KHRUSHCHEV'S THIRD REFORM
OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE
By ERNEST GERMAIN this scandal various sectors of Soviet society are production of the kolkhozes, due to the increase
For the fourth time since Stalin's death, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy have modified their agricultural policy. The first reform - that of Malenkov - was proclaimed at the meeting of the CC of the CP SU of September, 1953; the second (Khrushchev's first reform) was decided on in 1955; the third resulted from the speech which Khrushchev made at Minsk on 22nd January, 1958; the latest and fourth reform is the result of the debates of the Central Committee during January luth to loth, 1901.
Why this new reform? It is because Soviet agriculture is not developing at a sufficient rate, in spite of the partial successes of the earlier reforms. The targets fixed by the sixth five-year plan (which could not have been reached in any have not been attained, as the following figures show:
Targets for the 6th five- Actual proyear plan fix- duction reaed in 1955 for ched in 1960 1960 Cereals harvested 180,000,000 tons 133,000,000 tons Livestock 13,000,000 » 8,700,000 Wool 465.000 355,000 » Eggs. 45,800,000,000 units 26,400,000,000 units
The gap is therefore considerable; on average, the agricultural production was 25% below the expectations of the planners in 1955, and 15% below the targets set in 1959 for 1960. As the requirements of the population have increased to a greater extent than the planners had foreseen, especially with regard to the basic agricultural products — meat, butter, milk, cereals, vegetables - the tardy development of Soviet agriculture constitutes a permanent source of social friction and of political tension in the country.
The tremendous success of Soviet science and technology — as witness the sputniks and Gagarin's exploit — have not in any way lessened the tension, even if they have undoubtedly strengthened the subjective foundations of Soviet society (ie the refusal to make any change in the social regime). On the contrary, compared to achievements, the shortages and interruptions in the food supply of the people and in other agricultural products more and more assume the aspect of a permanent scandal. Against raising an outery. Under Stalin, the savage police dictatorship made it possible for this weakness in agricultural policy to persist for a long time. Under Khruschev, the change in the relation of forces between the masses and the bureaucracy obliges the government constantly to modify their agricultural policy when it appears that the targets set are not likely to be reached.
The president of the Council of Ministers of the Federal Russian Republic (the largest Republic in the Soviet Union), DS Polianski, has admitted that "some irregularities in the food supplies of the people (meat, milk, butter) are found in many towns and cities." (Pravda, 12th January, 1961).
In a speech on 17th January, 1961, at the CC of the CPSU, Khrushcher himself admitted the inadequacy of the development of agriculture in relation to the increased needs of the population: "As I have already stated, the agriculture of our country has achieved much success, but it must be admitted that it is not developing as rapidly as industry, and that it does not follow, so to say, the rapid increase in our industry and in the requirements of our people... Although we can state that in the past year or so a definite increase in our agricultural production has taken place, this fact does not give us satisfaction because it does not correspond to the increased need of the people." (Pravda, 2lst January, 1961)
Khrushcher affirms that in 1960, income of salaried persons in the Soviet (including superannuation) increased by 242 milliards old roubles in comparison with that of 1955. At the same time per capita consumption has increased, between 1953 and 1959, by 42% for meat, by 35% for butter and by 74% for milk and dairy products. On the basis of these figures, per capita consumption of meat in the US SR falls below that in the USA by 50%. The prospect of reaching and overtaking the American pro capita consumption of meat therefore remains distant, as it also does for agricultural products of high quality. THE KOLKHOZES DELIVER LESS AND LESS GRAIN TO THE TOWN
The first agricultural reform since Stalin, launched by Malenkov, saw an increase in the
42 in the incomes obtained by them for products supplied to the State. The second reform - the first to be initiated under the direct responsibility of Khrushchev -- envisaged the exploitation of virgin areas on a large scale. As we explained in a previous issue, these virgin lands came to be exploited exclusively by the sovkhozes (state farms). The scheme had as its aim the provision of foodstuff to the towns to some extent independent of the production of the kolkhozes (peasant collectives) ie of by-passing the peasant and at the same time of winning him over.
The third reform consisted in the sale to the kolkhozes of agricultural machinery, tractors, and other forms of state property, with the object of stimulating production of the kolkhozes, as production of the sovkhozes established in the virgin lands was found to fluctuate too much to afford a firm foundation for supplying the towns.
What is the nature of the fourth reform, evolved by the "Agricultural Plenum" of the CC in 1961? Contrary to the three earlier reforms, the fourth cannot easily be summed up. The essential measures make provision for especially:
an improvement in the supply to the kolk. hozes of agricultural machinery through the creation of a "Union for the Sale and Maintenance of Agricultural Machinery" with powers to register and regulate the demand for and supply of such machinery, as well as being responsible for the production, re-allocation and despatch of such machinery throughout the USSR; 2) a reorganisation of the methods of purchase of the products of the collective farms by the State by means of contracts entered into by the kolkhozes the one hand and itinerant inspectors on the other; 3) an attempt to stifle the growth of private peasant markets, by instructing the state cooperatives to buy not only the surplus production of the kolkhozes, but above all their surplus private production; 4) more energetic measures to suppress forgery, theft and misappropriation of kolkhoz property by the kolkhoz bureaucracy or by indi. vidual peasants.
Does this reform contain a fifth element, extremely important to note, i e, the attitude of the State towards commercial and industrial enterprises created by the rich kolkhozes, this latter implying private exploitation of the peasants? The report of the C C debates provides no answer to this question, although some divergency of opinion seems to have provoked discussions which were kept secret. However, some decision or other
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL can be expected in the course of the next few months.
To understand the reasons for this new reform,
20%: the balance sheet presented at the Plenum of the C C of January, 1961 must be examined more closely. It is evident that the two major weaknesses of the system continue despite the measures taken in 1958. Kolkhoz production stagnates, and production from the "virgin lands" fluctuates greatly from year to year, according to weather conditions in Central Asia.
Certain figures, quoted in the course of the C C debate of January, 1961, regarding kolkhoz production, extremely alarming. Thus, Khrushcher's closing speech, as well as his speech on the resolution, shows that between 1953 and 1960, the quantity of grain sold to the state increased from 31 to 46.5 million tons. But, in • speech previously quoted, Polianski indicates that the "virgin lands of the RS F S R alone have sold more than 16.3 million tons of grain to the State in 1960." (Pravda, 12th January, 1961). It follows therefore that the supply of grain from the kolkhozes to the State in 1960 was at a lower level than during the crisis of 1953. Khrushchev prefers not to quote all the facts, but he does quote sufficient figures for this conclusion to be drawn. Out of 15 Soviet Republics, 13 supplied less grain to the State in 1960 than in 1953, while for the fourteenth, the RS F SR, the districts in which no "virgin lands" are available find themselves in exactly the same position. Of these 13 republics, no fewer than 7 (Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Turkmenia Esthonia) supply not a single kilogram of wheat to the State, whereas in 1953 they supplied almost a half-million tons.
In the Ukraine, which in 1953 supplied almost a third of the wheat sold to the urban population of the entire US S R, the sale of grain to the State has fallen from 9 million tons in 1953 to in 1960; the one-time granary of the Soviet Union cannot supply more than 15% of the needs of the Soviet citizens. For the White Russian Republic, the fall in supplies to the State was 50% if based on the 1953 level, and 65% on that of 1950. As for the RSFSR, if one exeludes the production of the "virgin lands", sales to the State have fallen to the same extent by 1.5 million tons between 1953 and 1960.
As Khrushchev elsewhere confirms that production of the "virgin lands" contribute more than 40% of the grain supplies at the disposal of the State, it can be estimated that other agricultural areas have reduced their grain supplies to the State by almost 6 million tons, in comparison with 1953.
Certain figures quoted by Khrushcher suggest
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL that a general tendency is manifesting itself. Sales of grain by the Ukraine to the State were as follows: 1948, 10 million tons; 1949, 8.7 millions tons; 1953, 9 million tons; 1958, 9 million tons; 1959, 7.4 million tons; 1960, 5.8 million tons.
certain regions, especially in White Russia and in the region west of the R SF SR, a large deficit in grain is apparent, that is to say, the State had to supply to these areas a much greater quantity of cereals than it obtained from them. In 1960, this deficit reached nearly 300,000 tons for the White Russian Republic alone, and almost 600,000 tons in some districts to the west of the RS F SR. THE "VIRGIN LANDS" EXPERIMENT REMAINS HYPOTHETICAL
Even if Khrushchev and other speakers at the "Agricultural Plenum" had not stopped boasting about the results obtained from the clearing of "virgin lands" in Siberia and Kazakstan, some facts given incidentally still show that the experiment has not yet proved itself. Khrushchev himself recognises that it is impossible to maintain seriously that this clearing of "virgin lands" is the final solution to the agricultural problems of the USSR. In his closing speech to the Cl of January, 1961, he included a rough estimate. During the seven years 1954-1960, the State has invested 440 milliards of old roubles in these areas, and the entire grain production during these seven years amounted to 760 milliards. This gives a nett profit (these are the exact words of the first secretary!) of 320 milliards.
But Khrushchev should take pains to make a more profound and serious analysis. He fails to answer this question: if these 440 milliards had been invested in the development of grazing lands for fattening stock and the production of additional agricultural machinery, would this not have yielded more than 760 milliards of roubles worth of cereals in the US SR?
He does not include in his costing the terrible sufferings and great sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands of young Komsomols and workers, sent to clear these lands and having to live under absolutely inhuman conditions. include damage caused by erosion as a result of the extensive cultivation of the "virgin lands". The First Secretary of the CP of the Ukraine, Podgorny has spoken of the terrible "black tempests" which are sweeping right to the borders of this Republie (the dust from the distant Siberian fields!), not to mention the future havoc. An immense "dust-bowl" like that of Oklahoma, tragically famous during the 30's, is today being formed in the USSR. A gigantic irrigation project will be needed to solve this problem. The
43 First Secretary of Kazakstan has admitted to the CC that of the 7,300 acres ordered to be put under irrigation, not a single acre has been successfully irrigated during the present year. (Pravda, 12th January, 1961).
The figures quoted for the cleared "virgin lands" are equally eloquent. The average grain yield in the US SR is just over 10 ewt. per acre, which is extremely low even for extensive agriculture. But in Kazakstan, this average fell to 8.4 ewt., and this figure includes the yield from irrigated areas. Polianski's figures suggest that a similar return from the "virgin lands" of Siberia is likely. This is lower, by more than 20%, than the average yield from the cultivated areas in other parts the USS R.
Khrushchev's closing speech does not directly touch on the problem of the discontent of the young workers sent to the "virgin lands". It is known that this discontent has given rise to open and above all violent strikes, that is to say, of wide-spread desertions, thus endangering harvest in many regions, especially Kazakstan. Various books and articles have recently reflected the agitation of public opinion on this matter. But the leader of the Soviet bureaucracy makes only an indirect reference to this when he states that it preferable "to create local enterprises founded on seasonal production which can be halted during the harvest in order that the workers can be sent to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes".
This will be more effective than sending to harvest people who are not accustomed to working on the land. Is this an indication that a stop will be put to sending Komsomols to the "virgin lands"? THE BUREAUCRACY AS BRAKE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES
Among the significant aspect of the "Agricul. tural Plenum" debates were the violent attacks made by Khrusheher on State and Party leaders as well as on certain leaders of minor bodies. These leaders were accused of a series of crimes: falsifying statistics and accounts; criminal prartices to justify the falsifications; "bulletins of victory", especially with reference to the slaughter of calves and of heifers, to "reach" the target set for the supply of meat; purchases of butter or milk on the open market to 'reach" the target for milk production, ete.; clear-cut cases of theft. These debates took place in the presence of numerous "experts" — agronomists and the presidents of kolkhozes. More and more, the Plenum of the C C of the CP of the USSR thus transforms itself into a veritable little parliament of the bureaucracy, an extension of the basis of power even at the heart of the bureaucracy, which we fore.
44 cast ever since the day following the death of Stalin in 1953.
Certain interruptions by Khrushchev, certain dialogues and revelations, take on a tragi-comic aspect. Here are examples: Khruchchev (interrupting G. I. Tkatehouk, president of the Ukrainian kolkhoz): And why do the Ukrainians not promulgate a law against the thieves (sic)? Is that possible? (applause).
K. I. Tkatchouk: That is certainly possible.
Khrushchev: As well as against the private distillers and the drunkards? (Commotion in the hall).
G. I. Tkatchauk: Certainly. Whoever drinks too much ought to be punished in the same way. (sic). Pravda, 14th January, 1961. Again:
I. R. Rassakov: (First Secretary of the CP of the RSS of Kirghiz): In the theses on his report, Comrade Khrushehev has criticised the C C of the CP of Kirghiz in a severe but fully. justified manner... In effect, the ex-First Secretary of the regional committee of the Party of Tsian Chan, Issaiev, has committed a crime in calling on the presidents of the regions and of the kolkhozes to buy butter in the shops and to supply this butter to the State, pretending thereby to have realised the target for the production of milk. The C C of the CP of Kirghiz has dismissed him from the party for anti-party conduct, and depri. ved him of his office of Minister of the Interior.
Khrushchev: When did you do this? After you received my Open Letter?
I. R. Rossakov: Yes, after the Letter.
Khrushchev: Did you learn the facts only from the Letter?
I. R. Rossakov: Some party members had posed this question at the conference.
Khrushchev: And previously, you did not
I. R. Rassakov: We knew it but we did not deal with him too severely.
Khrushchev: And you afterwards appointed him as Minister? You go so far as to consider that the best punishment for a man who has mitted a crime is to appoint him as Minister? (Commotion and laughter in the hall).
I. R. Rassakov: There we committed error. We appointed him Minister of the Interior. (sic!) (Pravda, 14th January, 1961.)
But in his closing speech Khrushchev bitterly attacked the Prime Minister of the Ukraine, Kaltchenko, who by urging a premature harvest of maize and sunflowers under the pretext that the crops were being scorched had caused serious damage... "and today he is a deputy member of the Council of Ministers of one of the largest Re. publics, the Ukraine, and its like water on a duck's back to him — he is unconcerned over his mistake." (Pravda, 21st June, 1961.)
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Epilogue: Kaltchenko was relieved of his post in February, 1961, but shortly afterwards was appointed vice-president of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republie!
These attacks, crude at times, but often shrewd, against the conduct of individual bureaucrats, are, nevertheless, not a new phenomena in the history of the Soviet bureaucracy. Under Stalin they were common enough; and they have occurred more than once since his death. What distinguishes Khrushcher's attack from the preceding ones is, on the one hand, their extent (see note 1) and on the other, the fact that they are not fol. lowed by disciplinary measures. It is clearly a classic case of finding a scapegoat. Moreover, some of Khrushchev's attacks under the guise of an attack on the bureaucracy are in reality directed against the peasants. Thus the most sensational outburst from Khrushchev was when he was obstensibly visiting the chief secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, N. V. Podgorny.
Khrushchev: I am convinced, Comrade Podgorny, that the figures quoted by you in connection with the maize output do not represent half the harvest. The remaining half has been stolen from the land while it was ripening.
N. V. Podgorny: That is true, Nikita Sergei. vitch.
Khrushchev: Can you then say that the loss was due to the bad weather? The harvest has been stolen yet you say that the poor harvest was due to the bad weather. Is that so?
N. V. Podgorny: Yes, that is correct. (Pravda, 12th January, 1961.)
It is necessary to emphasise that following his explanation, Podgorny tried to minimise the effect of Khrushcher's accusation by declaring that the facts revealed by Khrushchev have had a certain influence" on the work and, "to some extent" complicated it. But the incredible accusation from Khrushchev that 6. ... half the harvest from several millions of acres of wheat-fields has been stolen" leaves no doubt as to the guilty ones the peasant masses themselves. In fact, it would be difficult to believe that the bureaucrats had "stolen" and transported to the Kolkhoz the contents of thousands and thousands of railway trucks or a veritable fleet of tens of thousands of lorries. Unly the peasants could have committed such a large-scale theft. Moreover, the decrees recently promulgated in connection with the penalties against economic crimes leave no room for doubt
As one can expect, the range of these attacks has had some effect. in industry; the workers know very well that the methods of the State bureaucrats are in every way dishonest as those of the bureaucrats in agriculture. Recently Pravda published an article declaring that it had received thousands of letters a (sic) denouncing exact detail false statisties of the factories.
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL in this matter: they deal mainly with the offences of the peasants and other "private entrepreneurs" rather than with the crimes of the bureaucrats. BETWEEN SCARCITY AND I RIMITIVE ACCUMULATION
In his closing speech to the Central Committee in January, 1961, Khrushchev relates that last year while on holiday in the Ukraine, he met a happy group of men and women who had brought some apples from Saporoshe, about 800 kilometres distant and almost in White Russia! He adds that some people even transport apples by plane from as far away as Chabarovsk in the far East.
The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme soviet of the U SS R of the 4th. May, 1961, refers to similar cases. A letter published in the journal Sovietskaia Rossia and reproduced in Le Monde of 4th May mentions the "rich harvest" which can be reaped by enterprising individuals in selling a product privately at speculative prices and at the right moment. If one were to view this not only from the moral angle but also from its economic origins, one will easily grasp that it is a question of a permanent revival of the small retailer due to the shortage of food supplies.
As in Stalin's time, the agricultural policy of the Soviet bureaucracy vacillates between two extremes on this question: whether at all costs to encourage the growth of production and the productive efforts of the peasants including on their private plots — and thus inevitably bring to the fore the tendencies resulting in primitive accumulation; or whether to wage war on the small retailer by means of restrictions and legislation — thus provoking an inevitable reduction in the output of the peasant, and a growing scarcity in consumer goods for the urban population.
Between 1953 and 1959, the initiative and the profits of the kolkhozians were encouraged in every way, above all by the policy of prices. As a result, an extensive accumulation of liquid capital occurred. This capital was used, primarily, in the purchase of agricultural machinery especially tractors, and in the purchase of the means of industrial production and the means of exchange. Some Kolkhozian factories were erected (particularly in the food and building industries) which were thus actually competing with the State indüstries. Some Kolkhoz shops appeared - in the farms cheek by jowl with the State shops and the co-operative shops.
Parailel with this development, a section of the private peasantry has discovered how to accumulate equally extensive properties, thanks to the proceeds from private sales on the "Kolkhozian market" which are once more tolerated and even encouraged by the authorities.
45
It seems that in 1959, a reaction against these lendencies began to show itself. Already at the Plenum of the C C in January, 1960, the tendency to reduce private plots and to force the peasants to sell their private cows, makes its appearance (see Note 2.) We stated at the time that the reaction of the peasants to those measures would be a reduction in output. The production figures for 1960 have confirmed this forecast.
The protests of the "poor Kolkhoz" against the difficulties which we have fully dealt with — (see our article in Fourth International of April, 1958) one che firke late a riter ton the added to the increasing y bolder activities of the Kolkhoz in the industrial and commercial fields, are foreing the authorities to debate raged in the leading spheres of the Party, the substance of which we can infer from the organisational measures taken afterwards at the Agricultural Plenum of the C C in January, 1961.
At the end of February, 1961, there appeared a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USS R which authorised the co-operatives to repurchase the surplus production of the Kolkhoz and of the private peasants at prices higher than fixed for deliveries stipulated and "fixed by agreement" by the consumer co-operatives and the Kolkhozes (or Kolkhozians). Pravda, 18th March, 1961, mentions that at Krasnodar there is in operation the first "co-operative market" which will thus replace the old "Kolkhozian market" to advantage. The same journal also mentions that the food supply is once again "insufficient".
Parallel with this, another decree of the Council of Ministers of the US S R insists on the obligation of the kolkhoz to enter into contracts for the deliveries to the State, contracts which would be negotiated by "itinerant buying commissioners.
The two measures seem to have the same object: to reinforce the control — previously decentral. ised — of the State on agricultural production by means of the new apparatus of bureaucratic intermediaries. But in the situation of scarcity which exists, the law of supply and demand cannot be ignored by the bureaucracy with impunity if production and the consumers are not to suffer severely!
One gets the impression, moreover, that a compromise will be struck in this matter and that the discussion will be continued at higher levels in the bureaucracy. For, in addition to the above mentioned measures which the peasants will undoubtedly consider vexatious the government has decided to lower the prices of spare parts for
Podgorny declared at the CC of January, 1961, that in 1960 livestock had diminished by 1.7 million cattle and by 400,000 pigs in the Ukraine.
46 agricultural machinery and to facilitate the supply of tools to the kolkhoz by the institution of the "Union for the Sale and Maintenance of Agrieultural Machinery" ("Soiousselchostechnika"). The bureaucracy has meanwhile taken measures against the direct sale of agricultural machinery. This is an additional and disquieting proof of the decentralisation and primitive accumulation introduced into the economic life of the Soviet Union by the increasing initiative of the Kolkhoz in industry and commerce.
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Thus, oscillating between two extremes and definitely seeking its salvation in a succession of spectacular measures, the Soviet bureaucracy far from a solution of agricultural problems in the USSR. And while it delays the solution, the causes of discontent are growing in various sectors of the Soviet population, undermining Khrushchev's popularity and the relative and temporary stability which the bureaucratic regime enjoyed since 1957. 5th June, 1961.