ADMISSIONS ON PENTAGON-CIA INVOLVEMENT IN CAPTURE OF CHE GUEVARA
Writing from La Paz in an "exclusive" which was published in the April 11 Los Angeles Times from the Manchester Guardian, Richard Gott reveals new facts about the direct role played by the Pentagon and the CIA in suppressing the guerrilla movement headed by Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia.
When Guevara was assassinated last October 9, all the official spokesmen of the U.S. maintained that the American military involvement did not go beyond the “normal military assistance program" begun in 1958. It was categorically denied that any Americans were engaged in field operations.
Richard Gott quotes what an unidentified "U.S. military spokesman" told him recently in La Paz about this official lie. "Our whole point was to play down our role. Of course, if President René Barrientos' office chooses to put out statements saying that it was all done by the Bolivians, that's his affair. But we know what happened, and some of us wouldn't mind some credit for it. We only do what we're asked to, of course, but we do make suggestions."
The "suggestions" began a year ago, in March, after a local newspaper announced that guerrillas were operating in the Santa Cruz area. "Immediately, on March 11, four members of the U.S. military mission in Bolivia, accompanied by a Cuban exile working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and using the name of Fernandez, flew to Santa Cruz to examine the reality of this report on the spot."
"At the same time," continues Gott, "the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Gen. Alfredo Ovando, was in Washington discussing the guerrilla problem at the Pentagon. It was agreed by both the Bolivians and the Americans that as little publicity as possible should be given to the guerrilla outbreak, for fear of stirring up unrest not only in Bolivia but in the rest of the continent as well."
The guerrillas became the subject of world headlines, however, with the first major clash on March 23. "The army had known for some time that Guevara was with the guerrillas, and this information was confirmed by three deserters who left the guerrillas in the middle of March bringing photographs with them. Subsequently they led the army to the guerrilla encampment."
When Ovando returned from Washington to La Paz, he tried to play the matter down in accordance with the agreement reached with the Pentagon. But Barrientos was already talking about both the guerrillas and the presence of Che Guevara. "After Ovando's return Barrientos changed his tune and said he thought Guevara was dead."
The Pentagon, however, was already putting its "emergency plans" into effect. "A high~level American team flew down early in April to La Paz to examine Bolivian requirements, and in the middle of the month the head of the military mission, Col. Joseph P. Rice, and Maj. Robert (Pappy) Shelton arrived in Santa Cruz. On April 19 it was announced that antiguerrilla training would begin at La Esperanza, with Maj. Shelton in charge. Appropriately enough, those who hastened to offer their lands for training purposes were those who had most benefited from the U.S. Agency for International Development program in the area."
With 600 raw Bolivian recruits, some 20 members of the U.S. Special Forces, “and an untold number of CIAsponsored Cuban exiles, Shelton began the task of beating out an antiguerrilla force. They were ready by mid-September, within five months -- an impressive feat of training."
One of the reasons for the impres- Siveness of the feat, according to Gott, was that the Americans had as material to work with, the "worst army in Latin America." It is the worst, not only asa fighting machine, "but also because it is the most inefficient, corrupt, bureaucratic and nepotistic on the continent."
"Every officer," continues Gott, "has his price, and there appears to be no tradition of keeping prisoners alive in Bolivia. Most of the guerrillas killed by the army were shot after capture rather than in battle."
To make something out of this material required drastic measures. The training camp at La Esperanza was the answer, but this was "in no sense part of the mission's regular scheduled activity as journalists were led to believe last year."
Moreover, the U.S. had at its service counterrevolutionary Cuban exiles. At least two of them, "Eduardo Gonzales and Felix Ramos, employed by the CIA and normally dressed in khaki without military insignia, shuttled between La Esperanza and the shifting front line of the guerrilla zone. ‘They proved very useful,' I was told, ‘as, of course, they didn't exist.' And since they were Cubans, the United States could deny the presence of Americans in the field with a clear conscience.
"Eduardo Gonzales, though this was not necessarily his real name, reported back on the political aspects of the guerrilla movements. He was responsible for interrogating Régis Debray, the French Marxist who was captured in April after visiting the guerrillas. He also interrogated captured guerrillas who were later shot, including Guevara, and on at least one occasion in September, he flew from Santa. Cruz to La Paz to interview members of the guerrilla urban network who had been betrayed. All this information was. funneled back to the American base at La Esperanza.
"Felix Ramos operated with the troops out of Vallegrande, the front-line headquarters of the Bolivian army. He followed in the footsteps of the guerrillas, visiting the places they had been to and reporting back on the military situation."
With Bolivia "quiet again," as Gott puts. it, "the Americans are withdrawing as surreptitiously as they came in. Col. Rice is off to Vietnam. Shelton is on his way home, to retirement and ‘a career in politics.'"
As for Ramos and Gonzales, they went to La Paz immediately after Guevara was murdered. "They left their hotel a few days later, doubtless for other areas where they can operate ‘without existing.'" .