RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN": CURBS "CULTURAL REVOLUTION --
By Joseph Hansen
[Continued ” from last issue.]-
The cultural revolution begat? it will. ‘be ‘recalled, with an attack on the intellectuals, the closing of the schools and the mobilization of téns of millions of Red ~ Guards at public expense. These were thrown: at party and government institutions under the slogan of seizing power. The main targets were thus the cadres in the Chinese Communist party who had not lined up to the satisfaction of Mao Tse-tung in his factional struggle with other old-1ine leaders such as Liu Shao- chi and. Teng Hsia6-ping. oom
Behind ‘the Red Guards stood the army headed by ‘Lin Piao; and at a certain point the army ‘openly intervened in the struggle as we noted earlier. Even as it intervened, signal bells were sounded, indicating that-a further turn’Was in the offing -- a "rectifieation-campaign." -This campaign, now underway, is directed in behalf: of the main target in the previous’ stage of the "cultural revolution" -- the party cadres -- and against the forces raised up by Mao under the slogan of seizing power. We documented the steps in this from-the dispatches sent out officially by the Hsinhua News Agency itself.
The most important single document, the one that most clearly lays down the line for.the new stage, is the editorial already cited which appeared in Red Flag, "Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly." The arguments advanced by Red Flag will undoubtedly constitute the main themes for much of the propaganda in the effort to again achieve stabilization. They are worth noting.
First of all, we learn that among those who responded to the call to seize power, "a misconception has emerged." The misconception is "that all those in authority are not good and unreliable and should therefore be overthrown en masse." Surprising as it may seem in view of all that was said about the virtue of making a revolution within a revolution, sweeping out the four olds and sweeping in the four news, "This viewpoint is completely wrong. It is contrary to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and is not justified by the facts."
A clear distinction must be made between "the handful" who took the capitalist road and those who did not. It is necessary to "relentlessly overthrow" the former but to "firmly support the people in authority belonging to the proletariat." To act otherwise is wrong. In fact, "It is an anarchist trend of thought to refuse to make a class analysis of the people in authority, and instead to suspect, negate, exclude and overthrow them all indiscriminately." In other words, cadres who are critical of Mao, or designated as critical, are to be relentlessly overthrown, but those who pass inspection are to be firmly supported. Mao's appeals to the masses to intervene have suddenly become hedged with a considerable restriction!
A rather surprising argument is advanced. The masses had been told that the "monsters and demons" wanting to take the capitalist road had wormed their way into positions of authority years ago, even as far back as the thirties. Now it-is suddenly recalled that "the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao has been in the dominant position and the majority of the cadres and members of the Chinese Communist party and the Chinese Communist Youth League have been carrying out this line."
It follows quite logically, of course, that "The view of overthrowing cadres indiscriminately negates the basic facts of the past 17 years and fails to acknowledge the great achievements made in those years." This was forgotten when Mao was issuing his appeals, it seems.
Aside from the famous "small handful," the cadres fall into two categories, "the good and comparatively good." There is more to come about the cadres, but the editors of Red Flag first take up the composition of the new organs of power that have been projected in a "three-way alliance." "This provisional 'three-way alliance' organ of power is formed by leading members of the revolutionary mass organisations that truly represent the masses, representatives of the Chinese People's Liberation Army units stationed locally and revolutionary leading cadres." This body operates on the level of provinces and cities "where power must be seized."
Further specifications .are given:
"In the factories, mines and enterprises where power must be seized, a provisional organ of power by the 'three-way alliance' must also be established, incorporating revolutionary cadres (leading cadres, ordinary cadres and technical personnel » workers'
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representatives (veteran workers and young workers) and representatives of the militia."
"In party and government organs where power must be seized, the principle of a combination. of revolutionary leading cadres, revolutionary middle-ranking.cadres and revolutionary masses must be carried out."
To be noted in “this, aside from the role of the army at the top level, is the play given to the cadres -- the category previously under heavy attack. In view of this it is readily understandable why the editors state that "it is imperative, at the present, to lay stress on solving. the problem of the correct treatment of revolutionary cadres."
A. brilliant perspective is opened for them. "Those leading cadres who follow the proletarian revolutionary line that Chairman Mao represénts...may and can become the leading force in the struggle to seize power from the handful of party people in authority taking the capitalist road." They can, in fact, even "act as the core of the leadership..." :
. Further compelling arguments are advanced: "The revolutionary leading cadres are. more mature politically. They. have .greater organisational skill. They are more experi-enced. in, struggle. They have the ability to exercise power and administer ‘work for the state of the proletariat." What bureaucrat could ask for a better presentation of his case against, the immature, unskilled, inexperienced, blundering Red Guards who ‘were called on to overthrow them?
Shouldn't. the "cultural revolution" then’ be: dropped? Not at all! Let these. -capa— ble bureaucrats. lead. it. And that is what is proposed: "Experience shows that with these revolutionary leading cadres. in the core of. leadership and integrated. ‘with the revolutionary masses, it.will.be possible to carry out the struggle to seize power more smoothly, put their power . into effect more quickly, grasp both revolution and production. effectively, and take action: in.accordance with the party's policy."
- How. wrong, then, ‘to rely on the initiative of the masses! Or as the editors of Red Flag argue: "On. the contrary, if. the revolutionary leading cadres are excluded, no powerful core of leadership can be formed, the révolutionary masses and revolutionary mass organizations cannot be joined together. into well organised and disciplined revolutionary. battalions, with centralised leadership and unified command. Instead, there will be. "no leader in a, herd of dragons.'" The opposing monsters and demons would of course , rejoice at that. : .
Besides the quality. of the cadres. in the Communist party and the Communist Youth League, as described in this favorable way, there is the quantity of>them to consider. "Large numbers of cadres in the party and government organisations are good and they want to make revolution. The proletarian revolutionaries among them. are the main force in the seizure of. power in their own departments."
Thus we reach the foreordained conclusion. Full confidence must be placed in them! "They know best whether the power. in their own departments should be seized...it ~ ‘is necessary to rely on them...The revolutionary masses and revolutionary mass organi- | sations from other departments should trust them, support them and give them the neces-— sary assistance instead of excluding them..." ;
The editorial finally gets around, as was to be’ expected, to the "neyolutionary | rebels" who had been led by the proclamations issued in Mao's name to believe that the masses should take the initiative and seize power away from the bureaucrats: "In some localities,.a few persons proposed that 'all persons who can be classified as "leading" cadres should step aside.' This view is devoid of class analysis. It counterposes the masses to all cadres. It does not direct its spearhead against the handful of persons in authority taking the capitalist road [bureaucrats opposed or held. to be opposed to the Mao faction] but against the great number of cadres [the bureaucracy as a whole]. It therefore runs counter to the basic spirit of the sixteen-point decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning’ the great proletarian cultural revolution, to the general orientation of the struggle and to’ Mao Tse= -tung's thought. To do things in this way would objectively be to help the class enemy."
A clear warning is issued: "Those comrades who committed such mistakes without thinking should. immediately correct then. It would be very dangerous for them to persist obstinately in their own view."
This editorial was, of course, at once hailéd. Throughout the vast country, the switch was made instantly by key groups. Thus on February 24, the day following publication of the piece, Hsinhua reported "widespread acclaim" from Shanghai, Tsingtao, Heil-
ungkiang, Shansi and Kweichow where the Maoists had "successfully seized power."
“With this send-off, the "rectification campaign" was soon in high gear. A wall bulletin posted by the "revolutionary students" of the Iu Hsun Corps in Shanghai was ~ reprinted in its entirety by the People's Daily February 26 together with an article from a Shanghai paper hailing the bulletin. Hsinhua had it translated and. in its own daily bulletin of the same date.
The article posted by the Maoist students poses some “new problems" that have arisen and issues a call fora "rectification campaign." In contrast to the model bureaucrats who are now called on to lead the cultural revolution "more smoothly" in seizing power from themselves, the revolutionary students who were previously entrusted with this task are suddenly discovered to be full of faults. If you don't believe this, then you must read what they themselves say.
"The purely military viewpoint is fairly rampant among | some comrades (including certain leading comrades) of the Iu Hsun Corps." These comrades make the grievous error of concentrating "attention and energy solely on ‘overthrowing so and so' and 'dismis-— sing so and so from office.'" They also mistakenly hold “that the ultimate purpose of this great proletarian cultural revolution is merely to pick out a number of counter= revolutionary resivisionists." Thus they have "neglected their own ideological revolu-_ tion, neglected political and ideological education among the cadres and the masses, and havé slackened their efforts in political’ study and ideological renoulding."
Still worse, "obsessed by the purely military viewpoint," they fail to understand what the cultural revolution is really about. True, the fundamental task is to “oppose. revisionism, prevent the rise of revisionism, thoroughly uproot revisionism"™' and so on;but the "purely military viewpoint would make this great proletarian‘cultural revolution just a matter of formality..." The revisionists would be dismissed from office “organi-. sationally, but not ideologically." As one revisionist went down, another would rise in his place. And where do you think thése new revisionists would come from? Why froin those doing all the purging and overthrowing! "...we ourselves might even follow the bourgeois reactionary line....our comrades have been more or less influenced by revisionism unconsciously and our heads are more or less filled with bourgeois ideas of all kinds."
How can you expect such uncertain elements to spearhead the cultural revolution? But even this is not all. There is worse to come. “An evil wind of counterrevolutionary economism has also risen within our revolutionaries. Some comrades have been conquered by the sugar-coated bullets of the enemy and have begun to rest content with their past achievements. They chase after motorcycles, telephones and bicycles and seek a high standard of living and material benefits. Many facts proved that this wrong trend exists in the Iu. Hsun Corps."
Some of the members of the Corps "have become conceited." They "look down upon others and adopt a closed-door attitude toward those people who made mistakes yet have the determination to correct them..." The correct attitude, as Chairman Mao has pointed out, is to be a "proletarian statesman" and "be @ good at uniting with those who disagree and even with those who formerly opposed them..." Again a warning is issued: a conceited attitude is "extremely dangerous."
The Lu Hsun Corps, let it be noted, is in position to speak with authority. They were in the forefront of the struggle to seize power. "The requirements of the struggle brought members of the Iu Hsun Corps close together in October when the Corps was suppressed, encircled and attacked. The struggle between two different ideas and two different world outlooks within the corps did not manifest itself in the face of the major contradiction [between Mao and his factional opponents]. Now, as the ranks have been expanded and victories have been won [including taking over Shanghai], closed-doorisn, liberalism, mountain-stronghold mentality, sectarianism, ultrademocracy and the tendency to seek the limelight, all of which existed below the surface in the Corps are gradually coming to light. These all run counter to Mao Tse-tung's thought and are as inconmpatible with the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao as fire with water. In the final analysis, it is the word 'self-interest' that has been the root of all these evils." One can scarcely disagree with that final sentence, although it would seem advisable to include the leaders of the Maoist faction among the humans of whom this could be said.
The article concludes with the statement that "We of the Iu Hsun Corps must put our house in order ideologically and organisationally....At present, the Iu Hsun Corps badly needs to put things in order, badly needs an ‘open rectification. '"
Other moves were afoot in Shanghai at the same time. On February 24 the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the highest organ of power in the city, held an en-
larged meeting that unanimously adopted a draft resolution on the present situation and tasks in Shanghai. It recognized that the “armed core of the militia, the People's Liberation Army and the armed people are the strong pillars of the temporary organ of power at each level." It called for close coordination with units of the army stationed in Shanghai. It opposed "anarchism, ultrademocracy, sectarianism, guild mentality and small group mentality [the tendency to set up new organizations having distinctive political colorations]." And it recommended that "all. revolutionary organisations openly carry out rectification campaigns." This, obviously, was an important step in widening the turn and giving it momentum.
By February 28 in Shanghai "open-door rectification" was in full swing and a dispatch from that city associated. it with "a new stage" in the cultural revolution.