Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

I'he Dominican Left Discuss Problems of Their Revolution

· World Outlook Vol. 5, No. 19, 12 May 1967 · pp 490-491 · 1,484 words

National liberation

PROBLEMS OF THEIR REVOLUTION

By Antonio Valdés

As repressions continue in the Dominican Republic so do the ideological discussions on the left in an effort to evaluate the experience of the Dominican revolution and find a new path forward.

While ultraleft Maoism is strong, reflected especially in its influence in the Revolutionary Movement of the 14th of June [1-J-4], there is also increased interest in Trotskyism. The widely read magazine Ahora, for example, found it expedient to print an article by the anti- Marxist Social Democrat Victor Alba which under guise of a historical review, twists and distorts the record of Trotsky and Trotskyism. Even in the pro-Moscow current, in the Dominican Communist party [PCD -- Partido Comunista Dominicana], there has been a symptomatic leftward shift of position.

The shift in the PCD is worth looking at because some of the recent PCD statements raise questions of importance, although their answers are inadequate.

Last October the party issued a manifesto stating their position on the Dominican political crisis. In it they declared that the present struggle of the Dominican people is geared toward the "restoration of the constitutionalist government of the April Revolution headed by Colonel Caamafio, based on the 1963 constitution, the democratic program of our people which constitutes their immediate task."

Such a government, said the manifesto, would unify "all the democratic and political sectors and all the classes interested in the defense of the national interest and the establishment of a revolutionary democracy." According to the PCD, such "unity" is the required premise for achieving "the ultimate socialist objectives," at which it is impossible to arrive without going through certain "transitional stages of struggle."

In January of this year, the PCD repeated the same position in a new manifesto. Among other things, they declared: "For the proletariat and its political party, the replacement of the Balaguer government by a nationalist and revolutionary government, such as that headed by Caamano in April 1965, constitutes a tactical objective closely related to the strategic objectives (socialist) of the Dominican revolution. Such a change corresponds to the necessary carrying out of the democratic and anti-imperialist tasks, which because of the characteris-— tics of our historical development, precede the achievement of the supreme objectives of the proletariat: socialism and communism."

What is this but a subtle restatement of the two-stage theory of Menshevism, refuted not only in theory but by history in the Bolshevik revolution fifty years ago?

The January statement of the PCD was subjected to serious criticism in the Dominican left. For example, the 1-J-4 pointed out that the true tactical objective of the Dominican revolution is to "struggle for a revolutionary government led politically by the working class."

But rather than a separate stage, said the 1-J-4, the "achievement of this objective is closely linked with the socialist revolution, for a government of that type, achieved through .an armed struggle that would defeat the oligarchy and the Yankees, would be nothing less than a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The 1-J-4 criticized the PCD for implying that the achievement of this objective would be easy. The 1-J-4 held that, on the contrary, it would require "a long process of armed struggle which would organize the forces and establish a United Front led politically by the working class and its party, which would take power by violently overthrowing the Yankee-led oligarchic power."

In response to this and similar criticism, the PCD in mid-March published a statement of clarification of its views. Most significantly, the party for the first time accepted, at least verbally, the notion of armed struggle.

"It is time to speak of a true revolution, to admit the new and superior forms of struggle, armed struggle, as inevitable." The statement went on to say that "the revolution has not failed; on the contrary, the central task of the proletariat is to carry through the antiimperialist revolution."

But here, the previous line was restated. "The struggle for a revolutionary government like that of April" is a tactical phase of the anti-imperialist revolution.

Among the tactics which the PCD , says are necessary are (1) the need to incorporate the liberal sectors of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie into the revolution; and (2) the need for

a national liberation government unifying all classes opposed to imperialism, which would "inevitably" lead to socialism.

Class collaboration and compromise it can ‘be seen, are still at the heart of their program. ‘This can be seen more clearly in their discussion of the role of “commando” groups in the April revolution.

The PCD's main assurance that a "national unity" government like that of Caamafio would lead to socialism is based on their analysis of the role of the commando groups, the fighting squads, of the constitutionalist uprising of April. Their stress on these armed groups also makes them sound militant and in favor of armed struggle.

They say that the establishment of workers and peasants "commandos" must be the "fundamental base" of a national liberation government, and they explain that the establishment of such organs would give the proletariat political hegemony in a national liberation government.

Looking back at the commandos of the April revolution, they claim that "in general they were not controlled by the bourgeoisie, and the changes in them were progressively in favor of the political position of the proletariat." This, claims the PCD, "limited the power of the bourgeoisie" and gave the Caamafio government its character as a "national liberation" government. The proletariat in arms would have been decisive, they say, in ultimately transforming the Caamano regime into a dictatorship of the proletariat "once the democratic and antiimperialist tasks had been realized and once the bourgeoisie had been defeated."

This sounds like an echo of "Defeat Franco first, then the revolution."

The role of the commando groups in the April revolution is indeed important; such formations could be decisive in any new advance of the Dominican revolution. But the PCD assertion that the: commandos were not controlled by the bourgeoisie and increasingly favored the political positions of the proletariat completely overlooks the political role of Caamafio as the virtually unchallenged head of the revolutionary forces. Was there any clear-cut alternative put forward politically by the commandos to oppose Caamaflio's; i.e., Bosch's and the PRD's policy of compromise with imperialism?

It is true that the armed masses wanted to continue struggling to the end, that they wanted to defeat imperialisn. But they had no organized leadership that could counter that of Caamafio. There was a failure of revolutionary leadership. The commandos were indeed a strong social force in the revolution, but a strong back without a will has-been put to many an alien use in the long history of class warfare.

The power of the commandos was limited and disoriented. by the lack of a political program and a ‘political leadership voicing proletarian demands and needs. Allowing for the weaknesses of historical analogy, one might say that the incipient Soviets were there but the Bolshevik party was missing.

Likewise in Germany and Austria in 1918, the armed groups of the proletariat predominated socially, but Social Democracy with its strategy of sellout retained the helm politically.

Thus the determining factor ina future uprising will not be the establishment of commandos alone. The decisive question will be: Who will lead the commandos, the revolutionary Marxists or the liberal bourgeoisie?

The PCD is correct to call for organization of workers and peasants commandos. But with its call for unity of classes in a national liberation government it is denying the political hegemony to the proletariat in advance. The call for unity of classes whose fundamental social interests are diametrically opposed is sheer utopia. The lessons of modern times, from the massacre of workers in China in 1927 to the blood bath in Indonesia today, should have shown once and for all what disaster the "alliance" with the liberal bourgeoisie brings to the proletariat.

In short, the PCD still adheres to the classic Stalinist "mistake": an alli+ ance with the liberal sectors of the class enemy to confront imperialism.

As Che Guevara says, in his message made public April 17, 1967:

"The indigenous bourgeoisies have lost all capacity to oppose imperialism, if they ever had any -- and constitute only a last trump. No other alternative exists -- it's either a socialist revolution or a caricature of a revolution."

The PCD reassures us, "The partic-— ipation of the liberal bourgeoisie in the patriotic struggle is not under any circumstances decisive. Constantly it will swim in two waters....But it maintains democratic and nationalist positions which permit in certain circumstances concrete alliances."

Well, then, if they aren't decisive, and they're not always in our water, let us not change our program to accom-— modate them. Struggle for a workers and peasants government and a socialist revolution -- let them come swim in that water if they are willing.

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