., to constitute the embryo of a paralel Centre. The struggle for a new Centre to which must adhere progressively all the trade unions making it possible to avoid vertical ruptures, is the central task of the Peruvian movement at this stage. This Centre will probably be led by men under the influence of the C.P. or generally "socialist" with an important participation of Trotskyists (7). It shall represent a turning point above all in the sense that the trade union movement will emancipate itself thus from the tutelage of all
the cavalier alone. In reality, it is precisely revolutionary meaning as a sort of final
41 sectors of the bourgeoisie and shall finally conquer class autonomy.
In the countryside a revolutionary situais maturing rapidly. different peasant layer idea is spreading that it is above all among the Communities, necessary to follow the Cuban way and to for the armed struggle. occupations are not rare and in certain cases the authorities consider it more opportune not to react. In other cases, on the contrary, there are bloody repressions. Let us cite the episode of Francisco Vallejos a young soldier of the Republican Guard who organised a circle of students and who one day, with his students, disarmed the local police and made for the mountains. Rescuing forces arrived however before the foreseen time, there was an unequal battle with the sacrifice of Vallejos and a peasant leader (8). It must be added that a guerilla group has been organised for some time by Hugo Blanco, in the Convention valley, and according to unconfirmed reports has already supported the occupation of land by the peasants (9).
There is no doubt that the developments in the sierra and selva shall be decisive for the Peruvian Revolution; there is no doubt that conditions exist already for the building of a structure of a peasant revolutionary movement with detachments of guerilleros. It is highly possible that in direct liaison with the occupation of lands as the Pervuvian vanhave understood, the armed fight can develop, above all in the first stage. Student layers and intellectuals of peasant origin will have a decisive role in the formation of a conscious vanguard in the villages and to assure in the last analysis a liaison between the urban movement and the peasant movement. revolutionary Marxists shall not spare themselves any effort their ranks elements with this capital conjunctural connection.
In Chile, the conflicts are not posed in such an acute torm and even in relation to the year 1960 there is a certain slowing-down of the movement. But as we have already mentioned, the conservative Front continues to enjoy a security which is limited, while the Christian Democrats.continue to play this party which finds itself at the centre of the tactical preoccupations of the ruling classes. Shall they seek to organise a new formula including the Christian Democrats or even, around a candidate of theirs, shall they accept the perspective of a dispersed struggle in 1964? Are there not people outlining an audacious manouvre putting forward a Christian Democrat-FRAP alliance in the struggle to castrate the possible victory of this latter? It appears to us in any case that the last two variants imply a game a little daring. On the other hand, a positive factor is represented by the activisation of certain peasant layers up till now without any real political weight. That contributed. to stimulate in Chile also the discussions on the revolutionary role of the peasants and of a possible guerilla struggle. But, in general, in a country of the Chilian social structure, it is not possible to foresee a predominant role for the peasants: the battle will take place essentially in the towns. On the other hand, even if one wishes to accept the conception of a stimulant role, a spark to set alight the movement-a conception that the Cubans themselves seem to generalise a little too much) it is clear that in the short run-before 1964—all attempts to pass directly over to the guerilla or the armed struggle in general are destined inevitably to a lamentable failure. In effect, it must not be forgotten that the traditional organisations, socialist and com munist, still exercise a very large hold over the mass movement which cannot be eliminated by ill-considered actions. More concretely, there is a very precise stage that polarises the attention of the worker and peasant masses. In reality, in Chile it is recognised that the expectations of the 1964 elections, could well represent a crucial turning point. Besides there is an almost unanimous agreement on this, inclusive of those who have considered already that in the eyes of the masses the traditional organisations are worn out and who pronounce themselves for independent activity. What 1s important, is that, in the spirit of the masses 1964 signines victory for Allende, the candidate of the FRAP, and in its turn this victory acquires a clearly
rendering of accounts. The author of this article understood from a direct source that, in one region at least, the peasants have already made out on paper the partition of the land to be translated into action on the morrow of the victory of Allende.
It is therefore clear enough that the majority of the masses still must have their experiences in the traditional organisations. A much clearer polarisation on the Left makes ruptures possible. New re-alignment of forces could be stimulated powerfully by the events of 1964. The possible victory of the the FRAP on the electoral plane will launch inevitably very violent struggles in the country but even a defeat would not probably be accepted passively by the masses (10).
In Bolivia, the tenth anniversary of the Revolution suggests a balance sheet little flattering to the MNR. The economic situation is extremely grave for the production of tin has been seriously lowered, the exports both in quantity and value have been reduced by nearly a half, the mines are, almost in their totality idle. There has been no technical renovation, which does not permit one to count on an amelioration in the short run. (11) The other industrial sectors feel heavily the effects of the so-called liberalisation (a little near 60% of the factories have closed in the last years). On the other hand, the results of the agrarian reform have been very modest, even adverse certain in respects.
The wearing-away of the MNR continues and its apparatus bureaucratises itself more and more; the signs of the last elections have already been stressed, the Congress of the COB has been above all the affair of the Lechin apparatus with numerous infiltrations of the C.P. Despite a certain lassitude, the masses still struggle, even coming into the streets, while the peasants are always capable of putting to flight the authorities by their violent demonstrations. Manifestations of duality of power continue to exist effectively.
Unfortunately, as we have already said, the masses disillusioned with the MR see no other consistant pole of attraction. The COB itself appears largely devoid of content, the militias exist only in certain zones, and have no national co-ordination. In conclusion, while from the objective point of view it would be legitimate to envisage some revolutionary developments in the short run, the grave lack on the plane of the revolutionary organization and of the revolutionary leadership weighs heavily in a negative sense.
Concerning Brazil, whose situation is known in general terms and could not be analysed in more detail in a few. We shall limit ourselves here to underlining two aspects.
The mass movement is still divided, structured under different forms, which vary much from region to region, and unification on a national scale always goes by default. What is worse, it is still far from having escaped the direct or indirect (by the mediation of the trade unions) hold of layers of the national bourgeoisie. To give only some significant examples, certain sectors it is the Labour Party (PTB) with its trade union organisations which controls the movement; in a town as important as Sao Paulo the majority of the workers follow Janism (the movement of Quadros), to the north-east the peasants are organised by the Left Socialist Francisco Jiliao, considered as Castroist No. 1 in Brazil. If we consider, on the other hand, the political organisations which claim more or less to be Marxist, there are several of them, but none have an important mass influence. The Brazilian Communist Party (Prestes) lost much force and will be incapable of genuine autonomous action, even if it wanted to (which it doesn't). The Communist Party of Brazil is only, if anything, a limited vanguard organisation. The Brazillian Socialist Party counts here and there certainly a little support, even in the trade unions, but it is absolutely illassorted; it appears more as a sort of confederation of very different groups than as a united party operating on a national scale (12)
In such a situation, one can understand how masses and their organisations, despite the explosive character of the situation and the combativity of large sectors, can be reduced often to a watching role in the grand manouvres of the different layers and tendencies of the national bourgeoisie.
43 This was the case twice in the course of the last fifteen months, at the moment of the succession of Quadros by Goulart and in the crisis of September last. The result was that Goulart imposed himself with the help of the masses, obtained a consolidation of his power in the same way and, finally, showed his true face by concluding an understanding with the Right, and lining up with Kennedy for whom he is now one of the most valuable allies in Latin America. This demonstrates that the Brazilian bourgeoisie still possesses trumps which are not necessarily negligible, even if they can dream of no economic or social stability.
All that implies, in conclusion, that the tasks of the revolutionary Marxists of Brazil are extremely difficult and complex and that it is only by scrupulous analyses, without prejudice, and constantly brought up to-date that they can discern the more profound process of the mass movement and be in a condition to play in it a role of propulsion(13)
Argentina has this year passed through an exceptionally acute crisis with the confrontation of several political and military tendencies. We will not insist on known facts, the end of Fondizism, the clash between the "gorrillas" and the "moderns" of the military, the push of the Nasserist tendencies, the manouvres of men such as Alsogaray and Aramburu. At the centre of Argentine political life is to be found the reality of Peronism, which on the one hand prevents any political stabilisation which either eliminates Peron or is against him, while on the other hand it influences the mass movement in a still decisive manner.
In fact one can ask with some reason whether the Argentine bourgoisise and Yankee Imperialism could again play the card of Peronism, by opening the gates to the exile from Madrid. But the difficulty resides in the fact that in 1962, in Latin America nobody can say whther such events as the restoration of Peron could only be the prelude. In the eyes of the masses, Peron is more than ever the flag bearer of the anti-imperialist struggle, of the fight against the oligarchy, and of their national and social emancipation. His return would be considered as a great victory, increasing their çombativity and aggressiveness, and the movement could go rapidly well beyond the goals that have been fixed by Peron and his Chief of Staff. At the base, it is the General himself who understands all that and, outside verbal proclamations, his concrete actions indicate clearly enough his intention of not fighting effectively for power in the immediate future. The problem could risk remaining always open, the bourgeoisie oscillating between the tendencies to put Peronism out of the game and the necessity of counting on it, , should be by an integration in the present system (14) or by recalling it to power in the absence of any other solution. In a parallel situation, the Peronist movement itself cannot prevent internal upheavals and will suffer from multiple pressures. The differentiations inside it will be acentuated more and more, at the very moment when the situation in the country becomes dramatic, and where, among other things, the influence of the Cuban Revolution will become more precise (15). While the leftist trade union wing of whom Framini is the principal representative, accept voluntarily a turn to the Left, of which Peron himself has understooa the necessity, (16) and that the same Framıni ranges himsell Nis an lalan formal (in, an e repviest Matera makes an overture to the "moderate" wing of the Army and to the partisans of the integration, by refusing the "left turn" and by aclaiming the Alliance for Progress. (18).
From all this can be drawn the obvious conclusion that, in the general framework of Peronism, will develop a process of vital importance for the development of the political struggle in Argentina and more particularly for the evolution of the mass movement. The revolutionary Marxists should not underestimate or ignore it: the Argentine masses have to have a whole series of experiences before finding other forms of organisations and other instruments of struggle. One can envisage their process of maturation with optimism in the face of the highly interesting fermentations which have ocurred recently in the Peronist youth. Some sectors of youth began to organise temselves with a very solid structure, even if it wạs only on the
44 local scale, to organise commandos, to publish clanderstine tallet er expressions. of their will for struggle. 1S here in embryo the first crystalisation of the proletarian tendency of Peronism, from where can emerge revolutionary cadres destined to play a role in the development of the revolutionary movement of the masses. The aim of this article is not to formulate the tasks and tactical orientation of the revolutionary Marxist forces of Latin America. Such a formulation can only result from a collective declaration of those engaged in action and only be sanctioned by the legitimate organisms of our international movement.
However, what we must do is to indicate how the task of the revolutionary Marxists is difficult in a context where pre-revolutionary and revolutionary conditions are existing already or are rapidly maturing, where the vanguard militants and groups still constitute only limited kernel often divided even leaving out of account the action of Imperialism and its agents, where some political and trade union apparata carried out a systematic campaign of disparagement, of isolation, if not elimination, of the most advanced cadres and militants. The Latin American reality even inside some countries— it is sufficient to think of the Brazilian collossus-—is very complex and volatile: changes, brusque upheavals are always possible, even to say probable. The revolutionary Marxists must reject all schema as the plague, and hang on to the the reality, interpret it dialectically, seizing from it in time the most dynamic tendencies. People who are only able to repeat slogans in a vacuum, always preferably the same for every occasion for every country in the world, who do not understand that the new revolutionary organisations and leaderships will rise from the mass movement's own development and that it is absurd to erect as fetishes small organisations, which, whatwhatever be the spirit of their militants (19), are condemned to sterility, to the mere recognition of the victories others have achieved; to the pretentious role of counsellors. It is necessary therefore to have the greatest broadness of spirit to understand that the revolutionary roads can be innumerable, and even unexpected. Which signifies that it is never enough to content oneself with summary judgments which become in substance lists of principles, but for each phenomenon to develop a detailed, concrete analysis based above all on a scrupulous knowledge of the facts. The equivalent of an attitude of investigation must be, on the plane of action, the greatest flexibility, the greatest tact, in combination with political decision and the clearest hostility to all organisational fetishism. The revolutionary Marxists must be always ready to the take audacious initiatives themselves, where it is objectively possible, correctly integrating themselves in the largest movements which develop independently of their action, and stimulating these movements by taking therein the role of the conscious vanguard. They must also, if necessary, have the courage to recall people to take account of the reality, to understand that the mass movement has its own laws of development, which in relation to ourselves, are. in a large measure objective facts which cannot be denied by simple acts of will.
In Latin America also, the revolutionary Marxists enjoy the capital advantage of being part of an historical revolutionary current of international communist organisation, which has at its disposal a whole theoretical heritage and political heritage as an irreplacable instrument of knowledge and struggle. But they should not content themselves with this heritage which, at length, can be converted into a handicap if it is not in a state of constant renewal and enriching experience. The Cuban Revolution has demonstrated, among other things how the new dimensions of the revolutionary reality are divulged by a revolution which has attained a high level of self-conscious-
These is still a whole continent as ness. terrain for analysis and action for those who would live be to the height of the extroardinary epoch in which we live.
20 October, 1962.
FOOTNOTES
A recent interesting report has been prepared (11) The modernisation of plant was very seriously
45 by some experts invited to an inportant meeting at Santiago in Chili by the Secretariat of the
CEPAL-In this report even, one recalls, for example, that while the Latin American exports represented 10 of world exports in 1937-38 in 1961 they had fallen to 6.5% of the unitary value of its exports; that in 1934-1938, the countries of the European Community bought more than 11% of the European imports of
Latin American goods, against 6% in 1960...... (2) In reality, the abstentions have been very high, up to 60% according to the optimistic official figures. big mining centres, only some hundreds of voters voted. (3) See the partial election of September 1962 in
Santiago, ras antonate their
moved back, while the FRAP and above all the Christian Democrats ameliorated their positions. The comrades of the POR (t) who edit EL OBRERO CAMPESINO expressed this analysis in a declaration issued on 18th July. 15) According to the passages from the book published recently in Brazil it appears that a leader such as Julio gives certain credit to the military, seeing among the generals a "national" "popular" tendency in the Brazilian Army. We recall, for example, the Communist Party of Brazil, which split from the party of Prestes, and the Leninist Communist Party of Peru. The metal-workers' trade union is led by well-known militants of the POR (t) which has a very good influence also in the building workers' trade union and some other sectors as well. (8) There was also Mayta who died crying: "Long live the Revolution!" and whose name shall not be forgotten by the revolutionary movements. (9) Hugo Blanco, in an interview with journalists, did not hide his favourable orientation to Trotskyism and to the Fourth International (10) There is a widespread sentiment that a defea for Allende would only be possible by frau and that there could be a reaction against such an eventuality..
held back by the fact that very heavy compensation was paid to the former owners. (12) The SP includes, on the one hand a good number of opportunists and even a minister of the Government, H Lima; on theother hand, left militants who are approaching revolutiomarxism, and a man such as Francisco nary Juliao. In Brazil, the perspective for guerilla war will be posed sooner or later concretely, not however be ignored that| countries such as Brazil and Mexico, guerillas in the backward zones could be prolonged for a long period without implying a rapid fall of the central power. (14) This tendency showed some signs after the mid-September crisis. (15) Besides a more general influence, one effect of the Cuban Revolution was to stimulate layers of the vanguard to a reflection and a political and theoretical elaboration which, before, they were not in the habit of. See certain declarations of Peron on the necessity to bring up-to-date his doctrine. points of Framini include: nationalisation of all banks, state control of foreign trade, nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, prohibition on the export of capital, expropriation of the landed oligarchy without comworkers control on production, abolition of commercial secrecy, etc.... (17) Cf L'Unita, 18 August, 1962 (18) See his declarations of 17th October, 1962 to the Foreign Press Association. (19) Even worse if, as is the case in certain organisations which still incorrectly claim to be of the Fourth International, the political level Is retale primely bureaucratise nd the organisatior
V. B. Theepisode gansed thy some mElants cor a
'eruvian Trotskyist tendency, is also significan