Johnson's critics in Congress and other high places are becoming increasingly alarmed at his recklessness and angered by his arrogant disregard for their counsels of caution. On the day that the president announced his choice of Clifford, Senator George D. Aiken, the conservative Vermont Republican who is the second ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, delivered one of the strongest denunciations of the official policy yet heard on the Senate floor.
He accused the administration of resorting to "military strength" in Vietnam to cover up its "political ineptitude." According to him, the problem there involved an internal conflict over the direction of nationalist aspirations rather than a centrally directed international communist conspiracy. "To make out that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong even today are integral parts of a unified monolithic world communism is simply selfdestructive fantasy," he declared.
Aiken said that "the Administration has had to create a monolithic enemy to justify its refusal to admit past mistakes. By clinging to its inventions the Administration is simply duping Americans at home and undermining credibility abroad in the sincerity of our purposes and the efficiency of our diplomacy."
In fact, he said, the administration has "so trifled with words" that it has managed “to endanger the peace of the world and to embitter our society at home in a manner not seen in a century." Aiken's speech was commended by Democratic Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican Senator Cooper of Kentucky.
On January 22 Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield warned that "the logical consequence of greater American involvement is still greater American involvement. At some point in this process, if it continues, the escalator may well go out of control. The war could then spread throughout the Asian mainland and push headlong toward a catas-— trophic world conflict."
Johnson does not show the least inclination to conciliate the growing array of his opponents. He made that plain in the key passages on Vietnam in his "State of the Union" address to Congress. His attitude on continued U.S. intervention in the civil war in Vietnam remains substantially the same as Goldwater's.
In a January 22 television interview Rostow set forth some of the strategic considerations behind the present policy. He stated that the United States had drawn a firm line in Korea, Laos, Vietnam and Germany beyond which it would not permit any "Communist aggression" and was fully prepared to uphold that boundary by military force.
Moscow had already learned in the Berlin and Cuban missile confrontations that Washington's will was unshakable, he said. Now Peking and Hanoi (and by inference Havana) had to be taught that subversive guerrilla movements aiming at the overthrow of Western-backed regimes could not succeed. U.S. forces were in Vietnam to protect American interests in that area and these would be defended come what may, Rostow emphasized.
That the administration is animated by such blatant imperialist motives is confirmed by Senator Eugene McCarthy, who in somewhat subdued fashion, is challenging the president for the 1968 Democratic nomination. He wrote in the February 6
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issue of Look: "My decision [to run] was strengthened by indications that the Administration has no plans for Vietnam other than continued escalation and intensification. It seems to have set no limits on the price it will pay for military victory."
McCarthy complained about the seerecy cloaking the designs of the administration. "As a senator and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I find it increasingly difficult to gain information about the conduct of the war, let alone exercise the constitutional responsibility of influencing it. To raise questions in public is to bring down showers of ridicule and invective. The Secretary of State refuses to come before the committee to give public testimony."
The public at large is being kept even more in the dark than the senators who are delegated to advise on foreign policy. It is being systematically misled about the real state of affairs in Vietnan. The official optimists present a picture of steady improvement in American military and political prospects when in actuality these are deteriorating from one month to the next.
The American people strongly suspect they are being hoodwinked and lied to. Johnson alluded to this uneasiness when he observed in his annual message that "there is in the land a certain restlessness, a questioning." Although he tried to minimize its depth and extent, there unmistakably exists a tremendous groundswell of disenchantment with his administration that is going to find expression in new antiwar actions and ghetto revolts during 1968 and at the polls next November.
BUT WHY CLIFFORD?
It has been explained by those who make a living reporting the inside dope on Washington politics that Johnson decided to remove Robert S. McNamara from his cabinet because the man had grown soft and was no longer suitable for the immensely important post of secretary of defense, his mind having become affected by doubts about the wisdom of continuing to escalate the war in Vietnan.
According to this account, Mc- Namara was moving toward a "dove" position. This was surprising news to the ornithologists who had listed him up to that time among the bolder variety of hawks. However, in light of the news, they conceded that perhaps from the standpoint of the Pentagon, McNamara might have become a bit dovish.
McNamara went down with tributes from all sides that could hardly have been more laudatory if he were already laid out in his coffin. The man with the computer brain was credited with having reorganized the defense establishment from top to bottom, with having put this colossal, sprawling, worldwide enterprise -- America's biggest business -- on an efficient, cost-accounting basis.
Then came the surprise. McNamara was not replaced by a military strategist -- nor by another executive type. Johnson chose, instead, Clark M. Clifford -- a lawyer.
Why would Johnson want a lawyer at the head of the war department? It is true that his escalation of U.S. intervention in Vietnam is completely illegal. The U.S. constitution specifically places
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the war-making powers with Congress, and Congress has not declared war. Moreover, in his conduct of the war, Johnson has violated international law and custom in countiess ways. The International War Crimes Tribunal has found his administration guilty of deeds as unspeakable as those committed by the German imperialist government in World War II, for which leading Nazis were hanged by the victorious Allied powers.
The truth is that Johnson already has his legal flank well covered. Congress, by passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution, gave Johnson power of attorney to act in Vietnam. The congressmen knew what they were doing when they put their names to this document, since nearly all of them, both Republicans and Democrats, are lawyers well acquainted with fine print. In addition, as reserves on the legal front, Johnson can count on the entire Supreme Court. These nine men, of course, are all lawyers, the most distinguished and powerful in the land.
So why Clark Clifford?
To unravel the mystery, it is necessary to know what Johnson considers to be the most important and pressing problem facing the United States at the moment. The January 1 New York Times indicated Johnson's thinking on this through a dispatch from Saigon. An unnamed official of the puppet government told the Times correspondent:
"It was in a briefing the other day, and the man briefing us came out and said it: 'An election year is about to begin. And the people we work for are in the business of re-electing President Johnson in November.'"
The acuteness of the problem arises from the fact that Johnson's popularity, with ups and downs, has steadily declined so that at points it has appeared that any Republican, even Nixon, could beat hin.
Johnson himself has pictured the situation as comparable to the one faced by Truman in 1948. An analyst as authoritative as Walter Lippmann has disputed this, saying that Johnson's situation comes closer to the one faced by Herbert Hoover in 1932.
Johnson has dismissed with contempt both Lippmann and his conclusions, insisting that the real parallel is with Truman. He has already sought to find a solution along the lines which worked out so well for the man who beat Dewey and then took the country into the Korean war.
The press has described Johnson's efforts to change his image in some detail. Thus the public has been kept well -76—
informed on how the president has let his hair turn silver, or had it tinted silver; how he has let it grow long, even putting a seductive wave in locks that are not yet flowing but are commendably close to the style made popular by Everett Dirksen, the Republican party charmer.
The extreme nature of the latter bit of image reconstruction can be judged by the fact that in his younger days Johnson would probably have been sooner caught dead than with his hair marcelled. But anything for the American people! If they want a touch of the hippie in their president, Johnson is ready to oblige.
This is exactly where Clark Clifford comes in. A book about the 1948 election, now in the press, describes the key role played by Clifford, who was called in by Truman for some badly needed advice.
Clifford, who is a realist in these matters, saw that the situation was very bad, if not desperate. He drew up a fortypage memorandum which is cited in the book and which is now being quoted in the press.
"The Democratic party," Clifford told Truman, "is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives, and Big City labor....The success or failure of the Democratic leadership can be precisely measured by its ability to lead enough members of these misfit groups to the polls."
"The blunt fact is," this lawyer told his client, "that the party has been so long in power that it is fat, tired, and even a little senile."
He then outlined how Truman should go about his campaign. The key thing was to change his image. He must put on an act, playing the role of "a man of the people trying to do his best." He should, moreover, "take the offensive."
Noting all this, James Reston, the Washington correspondent of the New York Times, points out why Johnson has now turned to the same lawyer for advice on the difficult problem facing him in 1968: ",..it is not surprising that Clark Clifford, the architect of Truman's spectacular victory of 1948, should suddenly appear on the Washington scene."
"The only surprising thing," continues Reston, "is that he did not take over as chairman of the Democratic Committee, which is where Mr. Johnson really needs a secretary of defense. Nevertheless, the appointment is logical and in some ways even welcome, for Mr. Clifford is not only a brilliant lawyer, but a good public speaker with a sense of humor and a sense of history."
James A. Wechsler of the liberal
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New York Post has suggested a further consideration in Johnson's calculations. Wechsler, in his colum of January 22, quotes a "shrewd Johnsonologist" as follows:
"If Eugene McCarthy suddenly got moving or Robert Kennedy decided to get into the fight himself, the cold fact is that Johnson can manipulate the war to keep his critics on the defensive.
"If the pressure gets strong enough, he can somehow get himself to the peace table -- and leak word that his bargaining power was being undermined by his domestic opponents. And if the talks collapse, he can blame them for what happened."
Conversely, if the war is widened, Johnson "just keeps running against Ho Chi Minh right through to November."
Wechsler then declares, "Clifford is not only remembered as an architect of the Truman 'miracle' of 1948. He is an instinctive political man. In accepting the assignment and renouncing all his private ties, he said deftly that hence-~ forth his ‘only client would be the United States.' This was a euphemism; his primary client will be the President, and a large part of his mission is a repetition of the Democratic victory two decades ago.
"The commitment involves no personal conflict of interest; unlike Mc- Namara, Clifford has suffered no tortures of doubt about our role in Vietnam and, if anything has echoed the Achesonian ‘hard-line’ view as unofficial counsellor. He is no doubt persuaded that Mr. Johnson's renomination and reelection are crucial to the continuity of our course in Southeast Asia. But his selection also presents the prospect that there will be more direct 'manipulation' of the conflict -- both military and diplomatic."
In short, Johnson has decided that the electorate in 1968 will act somewhat like a jury. As a war criminal, he needs genuinely competent legal advice. Clifford is the best he can get. To make it possible for this Machiavelli to operate with maximum effectiveness in shaping the appeals to the jury, he must be in position to pass judgment on every key move in the most sensitive area affecting Johnson's case. The indicated thing was to have him serve as Johnson's first lieu~ tenant in conducting the war in Vietnan.
For the sake of efficiency, Mc- Namara had to make room for a different expert.
FOUR H-BOMBS IN GREENLAND AND ONE SPY SHIP IN NORTH KOREA
It was a record week for the Johnson administration.
On January 21, a B-52 crashed in Greenland, near Thule, with four hydre-sen bombs on board. Some of the bombs probably sank in about 800 feet of water. Radioactivity was later discovered in the snow, however, indicating that at least one of the bombs had broken its casing.
The accident came in the wake of immense publicity about Johnson's success in negotiating a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with Kosygin-Brezhnev. The sudden proliferation of radioactivity in Greenland cast a revealing light on the true nature of the treaty. While other countries are to be denied bombs, the U.S. retains the "right" to fly them continuously over the territories of all countries too weak to resist.
In Copenhagen, pickets immediately responded. They carried such placards as "Stop U.S.A.'s Death Flying" and "Atom Weapons Are Now on Danish Soil."
While the White House was trying to brazen it out, as in the previous fifteen accidents involving nuclear weapons, the North Koreans on Janu 23 seized a spy ship caught red-handed in "electronic" activities near Wonsan.
All of Washington at once set up a howl about "aggression" on the part of North Korea. They dared to lay hands on our spy ship!
An authority on codes, David Kahn, former president of the American Cryptogram Association and the New York Cipher Society, explained what the Pueblo was up to. The crew was trying "to pick up as much radio and radar emissions as possible." The ship operated less than twenty-five miles from the coast "for the obvious reason that weaker signals fade out, so they wanted to get in as close as they could to get as signals as possible and as loud as possible." This accounts for the radio silence observed from time to time by the spy ship as it cut close to shore.
The North Korean government issued three specific warnings -- on January 6, 11 and 12 ~-- on U.S. spy boat activities. These were disregarded by the Pentagon and the CIA. Thus Johnson finds himself in a position like Eisenhower's when the famous U-2 spy plane was shot down deep inside the Soviet Union in 1960. Will he admit the truth like Eisenhower or insist on standing on the lies?
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