IRONIES OF HISTORY, Essays on Contemporary Communism, by Isaac Deutscher. Oxford University Press, London. 1966. 278 pp. $5.75.
The book which was recently published under this title is a collection of studies written by Isaac Deutscher between 1953 and 1965. Those who have already read these articles will find nothing new in the book. Nonetheless a collection of items composed as the events occurred facilitates a study in retrospect that is not without interest. It is well known how bewildering the phenomenon of Stalinism was during its rise, not only for those lacking social criteria by which to judge it but also for those who could find an orientation through the criteria advanced by Trotsky on the bureaucracy and the isolated workers state that suffered bureaucratic degeneration.
Today these criteria stand with Marxism in general -- even those who deny their validity cannot help but utilize them in their thinking when they deal with the Soviet Union.
But the disintegration of Stalinism in both the USSR and the official Communist movement now presents aspects that are not less unexpected and not less unforeseen and often bewildering. To reach a profound understanding of these requires "successive approximations." In such a context, going back over the ground, as Deutscher's book compels us to, is instructive. We can even say that it is precisely the points on which events have compelled a modification of the line of thought which are the most interesting.*
Deutscher's earliest articles in this collection were written at the time of Stalin's death. There were very few then who, like Deutscher, understood that the bureaucratic regime could not, with or without Stalin, continue to resort to the methods of repression and terror without risk of provoking serious explosions. But what is striking in these articles is the great hopes which Deutscher placed in the rate and the outcome of de-Stalinization.
This is all the more noticeable in view of the fact that later, particularly after the ouster of Khrushchev, in dealing with its causes, Deutscher came very close to the Soviet reality. What "de-Stalinization" meant for the leaders of the Soviet Union, and the stages in this "de-Stalinization," is told in a few pithy sentences:
"They denounced after the event the rule of the single leader but see nothing wrong in the rule of the single faction, which in its turn was rooted in the rule of the single party." (Page 10.)
"Looking back upon the post-Stalin era, one can see that it falls into two distinct chapters; the first, covering the period from 1953 till 1959, was crowded with intense reformist activity and was alive with de-Stalinization; the second, extending over the remaining years of Khrushchev's government, was on the whole characterized by stagnation and even retrogression." (Page 124.)
"As a rule the reorganizations changed the modes in which control over the bureaucracy was to be exercised from above; they hardly ever created any opening for control from below." (Page 128.)
Deutscher does not have the least illusion about Khrushchev's successors; he sees them as men of only mediocre stature, without a future, because they are incapable of rising to the present needs of Soviet society, which he defines in these terms:
"What is at stake is no longer the 'right' of a Leader and a ruling group to terrorize the nation, but the very essence of their political monopoly, their right to speak for a people which is not allowed to speak for itself. The predicaments with which the Soviet Union is contending at present call not for a new dose of patriarchal-bureaucratic 'liberalism,' but for genuine liberty and a genuine advance to socialism." (Page 133.)
With regard to this, beginning on page 138, Deutscher in a searching way presents on the one hand the changes that have occurred in the relations between the top leadership and the bureaucracy as compared to Stalin's time, and on the other hand the lack of substantial changes between the bureaucracy and the masses. He emphasizes very strongly the contradictoriness of this situation and also its unhealthy consequences in Soviet society.
But how can this contradiction be resolved? "The opening, the unequivocal opening, of a truly new phase of the Russian -- and not only Russian -- revolution is long overdue." (Page 143, my emphasis.) With these words, Deutscher, at bottom, comes up against the problem of a political revolution in the Soviet Union.
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With regard to the international policies of the Soviet authorities, Deutscher points forcefully to the fact that from Stalin to the present leaders, they have not aimed at subverting the capitalist world and that their attitude towards the revolutionary movements and towards the workers states is determined by "reasons of state" which at bottom signify trying to maintain the status quo in a world that is continually moving. It is all the more necessary to remember this inasmuch as working-class militants in their great majority have long been aware of this, although the capitalist leaders often act as if they were unaware of it.
In the articles dealing with the international crisis in the official Communist movement, the crisis of the international disintegration of Stalinism, Deutscher offers a very valuable contribution showing how the differences were born and how they developed under the apparent monolithism which masked them for such a long time. His contribution on Maoism is particularly interesting.
Nevertheless, he takes a certain analogy too far in his article "Three Currents in Communism." Without any doubt at the time he wrote the article, it was correct to put the spotlight on the differences that existed between a right wing (in which Tito and Togliatti could be considered as the most representative figures), a center (around Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership), and a left wing (including the then apparently united Chinese leadership). Under these conditions the temptation was understandable of recalling the differences between the Left Opposition, the centrist bureaucratic faction and the Right Opposition into which the Bolshevik party and the International Communist movement was divided at one time.
But the analogy cannot be carried so far as to ask, in conclusion, as Deutscher does, if the Communist movement can regenerate itself. Underestimation of the bureaucratic degeneration, it appears to us, is involved in this. We do not doubt that there are still considerable revolutionary forces within the Communist parties and this has tactical implications in various countries. But the Communist parties are all deeply rotted organizations.
Since Deutscher wrote this article, that is, a little more than three years, several new developments have highlighted the extent and also the meaning of the disintegration of the movements having a Stalinist origin and leadership.
In the parties having mass influence, like those in France and Italy, the rightist orientation has become accentuated to such a degree that the differences with the Social Democracy are hardly noticeable in daily political activities and in theoretical questions, remaining solely in the tie with Moscow in the sense that these formations see the economic development of the USSR as the main factor in the march of humanity toward socialism.
The rightist evolution of the Soviet leaders is equally evident.
As for the Chinese leaders, the unfolding of the "cultural revolution" proves among other things that one cannot expect from them a return to free criticism, to discussion, to democratic methods.
On the other hand, genuinely progressive development is discernible in the Cuban leadership, the decisive sector of which did not originate in a movement that had been under a Stalinist leadership. There is material for a supplementary chapter on the role of the personality in history, as well as a chapter concerning the influence which the condition of being a small workers state in proximity to American imperialism has had on the politics of the leadership of that state.
If there is a real "irony of history," it is certainly in this surprising development of a revolution at the very doorstep of imperialism which is today proving to be more combative and richer in ideas than movements having at their disposal much greater material means.
However slow and complex the beginnings may be along the road to the renewal of communism, it must not be forgotten that the progress made is one of the products of the colonial revolution, and quite particularly today of the heroism of the Vietnamese people, who by holding the powerful American imperialism at bay are compelling the vanguard militants more and more to consider the biggest problems of strategy and tactics in the revolutionary movement in our time. In this way, too, the Vietnamese revolution merits the strongest support.
April 17, 1967
* The collection of writings goes even beyond the subtitle. It includes the notable and courageous speech made by the author at the "teach-in" in Washington in 1965 against the American escalation in Vietnam. Also included is a discussion of the philosophy of history held by E.H. Carr, the author of a fine history of the Soviet Union. In this review, we leave these aside.
We likewise leave aside other essays, particularly the portraits or sketches of Lenin, Trotsky, Plekhanov, and also those figures in the history of the Russian revolution, the Mensheviks, who were swept aside by events.
Nor will we deal with Deutscher's comments on Pasternak, showing that Doctor Zhivago is neither the great novel which the Western world has praised so highly nor the slanderous work seen by so many bureaucrats, who, like Pasternak but in a different way, have failed to understand the Russian revolution.