Pierre Frank
MARCH 4 -- Since the Budapest conference, which opened Feb. 26, has not yet ended, and the full texts of the speeches have not yet been published, judgment must be deferred on the work of the conference as a whole. Nonetheless, it can be said for certain that no matter what the final decisions may be, the walkout, February 29, of the Rumanians signifies a defeat at the conference for Moscow and the leaderships backing the Kremlin. The attendance of the Rumanians had been considered a successful first step on the road to rallying the Communist apparatuses against divisive tendencies encouraged in part by the Chinese.
Did the Rumanians participate with the intention of finding a pretext for making a scandal? Or were promises made to them and then broken as they claim? In the absence of anything but the press releases, it is difficult to say. However, I would incline rather to the second supposition. Indeed, I cannot see how it would serve the interests of the Rumanians to act in such a devious way as to further embitter relations with the Soviets, which are already not the best. On the other hand it would not be out of character for the Kremlin, after luring them to Budapest with reassuring promises, to try through indirect means to pressure them on a point where they are particularly vulnerable -- the question of the Israeli-Arab conflict.
The Syrian, Bagdash , is an old Stalinist (trained in the school of Maurice Thorez) and this would not be the first time he has lent himself to an operation of this sort.
A conference will probably be held around the end of this year. But after the walkout of the Rumanians, other delegations -- among them the Italians -have spoken against any more criticizing of other parties and against any decisions binding on all the participants, etc. In other words, after the walkout of the Rumanians, greater reservations have been indicated, signifying that nothing will come out of this conference but vague, empty declarations, with the participants free to interpret them as they see fit.
The Budapest conference was an attempt at limiting the breakup of monolithism and giving an appearance of unity among the apparatuses of the majority of the Communist parties. The outcome was the opposite of what was sought. And this was not simply the result of an incorrect maneuver that can be made up.
We have gone into the reasons for the breakup of Stalinist monolithism many times. Fundamentally, Stalinist monolithism resulted from the consolidation of the bureaucracy around the Kremlin in a period of revolutionary retreat. Today, despite the inevitable ups and downs in the confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution, this period is over. Those directly pitted in conflict with imperialism, like the Vietnamese, the Cubans, and the Koreans, were not at the conference. The Cubans, who do not conceal their intention to aid the revolutionary forces in Latin America, organized an international conference, the OLAS (Organization of Latin-American Solidarity]; and there they did not bother about diplomatic niceties. The Chinese, despite their monstrous bureaucratisn, are not ready to come to an understanding with other bureaucrats whom they are not sure, to say the least, of having on their side in the event of an imperialist attack.
In these circumstances, only the partisans of "peaceful coexistence" came to Budapest, and not all of these. Some, | like the Yugoslavs, and now the Rumanian are taking "socialism in one country," the concept that constitutes their common denominator, to its final conclusion.
Since they are all traveling the road of reformism, headed toward a sort of "social-democratization," their international conference could not fail to exhibit the features of the old Socialist international -- this "international" which has no purpose, whose members maintain relations of a diplomatic nature; that is, amiable hypocrisy until such time as a conflict breaks out among then.
The failure at Budapest found its most glaring expression in regard to the Vietnam war. The conference was preceded by a verbal turn on the part of the Conmmunist party leaderships in favor ofa Vietnamese victory. The conference sent the Vietnamese a lukewarm message of greetings.
But these parties encompassing millions of workers did not even decide to do what the students and organizations composed mostly of youth have been doing for the whole past: period in the United States, in Japan, and in Western Europe, to say nothing of the colonial countries.
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