RECTIFICATION GAMPATGN" CURBS. "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" |
By Joseph ‘Hansen
. “A new phase has opened. in the “cultural révolution" in China. After ubilizing’ “the army to take over authority in certain areas or to play the role of arbiter among -thecontending factions, including diverse tendencies within the Maoist group itself, the: Mao-Lin Piao group is now trying..to mitigate the most damaging consequences.
The "rectification campaign," now in full swing, aims at curbing, restraining and subduing the forces set in motion by Mao's appeals to the masses. These forces, were’ they to be permitted free play, would end in a powerful mass upsurge that would shatter all sectors of the. bureaucracy and: initiate a political revolution that would put the establishment of a soviet form of government on the. agenda.
Before ‘examining the “rectification campaign, " ‘it should: be clearly understooa how important the army has become in the struggle over political power.
The army has evidently been groomed by the Mao-Lin Piao faction for. this new role for some time. In retrospect this seems to have been the: main.significance of some of the staff changes in past years and such measures as the abolition of ranks and other -shifts away from the army model set up by Stalin and maintained by his heirs in the Soviet Union. In the current crisis, a long, detailed editorial in the January 1 issue of the Liberation Army Daily, outlining the "general principle" for Chinese army work in 1967 5 signaled the. latest turn although it was little noted abroad at the time.
Heavy stress was placed in the editorial on the need to "firmly apply the spirit of the Eleventh Plenary. Session of the Eighth Party Central Committee." This was the meeting last august which issued the Sixteen Points and ‘other documents giving great fanfare to the "cultural revolution." The army, declares’ the editorial, is to “actively participate in and defend the great proletarian cultural revolution." In the list of specific points for army work, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" is placed first. "Fhis is the foundation for the whole year's work." The army is told: "Chairman Mao téaches us to concern ourselves with the affairs of the state and to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the énd."
This. could, of course, be interpreted. to refer only to-the ideological level. But Mao had already issued his appeals to the ranks to "take power" and the struggle was nding a tense and even violent tone in some areas such as. Shanghai. The aim of the
itorial was propagandistic preparation for something more concrete.
On. January 14.the Liberation. Army Daily carried another editorial. Its theme, like the editorial two weeks before, was to carry. the cultural. revolution through to the end. There were some important additions,: however. It was reported that “Our great leader Chairman Mao himself...has called on the: party,- the: government, the army and the _ people throughout the country to learn from the experience of the Shanghai revolutionary rebel groups, to join together in action and defeat: the new counter-attacks of the bourgeois reactionary line so that the great proletarian cultural revolution will advance along the proletarian revolutionary line represented by. Chairman Mao. Chairman. Mao's great call has pushed the great proletarian cultural revolution into a new stage."
“In the army itself, it was reported,’ there was need for a cultural revolution and this should be conducted "with particular firmness." "Not a trace’ of vacillation can be permitted under the pretext of special conditions of the army." It was explained that "The presence of revisionists in the army would be especially dangerous." And to facilitate this work, the Military Commission had reorganized the All~Army Cultural Revolution Group "and a. new one has come into being."-The new committee was a result of "the struggle in our army between the two lines..." oot ;
On January 17 Hsinhua reported that meetings and discussions were being held in many. different units throughout. China and the response was most encouraging. The army men were. taking pledges "to stand squarely behind the. proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle. to crush economism, capture’-the. bastions..in which counter-revolutionary revisionism has entrenched itself and establish new revolutionary order."
This campaign swelled in volume, reaching a high pitch in a January 25 editorial in the Liberation Army Daily. A handful of "bourgeois representatives," it was claimed, had "wormed their. way into the party," had "usurped the power of leadership in some places and departments, practised the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and tried in every way to pull socialist China to capitalism."
The editorial proclaimed: "It is entirely justified for the proletarian revolutionary rebels to rise and seize power from them..." In this struggle, the army "must firmly stand- on the.side of the. proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao...We must follow Chairman Mao's teaching. and enthusiastically, unequivocally and | wholeheartedly support the proletarian revolutionary rebels in rising to seize power. Even though they:may be just a minority temporarily, we must support them without the slightest hesitation." (Emphasis added.
)..it-is not possible for the People’ s Liberation Army to refrain from interven- - ing," the “editorial continued. Citing Mao! s rather famous aphorism, it’ spelled things “out still more plainly:
"'Political power grows out ofthe barrel of a gun.' The political power of the proletariat seized by the People's Army with the gun has to be defended by the People's _ Army with the gun, too. Active reactionaries and- ‘counter-revolutionary organisations . sabotaging the great proletarian cultural. revolution must be resolutely suppressed, and the dictatorship of the proletariat practised over then."
‘On January 26 a number of Hsinhua dispatches from Peking reported the active involvement of troops in various cities acting under. a "new call" issued by Mao himself. We have: been unable to locate the text of. this'call in the official English-language ‘material. Hsinhua described it’ in’ a-Jenuary. 28. Peking. dispatch as "the latest call of Chairman Mao Tse-tung";.and it quoted “leading members" of the army in Shansi as saying at a rally: "Chairman Mao's latest instruction is a general mobilisation order to the entire army and people of China."
The Tokyo newspaper Asahi reported February 4 that its Peking correspondent had read wall bulletins issued by the Committee of the Military Academy of the Cultural Revolution, according to which Mao Tse-tung had appealed to the army to intervene. The bulletins reported that he had made a long political declaration January 27 before the party's Military Commission. The wall bulletins reported a few highlights of the. speech:
"When the Cultural Revolution began, the army did not participate in the movement but was morally involved in it. The struggle between the two lines is now very sharp and the ‘army has been led to, intervene in it. “Bince at has joined 4 the movement, . it ‘must: resolutely support the left elements.
“Many 01a leaders do not understand the. Cultural Revolution. For the most part they are living in their past glory but they must throw themselves into the movement and - reform. themselves. . They must win a new glory, not vacillating and. remaining on the side -of the left. Under.the direction of.the latter they can carry out.,.good work...
"With regard to the seizure of power, articles in our newspapers dwell on the necessity of seizing power from those who: followed or supported the bourgeois road. It . is necessary. to take power and only then discuss. the question of where those who held it stood. A definitive judgment can be made concerning: them only in the final. phase: of-the movement. On taking power it.is necessary to get in touch with the State (Council in order to obtain its approval."
The latter: sentence would indicate that. Mao already had in mind the subsequent phase of "rectification." This explains the glaring contradiction between-the proclamation, "It is entirely justified for the proletarian revolutionary rebels to rise and. \ seize power.” and the: stricture, "On taking power it is necessary to get in touch, with the State Council in order: to obtain its approval."
If Mao went into the question of how the State. Council was to determine which “-groups should receive the official stamp. of appraval.,.it was not indicated. in the account. The question of program and the programmatic. differences distinguishing the various ten- ‘dencies is one of the more obscure aspects of the. "cultural revolution." ;
For some weeks, the army, in combination with the "revolutionary rebels," did its work in ousting, suppressing, disciplining or intimidating officials thought to be in league with or in sympathy with the faction supposed to be in opposition to "Mao's thought." Too little information is available, however, to determine the. extent, the depth and the final outcome of the struggle in many areas. It is also difficult to say to what degree the army itself proved to be uncertain or internally divided.
' The signal for the "rectification" campaign came in a lengthy editorial in Red - Flag (issue No. 3, reported January 31). The tip-off came in the admonition to the "rev-
olutionary rebels" that "Everyone, in the course of the struggle to seize power and after coming to power, has to undergo new tests." The hope was expressed that the "revolution-— ary path breakers" would pass these tests, "mature politically," always be loyal to the
proletariat and Chairman Mao and not "just flash across: the stage of history."
Most interesting of all was the warning on handling "leading cadres" who have a long record in the party. "To oppose, exclude and overthrow all indiscriminately runs counter to the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought....Cadres who have made errors should be treated.correctly and should not: be overthrown indiscriminately."
The signal had apparently been awaited. A Hsinhua dispatch February 1 reported nationwide acclaim. For instance: "In Peking, representatives of the Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters and thirty odd other revolutionary mass. organisations were holding a conference when the editorial was announced over the radio. Bubbling over with enthusiasm they called it a great victory for Mao Tse- tung' s thought...They immediately issued an 'urgent message' to all revolutionary rebels in the ‘capital..." In Tientsin the leading nucleus of the "revolutionary rebels...held a meeting to consider how to deal with leading party cadres." There was unanimous agreement that many of them “belonged to the proletariat," it was agreed to work with them: "side by side" and "let them take part in the leadership..."
Within ten days the-formula had become sloganized into the "three-way combination” composed of "“représentatives of genuine proletarian revolutionaries of revolutionary mass organisations, representatives of the Chinese People's. Liberation Army...and revolutionary leading ¢adres in the party and government organisations. ". The army» of course, constitutes the "firm and staunch cornerstone” of the combination.
Another theme that soon received increasing prominence was to! ‘strengthen the sense of organisation and discipline; oppose disregard of organisational discipline and ultra-democracy." :
In a summary of reference matérial for studying a reprint of Mao's- article, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," the editors of the Liberation Army Daily said on February 13: "The purpose of the great proletarian cultural revolution is, in the final analysis, to promote Mao Tse-tung's thought effectively."
Still another note was sounded February 15. when the People's Daily reprinted an “article written by the Tsingtao Revolutionary Rebel Committee, a much-extolled model group. The article raised a problem. What to do about those revolutionary rebels who broadcast “the nonsense that cadres are nonrevolutionaries and that all leading cadres are guilty of suppressing the revolution"? © - Here is the answer: "The main yardstick for judging whether or not a person is a revolutionary, is the degree of his support for Chairman Mao, for Mao Tse-tung's thought and for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."
‘In Shansi, another model for the country to follow, the army found it necessary ‘to intérvene in an educational way. "...there were some among the revolutionary rebels, ‘reports a February 18 Hsinhua dispatch, "who failed to: act strictly according to Gneine man Mao's policy concerning cadres. They were suspicious of anybody in authority and therefore prevented the revolutionary leading cadres from playing their role."
The several-times purged Shanghai Wen Hui Pao went even further in an editorial that was reprinted in the February 20 People's Daily. "The mass of government cadres, especially leading cadres, are more experienced in struggle and have greater political maturity’ and organizational ability. If they rise up and rebel, the revolutionary rebels should welcome them enthusiastically and: give them active support."
And on February 20 Hsinhua reported that the Tsingtao City: Revolutionary Rebel Committee "recently held a meeting to launch a rectification campaign..." This campaign is to be “among the revolutionary rebel organisations’ in the city." These, "after they had achieved some successes and successes" showed "signs of conceit and self-satisfaction and the erroneous ideas of the "small group' mentality..-especially among a number of their leading members . m
The new turn was made official in the usual way ~- an extensive editorial, "Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly," in Red Flag. Hsinhua provided a. translation of the full text of. this important editorial in a February 24 Peking dispatch.
The treatment of the leading cadres is now presented as a "key question." While it is true that a "handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists" did usurp power "in some places or some departments," still "it must also be soberly recognized that most of the cadres are good..." Moreover, in view of how few revisionists there really are, it would be “very dangerous if the scope of the attack were erroneously expanded and the spearhead of the struggle were directed against the broad section of cadres."
[To be continued. ]
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