obtain them because of his bureaucratic control of the top bodies. But in reality he has completely avoided the party, and has employed the Red Guards in order to carry out his purge, or as he calls it, the “
cultural revolution."
Q: What_has been the result of the actions of the Red Guards?
A: We must first understand who the Red Guards are. They are primarily youth. About 60% of them are lower middle-school students, that is, between the ages of 13 and 16. About 30% are high middle-school students between the ages of 16 and 20. Only about 10% of them are university students. Because the overwhelming majority of the Red Guards, especially the lower middleschool students, are so young, they have had no previous political experience, and do not possess any great understanding of politics.
For this reason it is very easy to understand why such elements can be organized behind the campaign to build the cult of Mao, leading to many outlandish and absurd actions, even to attacks upon local party headquarters and officials.
Most of the university students went along at first with the "cultural revolution," but as it developed, these LIN PIAO students, because of their greater political understanding, began to become divided among themselves.
The first actions of the Red Guards were to destroy the "Four Olds" -- old ideas, ola culture, old customs, and old habits -- and to establish the "Four News." This became a slogan: "Destroy the Four Olds and Establish the Four News."
They later continued with such actions as destroying Buddhist sculpture, making people remove western clothing and jewelry, and even invading people's homes and destroying any modern furniture, among other things, which they found.
They changed the names of almost everything in their path, such as streets, stores, buildings and even cemeteries..This and more was all done in the name of carrying the revolution forward against the feudalists, the bourgeoisie, the revisionists, and the imperialists. The People's Daily even commented in an editorial August 28, 1966, that the spiritual face of the country had been changed as a result of Mao Tse-tung's thought.
There were, nevertheless, some progressive slogans and demands. raised by some elements of the Red Guards. One of them was the demand to eliminate the interest payments to the remaining capitalists and to confiscate all their properties. These progressive slogans, however, have not been carried out.
Since the beginning of September the actions of the Red Guards have changed their complexion. At a large meeting of the Red Guards in Peking on August 31, 1966, Lin Piao gave a speech, substituting for Mao, in which he emphatically told the Red Guards that the main aim of the "cultural revolution". was to isolate and purge those party officials who are taking the capitalist road. It was after this speech that the Red Guards began to attack many provincial leaders by name in wall posters. -
It was in retaliation against these attacks that: some of the provincial leaders began to organize the party functionaries and cadres and even some of the workers and peasants, and they proceeded to set up their own Red Guards. These were the organizations that Mao's Red Guards soon began to clash with.
The People's Daily has referred many times. to these clashes. On September 12 it said, "Some responsible leaders in some locals have suppressed the mass movement under many and different pretexts, and they have agitated many of the workers and peasants against the revolutionary students." That is. ito say, they organized the masses against the Red Guards and the "cultural revolution.
LIN PIAO
‘Many of these conflicts ended with hundreds of casualties. For example, in Ching Tao there were more than 140 killed and injured. In Canton there were over 50, and in Lin Wu more than 300.
On September 15, at the third large
meeting of the Red Guards in Peking to be re-
viewed by Mao, Lin Piao made a speech in place
of Mao. What he told the Red Guards, in effect,
was that they must attack all those officials
who are resisting Mao's thought, and that they
must have no fear since the. army was. support—
ing them.
It was after this speech that the Red
Guards began to be much bolder and even un-
restrained. In the wall posters in Peking,
leading party members were named and accused
of taking the capitalist road. The. first secre~
taries of the Southwest, Northwest and North
bureaus, Li Ching-chuan, Liu Lan-tao, and Li
Hsueh-feng -- who had also become first secre-
tary of the Peking party in place of Peng Chen
-- are only three examples.
Simultaneously, officials of the state
began to come under attack. Chen Yi, foreign
minister, Li Hsien-nien, minister of finance,
and especially Po I~po, minister of industry |
‘and communications, are only a few examples.
Finally Liu Shao-chi, president of China, and
Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary. of the party, also
came under attack.
In. the latter part of October a special,
very important meeting was held. This meeting
lasted for 17 days. It was during this meeting
that Liu Shao-chi and Teng. Hsiao-ping were
: forced to make their self-criticisms after _.
CHOU EN-LAI being severely attacked by many of the partic-
ipants. It was just after this meeting that Peng Chen and lu Ting-yi, head of the central propaganda department, were arrested.
It seemed that Mao thought he had beaten the opposition. On December 26 a large victory celebration of the Red Guards was held in Peking, and newspapers like Red Flag (Hung Chi), proclaimed the victory of the "cultural revolution." At. this celebration the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng were revealed for the first time. Nevertheless, we can see by the events from the first two weeks in January that the opposition was far from . béing broken. Q: Since the beginning of the year the newspapers have reported very confusing accounts as to what has been happening in such places as Nanking and Shanghai. Can you
SSS EE eee —eeeeeeeeeeeaoa eee OY Sa SS Ss Jt ee J eee OT eee A: First of all, it “must be noted, that the events in these cities mark a new stage in the development of the struggle. Before, everyone considered these cities to be under the strict control of Mao and Lin's forces. However, the events there have shown the existence of a very powerful resistance. Shanghai. and the surrounding area make up the most industrialized section of China, and Nanking is also an industrial city. It was the party in these cities that organized the opposition, and it has, of course, a very large base in the working class. By granting the workers more pay and more welfare benefits, it has organized the workers against many of the slogans of the "cultural revolution" like "Make the cultural revolution and maintain production." .
This presents a big problem for Mao. The only means he has to suppress such a force is the army. However, it would be very dangerous for him at this time to actively use it. From this angle, then, Mao-is very weak. His strategy in Shanghai has been to try and gain control of the workers' organizations by occupying offices of the trade unions and other workers' institutions. After the occupation of these offices, the leaderships of the organizations were reorganized and Mao placed his own followers in charge. Mao, as far as I know now, seems to have been successful in doing this in the dockers, railway,
and bus workers trade“unions, and‘it is this that his faction refers to when speaking about the victories it has made in the working class in Shanghai.
In Nanking the situation was a little different. The party in this city was able to control the police and army as well as to organize the workers. It appears. that Mao has been: unable to make any headway whatsoever there, and the whole city, therefore, remains under the control of the .opposition.
civil war, to examine the strength of both factions in the eo and in the army.
A: Yes, especially the army. At this point we can very briefly draw a palance sheet as far as the party is concerned. As I stated earlier, the leaders in the. Northwest, Southwest and East bureaus can be considered to stand pretty firmly in the camp of the opposition. The leaders of the North Bureau in general seem to be in support of - the oppo~ sition. However, there are some leaders who support Mao.
The Central South Bureau has been considered a stronghold of Mao and*Lin, although now we have to-consider the situation in light of the recent attacks against Tao Chu, the new chief of the party's central propaganda department, because before assuming his new. post he had been the first secretary of the Central South - Bureau. for many years, and heis:still very influential there. The new first secretary of the bureau, Wang Jim Chung, has ‘also been attacked, which demonstrates that Mao and Lin are not completely in control.
As far as the East Bureau is concerned, the events in Nanking and Shanghai demonstrate that Mao and “Lin have even less control than in the Central South Bureau. It is possible to say, then, that a large majority of the party either supports or sympathizes with the opposition. ~
It is more difficult to judge the relationship of both factions to the army. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration some historical aspects of the army, it makes the situation much easier to judge. 2
The original Liberation Army was divided into several parts. After victory, and Chiang Kai-shek's flight to Taiwan, the different sections of the army were led into a number of different regions. by their commanders. The army led by Lin Piao went from the Northeast to the region’ now controlled by the Central South Bureau. The army led by Peng Teh-huai: went to the -region now under the Northwest Bureau. Liu Po-ching led his army to the area under the Southwest Bureau.
"When Lin Piao left ‘the Northeast," he left behind the native guerrilla ¢ army.’ It is now under the control of- the: Northeast” Bureau. Chen Yi's army occupied the whole area under the control of the-East Bureau.-In the’ Northern Bureau the army was constructed by combining many regional armies under the direct leadership of the North Bureau. As I said earlier, the leadership in each bureau controls that particular: army , and: therefore, we can say generally that-the influence in the army of both factions is’ similar to their relationship in the party. Of course, it is-possible that certain local army leaders are in disagreement: with the bureau leaderships. 7
There are, however, some other factors we have to take into consideration concern-— ing the army. There are figures such as Peng Teh-huai, minister of defense from December 1954 to September 1959, Lo Jui-ching, the chief of staff: from 1959, and especially Chu Teh, the historical leader of the whole army, and Ho Lung, who is also'a historical leader of the army, all of whom wield tremendous influence in the army. All.of these figures have been attacked -- Chu Teh and Lo Lung only recently -- by the Mao-Lin Piao faction which indicates that these leaders have differences with it.
From this we can judge that the position of Mao in the army as a whole’ is. not too favorable. It is precisely because of his weakness that he has attempted to reorganize the army by introducing into it the "Cultural Revolution Committee." This committee sent representatives to the different armies for two-main reasons. One was to find out. what strength the opposition had in the army and on what parts of the army Mao himself could depend. The other was to try and win certain elements in the army to its side, by such methods as bribing certain leaders with promises of promoting them to high posts.
In my opinion, this cannot change-the situation very much in Mao's favor. Of course, the delegatés are met and dealt with very diplomatically, and they show their enthusiastic | agreement with the 16-point program adopted by the Central Committee on August 8, 1966: Yet-in reality it seems most of them are waiting, if not preparing, for | a showdown with Mao in the future. ;
‘There is one ‘other force which is also of importance, and this is the security
forces, both public and secret. This organization was formed right after the CPC took power through Lo Jui-ching with the assistance of many specialists from the-GPU of the USSR. When he resigned from that post in 1959 in order to become chief of staff, Hsieh Fu-chih -- who had worked under the leadership of Teng Hsiao-ping for almost 20 years -took over his post as head of the ministry of public and secret security. Both of these men have been attacked by the Red Guards, and Lo Jui-ching has even been arrested by the - Mao-Lin faction because, as it seems, the police force as a whole, or at least the greater part, are under the influence of the opposition. Recently it seems that Hsieh Fu-chih, under tremendous pressure, especially that of Lin Piao's army surrounding Peking, made a compromise with the Mao-Lin Piao faction, and this explains the statement.of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, that the Red Guards should no longer attack hin.
I must also say a few words about Chou En-lai, who represents somewhat of a third major tendency between the two opposing factions. This tendency is very weak as it has no mass base and is not itself actually struggling for power. The strength it does have comes from its control of the government ministries. To understand the position of this group, it is necessary to describe its leader, Chou En-lai. Politically, he is very weak and has continually, throughout his career, leaned towards the stronger groups when there has been a struggle in the party. Yet, organizationally, he is very capable, and he is valued by the whole party for his abilities in this field. At the present time with Liu Piao's army surrounding Peking and his ministries, he has made a compromise with Mao and is trying to play more or less the role of a compromiser. If the opposition should begin to show its power, however, there is no doubt that he would change his position accordingly.
What the future holds, then, still depends on many factors, domestic and foreign. However, we can make an overall judgment now that Mao's forces are in a minority and that Mao and Lin Piao will not -- unless they take an adventuristic course, or are forced to -- launch a civil war at this time.
9 J was he able to get the party to adopt the 16-point program of Tega 8, "1966?
A: First of all we must not underestimate Mao's influence in the party and in all of China. The CPC conquered power under his leadership. as chairman of the party. Therefore, in the eyes of the masses he is. the great symbol of the victory of the revolution. There is no doubt that even now he still commands respect among a portion of the masses.
However, with the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," his influence was weakened, and the many obvious mistakes in his policies since then, such as his positions on literature and art, education, on the Vietnamese war, and especially on the Indonesian CP, have further tarnished his reputation in the party and among the masses.
Most of Mao's so-called victories have taken place in Peking, such as the adoption of the 16-point program you mentioned by the Central Committee. These "victories" have been almost completely dependent upon one factor -- the army of Lin Piao. It is with the army and the threat of the army that Mao removed Peng Chen, secured the adoption of the 16-point program, forced self-criticisms from leaders such as Liu Shao-chi, forced Hsieh Fu-chih to compromise, etc.
@: Mao accuses his opponents of being capitalist restorationists, revisionist, etc. etc. Yet_no one seems to know for sure what the program of Mao's opposition is and who this opposition represents. Can you clarify the nature of the opposition?
A: The CPC is something like its sister party in the USSR. There is no democratic discussion inside the party; all decisions are handed down from above and must be carried out and obeyed by the cadres and the rank and file. Even in the top bodies such as the Central Committee and the Political Bureau there is generally little discussion. .Only on very critical questions such as the "Great Leap Forward," the People's Communes, and the defeat in Indonesia, has any real discussion taken place inside the top bodies. The oppositions which have developed and attempted to criticize Mao and his programs have in the past been expelled. I have already spoken about Peng Chen, for oxample y and in the first interview, about Peng Teh—-huai.
Under these conditions it is very difficult to learn what the specific program of the opposition in the party is. However, we can get an idea of the opposition's general attitudes from the documents published by the CPC -itself criticizing the opposition, as well as from the writings for which. many intellectuals in the party have been attacked. I will point out what seem to be the main points of disagreement with Mao's faction.
(1) They considered Mao's economic programs like the "Great Leap Forward" --~ espe-
cially the formation of the People's Communes -- to be adventuristic..
(2) In: literature. ‘and art they have felt that Mao! s: ideas are too strict, and that they put a straitjacket on any cre- : ative writing, etc.
(3) Almost.all ‘educators,
professors, teachers, and university students opposed Mao's policies in the educational field because.of their interference with freedom of study, and they felt .it was a waste of time for: them tobe sent into the countryside or into the factories. They felt that Mao's policies on the whole had disrupted the educational systen.
(4) The position of the opposition on international questions is much more difficult to determine because there is much less material. It .is .probably safe to assume that there is general agreement with Lo Jui-ching on the question of how to defend China in case of a possible attack from the U.S..Lo Jui-ching does not seem.to have been: in disagreement about politics being in ‘command -in the army. Rather, it was his position that-:one must recognize the importance of today's type of warfare, especially the role of nuclear weapons. Therefore, he felt that the break with the Soviet -Union on the state level had endangered China's capacity to defend herself militarily against a probable imperialist attack.
(5) Finally on one point .they . LIU SHAO-CHI make themselves very clear. There-is | general disgust with Mao's omniscience and they aemand more discussion. in ‘the party on important questions.
These five points give us a general picture of the ideas and opinions of. the opposition. It is impossible, of course, for us to give a comprehensive explanation of their program, and I doubt that they have one that is systematic and formal. But we can say -: that these make up the most important disagreements with:Mao to be found among the -various members of the opposition.
To understand fully the differences petween. the two. groups, . _I should say something about some particular points in Mao's own program. Since the stated objectives of Mao's formal program do not correspond to the development of the "cultural revolution"-itself, it:is more enlightening to examine the way in which Mao has actually implemented the. "cultural revolution." I. have already described at some length what Mao is doing when I discussed the struggle and its evolution. Briefly, Mao is trying to carry out a purge:in the most undemocratic way, and in fact a-coup d'état. -He has tried. to make himself a Living god and to make his very word law. ‘
It seems that in the recent events another very important disagreement has" arisen between the two factions. The opposition, in order to win over and organize the workers, has granted many concessions in some localities, and has taken measures to raise their standard of living. Mao, with the "cultural revolution," has continually and strongly opposed such measures.
> Q: ‘Does the. opposition, then, represent a democratic force, and what .do you think about the idea which seems to be the most widely accepted, that is, that the main opposition to Mao is Khrushchevist?
- A: The opposition is not homogeneous but is composed of many tendencies. We are able to » distinguish three main currents. The first is found among the top ledders like
LIU SHAO-CHI
\
Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-—ping, and many leaders of the bureaus. This tendency in general represents a bureaucratic group inside the party which is in control of a considerable sector of the party's apparatus. The political traditions of this group organizationally and politically are those of Stalinism.
The second current can be referred to as a "liberalizing" tendency, and is made up of second rank or middle cadres in the party, of which Teng To and Wa. Han are good exam— ples. :
The third current is much more difficult to define because there doesn't seem to be any single leader,.or any well-known cadres for that matter who represent it. But we . can say almost with certainty that this group represents, if not a revolutionary, then a quasi-revolutionary tendency, and is made ‘up primarily of rank-and-file party members.
The third current would, of course, represent a sector of the masses and express most vividly the feelings: of. the population as a whole. The middle layers of the party . have much more contact.in their work with the rank and file, and would therefore be.more likely to reflect the attitudes.of the masses.
It is with sectors of the middle layers that the top leaders have the most contact in their day-to-day party work. For exampie, Teng To was directly under Peng Chen, who was one of the top leaders.-It would have been impossible for Teng To to carry on the work that he did without at least the tolerance, if not the approval, of Peng Chen. “It was Liu Shao-chi's close personal relationship with Peng Chen that probably thrust him into the leadership of the present opposition faction.
In the very top leadership, Mao tolerated no disagreement, and every opposition was expelled. However, because of the past experience of the top leaders in working with the masses, and their connection with the middle layers, some of them reflect in some measure the movement.of the masses. While the middle layers represent the tendency in the party for reform, it is probably. safe to assume that the need for reform-is also recognized by top leadérs who are, nonetheless, more conservative, and who still wish to maintain a tight control over the party. J
The question of Khrushchevism is very important. We‘must first understand what is meant by Khrushchevisn, and especially what Mao means by” Khrushchevism.
There are two different aspects of Khrushchevism: one is political revisionism, which is reactionary; and the other is de-Stalinization, which is progressive.
Mao does not distinguish ‘between these two aspects. He lumps them together under the label of revisionism. Both are reactionary from his point of view, and: -he has said that Khrushchev's policies have restored capitalism in the USSR.
We must understand, then, that anyone agreeing with any aspect of Khrushchevismn is, according to Mao, a revisionist, and wants, or is attempting, to restore capitalisn. From what I have said earlier, you can see that the opposition desires in its own way similar reforms as those ‘carried out under Khrushchevism during de-Stalinization, and.of course these reforms are directed at Mao. = ;
In Mao's opinion, then -- if he actually believes his own propaganda -- such reform measures will lead to a capitalist restoration.
As far as the politically revisionist side of Khrushchevism is concerned, we must recognize that in practice Mao's own policies have not proved to be substantially different, as the events in Indonesia so well demonstrate. It seems that Mao's main objection to the revisionism of Khrushchev has been de~Stalinization. There is no evidence that I know of that the opposition is in any way in disagreement with the official policy of exposing the political revisionism of Khrushchev. Therefore, at least on the question. of de-Stalinization, the stand of the opposition, is the more progressive. In general, the opposition shades from currents that are really Maoist to tendencies: that are quite revolutionary.
Q: What, in your opinion, will be the final outcome of the struggle?
A: Taking into consideration the relationship of forces on each side as I have already « outlined, it is clear that: the odds are against Mao, especially if the organiza-— tion and mobilization of the peasants and workers, which we have seen in the recent events, continues.
If Mao should nevertheless be victorious, I think a sweeping purge comparable to the one in the Soviet Union during the 1930's, if not larger, could occur, and the de-
fenses of the Chinese Revolution would be placed in grave danger. However, if the opposition should win, the most likely result would be a few concessions of a liberalizing nature as well as a shift away from the ultraleft sectarian positions taken by Mao. For example, it is possible they would set up some kind of united front with the other workers states against U.S. imperialism.
There is another important prospect if the opposition should win. If the masses have entered into motion, it will not be so easy for the bureaucracy to stop them or.to contain them within the prescribed limits. In that case, a real massive.struggle for: workers democracy could open up. .
WAR