SATO'S PILGRIMAGE TO WASHINGTON
By Les Evans
Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato arrived in Washington November 14 in hope of gaining a political concession from Lyndon Johnson, thereby demonstrating to his left-wing critics at home that his policy of prostration before the American colossus is a paying one.
Sato wanted a promise that Japanese territories, under U.S. military occupation since the close of World War II, would be returned. The public pressure on Sato to produce on this was immense.
The widely read Asahi Evening News commented in a front-page story November 13 that "Compared to his previous visit to America in January 1965 -- more or less a courtesy call -- this visit has a very important political aim -- return of the Okinawa and Bonin islands."
The Yomiuri declared more sensationally in a banner headline November 12, "Sato Leaves Today in Bid to Set Date of Okinawa Return."
Sato himself described his intentions more modestly. Mentioning that on his last visit Johnson had given him a 10-gallon Texas hat, he expressed the hope that "This time I'd like to get something to go in the hat."
And so Mr. Sato appeared in Washington, hat in hand.
Johnson, a wheeler-dealer well known for his insistence on reciprocity, suggested that Sato meet him halfway by putting up some political collateral.
After Sato had negotiated with Johnson for two days, the pair issued a joint communiqué November 15. The New York Times described Sato's part of the trade:
"For his part, the Japanese leader offered President Johnson explicit support of the Administration's policy in Vietnam." He even went so far as to demand "reciprocal action" by Hanoi in return for any halt in American bombing of North Vietnam.
For Johnson this uncritical endorsement of his war by an important Asian head of state was as good as gold in the face of his declining popularity at home. What, then, did the wily Texas horse trader put up in return?
Not Okinawa, certainly, but to preserve at least the appearance ofa meeting of equals Sato was promised the Bonin Islands as a consolation prize.
The first reaction of the American press was to hail Johnson's generosity and the wisdom of Sato's pro-American policy. The second reaction was to consult an atlas to discover what Sato's reward consisted of.
Okinawa, which Johnson refused to consider returning to Japan, has a Jdapanese population of one million. U.S. forces there operate a multibillion dollar complex of air, ground and missile bases.
Tankers from Okinawa refuel Guambased B-52 bombers bound for Vietnam. Nuclear weapons are stockpiled on the island for use against China through an extensive network of Mace-B missiles and F-105 jets fitted to carry nuclear bombs.
Sato's prize, on the other hand, has a population of about 200 people. The American complex there consists of a single navy weather station manned by 77 men.
But Johnson's back of the hand treatment of Sato may cause both of them more trouble than he bargained for. The New York Times, looking further than the Pentagon brasshats, toward the scheduled renewal of the U.S.-dJapan security treaty in 1970, declared November 17:
"Without a settlement, the Japanese leftists will be handed a potent emotional issue to exploit in their likely attempt to break off the American alliance. Important as Okinawa is to the United States as a military staging area in the Far East, it pales before the momentous importance of the alliance with Japan."
All major newspapers in Japan have deplored Sato's failure to recover Okinawa. Within his own Liberal Democratic party important figures have called the results of the talks "a big disappointment."
The rising wave of revulsion against U.S. aggression in Vietnam that is sweeping Japan will hardly be mollified by Sato's obsequious yes-man performance in Washington.
One of the most important symptoms of the trouble lying ahead for Sato erupted in Okinawa itself November 20. More than 100,000 demonstrators, ten percent of the entire population, marched through the streets of Naha demanding that the U.S. get out of Okinawa.
Sato got something in his hat, but not what he bargained for.