KOSAKA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON -- VIA PEKING
». A move on the chessboard of international diplomacy that aroused considerable interest in Japan, if nowhere else, was the visit of Zentaro Kosaka, former foreign minister of Japan and a well-known figure in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, first to Peking and then to Washington. :
During a trip to China in September and October he engaged in talks with China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi and with Premier Chou En-lai.
It was reported in the Japanese press that Chen Yi had indicated willingness on the part of China to negotiate. This was promptly denied in Peking as a "misinterpretation."
Kosaka nonetheless maintained that Chen Yi had told him "the fundamental attitude of Chinese diplomacy is to solve questions like Vietnam by negotiations on an equal footing." Chen Yi added, according to Kosaka, that "it was very difficult to make negotiations with the United States because of misunderstandings. This was due to the fact that the United States is standing on the basis of imperialism.” ,
Chen Yi, it should be added, told a Latin-American journalist last summer that he was convinced that the United States is deliberately preparing to attack China. In the face of these preparations it is perfectly in order, of course, for China to seek to stave off the imperialist aggression by diplomatic means so long as it is done without injuring the cause of socialism.
Whatever the situation may be in this respect, Kosaka acted as if the conversations were of sufficient interest to warrant a special trip to Washington. He arrived there in the middle of November and was soon closeted with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, who is in charge of Far Eastern affairs, and Johnson's special adviser Walter W. Rostow. He also had talks with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg and with UN Secretary General U Thant.
Kosaka maintained an enigmatic stance about his conversations with the State Department brain men. Upon his return to Tokyo, he made some inconsequential remarks to the press such as finding "U.S. Government leaders adamant in their view that communism will not contribute to the prosperity of the people." He said Thant wondered why the "Communist Chinese have become belligerent like they are today." As to the central topic of his conversations in Washington, Kosaka kept up the veil of mystery by saying his talks were "Significant." And what was the subject matter? He said he had stressed the need for a fresh outlook regarding Communist China. The November 27 Japan Times quoted him as saying "he had told U.S. leaders and the U.N. Secretary General that the cultural revolution in continental China can be regarded as a power struggle and has signs of lasting for a long time."
It remains to be learned what Kosaka really relayed to the White House and what he thought he could accomplish by his hop first to Peking and then to Washington. Perhaps it was only a stunt aimed at giving the Japanese people the impression the government is trying to do something to halt the war in Vietnam. Wilson leaned heavily on such stunts in England during the opening stages of Johnson's escalation of the war. All Wilson's diplomatic hocus pocus ended in nothing, however. He did not even win a face-saving gesture from the head of Western imperialism in the White House. Kosaka would do well to study this precedent before buying anymore airplane tickets.