THE ALGIERS PUTSCH OF APRIL 22nd
By PIERRE FRANK
The recent putsch in Algiers attempted by a few Generals and Colonels followed a number of attempted armed coups which, since 1956, have aimed to modify the policy and regime in France. From February 6th 1956 to May 13th 1958 these armed coups have succeeded in imposing the policy of so-called "French-Algeria", and the elimination of Parliamentary democracy.
Since May 13th 1958 these armed coups have neither reversed the regime of the Fifth Republic, nor reversed the march of Algeria towards self-determination — towards independence.
Until May 13th 1959 these coups succeeded, thanks to the union of the European-Algerians and the army, combined with the wearing down of the democratic regime and the needs of Big Capital for a power "independent" of French society. Once de Gaulle was installed in power this combination was not maintained. We come later to the attitude of the bourgeoisie in France. For, whatever they did in Algiers, the army (the professionals of course) wanted to maintain an Algeria indissoluably tied to France and did not want to serve the particular reactionary interests of the European-Algerians. It is this which explains both their attitude of wait and see in January 1960, when Lagaillard and Ortiz attempted the "coup des barricades" in Algiers and their recent attempted putsch, prepared entirely in the backroom, truly as a "Kriegspiel", outside any ties with the political formations of the "ultras" of France and Algeria, and of all preparations of a political order -unless one calls a few plastic bombs preparation of a political order...
We see once again, as in the whole post-war period, that fascism has been revealed to be extremely feeble. In France itself it reached its height as a movement with Poujadism, which grouped the generally old and small merchants ousted by the capitalist concentration in certain underdeveloped regions, but who never dared attack the workers' organisations. In Algeria it was more important; it was founded on the desperate resistance of the Europeans to the rising colonial revolution.
But there also without the support of the army it would not have been very important. Fascism not known a serious development in the post-war period except in the very particular form of the transformation of an important part of the professional army into a political faction, seeing in the "subversive war" and the "psychological war" the means of bringing an end to communism and the colonial war. BONAPARTE AND HIS SWORD.
De Gaulle was brought to power following the coup of May 13th 1958, but as we said at the time he was not at all a political representative of the forces which made the operation. ' He came to power pushed by à small but dynamic wing of Big Capital which has modernised the basic industries in France but which, in order to carry out its work, must accelerate the process of concentration in light industry, in distribution and in the countryside, and which finds the parliamentary regime a big obstacle on this road. De Gaulle was installed following an old political tradition — that of bonapartsm — as an arbiter above society. The bonapartism of de Gaulle uses well the philosophy of the "Grandeur" of France but he does not hold the sword - that is to say the army — firmly in his hand. On the one side there is no lack of officers of the old school still imbued with Petainism and who have not forgotten that in June 1940 de Gaulle gave a dangerous example of disobedience. On the other side, there is the young neo-fascist school of "expeditious and limited savoir-faire" who reproach de Gaulle with selling out the Empire in the manner of Mendes-France.
From May 13th de Gaulle sought by all sorts of manoeuvers, tricks and corruption (promotions, dismissals...) to take the army in hand and make it an instrument of his "strong State"
He did not fail as well to give a new reason for its existence. If, with the march of events, he, de Gaulle, will keep it in the ranks of a Great Power, creating that which at present is the mark of a Great Power, that is, atomic weapons and not colonies. Amongst other things the "striking force" serves to regroup around de Gaulle the most technical part of the army far removed from the memories of Dien-Bien-Phu. But, this attempt to take over control of the army by these means will prove in vain. If it is true that the adventure of Challe, Salan, et 1 See various articles in the "Fourth International" and also our introduction to the new French edition of "Whither France" by L. Trotsky.
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL al. failed quickly and miserably, it is no less true that the plot was widespread in the army and that only the course of circumstances prevented the participation of a larger number of officers implicated in the plot.
Also, this time, under the cover of a few arrests and of a certain number of sanctions, de Gaulle proceeds with a much more serious plan. He is obliged to dissolve the units which constitutes the spear-head of the French army — the four day putsch itself contributed to the breaking up of the army. De Gaulle clearly felt the danger of the putsch and he did not hesitate to appeal lo the troops to refuse to obey all rebel officers, even when they were involved in operations against the F.L.N., to crush the military plot if necessary with arms. Never have the "democrats" and the workers' parties dared go so far, not even on May 13th 1958.
The greatest obstacle the "putschists" encountered in Algeria were the conscripts. They did
La malleable mass, who would be sympathetie to the sentiments of the EuropeanAlgerians, and would not oppose the plot: From the beginning the conscripts were hostile to the armed coup. The resistance first of all manifested itself as inertia, passivity, in front of the orders of the rebels and here and there an active resistance. The appeal of de Gaulle gave to all soldiers who wanted to act against their officers a point of support.
The remaining rebels rapidly retreated with the regiment's professional soldiers whom they used to commence the operation. One sees now in the The orders of those ollier whe army a number of signs of distrust, to serve under the orders of those officers who have been dilatory in the course of the putsch. In short to the growing distrust between the трак officers and de Gaulle, is now added a distrust between the troops and the officers. THE "STRONG STATE".
The same dubious attitude of the military cadres is rife in the other armed forces of the State (police...) and this explains why on the evening of Sunday 23rd April panic reigned in the high apparatus of the State, and why, after de Gaulle's "aidez-moi" appeal to the French people, Debré appealed to the people to oppose the Parachutists whom, he thought, threatened to land within a few hours. This is why the ministers such as Malraux and Frey were forced to form a militia of odds and ends, and why the "government" closed its eyes, more or less, to the possibility of the formation of workers' militias. The attitude of the manager of Renault in his relations with the trade union organisations, more particularly with the CG I, was at least ambiguous on this point for
37 some hours. It is hardly necessary to say that, once the danger became remote, the government recovered itself and even swaggered, attributing to itself all the merits of success. In fact, within a few hours, all the mystique of the "Strong State", spread abundantly for nearly three years, had collapsed. THE BOURGEOISIE AND DE GAULLE
In the course of this operation, amongst other things was shown the isolation of the regime even with regard to large layers of the bourgeisie, both middle and big. Incontestably these layers were not favourable to a coup d'Etat. Business goes well - why upset the market! But at the same time these layers did not show any solidarity towards de Gaulle. The Conseil National du Patronat Frangais (National Council of French Employers) only made a declaration against all disturbances of order three days after the collapse of the putsch. The Confédération des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (Confederation of Small and Medium Enterprises) made no declaration. The Confédération Général des Cadres (General Confederation of Managerial Staff) was not associated with the strike of April 24th, refusing, they said, to participate in a political movement. The organisation par excellence of people of influence, the Indépendants et Paysans, made no declaration, and its General Secretary, Duchel, refused as Mayor of his commune to send a pro-de Gaulle declaration. He has since left his post as General Secretary but this does not cancel out the fact that he expressed the sentiments of large layers of the well-established bourgeoisie, who accept de Gaulle as a last resort. The political editor of "Le Monde", , Jacques Fauvet, who conveys with a slight Leftish touch the positions of the intelligently conservative bourgeois strata, in a conversation with some journalists, replied as follows to the question: "If de Gaulle was to disappear what would remain of this regime?"
"Nothing! For the time being, nothing!... I believe that de Gaulle has been necessary to set the affairs of Algeria in order. The suspension of certain democratic forms was also a necessity... But we shall not be committed much longer to this road and wait first for Algerian affairs to be solved, and second for de Gaulle to go. Afterwards we shall see!"
How much is expressed in these few words! The cynicism of a bourgeoisie rich in political experience lends support to the impression that de Gaulle will go once the affair of Algeria settled.
38 THE ATTITUDE OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS ORGANISATIONS TO THE PUTSCH.
Faced with the rising of the army the "Strong Government" turned towards the working class. Their reply was rapid and firm. Not only was the strike of April 24th general, the demonstrat-. ions large, but the slogans launched by the CG T and the FCP for arms and militias were accepted without difficulty, even though the same organisations in the past and again on May 13th 1958, denounced as "provocateurs" those who advanced such a policy. 2
It is not sufficient to say that the working class reacted immediately against the fascist putsch, it is necessary to analyse their feelings and reactions more fully. Generally, though there much resolution among the workers and though one does not doubt they would have faced this show of force without weakening, neverthe. less, at the same time, they have been deprived of any of the enthusiasm which is normally associated with combat, and they have been very preoccupied with making clear that their action cannot be considered as political support for de Gaulle. It is true that the F CP and CG T and, in the same way, the P SU have denounced the Gaullist regime which has placed the leaders of the putsch in the highest positions, whereas the leaders of the SFIO, FO, CFT C have lined themselves up behind de Gaulle. But this anti-de Gaulle feeling has developed over the years just and this explains largely the lack enthusiasm which marked the workers' intervention.
At the same time as denouncing the responsibilities of de Gaulle, these organisations did not develop the least perspective for the workers. 2 The recourse to the slogans of arms and of militias does not signify any change in the conceptions of the leadership of the FCP on the "parliamentary and pacifist road" to Socialism, as one could to verify a few days later at the 16th Congress of F CP. These slogans were launched under pressure of these very same events which led the government, faced with the possible landing of the Parachutists, to add to its appeal to resist, the necessity to do this with empty hands. Moreover the leaders of the FCP and the C G T launched these slogans in a very legalistic manner, demanding arms vernment, and leaving it at that. At no time was this step intended as a manœuvre to make better understood these slogans in the way Lenin so powerfully expressed "Arm the workers with the desire to arm themselves."
All this being stated it is nevertheless clear that the use of these slogans in the way it has been done can lead much further than is the wish of leaders who, in their past career have gone no further than to call the replace Mashal Petain with
General de Gaulle. More than one militant thinks that an opportunity was lost once in 1945, and that that was already too much.
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL To them it is obviously necessary to bar the way to a military dictatorship. But, this done, one comes up again against de Gaulle. And afterwards? In actual fact the F CP, CGT, and PS U have all brought forward the "Defense of the Republic", the watchword of the socialists, the Gaullists, the MR P and all the other opponents of the putsch. The FCP have forgotten to propagate their "renewed democracy" and the PSU the "socialist front." These organisations forgot, at this crucial time, the pivot of their policies; this alone suffices to show their feebleness. Let us add that the right wing of the PSU has gone further, it joined the "left Gaullists" in their effort towards the Minister of the Interior to get arms.
Finally these organisations in Paris bowed to the decisions of a government whose powerlessness was evident, they did not ignore a government ban on street demonstrations at a time when millions of workers left their work and would have responded in very great numbers to an appeal for street demonstrations. Only the students ignored the government ban and once again in this period showed themselves acting as the advance guard, leaving behind the traditional leaders.
The suspicion of the workers towards the government was expressed as early as the day after the collapse of the putsch by a stepping up of the wages drive. There had been, a short time before the putsch, many demonstrations over wage demands. Halted during the four days which it lasted, they were taken up immediately it came to an end. But, at this moment, the reformist top TU leadership of the FO and of the CF TC in order to be forgiven for making a certain rapprochement with the C G T and the communists, wished give a breathing space to the government and the bosses. The workers would not listen to this. This was very clear in the Paris transport undertakings. Though the workers in this industry are very divided from a trade union point-of-view (twenty-odd unions) which meant that in the past these movements did not happen except when a limited unity of action was realised by the principal unions, this time the appeal of a single union, the CG T, produced twice the number of strikers. The same day the railway workers, encouraged by the CG T and the C FT C largely brought the traffic in the whole country to a halt.
the factories numerous demonstrations sprang up, initially for better wages.
However important this surge of wage claims might be, however promising it could be for the cohesion of the working classes and for their future struggles, one must not mistake its limits,
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL it must be placed in the framework of the regime. It is from de Gaulle they are demanding an increase. It is not, but must become, a battle against the regime. ONCE MORE IN SEARCH OF THE "STRONG
STATE"
The general effect of this situation: the feebleness of fascism, the indifference of the bourgeoisie, the working class affected politically by the disillusionment of the post-war period, the defeat of the 13th May, and the flabbiness of the traditional leaderships, gives to French political life a rarified atmosphere in which the personality of de Gaulle takes on a particular importance, and which also gives him, in spite of the narrowness of his support in the country, a significant amount of room to manoeuver in internal policies. The putsch has much enfeebled French imperialism by dislocating its army, but present day political conditions in France mean that in the immediate future in internal affairs it will be de Gaulle who will hold the political initiative and derive an advantage from the operation. Realising at the same time his strengths and his weaknesses de Gaulle has brought into play article 16 of the Constitution, which consists precisely of suppressing all legal or judicial rule and of giving all power to de Gaulle, of installing in French society completely arbitrary government.
The pretext is that it is very convenient for the suppression of the instigators of the putsch. But nobody doubts that it will translate itself into some measures, probably quite stringent, but extremely limited, against the fascist Right, and into play article 16 of the Constitution, which of the political revolutionary vanguard of the working class and the intelligentsia.
Has de Gaulle succeeded in building his "Strong State"? If he has only the traditional Leaderships he will be able to achieve this. But there are, throughout the world, problems much less easy to deal with than these leaders. In the first place, there is Algeria. It was seen in what an unpredictable way the Evian encounter was prepared. The downfall of the would-be fascists of 1960 and 1961 has not advanced things more than in a very limited fashion. On the - one hand de Gaulle has not renounced the attempt to conserve the serious holdings of French capitalism in Algeria; he still has remote hopes of what the men of the G PR A will sign and accept, even il, under the pressures exerted them from all sides, they show themselves unwillming to make extended concessions. For there are the Algerian people whose aspirations are grow-
39 ing more and more radical. In spite of the chatter of a sycophant press de Gaulle approaches the negotiations in an aura of enfeebled power, for he has had to strike at the unity of the army which throughout the past years has to de Gaulle and the fact that French Imperial. ism has accepted its defeat in Algeria.
We must therefore expect long negotiations before agreement can be reached. During this period one could think that the political reawakening witnessed on the Left in France would grow, nourishing itself precisely on the resistance to de Gaulle and the fact that French Imperialism has accepted its defeat in Algeria. MORE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES
Political re-awakening, let us say, but without having illusions with regard to its extension and rhythm in the most immediate period, all the more that the good economic conjuncture contributes to maintaining a settled situation.
Nevertheless many elements are preparing for a more active political future, as much on the Right as on the Left.
On the Right we have seen a series of defeats of a particular form of fascism. It is possible that the putsch of the 22nd April is the last important political action — exclusive of some "plastic" bombs. But fascism will find itself new forms later on when the independence of Algeria is recognised. Ex-officers returned to civil life, European-Algerians who have left Algeria, petty-bourgeios nursing the humiliation of the selling out" of the Empire, others displaced by the growing concentration of capitalism, will furnish a clientele for the fascist politicians. The danger of a conquest of power by the fascists in the longer run seems to us very limited, but one must expect intense fascist political activity, so much the more acceptable to capitalism because they would wish to counterbalance a resumption of political activity of the working class.
Un this side, from now on, the re-awakening of which we have spoken, although it seems feeble, manifests itself above all on the level of a critical approach, in two groups of great importance for the future: the militant workers and the youth, student youth more particularly.
Although Mollet and Thorez continue to boast, each in his own party, the crisis of the lack of confidence grows and deepens. As far as the F CP is concerned the unanimity of the Congress no longer succeeds in disguising the misgivings of the great majority, the irreducible disagreements of a minority.
40
Although cut short, the Casanova - Servin affair reflected this state of things in the party apparatus. The perspective of "renewed democracy", the question of the "roads to socialism" are problems which pose themselves to a growing number of militant communists.
It is amongst the youth that one feels a growing political interest which is not at all conformist either towards the government or towards the old leaderships. Instinctively it is towards revolutionary solutions that a vanguard turns, disgusted with the policies pursued by these leaders. One remembers the affair of the 121 intellectuals recognising the right of "insoumission" (i e, refusal to be conscripted intothe army.) The role played by the conscripts in the debacle of the recent putsch allowed those who, inside the workers' movement had denounced this demonstration, namely the leaders of the F CP. to sav: "We advised vou, you should not have deserted, you should have done work inside the army!". This "argument" does not take into account a certain number of facts: First, the position of the 12] could not be a call for a mass action, it was a demonstration of opposition towards war in Algeria aimed at an awakening of the public opinion which no political leadership with a mass influence called upon for action; second, the "insoumis" and deserters were the result of this inefficient lead. ership and treason after six years of war! third, as for the work of these organisations inside the army, it never existed; the conscripts reacted spontaneously, under the pressure of weariness towards war in Algeria, which is felt by most French people, and of the desire not to help
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL people whom they know pretty well ("paras", "légionnaires" and also the European-Algerians) and whom they hate.
But if the organised workers' movement has no direct responsibility in the attitude of the conseripts during the putsch, one may say, without fear to contradiction, that the young men who have made such an experiment in Algeria, however short this experiment may have been, will certainly stay profoundly influenced thereby and that later there will be repercussions inside the workers' movement. The attack against Order in its most oppressive form, the military hierarchy, cannot but lead to a capacity to stand against disfigured forms of the bourgeois order as are the apparatus of the organizations established in this society.
New generations are arising to political life, in a climate of oppression and stifling of political thought both by the regime and the old leaderships. They reach political life with much confusion resulting from the whole policy and teaching of the old leaderships. But at the same time they are rebelling against these policies, these teachings.
The putsch which recently failed, struck a big blow against French imperialism, obliging chop off a part of its armed forces. It will have contributed also in allowing thousands and tens of thousands of young people to have an unforgettable experience which will stimulate in them the spirit of criticism and rebellion. was not bad that Reaction should have made a faux pas. Unfortunately benefits will not be immediate, except for de Gaulle, but they will nevertheless exist in the future.
15 May, 1961.