WHY McNAMARA'S REMOVAL FROM THE PENTAGON STIRS FEAR
By George Novack
President Johnson has suddenly transferred Robert McNamara from the post of secretary of defense where he has served for seven years to the presidency of the World Bank. This move has touched off feverish speculation in diplomatic and political quarters at home and abroad. What does it portend?
The perfunctory explanation in the official statements that McNamara took the step entirely out of personal choice hardly holds water. Tom Wicker of the New York Times categorically asserts that the initiative came from the president. The Washington correspondent wrote on November 30 that "Johnson himself did not inform the Secretary of his nomination to the bank post" but confronted McNamara with the accomplished fact.
What led Johnson to remove McNamnara so stealthily from the third most inportant office in the U.S. government and appoint a new secretary of defense at this time when there is only a year to go in the president's present term? Why did he make a change that he knew would create commotion and even consternation around the world?
Some essential elements for an answer are known. McNamara has been one of the three men in Washington who make the ultimate decisions on foreign policy. He has met regularly at least once a week, sometimes more, with the president and secretary of state to deal with all matters pertaining to the Vietnam intervention. He has been so conspicuous as the chief civilian organizer that at one point it was called "McNamara's war."
However, since the summer of 1966 the defense secretary has developed sharp differences with the joint chiefs of staff over some major issues of military strategy. He has resisted requests for the mobilization of reserves to amplify the numbers of American troops beyond 525,000 to fight the ground war in the south. Against the generals, he favored the erection of an anti-infiltration barrier along the seventeenth parallel which divides the north from the south. He reportedly regards the $5 billion antimissile missile system he recently announced as a waste of money.
No admirer of the achievements of General Westmoreland, he has: been increasingly critical of the commander's tactics and displeased with the progress of the war which he knows is not going so well as the official optimists claim in public. He has angered the admirals by overriding on grounds of economy their recommendations for more aircraft carriers.
His main disagreement with the military leaders has concerned bombing targets in North Vietnam. McNamara has advised against bombing too close to the Chinese border or striking at the docks in Haiphong harbor. Since the generals have won out, U.S. planes have been bombing within seven miles of Chinese territory and hitting warehouses close to the docks.
In addition to these quarrels with the Pentagon chiefs, McNamara has offended key industrial interests over such disputes as the TFX fighter plane, longrange bombers and similar military hardware decisions involving billions of dollars in lucrative contracts. As secretary of defense, the former head of Ford Motors controlled the expenditure of $80 billion, well over half the federal budget.
Consequently, he has been looked upon by "doves" and "hawks" alike as the most persuasive voice for restraint upon the Pentagon brass hats among the men closest to Johnson.
The president's move to dump his defense chief must be interpreted as a victory for the joint chiefs of staff and the advocates of widening the war and fighting on regardless of costs and consequences in the powerful armed services committees of Congress, in the State Department and on the White House staff. That is how the news has been received in both camps.
Thus the 1964 Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, whose policy Johnson has been pursuing, stated that the decision was a "combination of McNamara wanting to move and Johnson wanting him to." In any event, he added, "I'm very glad he's leaving."
On the other hand, Professor John Galbraith characterized McNamara's departure as a triumph for the conservative forces and the generals "who have found him an inconvenient voice for restraint" and prefer a more compliant man in that cabinet seat. Arthur Schlesinger, the academic adviser to the Kennedys, deplores his removal "as ominous and scary." Their attitude appears justified by the fact that Rusk, the main target of the "doves" on Capitol Hill, stays in office while McNamara is on his way out.
Johnson's surrender to the brass hats is connected with plans under discussion to escalate nilitary operations
in Southeast Asia which raises problems in regard to the forthcoming presidential campaign. By dismissing McNamara and appeasing the generals, Johnson is free to widen the war without risking a public policy row between the joint chiefs and the defense secretary which might have ended in resignations on either side. Such a contretemps would have been highly embarrassing during an election year.
Mary McGrory reported from Washington in the November 28 New York Post that "the President is increasingly desperate to end the war which has cost him popularity and prestige and mounting criticism. McNamara's removal would make a decision to intensify and hopefully end the war by 1968 presumably unanimous with~ in the government.'
She pointed out that “his removal to the World Bank post...insures his silence. International servants do not speak out against national policy from the counting-houses."
While official circles deny that McNamara was shifted to clear the way for new nilitary actions, this supposition was given credence by General Eisenhower's television interview with former General of the Army Omar Bradley coinciding with the announcement. The former president proposed that land forays be made into North Vietnam as well as neutral Laos and Cambodia and favored hot pursuit by air into China. Respect for boundary lines on a map can be overdone, he said.
According to the November 30 New York Times, some senior military men believed that "General Eisenhower may have been asked by the Administration to float the idea to test the reaction, both among the American people and in Moscow and Peking."
That same day the apprehensive Times editors complained of this reversal of position by Eisenhower who had warned against involving American forces in a major war on the Asian mainland and rejected escalation in favor of negotiation when he was in the White House. They observed that "Eisenhower's remarks will strengthen fears at home and abroad -fears that we hope are groundless (our emphasis) -- that the United States is preparing to widen its present 'limited' war that has already exceeded reasonable bounds. His unfortunate remarks could hasten that genuine possibility."
While the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff conceded that plans are being studied for invading North Vietnam, he contended that these are solely for contingency purposes and have not yet been recommended. Nevertheless, some highly placed congressional critics fear that expansion is on the doorstep as McNamara goes out. Thus Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield expressed the hope that "McNamara's leaving will not mean in the months ahead further escalation of the bombing in North Vietnam or of the war to other areas."
McNamara's fall demonstrates how greatly the power of the military has grown in national affairs. They are in the ascendancy in shaping government policy at the behest of the most recklessly aggressive imperialist forces among the ruling class. Now, even Eisenhower, despite his warning against the danger of the “industrial-military complex" at the end of his administration, is peddling their arguments.
Johnson has plunged ahead without letup in Southeast Asia since he ordered the first bombings of North Vietnam in February 1965. Now, according to certain of his friends, McNamara himself is worried lest further escalation provoke a confrontation with the Soviet Union or China. His dismissal can only be viewed as an alarm signal in every capital not vassalized to Washington.
It will surely intensify the unpopularity of the president and his war among the American people and spur the antiwar movement to more vigorous actions against his disastrous course in Vietnam.