Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

The Arab-Israeli War: Yost's Analysis

· World Outlook Vol. 6, No. 13, 5 April 1968 · pp 305-307 · 1,699 words

Middle East

YOST'S ANALYSIS

By Peter Buch

"It remains...the thesis of this article," Charles W. Yost concludes in an essay entitled, "How the Arab-Israeli War Began," in the January 1968 issue of Foreign Affairs, a scholarly U.S. quarterly, "that no government plotted or intended to start a war in the Middle East in the spring of 1967...there is no evidence -quite the contrary -- that either Nasser or the Israeli government or even the Syrian government wanted and sought a major war at this juncture."

Yost, a former U.S. representative to the United Nations (1961-1966), and at various times U.S. ambassador to Laos, Syria, and Morocco, begins with the existence of a Jewish state fearful for its survival and loath to grant concessions to its surrounding Arab neighbors. The Arabs, on the other hand, could not accept the permanent status of a country responsible for expelling one million Arab refugees from their native lands, refugees who were still suffering in miserable camps within sight of their former homeland. This situation gave rise to constant hostility and harassment, culminat-— ing periodically in war.

In 1966, the "El Fatah" commando raids from Syria grew in intensity. "It had long been Israel's policy," Yost remarks pointedly, "whenever it judged that Arab raids had reached an intolerable level, to retaliate massively." On November 13, 1966, Israel attacked Es Samu, a village in Jordan (not Syria, where the raids were said to come from), in which eighteen soldiers and civilians were killed and fifty-four wounded. Yost calls this a "disproportionate and misplaced retaliation" and it was condemned by the UN Security Council fourteen to one, as such raids by Israel had been condemned repeatedly in the past.

Both sides continued to insist on patrolling and farming disputed border areas, resulting in periodic clashes. One of these escalated on April 7, 1967, into an aerial dogfight in which Israeli pilots shot down six Syrian planes over Damascus.

Thus, the Arabs had sustained two bloody military blows within six months with no response from Nasser, the acknowledged central leader of Arab nationalism and head of the “unified Arab Command" in Cairo, established to contain Israel. The pressures within the Arab world for ac-— tion mounted tremendously. The "El Fatah" raids increased. Israeli leaders in the meantime were issuing threats of further military actions, "no less drastic than those of April 7," as Premier Levi Eshkol said May 11.

"These Israeli exercises in verbal escalation," says Yost, "provoked far more serious repercussions than they were no doubt intended to do and, far from sobering the exuberant Syrians and their allies, raised probably genuine fears in Damascus, Cairo and Moscow to a level which brought about the fatal decisions and events of the following week." ([Emphasis added.] He quotes UN Secretary General U Thant in a May 19 report as saying: "“Intemperate and bellicose utterances....are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that state statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines."

Yost adds: "Press accounts of these statements also seemed so inflammatory to U.S. State Department officials that they expressed concern to Israeli authorities."

Thus the Arab regimes as well as the Soviet Union became convinced that "a major retaliatory strike against Syria was fixed and imminent," which might result in the overthrow of the Syrian government and war on other Arab territory.

The Arab regimes reacted by denouncing the expected plans, readying themselves militarily, and verbally abusing the Jewish settlers.

Yost rounds out the story by detailing the steps through which Nasser's request for temporary and partial removal of UN troops from the Sinai desert was answered by the UN's "precipitous" and complete withdrawal of all its troops. (Israel never allowed any UN troops on her soil.) This left Egypt in full jurisdiction once again of the Straits of Tiran. Nasser felt obliged to make the obvious next move, namely, to assert "belligerent rights" by blockading the straits against hostile, i.e., Israeli, shipping.

These moves induced tremendous euphoria in the Arab world, expressed by the nationalist leaders in terms of new defense pacts, promises of troop shipments, and threats of vengeance against Israel.

"Yet even at this late date," Yost insists, "despite all these verbal pyrotechnics and concentrations of force, there does not seem to have been any interition in Cairo to initiate a war. In reply toa

question by British M.P. Christopher Mayhew interviewing Nasser on June 2, ‘And if they do not attack, will you let them alone?,' the President said, 'Yes, we will leave them alone. We have no intention of attacking Israel.' Similar assurances were repeatedly given the United States by the highest Egyptian authorities. There seems little reason to doubt then."

In other words, the Arabs were made as apprehensive by the Israeli leaders as the Israelis were made fearful by the Arab leaders. But it is clear from Yost's account that the policy of massive retaliation and the unbending attitude towards the refugees, whose readmission was categorically rejected beforehand by Israel, led to an escalation in which the fate of the Jews in Israel hung once again in the balance. This time, a "first strike" made Israel victorious. But other countries can use that tactic also, a tactic which becomes increasingly attractive today when ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads can make a war a matter of days or even hours. What will be the outcome in the next round?

While introducing a measure of objectivity into the discussion on the Arab- Israeli war, this account remains skeletal. Even though the author recognizes the issues of the conflict arising from the vast refugee problem and the rising Arab tide of nationalist revolution, he does not analyze the basic nature of the social forces and contradictions at work here. He therefore lapses into psychological explanations and winds up with exhortations to all concerned to "face the facts of life." He lays the blame equally upon the Arabs, the Israelis, the UN, and the great powers for "overreacting outrageously" and condemns sins such as "arrogance" and "inflexibility" as impermissible modes of international conduct.

Of course, it is to his credit that he sees Israel, the U.S., and the UN as capable of sins usually attributed by bourgeois commentators to Arabs, Vietnamese, North Koreans, Cubans, and any others standing up to United States imperialisn.

The most glaring deficiency in Yost's article is the complete failure to mention the central role of U.S., British, and French imperialist interests in the Middle East, revolving around the protec-— tion of their gigantic and highly profitable oil monopolies. He doesn't even refer to the fact that the nuclear-armed Sixth Fleet was poised to intervene inmediately on Israel's side if she had begun to lose. It is not surprising, therefore, that Yost also does not deal with the Arab national revolution as a fundamental process threatening the interests of Western imperialisn.

Nor does Yost view the Israeli regime as anything more than a Jewish government seeking, in however a blundering and headstrong way, to carve a Jewish homeland out of a territory that unfortunately happened to be occupied originally by another people, whose expulsion has led to some lamentable problems.

It is thus hard for Yost to explain the readiness of the Israeli government to act in accordance with the interests of U.S. imperialism against the Arab peoples, to resort first to massive and disproportionate retaliations and then to seize demagogically on the resulting Arab propaganda fusillade as a justification for preemptive attack and extensive occupation. This Arab propaganda, though filled with reprehensible and self-defeating threats of annihilation of the Jews, was backed up by essentially defensive measures of troop movements within the Arab territory, as Yost insists, and was not accompanied by any genuine mobilizations for an actual first-strike assault on Israel.

To Yost, it seems much more logical for Israel to seek some accommodation with the Arab peoples, instead of incurring their ever-deepening hatred. "There will be no security for Israel," he cautions, "until whatever the political and financial cost, the...refugees have been compensated, resettled and restored to dignity."

Why indeed doesn't the Israeli government declare its deep regret at the wholesale expulsion of a million Arabs from their farms and cities in Palestine? Why doesn't it offer to take them back and make up for past injuries as best it can, bringing the Palestinian Arabs into the national life of Israel as full citizens? Why doesn't it issue a worldwide appeal and demand that the rich nations, which claim such deep concern for the plight of the Jews and the welfare of the refugees and which have done so little for either, make available to the refugees the huge sums they now send there in the form of armaments?

But the Israeli regime's calculated risk in the June invasion, as well as its entire U.S.-oriented foreign policy, developed over the last twenty years, flows from its character as a government of a capitalist country, heavily dependent on foreign aid and private "charitable" contributions, largely from the U.S. This country is living beyond its means and is beset by overwhelming problems of unemployment, inflation, color discrimination, militarism, and government strikebreaking. Israel's ruling capitalist class, boasting already some 2,000 millionaires, survives by using the ideology of Zionist colonization to identify its interests, that is, of maintaining an exclusively

Jewish capitalist state, with the alleged interests of the Jewish workers and farners of Israel and of world Jewry.

The deep grievances of the Israeli workers and farmers against their bosses, especially the grievances of the Oriental Jews, who are half the population and who are treated as second-class citizens, are answered by patriotic Zionist appeals. All Jews are called upon to defend the regime of those bosses whose intransigence and aggressiveness are largely to blame for the danger of attack. This policy drives Israel deeper and deeper into dependence upon blitzkrieg-type "final solutions" against the Arab nations and into economic, financial and military dependence upon U.S. imperialism.

ECONOMIC

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