documents constantly cite Mao's writings in support of current positions which go far back into the past and obviously refer to very different situations. Even the famous little book which has been the primary instrument for educating and mobilizing the Red Guards is very largely based on old quotations.
A characteristic of the present Maoist conceptions is a rather pessimistic view of the phase of transition from capitalism to socialism. Mao believes that this phase will extend over a rather long period, for decades and even centuries (see, for example, Pékin Information, No. 52, 1966, p. 27, and the article appearing in Liberation Daily, May 4, 1966). Furthermore, the danger of restorationist degeneration is denounced in terms which could lead one to believe that this is a very probable if not largely inevitable outcome.
The attempts made to point out the origins of this process of eventual degeneration are significant chiefly in the sense that they enable us to perceive a salient feature of current Maoist methodology: the primacy accorded to the subjective factor.
While the Maoists sometimes point out specific agents of degeneration, such as material stimuli which give rise to privileged positions in general, emphasis is not put on phenomena and tendencies in the system itself which would favor capitalist restoration. Instead, they profess the view that this degeneration is bound up with a kind of moral degeneration in which egoistic motives gain ascendancy over heroic collectivist motives. Most of the documents which raise this question make it clear enough in the last analysis that moral and ideological degeneration produces the first breaches in the systen, thereby opening the way for restorationist tendencies.
The means envisaged for struggling against this danger of degeneration are of a subjective and "moral" character: an ideological hard line taking classical sectarian forms which, in the cultural area, borders on Zhdanov-like dogmatism; rejection of material stimuli carried to an absurd extreme; criticism of "economism"; and glorification, first and foremost, of the spirit of sacrifice, which is the primary characteristic of all the positive heroes presented in day-to-day propaganda. It goes without saying that no one denies the merits of certain points pertaining to a collectivist society.
In fact, in the face of tendencies which have developed in the USSR and the European peoples democracies, and the ideological tendencies flowing from then, a reaffirmation of the underlying motifs of a communist outlook and mentality is in itself legitimate. However, the danger of degeneration has its roots primarily in the economic, social and political structures. The real reason that the Maoists pose this question in unrealistic terms is that they tend inevitably to try to conceal the paramount problem of the transitional phase which, as historical experience up till now has shown, is not capitalist restoration but bureaucratic degeneration.
Moreover, the Maoist propaganda reflects a tendency which is not new to the history of the Chinese Communist party: the tendency to attribute absolute theoretical validity to ideas and motifs justified in actuality by empirical considerations. For example, when the Peoples Communes were launched, instead of first and foremost explaining the concrete and immediate reasons for the turn (chiefly the need to make better use of underemployed manpower), the official propaganda presented the Communes as a realization of the norms of a communist society -- a pizarre identification of the relative equality of a primitive Spartan regime with the real equality which will mark a society based on incomparably more developed productive forces.
Recently, the Maoists have come up with a theory, uniquely transcending the division of labor, that it may be necessary for all effective forces to carry out an array of very diverse tasks together with military duties; this would have practical significance in the exceptional circumstances created by the immediate threat of an imperialist aggression and still more so in those created by an out-— break of war. More generally, one notes the tendency in official propaganda to exalt the standards and conduct during the heroic Yenan period, actually characterized by very special conditions, as the purest expression of communism and the collectivist mentality. (15)
Two opposite but equally incorrect attitudes must be avoided in regard to such ideological orientations: the attitude of those who reject the general formulas for their intrinsic weakness and disregard their practical import, and the outlook of those who also pay little attention to their origins and concrete import but content themselves with the abstract formulas alone.
The equalitarian theme in particular, one of the central motifs of Maoist propaganda in recent years, must be judged in accordance with this kind of criteria. It would be a mistake either to disregard its factionally heightened demagogic and propagandistic character or to regard it as pure and simple humbug: It would be wrong on the one hand to overlook the basis for such motifs (the Yenan period, the fact that the bureaucratic layers are not as hardened and fully developed in China) and, on the other hand, to disregard the import such propaganda may have regardless of the subjective intent of the leading groups (the experience of the crisis following August 1966 is quite revealing on this score). Another side to the Maoist ideology which has held a certain attraction for young left circles is its glorification of the rebellious spirit, of renovating struggle against any sclerosis deriving from the past. Once again the distinction between the practical import of a point and its intrinsic ideological merits must be clearly noted. Obviously, the very fact that this praising of the rebellious spirit goes hand in hand with the most extreme cult of Mao, making the
(15) Recalling the heroic period is a strong point in Maoist propaganda, especially with war in prospect. But can the circumstances of that time be repeated? That is far from certain, especially if one accepts the possibility that sooner or later an imperialist war against China would be transformed into a worldwide conflict. leader's thought the supreme test of every idea and action, belies any such merits. A Red Guard notice which appeared at the University of Shanghai and which was widely taken up in the official publications expresses this underlying contradiction in a condensed and inadvertently paradoxical form: "In a word we will rebel against anyone who dares to oppose Chairman Mao and his thought." (Hsinhua, January 20, 1965, p. 13.
In our polemics with student and intellectual groups with pro-Chinese leanings, we must draw special attention to the methods and conceptions which Mao and his supporters have reaffirmed in the cultural field. Here, we must note not only that a degeneration has occurred with respect to the best period of the so-called one hundred flowers campaign but that there has even been a step backward by comparison with a more recent period when polemics developed rather openly, even though, as we have already pointed out, specialized publications were the preferred media for this. Comparison with the methods and conceptions of Zhdanov is entirely proper: The whole classical repertoire of monstrous distortions and falsifications has been utilized to the fullest, especially in widely circulated articles aiming to discredit permanently persons like Chou Yang, Chen Po-tsa, orothers. This was particu~ larly apparent in the January 1967 polemics against Chou Yang, which Comrade Novack analyzed in an interesting article published in World Outlook (March 10, 1967]. (16)
We have already pointed out elsewhere the reasons for this very severe barrage. Basically, what was involved was fear that a relatively homogeneous opposition nucleus with an all-embracing political program might develop in intellectual circles. The criticisms of Teng To for glorifying the role of miscellaneous scholars and wanting to stick his nose into everything are particularly instructive on this score.
The Opposition Groups
and Our Arena of Work
I will not repeat the points made in the draft document. I will limit myself to noting again that since the fall of 1966 certain oppositionists have been more and more frequently characterized as "left opportunists" and that the supporters of the Shanghai strikes and demonstrations have been accused of trying to hide behind
(16) It is important to note, however, that much more flexible methods have been enployed in some scientific fields, for obvious reasons. Among other things, in these fields there has been no wholesale condemnation of the contributions of foreign countries, capitalist countries included.
left slogans and labels. Our press, moreover, has printed the report that a wall newspaper accused Kang Sheng of having defended a Trotskyist student [World Outlook, February 3, 1967).
All this is a reflection of a more general situation about which we know very little. It seems certain in any case that as the movement developed, groups of militants and cadres began to function as a revolutionary left tendency and to voice their own ideas and slogans.
In other words, my estimation is that there exists a whole gamut of left opposition elements and groups which developed at different times and which have played very different roles among themselves in the present crisis. The sectors foremost in formulating ideas, and even perspectives, were probably the political-intellectual groups which manifested themselves already in 1956-57, sometimes expressing positions which tended toward revolutionary Marxism. Some of them were in the party and state apparatus, even at rather high levels, and they seem to have carried on factional activity in accordance with a unified tactical scheme. In the mass movement, the tendencies most promising for the formation of a real revolutionary left probably emerged from supporters of the Mao group -- from those who acted in unorthodox ways in the effort to apply their own line, or their own interpretation of Mao's line, and most of all to give more precise content to some current propaganda slogans.
Revolutionary Marxists cannot pass over such an analysis in formulating a political platform and tactic. In particular, account must be taken of the level of understanding and political maturity of these layers, which are largely conmposed of youth, both in the choice of the most important themes to be advanced as well as in the formulas and terminology to be used.
The Chinese events have again confirmed a point which has not escaped our movement since the Revolution Betrayed and the "Transitional Program": the bureaucracy is not a homogeneous reactionary mass but rather is greatly differentiated, both vertically and horizontally. It can undergo profound divisions when crises occur, with some of its layers fighting ferociously to defend their positions while others seek to link up with the mass movement, whose success they can objectively facilitate. This is one of the lessons of the 19543 events in Berlin and East Germany, of the Hungarian Revolution, and the Polish October in 1956; it is a lesson of the Chinese crisis of 1966-67.
We are not going to restate the fundamental causes of this phenomenon here. It is sufficient to recall that such tendencies are playing a much greater role in the case of China than elsewhere, both for historical reasons (the experience of: the war against Japan and the civil war, the fact that the present leading group led the party during this experience, etc.) and for structural reasons having to do with the post-revolutionary period (the fact that the bureaucracy has developed to a much more limited extent in Chinese society than elsewhere).
Some Conclusions
What possibility is there that the present crisis can be overcome? At this juncture, a phase of relative détente is apparent: the Mao group is doing its best to reestablish some kind of equilibrium and get some kind of renovated apparatus going which could handle the situation. For the moment, as we have seen, the actual solution has been ever more extensive use of the army.
But whatever the vicissitudes in the short run, the tendency will be for these tensions and conflicts to continue, for, aside from the plethora of very general proclamations, no real solution of the problems at the root of the crisis has been undertaken.
We have not discussed the economic situation in our report. We are convinced, indeed, that while economic difficulties spurred the tensions of the 1959-62 period in a direct and immediate way, the same cannot be said for the 1964-65 period. It is not possible to get a complete picture for 1966, but many indications lead me to believe that it was a rather good year. Industrial production rose by 20 percent and the financial and market situations were generally positive. The figures for foreign trade reached record heights in almost all sectors.(16) In other words, the political crisis has probably not had harmful effects on the economy.(17) This does not exclude the possibility that such difficulties may develop over the long run and, in fact, concern over the tempo and
(16) Hsinhua, January 4, 1967, p. 3; and the account Le Monde gives of a press conference of a Chinese representative in Paris.
(17) Serious difficulties have shown up in transport as a result of the Red Guard migrations. As for the phenomena which occurred at Shanghai -- scarcity of certain goods and inflationary tendencies due to concessions made to the workers and a wave of buying by the apprehensive populace -they could not have had an effect on the 1966 balance sheet (Hsinhua, January 20, 1965, p. 22).
level of production is now being voiced to a greater extent. There will certainly be difficulties and the intervention of the army in production cannot solve them.
I would also mention another area where tensions have already developed and may again arise, i.e., in relations with the national minorities. The international press has published sensationalist accounts, but in some regions the crisis has posed some very delicate problems. Moreover, problems had also developed in this regard in previous years.(18
On international questions, the Mao group does not yet seem to have drawn the lessons from some very grave blows which it has suffered. Thus, the line for the countries involved in the colonial revolution has in no way been rectified as a result of the tragic defeat of the Indonesian Communist party. So far, it has preferred to hold its peace on this subject, going no further than the repetition of standard propaganda themes (it is significant that the documents on the PKI's {Partai Kommunis Indonesia -- Indonesian Communist party] self-criticism were made public not by Peking but by Tirana). The Chinese have not changed their methods either with respect to the international workers movement (polemics in which epithets and insults prevail over arguments, crude retorts to dissenters -- as in the case of the Japanese Communist party, boundless and often grotesque magnification of small groups and personalities who represent absolutely nothing).
But the fundamental question is still the war in Vietnam. There is no need for us to go over again the failings and contradictions of the Chinese line on this question. Many months of "Cultural Revolution" have not helped to correct this line or to make it more concrete. Therefore, new discussions and conflicts on this question, which is absolutely vital for the future of China itself, are in prospect in the Chinese Communist party.
In conclusion, I would like to make a few observations on building a new vanguard, which is the prerequisite for resolving the crisis in both the short and long run. We cannot yet say what level has been reached because it cannot be known exactly to what extent the apparatus has come apart or to what extent it can be put back together. In addition to what has been previously stated, it may be noted here that there have been
(18) For example, see the reference to a "counterrevolutionary" uprising in a report in 1962 by Chou En-lai, Pékin Information, No. 1, 1965, p. 16.
very significant advances in this process,
to an extent inconceivable a year and a
half ago. On the side of objective condi-
tions, the crisis of the bureaucratic
system has led to the mobilization of
revolutionary cadres and militants in
mass activity neither planned nor con-
trolled from above. Subjective conditions
have also ripened. For the first time
broad sections of the masses have moved
into conflict with the bureaucratic lead-
ers. Slogans and demands representative
of the needs of the decisive social strata
have been proclaimed and, last but not
least, many workers and young students
have gained organizational experience
outside the traditional apparatus.
All this must be taken account of
in the total balance sheet of the crisis.
Comrade Germain's contribution to
the discussion may be considered in large
part complementary to the report. The most
interesting part dealt with the tensions
at work in Chinese society and I agree
with his points of correction on the fac-
tors which provoked the outbreaks among
the workers.
I also concur with some of Germain's
statements regarding the youth, which can
serve to complement the analysis contained
in this report.
On the other hand, his analysis of
the situation among the peasants is not
convincing -- at least, it does not jus-
tify immediate tensions. But my chief
disagreement is over his interpretation
of the mass mobilizations carried out con~
currently by both the Mao tendency and the
opposition around different themes. I
point out that Comrade Germain has not ad-
duced any concrete argument to support his
interpretation and, moreover, that he hin-
self has admitted that it probably does
not hold true for the case of Shanghai,
which indeed is by far the most important.
Therefore, his conclusions on the way the
differences which have arisen among the
masses can be overcome seem to me to lie
essentially in the realm of abstraction.
As for the remarks various comrades
made on special questions, I note only
that the report deliberately avoided some
questions due to the prior existence of
the United Secretariat document of Novem-
ber and the draft declaration. If the
International Executive Committee decides
to adopt a document of broader scope, I
would have no objection to introducing
ideas such as those suggested by the Greek
comrade.
Almost all the comrades who have
taken part in the discussion have declared
themselves in favor of explicitly accept-
ing the concept of political revolution
against the bureaucracy in the case of China. I am in agreement on this fundamental point and, moreover, I note in this connection the following important passage from the United Secretariat declaration of November 1966:
"The struggle against such a leadership can only be brought to a close by bringing about a qualitative change in the political regime -- through a deepgoing mobilization of the masses which can break up the structure of the bureaucratic system and through the activity
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