AFTER. THES TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE
By Livio Maiten
The Tricontinental Conference, which took place in Havana last January, was an unusual gathering of representatives of revolutionary movements in those sectors of the world where the most important events of the past fifteen years have occurred; and there was good reason for the virulent response of American imperialism and its puppets. Its’ repercussions in the development: of coming anti-imperialist struggles, particularly in. Latin America, will probably be considerable. It would, however,.bé a mistake to accept the favorable interpretations without taking into account all the distinct, even contradictory elements; it would likewise be a mistake to minimize the internal conflicts that reflected more or less directly the various interests of the different forces present.
Projected for some time, the conference was finally convoked at a time when on the: one. hand imperialism was concretizing in action. its determination to crush the freedom struggle of the ‘peoples of the colonial and’ semicolonial countries, including by: means.of . outright war and at the risk of unleashing: a nuclear conflagration;. and on the other hand when the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict rendered it more’ and more difficult to organize an effective reply from the side of the workers states and the’ world anti-imperialist forces. The need to get together and to work out, if only’ partially, a strategy for present and prospective struggles was thus the motive for holding the conference. If it is impossible to agree with the impressionistic interpretation that the conference was:of. such nature as to enable’ it to play the role of an International, the: Tricontinental testified unquestionably to’ the existence of a profound need and provided material that ought to give cause for thought to all the partisans of the. so-called national roads -- the fragmentation, in practice, of the workers and world anti-imperialist movement. At the same time it provided a glimpse of the new forces that will necessarily be ‘among the components of: the mass revolutionary International which is a major objective of the struggle we are conducting. The Forces Present and the Cuban Success
Attention must be directed first of all to the rather heterogeneous composition of the conference. The fact was that alongside representatives of revolutionary movements that are fighting, arms in hand, against imperialism and the indigenous conservative forces -~ in Africa and especially Latin America -- there were a considerable number of delegations which, whatever their formal designation, were in reality government delegations. And if a good part of them . came from workers states, there were also others, from Asia and ~— Africa. For example, one Asian delegation officially represented the kingdom of Cambodia, another the government of Pakistan. Among the. African delegations ‘was one from the KANU [Kenya African Nationa. : Union], which is | becoming dominated : ‘more. and 1 more by conservative -
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neocolonialist tendencies.* In-addition, the rules limited each coun- ‘try to a single delegation and one vote, the aim being: to foster the. formation of united fronts; but this inhibited the confrontation of positions and an often indispensable: political differentiation. The consequence was that conflicts:broke out over the. recognition of delegations. In certain instances this: finally ended in inexcusable | exclusions. ** : abies,
This extremely varied composition, the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the public outbreak of the violent Sino-Cuban dispute on the very eve of the opening of the conference, and.some . other latent conflicts within formally united delegations inevitably. gave rise to very.sharp confrontations and real faction struggles. . - The deliberations’ were, : in fact, featured by a stubborn struggle from beginning: to end,’ during the official meetings and in the corridors. This was. noted. by all the serious reporters and confirmed: in addition by the extension of the conference and by the. commentaries in official organs of the parties or movements: represented there.*** . .
From an analysis of the documents that were adopted, partic-— ularly the most important political resolutions, it must. be concluded that the partisans of ‘a radical: line gained indubitable successes.. We would call attention in particular to the following points:
(a) Certain: essential.aspects of the dialectical interrelation of different motor forces of the world revolution were recognized. |
(b) Solidarity with Vietnam and the. struggle. against American imperialism were listed: as the. most important. problems of the present stage. : . *According toa report in the January 8 Granma, up to January 5 there were a total of 743 delegates, observers. and: guests; 80 organizations representing 79 countries. The Cubans had the highest number of representatives (40), followed by the Soviet Union and China with 44 each. The United Arab Republic stood fourth with 21 plus 3. The government delegations were the most numerous. As for the observers and guests, the choice was often unfortunate. There were utterly tarnished figures like Renato Bitossi, chairman of the World Federation of Trade Unions, professional political traveling salesmen who adapt. themselves to every turn, highly questionable intellectuals, . including the celebrated novelist Alberto Moravia who upon returning to Italy wrote reactionary articles for the conservative newspapers.
**The most scandalous exclusion was that of the MR-13 [Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre] of Guatemala. But the FNLA- [National Liberation Front of Angola] was also absent although it has fought. for five years against Portuguese imperialism. Also one can only deplore the nonadmission of the Unity Movement, the popular movement which has real roots and which is carrying on a stubborn struggle in South Africa. See | for example 5 the Chinese commentaries. “Also the articles. that appeared in 1l'Unita, the newspaper of the Italian Communist party.
- ' (¢) The revolutionary road was viewed as a requisite: to meet the violence of imperialism. * _
(a) Radical. measures to expropriate both the “imperialist owners and the indigenous possessing classes: were held indispensable, . particularly in the economic resolution; and this was. placed within the framework of a "noncapitalist road" and a general socialist perspective.
It. is clear that it was the Cubans especially who succeeded: to a considerable degree in carrying their line. Moreover the essential points as they saw them were particularly stressed in the opening speech by Dortic6s; in the remarks by Cienfuegos, who emphasized ‘the necessity and the objective possibility of the revolutionary road, utilizing formulas ‘testifying to an internationalist spirit; in the. - important fiery. declarations: of Rail Roa; and above ali in Fidel _ Castro's closing speech.** This speech. in:particular has been widely circulated and we will not consider it in detail.Here it is suffi-. cient to note two central themes; namely, solidarity with Vietnan, expressed in an offer of direct Cuban participation in the defense of that country and the: outline of a concrete orientation of coordinated struggle in Latin America to settle accounts with North American imperialism. ***
‘The political success of the Cubans was clinched, moreover, by an organizational success. The choice of. Havana instead of Cairo as the headquarters for the bodies set up by the Tricontinental had a Significance that.did not escape amyone, and with good reason; it was around this question that one of the sharpest conflicts of the whole conference centered. Among the Cuban gains must also be listed formation of the Latin-American Solidarity Organization [Organizacién ‘“Latinoamericana de Solidaridad], the composition of the top committee constituting an ‘additional guarantee: from their point of view. **** *This line was- coneretized in addition in ‘particular resolutions on Peru, the Congo, Venezuela, etc. **Dorticés spoke particularly of vour | determination to carry out the commitment that we have’ made with other: peoples, even if we thus imperil our works and achievements." (Granma January 4.] Ratl Roa said, among other ‘things: "The people of Cuba, the revolutionary government: of Cuba, and the Communist party of Cuba do not preach with words; they preach with deeds ‘like fists." [Granma January. 16.]
***We are referring to the part of the speech stressing that "The correlation of forces of the ‘imperialists on this Continent, the . proximity of its metropolitan territory, the zeal.with which they will try to defend their dominions in: this part of the world, require a conmon' strategy on this Continent, more than anywhere else: a-common and ‘simultaneous struggle." ne
****The following countries are represented on the committee: Brazil, Mexico; ‘Uruguay , British. (Guiana, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala and | Cuba. © . : -
The Russians, the Chinese and Cabral's Speech
Within the framework of a conference in which the most: radical concepts had every chance to prevail and in the .context of an. inter-. national situation featured by the intensification . of the crisis over Vietnam and the decision of imperialism to utilize all the. means at. its disposal to block from the beginning any revolutionary process in Latin: America, the Soviet representatives: obviously had little. choice but to accept a series of formulations concerning responding with. revolutionary: violence to the imperialist violence and to reiterate. their promises of aid for the peoples struggling against imperialisn. Their posture enabled them to exploit in a profitable way the ..tension in-Sino-Cuban relations and certain extremely sectarian moves. made. by the Chinese. -
Thus in the conflict shaking the international Communist movement, they scored some points; and they succeeded, among other things, in bringing’ back into play:certain Latin-American Communist parties, partisans of their concepts, who, because of their opportunist views, and their political zigzags: became cut off from the rank and file of the revolutionary current in their continent.
' On the. other hand they had to accept. a kind of consecration of the Fidelista leadership in Latin America and give up their opening position concerning: the headquarters for the bodies set up by the Tricontinental. (It is well’ known that they wanted Cairo.) They. also had to accept continuation of the Afro-Asian organization which they would have liked to bury in order to impede the activities of. the Chinese. They even suffered a defeat on the. composition of the Asian representation in the Executive Secretariat elected by the conference.* In the more strictly political sphere, they did not succeed in introducing their concept of peaceful coexistence as. the central idea in the general: resolution, although they did get it adopted by a majority under unclear conditions** in a special resolution which is. also rather restrictive. :
In contrast. to this, ‘they scored a certain success in opposing proposals which they considered to be extremist, such as open and explicit condemnation of the UN in an ad hoc resolution submitted by a delegate from Santo Domingo. (a sugar-coated condemnation was included in the general document) or that of a delegate from Cambodia who wanted all relations with the United States broken off.***
*In accordance with a proposal on which agreement was reached, the Asian delegation is to include Korea, South Vietnam,. Pakistan and Syria. The Soviet representatives pressed their own candidacy at the end, but _they did not win. **At least this is the claim of the Chinese commentaries, which ive details on the’ course of ‘the voting.. : *** Among the most fervent partisans of the Soviet position + was the delegate of the ‘African National Congress of South Africa.
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; The balance sheet of the Chinese was not brilliant, despite: the optimism of their official commentaries. Whatever the reciprocal responsibility -- we do not propose to analyze the subject here -the fact that the Cubans were now lined up on the Soviet side and : even delivered some of the most violent. attacks yet launched, repre= sented a major defeat for Peking, the repercussions of which were. — visible at the-conference itself. But all the same it is not true that they found themselves in complete isolation. Thus their opposition to the resolution on coexistence was shared by a-certain number of. ‘delegations who either voted against it or abstained;* and ‘even - ‘their posture rejecting any united action with the Soviet ‘Union was supported by Japan, Indonesia, Malaya and Thailand. Contrariwise, after the rules on recognizing © delegations were adopted, their -positions received but little support in the Latin-American sector. “ Aside from the delegations that necessarily played a fundamental ” ‘role, the attention of those at the conference :centered par-» ticularly on the delegations- of certain movements, including those from Peru, Venezuela and Guatemala,** who expressed in a very clear way the orientation of armed struggle. Among the Africans, the man who stood out most prominently was Amilcar Cabral, leader of the liberation movement in so-called Portuguese Guinea, who gave one of the most important speeches, particularly from the viewpoint of theoretical generalizations. He insisted above all on the need to reach a theoretical view of the whole and to reject all demagogic concepts and any extolling of the empiricism that represents in reality, in his opinion, "the greatest. deficiency in our struggle © against imperialism." After giving a brief historical sketch, he advanced the thesis that it is possible to jump over historical stages, which: boils down more concretely to affirming’ the possibility for underdeveloped peoples to reach. socialism without. having: to go through a capitalist phase. He stressed in addition the multiple dangers of neocolonialisn’ and the danger of regressive tendencies. On the latter, he analyzed in greater detail the relatively progressive role played by the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, who can nevertheless undergo a conservative retrogression. In bringing out, finally, the anticapitalist dynamics of the struggle unfolding in the three continents which have suffered imperialist exploitation, he underlined the necessity for a vanguard’ to. lead the struggle. * *Tn addition to China, those. voting against Gneluded Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Uganda, Basutoland, Bechuanaland , -South West Africa, Nepal and Pakistan. The Congolese delegate also condemned ‘the Soviet attitude . **With regard to Guatemala, “the play given: to Turecios over Yon Sosa was undoubtedly due to factional reasons. : ae lg ***We also note the following very pertinent remark: "The experiences of certain peoples, the present: conditions. of the: freedom struggle in the world, the condition of permanent violence. (or, at least, contradictions and disorder) in certain countries that have conquered - independence” along the ‘peaceful road'. show, us, not only | that any conpromise with imperialisn- is: self-defeating, but also that the normal road to freedom is through armed struggle.'
. It would be interesting to know the reasons that brought Cabral to” deliver ‘this speech to the conference and to play the role he did “in ‘general. Aside from some of his'-formulations which were , of course ,debatable, his. speech in: “any case ‘was one of the most rigorous, and-best: thought out. ; What Is the True Balance Sheet?
If one cares to go through the documents adopted at Havana - with: a -fine-tooth comb, you can find gaps, equivocal. statements, formulations ‘that have covered up the’ opportunist practices of not. -a few big: workers organizations for decades. Particularly to. ‘be noted is thé’ lack of clarity on the so-calléd national bourgeoisie ~~’ whose representatives, moreover, were present at Havana -- passages tending to engender confusion on the nature of the dynamics of the struggle “to be conducted, acceptance of-an antimonopolist and not outright anticapitalist outlook for the workers movement of the countries of Western Europe and North America.* But all this should not be taken as decisive in judging the conference. The real’ question, which without doubt not a few delegates posed at the time and which are still posed two months after the deliberations ended, is the following: to what degree will the resolutions be carried out in life? To what degree. ‘will the decisions actually aid the revolutionary movements, in Latin America first of all?
We do not agree with the simplistic sectarian interpretation according to which the gist of the conference was to put on a propaganda display, the Cubans themselves seeking to. use revolutionary — phrases ‘as a cover while in substance giving up active support of the struggles in Latin America. We are not unaware of the difficulties faced by the Cubans and we do not idealize any leadership, no matter how revolutionary. Our analysis is based on a concrete fact -in the final analysis, Cuba's state‘ of health will be determined not by the economic and military aid of the USSR and the other workers states -- which nevertheless remains indispensable -- but by the extension of the revolution in other Latin-American countries. This is a basic truth that no Cuban leader can forget without going’ against his own interests and hope of survival. That is why we do not doubt that the Fidelista team wanted the conference with the © objective of furthering concrete political action and will try to utilize for this all the means which they now have at their disposal.
This does not at all signify ignoring powerful factors opera~ ting in the opposite direction. In the first place.-are the actions. and constant pressure of the bureaucratic leadership of the USSR for whom adoption of the: resolutions at the Tricontinental was far from having the same meaning as for the’ :Cuban revolutionists. Moscow's. general line’ remains that of coexistence. based on finding a modus. : vivendi with American imperialism.and therefore. of:.avoiding any supplementary causes of friction. A possible: ‘revolutionary:.explosion in no matter what. country of Latin America would heighten international *The general declaration talks about struggling against the domination of monopoly capital, a theme on which it was easy to get agreement from both the Soviet and Chinese representatives.
_tension and, in face of the-probable intervention of imperialism, would place. the Soviet leaders before the disagreeable choice of organizing a reply or of demonstrating that they do not want, or are. not able, to effectively counteract the imperialist action. Thus it is likely that they will do everything to prevent the line of the conference from being translated into practice; and arguments will not be lacking, both from them and their partisans, seeking to -utilize the thesis of the absence of mature objective conditions.* — .
‘In the second. place there. is: the problem of a series of Latin- American Communist parties. Apparently. they made a turn, accepting. the. Cuban line by and large and giving up their traditional positions. But to.what degree does this represent a genuine change? To what degree, even admitting that the about-face was sincere, are they .in such shape as to be able to carry out the profound renovation.of ine their concepts, their structures, their methods which a revolutionary orientation demands? It cannot be excluded a priori, of course, that in an explosive context some of the parties that do not have a.big crystallized apparatus and whose. composition could change with the influx of new elements, particularly the young generation, could in practice take the revolutionary road advocated by the Havana documents (there have already been examples along this line); but, aside from the:-fact that there is.no- certainty about this and it would thus be a mistake to give up a consistent struggle within the revolutionary movement, is it possible to seriously envisage this variant for parties. which have a rather long tradition of opportunism and which at the same time have very bureaucratized apparatuses, as, for us example, the Argentine and Chilean Gommunist parties? Can we believe that even a Salvador Allende, who has symbolized the "democratic"... road, is inclined to turn to the solution offered by the revolutionary road?** bits
(Finally, it: cannot ‘be forgotten that ‘in certain countries there are or there -can be real objective difficulties in the immediate future which. will.continue to be-reflected even within the. movement engaged in armed. struggle. In, Peru there are differences over the choice of conditions made. by the MIR [Movimiento de. Izquierda Revolucionaria -- Movement. of the Revolutionary Left] and its courageous militants for launching guerrilla warfare and there is no doubt that the ‘experience begun the past year is running into a more and *Tt is not without significance that the Soviet press did not call attention to the most: revolutionary aspects of the conference and Fidel. Castro! s speeches. oo . **Nothing indicates, for example, _ ‘that the Chilean Communist. party, which makés no secret of -its: "Italian" inclinations, has made a. turn away from its preceding course. As for Salvador Allende, some of his. declarations at Havana leaye the door open: "Each country," he said January 5 (see Granma January 6), "has its own reality and: in ‘relation with "this logically its. own: ‘tactics and strategy..."
more difficult .situation.* In Venezuela the government repression has unquestionably scored gains that have lately favored the tendencies in the Communist party and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] which have for some time advocated a turn toward. more or less "legal" forms: of struggle. And even in Havana there. have been echoes of the polemics: going on in the Venezuelan. movement. **
In ‘this. article we have:: left “aside the problem ‘of ‘the attack ‘against the Trotskyist movement made by Fidel Castro in his closing speech. This problem did not directly involve the conference, but. the repercussions of Castro's attitude, if this attitude is maintained and not rectified,. cannot..be minimized -- all the more so since the virulent polemic between. the Cubans and the Chinese broke out at the same time. What is to be feared is bitter factional struggles developing in the vanguard-sectors in Latin America, faction . struggles conducted by the baneful methods of reciprocal distortion of positions, of denigration, of.slander +-. which will do just the contrary of helping to.clarify the basic tactical and strategical | questions. The Fourth International, which endured the worst campaigns of Stalin's time without yielding, is not at all alarmed at the perspective of such a confrontation -- but it feels that with . his accusations in the purest Stalinist style and his grotesque amalgams, Fidel Castro created additional difficulties, risking ending up with the opposite of what ‘he. claims he set out to -achieve. Instead of helping unity and joint. ‘pevolutionary action, she will have contributed to deepening the divisions and obscuring the real problems that require specific analysis and a strategic, line. **
For all these reasons, the: true balance sheet of ‘the “Havana. conference cannot.be drawn up at present. Only. the experience of the coming months and years will tell whether-the resolutions adopted there had a real meaning, thus marking a stage of :revolutionary history, particularly in Latin America, or whether the factors working in the opposite direction gained the upper hand. - : March 18, 1966
*The Peruvian FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario ~- Front. of the Revolutionary Left] holds that conditions did not exist for success in the initiative taken by de la Puente and his comrades in arms. “**According to Niedéergang, the correspondent of Le Monde, the militants of the MIR have not spared their criticisms of a declaration made by. ‘Pompeyo Marquez , one of the: leaders: of the Communist party of Venezuela. ***This has already occurred in the case of Guatemala. On this subject see my article, "Castro's intervention in’ the Guatemalan Dispute," World Outlook, March 4.
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