Dominican Workers Draw Another Lesson

DOMINICAN WORKERS DRAW ANOTHER LESSON

Bitterness is mounting among revolutionary-minded leftists in Santo Domingo over President Héctor Garcia Godoy's naming two reactionary generals to his cabinet February 26. Told by the president on January 6 to go abroad in order to lower tension in the island, _ they steadfastly refused although leftist leaders at once jumped to obey the decree.

To compel the two generals, Jacinto Martinez Arana and Juan de los Santos Céspedes, to go abroad, the unions called a general strike. At the end of a week, Garcia told the strikers that he would enforce his order and the generals would go.

Thereupon Juan Bosch, president of the Dominican Revolutionary party ordered the strike ended. The strikers honored the order and called off the crippling strike February 16. Ten days later Garcia named the two generals to his cabinet.

. Among the figures now under attack is Bosch himself. Over the radio, Bosch defended himself, saying it would have been "madness" to go on with the strike after the president's "promise." To win a | smile from the frustrated workers he said that Garcia "crowed like a rooster and laid. eggs like a hen."

But the Dominican workers were not smiling. They were drawing one more hard lesson about the class struggle. Not the slightest confidence can be placed in the word of any bourgeois leader whether of the right, left or center. And if one of them cackles like a hen, it is because he lays eggs like a goose.

~OB—

AN EMBRYONIC LEFT WING IN THE ITALIAN CP 4

By Sirio Di Giuliomaria

Rome

Since the June 1965 session of the Central Committee [see Worid Outlook June 11, 1955] where some of the members, for the first time, either voted against or abstained on a document Submitted by the "Direzione" [Political Poard], the Italian Communist party: [PCT] has undergone a deepening anc increasingly significant process .of internal differentiation. The CC session held October 26-30, 1965, snowed that the differences had not only taken on greater political substence, but the number of leaders involved had increased.

The October meeting was unusual in length (four days), in the number of members: who took the floor (53), and in the openness (for. a Communist party ) of the discussion. For the first time, differences were brought out and sharply discussed, revealing their exis-: tence in all the top leading bodies, from the National Secretariat.’ and the "Direzione" down to the Central Committee. The discussion took place in an atmosphere made hotter by threats and blackmail attempts anc all the traditional arguments inherited from the Stalin- 5 + + + st past.

Meantime, all sorts of meetings showed that the differences among tne top leaders were also reflected among the rank and file. No matter what might be on the agenda, in local meetings discussion continually reverted to. the two. sharpest issues in dispute -- the question of a "united party" and the escalation of the war in Vietnam. At leadership meetings in important areas like Rome and Milan a significant: minority of left-wingers voted against or abstained when the Central: Committee positions were put to a vote.

This was the climate as preparations for the eleventh congress got under way. A large subcommittee had been set upd by the Central Committee almost a year ago to prepare theses for the coming congress. The subcommittee set. to work, holding sessions at which members. spoke at length on their views. Finally the task of actually drawing up the theses was turned over to the "Direzione." Drafts were prepared, rewritten and amended. Pressures of all kinds were brought. to bear on two. members of the left wing seated in this body, Reichlin and Ingrao, who is also a member of. the National Secretariat. The "Direzione"” presented the final theses to the Central Committee. : ~

The reporter was National Secretary Longo. His speech October 26 was substantially a summary of the document. Longo begen with the international situation, evaluating Kennedy's policy.

To defend. the imperialist positions, said Longo, Kennedy had to move differently from his predecessors. Kennedy was "preoccupied with avoiding the catastrophe of a world war," although he also

aimed at consolidating the relationship of forces internationally. "No doubt," declared Longo, "new ground was broken at the time for the . initiative of the peace forces and for the development of a more. favorable climate in relations between the USA and the USSR." This ~~ did not materialize because the USSR refused to agree to a general deal ‘behind the backs of all the other states and peoples. :

Nis for Cuba," Longo continued , "at one of the sharpest mom~. ents of international crisis, she obtained recognition of her right to independence and the choice of socialism. The compromise reached on that occasion represented a clear defeat of the American thesis of dividing. the world into spheres of influence."

After..the assassination of the president, said Longo, the leading: groups. of American imperialism abandoned Kennedy ' Ss peace strategy. oo,

- The aim of this ardent evaluation of Kennedy ' s policies was clear to. everyone. -- _ Longo was defending Khrushchev's course and that of the PCI.

Arguing that the policy of peaceful coexistence was valid, Longo launched a very heavy attack against the Communist party of China, denouncing its use of "political and ideological blackmail" and its policy of acting like a "great power." He said, however, that the admission of China to the United Nations is an important: goal. Concluding this point, the National Secretary listed the items on which his party demands a change in Italy's foreign policy.

‘Turning.to the national scene, - Longo stressed one of the | main ideas of the document, an idea that had met heavy opposition ‘in the drafting committee and the "Direzione" -- the "failure" of the government's center-left policy. "The center-left policy," he said, "has failed as a reformist design and as a general political operation." He acknowledged that the center-left policy succeeded in’ pulling the Socialist party away from the workers front -- yet, he said, the PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity] was formed and a.new left wing has developed in the Socialist party. Nevertheless, the essential element to note is the failure of the policy.. The criticism that this formula "may dangerously underestinate. the - dynamic . elements in the present process of restructuration. of the monopolies. and. the consequent integration. of :the working class into the capitalist” system through corporative and authoritarian means" is to be rejected, said Longo, because this policy of. integration may be "a stimulus to the resistance and the struggle of - the. working class, provided its unions and parties can mobilize and lead it. :

a What policy should the PCL elaborate vis-a-vis the failure of the center-left. policy? The party's policy, Longo. declared, must be "a general alternative to the line that the moderate and conservative front is trying to impose on the country." This should be based . ‘on fundamental ideas like democratic public intervention in the economy, opening .a.struggle for a new model-of economic development and modification of the process of accumulation as it is carried::on at. present.

-. Contending that the theses answer the concern of both the right’ and. the left wings on the question, Longo declared: "The model of ‘development;:iie., democratic programming, which we oppose to. the present reorganization of the monopolies and the insubstantial Pieraccini plan: [the government: plan], has no socialist. character, but it aims at hitting and breaking the power of the big:monopoly groups in order to ensure real supremacy of the public interest in economic developments, to force profits and the market into a line of development capable of assuring new relations, new margins."

~The fight for democratic programming as against capitalist programming thus becomes "a new form and a new medium for advancing towards socialism, ® Longo said, quoting Togliatti's testament.

| However , what should the content of the policy be? Not so strangely, after criticizing the center-left policy, Longo pointed to goals substantially the same as those of the Pieraccini plan. This constituted a clear bid to those sectors of the Socialist party that are not against the center-left formula but only the way it is being applied. Longo stated that the "fundamental goals" should be as follows:

@ Full employment and higher incomes for workers.

-@ Transformation: of ownership structures on the land and the development of associative relations in agriculture.

@ General development of industry and attenuation of the unbalanced relation between the North and the South.

@® Development of collective transportation, social security, housing and town planning.

@ Development and modernization of commercial distribution.

As for the nationalization of. industry, the reporter pointed to three sectors: sugar, cement and pharmaceutical products. Nationalization should be carried out under a policy of "democratic control of investments and of plans for industrial reorganization." However, the reporter cast no light on the obscure meaning of this slogan which the PCI has been using for the past few years.

Longo then took up the problem of what forces should implement this program. He had nothing new to add aside from stressing the need to overthrow the present government. The stress was a concession to the left wing. The fight to overthrow the government should be accompanied by action to build a new majority constituted of all the leftist parties and the “mast open and morally engaged Catholic forces."

“The Communist party," said Longo again quoting Togliatti, “is a government party because it wants to play and it does actually play

-- even by being in the opposition -- the leading role which historically belongs to the working class and it.does not limit itself to propagandizing for a coming. society; it points out, in the struggle, concrete solutions to the problems of the masses and the country. This involves, of course, a struggle to build democratic coalitions which, through the participation of the Communists or their mere support, may gain strength to take a new political course.

in connection with this policy, Longo spoke once again of the problem of building "a united party of the working class."

‘In conclusion, the National Secretary reaffirmed his belief in the validity of the "Italian road to socialism." "As demonstrated by the draft theses," he said, "the building of a new society is conceived by us as the outcome of a struggle for the continuous development of democracy and for structural reforms which should move towards a positive solution to the big problems of. the country and a growing and actual participation of the working class in the management of economy and in’ all spheres of public life. "

The first critical speech’ in the subsequent debate was made by Gullo. He criticized the theses on three main points: (1) its renetR which makes it difficult for the rank and file to understand

(2) the formula "the center-left has failed" is not correct, for the policy achieved its main goal -- it split the working-class move-

ment; (3) the idea of a "new majority," as well as the idea that "the struggle for a socialist society may be stimulated by religious consciousness" are both wrong. This attack, however, had the appearance of an isolated speech and did not cause any serious reaction..

In another critical speech, Pizzorno talked on the theme that “public intervention in the economy, programming and even structural reforms, at the present stage of capitalist development, are not by themselves elements: of democratic progress but may even be fac— tors in the rationalization of the capitalist systen.'

- ‘Ingrao took the floor. He began by saying that the. draft theses furnished a useful basis for discussion. "I think, however," he continued, "that it does not adequately emphasize important new developments in the situation and adjustments that should be made in our policies." Ingrao held that the theses did not provide sufficient material to-answer the most important political question: "the necessity of a front and a majority capable of orientating the. economy as a whole and hence also influencing the decisions taken by the advanced sectors of industry and big business." If success is not achieved in this, conditions will worsen for the working class. "In. this connection the content of the economic and. political order to: be realized now, which is not yet a socialist order, should be stated more clearly; the struggle required along this road should also be. better defined."

‘To influence the "advanced sectors," Ingrao continued, the participation of the state in the ownership of some enterprises is not enough unless a planned economy is in effect. It is necessary to create "a mass movement, which may conquer instruments of both pub-

lic power arid workers intervention in the factories, gaining elements of knowledge, of control, of negotiations in regard to investments. and labor organization in the big: enterprises. "In Ingrao's: opinion this had not been given ' ‘the central place in the draft: Lect which , it deserved.

"We should go deeper in our criticism of the policy that fos. ters the illusion we can use the state as it is in facing up to the system and correcting it. We have been stating that. it is necessary to transform the state machinery and to depend on a large mass move-. ment. In our actions and in speaking with other political forces, we must bring out more clearly the continuity and the correspondence between our. renovated political: program and the mass movement. Undifferentiated pressure from below,: open to use by politicians, is not. enough. More than that is required; something really new can become . asserted only insofar as social and power relationships change. To . control capital by political means from above instead of by social means from below is an illusion. This casts fresh light on a new series of problems: the political value of establishing a new workers contractural power in factories; peasants management of the Land Reform ‘corporations; people's control of state institutions; participation of unions | in the management of social institutions. . "Taking these as goals means planning to advance the political and social fight as a whole, setting targets that are new even in relation to those of our tenth congress. The draft theses should say this more vigorously. Of course, today, as yesterday, ours is a platform of antimonopolist struggle, but with’a more advanced content that poses the question of power in a sharper way."

After denying that this could be labeled "economism," Ingrao insisted on the necessity of a. common strategy with the PSIUP and the left wing of the PSI [Nenni's Socialist party]. "This common approach on fundamental problems bécomes all the more indispensable as the platform of our adversaries is made more precise. It was the exigency of defining that platform that led me to consider the formula. 'failure-of. the center-left' to be inadequate. The draft theses actually denounce in a strong way the serious damage this policy. has caused the country. However, the draft does not clearly show how, on what political grounds, the bourgeo#s: ruling groups are working to build a new power bloc that may include'la part: of the left wing of the workers movement. The bourgeois'‘action is not developed through mere intimidation; it not ‘only’ ‘takes advantage of. discouragement. -it develops through dynamic. polivies such as the concept of existence of the status quo, Social-Democrati¢ unification, an incomes policy, international ‘integration. The capitalism we face is not inert, | either on the economic or political fields. Emphasizing all this is essential if we are to orient the party in the real field of ‘battle and underline the necessity for a positive answer by the left."

The final part of Ingrao's speech was devoted to the need for more internal democracy and the burying of monolithism forever, allowving. differences to be openly discussed even when they arise.in leading bodies such as’ the’ ‘"Direzione." —

Ingrao was followed by a number of members of the Central Conmittee who took the floor either to support or oppose his stand. It’ is notable that this was done. not only openly; it was accurately reported in L' Unita, the Italian Communist: daily newspaper..iIn this respect’ there was an advance over previous sessions where a: similar phenomenon occurred. ; :

‘About fifteen members, including the two who had spoken before Ingrao,’ took the floor to support his stand, either.in whole. or. in part. Among these were Garavini, secretary of the furin.CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]; Reichlin, former editor of L'Unita — and now secretary of the Regional Organization of Puglie;. Petruccioli, of the National Secretariat of the youth organization; Paolicchi, former chairman of the Federation of Cooperatives; Natoli, a very popular leader in the Rome organization; Rossanda, chairman .of, the National Commission. for Cultural Problems; Pintor, former co-editor , of L'Unita. Of thé older party leaders, Colombi's defection should be noted, while Vidali, leader of the Trieste organization, Secchia’ and Roasio eriticized. ‘the theses and pleaded for more internal democracy.

“As for Occhetto, the National Secretary of the Communist Youth, although he upheld certain leftist positions, his support for Ingrao | was rather cool. He did not support Ingrao's "criticisms of .method, " he said. Occhetto had just returned, fresh from a heavy-handed and most bureaucratic intervention among the youth leadership of Milan, where he fired full- -timers, and changed the secretary and the secretariat although the left wing ‘-holds''a majority in the Federal Committee. (the leading ‘body in ‘the province). ty

Among Ingrao' s opponents, the attacks. were. very sharp. Ingrao was criticized for having written the minutes of his speech himself for publication in L'Unita, thus showing:his thirst for "publicizing" his criticisms. He was also attacked for having voted for the theses in the "Direzione," along with Reichlin, and then criticizing them afterwards. (Ingrao’ stated that he considered the. document consti- |. tuted a*basis for discussion but that he had‘reservations on, its. content). He was accused, too, of being reluctant-.to. develop, the. true . logic of his positions. During. the discussion, the atmosphere. was. _ poisoned by heckling of the speakers and the use of violent language. Prior to the session pressure of ‘various. kinds was exerted, from appeals for party "unity," to threats that full-timers would be fired and members of the Central Committee would be kicked off at the next congress.

Among those who attacked Ingrao, the following were in the forefront: Macaluso, a member of the National Secretariat; Sereni; G.C.Pajetta, a member of the National Secretariat; Cossutta, a leader of the Milan organization; Colombi, a member of the "Direzione"; Novella, a leader of the CGIL; Amendola, a member of the National Secretariat; and Alicata, a member of the National Secretariat. Alicata was given the task of answering specific criticisms of the draft theses. One of the main points made by these figures was that a member of the National Secretariat and even the "Direzione" cannot take his differences outside the leading body he belongs to. The party bureaucrats were obviously worried over how far Ingrao had

-34~ . “

gone in making | his criticisms available to the ranks.

_ Alicata’ concentrated on ‘the speeches made by Ingrao, Pintor (he labelled Pintor's contribution as “indefinable"), Natoli, Reichlin, Secchia, Cerreti, Roasio, Vidali. Alicata even quoted parts of the speeches that had not been reported by L'Unita, thus in his own. way enriching public knowledge of the debate. (Pintor, for instance, allegedly said that the’ PCI is chasing the PSI like a rabbit.that can't be caught, and that the leading group is: almost afraid.of concentrating party action in the factories. )

Even cruder and sharper was Longo! Ss summary at. the conclusion of the session. He did not formally deny the right of Ingrao and Reichlin to register dissent. However , he made two remarks: (a) Ing- . rao's statements were vague; (b) in face of the pressure on the party from various directions to form factions and tendencies, the party leaders should seek unity ‘and not become divided among. themselves. Answering an argument repeated by Pintor, Roasio, Secchia and Vidali that pointing to the danger of factionalism may be considered "illic~ it intimidation," Longo declared that they should open their eyes. Outside groups, including the pro-Chinese, were seeking to build tendencies and to divide and disintegrate the party. He mentioned Occhetto's report about pro-Chineése groups in the youth organization of Milan and the existence ‘of an anonymous: "monthly letter," drafted Dy comrades, calling for the formation of factions.

After the disctission, the Central Committes. voted unanimously for a resolution calling a national congress on. January 25-30, 1966, approving the general line of the theses, and ‘entrusting the MDirezione"with the task of editing and publishing. them, "taking into account the positive contributions for ‘better elaboration and pointing up of the Tine of the document. cu

At the June session, the ‘final vote was differentiated, whereas in this session it was unanimous. But this should not be considered to be a step backward. The most important feature of this session was the deepening of differences up and down the line in such a "delicate" period as the one preceding @:congress. _

(Next: The Eleventh Congress. ]