leadership was smashed, Aidit himself having been executed according to a number of rumors that. gained in credibility as time passed. Party cadres were physically liquidated by the tens-of thousands. The mass murder terrorized millions of workers and peas-— ants, for they were totally unprepared to defend themselves. Sukarno found nothing to lean on toward his left.
The generals meanwhile held a series of secret meetings, in which they composed at léast their major differences. One of their decisions, evidently was to depose Sukarno.
Moreover, they blocked Sukarno's efforts to bring the purge to an end. There appears to have been some subsidence of the mass killings, but executions still went on. [See World Outlook March 11.] In addition, demonstrations against Sukarno, organized by reactionary student organizations around such slogans as getting rid of Subandrio and Sumardjo, were not opposed by the army. In fact they appeared to be covertly. encouraged and even, instigated by the taal cer caste. °
In face of this renewed assault, Sukarno gave in, and now appears to have reached the final stage of his political eareer -~ a keeper of the rubberstamp for putting his name to decrees issued by the army. How long the generals will deem this to be a profitable game remains to be seen.
As for the imperialist reaction, this is sufficiently indicated by the March 1% New York Times: "In Washington the Administra-
tion found it difficult to hide its delight with the events in Indo- | nesia. ‘