Voi. 4h, No.5 a March 4, 1966
DESERTIONS ‘ON THE RISE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
> if American officials in Saigon are planning on a war that will last from "three to seven years," according to a February 25 dispatch from Seymour Topping, special correspondent of the New York Times. In addition they are beginning to talk more openly about widening the war, particularly in the direction of Cambodia.
D OUT sis a terpretati ents for labor, socialist, c | P' denc Pi ig
1 f ‘9 epresent he views of the authors, which may not necessar ily coincide with those of WORLD OUTLOOK. Unsigned naterial expresses, insofar as editorial opinion may appear the standpoint of revoluti Marxism. i i i
FHP
WORLD. OUTLOOK.
Un service de presse. ouvrier PARIS: OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue ed’ Aboukir, Paris 2, France ; co ,
Vol. 4, Noo 5 a ree March 4, 1966
DESERTIONS ON THE RISE IN SOUTH VIBTNAM
American officials in Saigon are planning on a war ‘that will last from "three to seven-years," according to a February 25 dis- , patch from Seymour Topping, special correspondent of the New York. Times. In addition they are’ beginning to talk more. openly about — widening the war, particularly | in the. direction of Cambodia.
the standpoint of revolut i ;
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2.
Meanwhile in the United States, White House and Pentagon circles are stepping up intimations that another 200,000 to 400,000 troops will be required in Southeast Asia. Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the New York Times and one of the Pentagon's wellknown voices, shifted from his pseudo objective reporting about the war in Vietnam to open advocacy of a policy of calculated "escalation." Writing in tne February 27 New York Times Magazine, the military pundit declarec that "there is, in my opinion, nothing else for President Johnson to do" except deliberately escalate the war.
In his articie, entitled "The Case for Escalation," Baldwin said: "Given the rresent situation in Vietnam and our other commitments throughout she world, it is high time -- more than time -that Congress declare a state of national emergency, that there be a limited mobilization of reserves, the appropriation of more bil= lions for war, a major increase of United States strength in South Vietnam, and intensification of the bombing of North Vietnam." _
This policy, it should be noted, dovetails. neatly with Johnson's February 23 speéch in which. the. president declared that his: administration would undertake NO: “bLind" escalation. a
While the clamor. of the warmongers. thus’ ‘pose in. the United States, and: Johnson. moved. toward further escalation. of U.S. involvement in the civil-war-in Vietnam, a.very. informative report from. Saigon was filed February 23 by Neil-Sheehan, another special correspondent of: the- New York Times. About. 96,000 men deserted from: the armed forces. of: the Saigon government last year, he declared. Officials in the Ky. regime. gave even higher figures,. said Sheehan, but they did not take into account the. number of deserters who later re-enlisted. ; Sg
According to official figures 113, 000 deserted in 1965. Of these, 47,000 were from the regular. armed | forces, 17, 000 from the regional forces, and 49, O00 from ‘the local militia.
"Desertions from the regular armed forces nearly doubled during the last year," Sheehan said, "reaching 14 per cent of the forces total strength. Desertions from the :270,000-man army, which ‘forms the great bulk of the regular armed forces, showed a gradual increase during the year. They ran near 18 per cent of total strength in December.
"The armed forces discharged 48,000 men. for various reasons in 1965 and suffered 13,000 killed, 23,000 wounded and 6,000 missing in action or captured. "
- The Ky- government : élaims “that: some. i, 000 deserted from "the Vietcong": during 1965 and came!.over: to. the government. They offered no estimate on the number of Ky's' troops that. went over to the side of the freedom fighters; contending that most. of the deserters do not follow that course but simply return to their homes, go into hiding, or drift into the cities looking for jobs.
Nevertheless Saigon officials estimated that the National
Liberation Front increased its fighting forces from;103,000 atthe... beginning of 1965 to 230,000 by the end of December. Of these, | about . 20,000 "were North Vietnamese regulars who had infiltrated the south since. last winter. : =
It would seen ‘difficult: to ‘éscape- ‘the. ‘conétusion in: ‘the ‘Light. of the evidence that a high proportion of deserters from. Ky's forces. find their way to the Side of the freedom fighters.
The » Séigon officials ‘who. gave ‘Sheehan these, ‘figures \ “were: un-..: able to offér any reason for the high rate of desertions except. the "intensification of the fighting and a | general war weariness that has © overtaken the country. co . : cies
A more specific reason might well be that the big. “influx: of American troops is revealing in a still more pitiless light the puppet nature | of the Ky regime and: the’ imperialist aims of. the.invader. If it is impossible to avoid fighting,. many in Ky's: army: may reason, then. At, should be- done for a cause that is worthwhile, - oti pen? 4
_ CIA HAND IN eae COUR pera
> The: - coup a'état in Ghana: that unseated Kwame. Nkrumah. February 24 while the African leader! was on a trip to Peking. and Hanoi seeking a role as*nediator inthe Vietnamese: war may well have deen. . _ inspired by the Central Intelligence Agency. It is hard: to escape... any other conclusion in view:‘of the’ boasts of. Khow Amihyia, former. -:. chief of Ghana's intelligence service who: was living in exile in ondon.
.. Amihyia told “the press - ‘on: the day of the coup d'état. that it: had ‘been plotted” in’ ‘London by the “Ghana Revolutionary. . Counc? 1 -in Exile." ; oe :
"We have been planning: this coup: for. months, " he said, “Dut it went off ahead 6fschedule. It was not supposed to. have taken place until August. "
Phe group: 6f: plotters in London maintained contact with. other plotters in Accra through a radio relay in "a European country." .. from there messages were telephoned to London.
"Mr. Amihyia says he was trained by the United States Central Intelligence. Agency," a February en. UPI. ‘dispatch reported.
‘The - ‘ 6vértuen, it is. to. ‘be noted; aused little. surprise. ‘in the U.S. State Départment. It "was greeted with a noticeable lack of regret by the Administration today," said Richard Eder, Washington correspondent of the New York Times in a February 24 dispatch.
G.- -Ménnen Williams,’ Assistant Secretary. of. State for. Africa, at once called a press conference’ din which he stated that the U.S.
he.
could have "gzood and favorable relations". with the Ghanaian military chiefs. ee et ; ID
The State Department explained officially ‘that this was "not intended to imply recognition" of the new regime. But this was said © only in order to avoid the conclusion that. Williams '®, statement had been "premature." ~~ wo. ho, .
Unnamed officials in the ‘State Department indicated that relations with Nkrumah had been chilly." They pointed to-a book recently published - “by the Ghanaian. ieddex: attacking U.S. ‘imperialisn.
"There was also a tendency," according to Eder, £9 ‘compare ~ the situation with the _ overthrow last year of Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. ! — _—
oS The State Department’ posture. of waiting a "decent interval" before recognizing the military. takeover may quickly shift..When | Kwame Nkrumah announced February 25 in Peking that he intended to ~ return to Accra, the State Department leaked the news that recogni-” tion of the plotters may come early in order "to stabilize the situation."
"With deliberate speed scarcely concealing its pleasure, the United States was moving today toward diplomatic recognition of the new military regime in Ghana," saida special dispatch to the New York Times from Washington. February 25.."The department had intended to let a discreet diplomatic. period elapse before endorsing the new regime. The timetable may now be speeded up in view of Mr. Nkrumah's threat in Peking today to return to. Ghana « ‘soon ‘to reassert his authority as head of the government."
_ In trying to find more fundamental reasons for the ease with” which Nkrumah fell victim to a military plot, most observers pointed to the megalomania- which led him to. great excesses such as building a cult of his own personality. He had statues erected of himself everywhere, called himself "the Redeemer" and similar extravagant terms. Like many other leaders in underdeveloped.countries he was also given to conspicuous and very costly displays of.all kinds.
He was also intolerant of any political opposition, ran everything in dictatorial style and established a. one-party.systen. Naturaily Nkrumah became the target of. “underground political opposition. : oe,
None of this would have bothered imperialist. circles;: this is the normal’ type in their’retinue. Their hatred for Nkrumah. stemmed . from his. outspoken opposition to imperialisn, from his friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union and China, the socialistic coloration he. sought to give his | Bovernment , and. his. slogan calling for a united Africa. . aby park . an
Nkrumah tried to woo investments and even ° esd" pS% “Finenet-
al aid from Washington. But the imperialists desired a regime that offered greater future security for investments. Thus Washington's
“policy was. to seek to undermine Nkrumah's government, a policy that Nkrumah greatly facilitated by. separating himself more and more from the populace and their aspirations... _ s What was decisive in Nkrumah 's standing in Ghana, however, was the price of cocoa. This is the commodity on which the country depends» for most. “of its foreign exchange. A precipitous decline in .. tthe price of cocoa’on' the world market was countered. for a time by government subsidies to the growers.
It finally became no ‘longer economically feasible for the government to continue this course and. in recent speeches Nkrumah sounded the call for a retreat and for the need to make “sacrifices.
‘In the long run, Nkrumah hoped to get out of Ghana's dependency on a single crop by diversification, above all by developing _ the country's huge potential in aluminum production. This was the ~. main. purpose of the Volta dam and of Nkrumah's dealings with the Kaiser aluminum interests. That possibility of improving the economic situation could not be speeded up, however, and Nkrumah. fell victim _ to this impasse.
The deep ‘instability’ of the Indonesian. situation. ‘received. dramatic confirmation with Sukarno's success February 21 in removing ‘General Nasution from a position of central authority to which even Sukarno himself had been forced to bow since October: l.
Nasution launched the. anti-Communist. witch-hunt. in which the number of victims slaughtered, according to an admission by Sukarno, reached 87,000. Others have put the figure at 350,000.. There are stories of rivers choked with bodies; the London’ Economist reported 400,000 children had been orphaned in the bloody purge.
It appeared that Nasution was firmly in the saddle; that Sukarno -was being retained as a figurehead; and. that the generals would proceed along the reactionary course they had begun, eventually bringing Indonesia fully into the orbit of U.S. imperialisn.
Njono, one of the top leaders of the Indonesian Communist party. and head of the’ country's huge trade-union federation, had -been-placed in the stellar role in a show’trial complete with a false confession wrung from him under duress. In fact he was condemned to death by the military court on the very same day that Sukarno re- ‘moved General Nasution and reshuffled his cabinet, strengthening the ‘position of Subandrio.
Reactionary sectors of the students who had spearheaded. the drive to physically liquidate’all the key figures in the Indonesian Communist party, staged demonstrations on behalf of Nasution. A
crowd: of some hundreds marched on the presidential palace Pebruary 24, put instead of. ‘recéiving support from the: army, as on previous o¢casions, troops fired in their direction; ‘killing three of the participants. Some were wounded by bayonets.
On the: following day, the: reactionary | Indonesian. ‘Student Action Front organized! a "funeral march" of some 10,000 participants. The demonstration protested the killing of the: three. students the day before, shouted against Sukarno's. "new Communist: cabinet," and called for the. reinstatement, of General Nasution. ,
“The: ‘army: dia: ‘not join in the demonstration. Instead, _ troops kept machine’ guns’ trained’ on the erowd.. oO re
Sukarno followed-up by banning. the. student, organization and ordering a curfew in Djakarta. ff
It was clear that: the Indonesian president had retrieved some of his former authority and: ‘was seeking to establish. @ new. political equilibrium. :
Two factors account for this abrupt alteration in the relative positions of Nasution and Sukarno.
The first is..that:no- improvement of even the most ephemeral kind occurred in the steadily worsening economic situation in Indonesia after the generals seized the helm on October 1. Inflation, for example, has gontinued,, .to slash. Seeply into the standard of “Living. or a —
Nasution ‘and his. ‘entourage nad. no ‘program whatsoever offering even a plausible way out. Their program consisted of nothing but the grossest kind of anti-Communism accompanied. by a. fearful blood purge. There was::nothing attractive: about this. Thus. ‘the. generals represen-~ ted. only ‘harrow class. forces and failed to advance a demagogic platform that. might have- widened. their appeal. | oo,
The second factor was a split among the ‘generals. This is clearly: evident.in Nasution's incapacity to counter Sykarno's latest moves by a military. coup. d'état, for example. Part of the officer -caste, for: whatever reasons,. cooled off on. General Nasution end swung. behind Sukarno, enabling him to. strengthen his hand somewhat.
Already Sukarno has given intimations that he would like %o restore the-.Communist party as a counterweight to the army. But this may not be easy. The party was decimated by the purge. Those: who: _ survived are. undoubtedly mulling over, the. lessons, and one of the lessons is not to. depend on Sukarno. -
“The situation in Indonesia remains highly fluid and Sukarno's new lease on life could prove to be quite temporary. The ultrareac-— tionary forces are.not exactly out of the running. If Nasution < preves incapable of playing the role of military | dictator, there are other candidates eager to move forward.
ay
THK DANIEL AND. SINYAVSEY TRIAL
By Pierre Frank
- The tial of” the two Soviet - ‘writers: ‘Yuli M. Daniel (pen name, Nikola’ Arzhak) and Andrei D. ‘Sinyavsky (pen name, Abram Tertz) and
the severe Sentences imposed on them [five and seven years at hard labor respectively] have created an international scandal. There has been widespread denunciation of the fake character of the public trial, the way the trial was reported in the Soviet press, the attitude “Of ‘the Kremlin' s hireling "writers" toward:+the trial, . be...
. Some péople have > wondered how such a trial could. take | place, how ‘the Soviet leaders ‘could commit such an "error."
Even if the trial represented an error in judgment on the part of the Soviet authorities, the: error has shown that a good many things have not vanished in the Soviet Union despite the "de-Stalinization." But we do not believe an "error" occurred; the Soviet authorities could not but know that a trial of this kind, anticipated and followed everywhere in the world, would stir up protest. One must conclude that they deliberately decided to disregard the reaction abroad because they needed the trial for domestic purposes.
The severity of the sentences ‘likewise ‘indicates that the organizers of the trial had others in mind besides the defendants. The fact they had published material abroad-under pen names was a convenient pretext, but only a pretext. Pasternak was harshly denounced for publishing Doctor Zhivago abroad, as was Yevtushenko for _ Similarly publishing memories of his. childhood.
The tip-off that it was a calculated move came on the eve of the trial when the Soviet authorities gave Valery Tarsis permission to leave the country although he, too, had sent writings abroad for publication. In contrast to Daniel and Sinyavsky, Tarsis has strongly proclaimed his hostility ‘to the Soviet: government. The argument offered by way of explanation for the favor granted Tarsis would be comic if the context were not so scandalous. Tarsis, it seems, is not legally accountable since he is mentally irresponsible. Under this pretext he was confined to a mental hospital, enabling him to “write Ward 7, a book’ in which he reveals that some. of the. opponents of the government are locked up in. such institutions... Tarsis, as his book also reveals, is a little psychopathic -- which. does not mean _ that he ought to be locked up or that: Ward 7 is without interest. ‘But the true explanation for his being permitted to leave the Soviet Union is that the authorities counted ‘on his uttering virulent statements abroad that could be utilized-in the Soviet Union to still further damage the two condemned writers and all those aimed at “through then. * *After this article was written, the press reported that the Presidium.of the Supreme Soviet had annulled the Soviet citizenship of the writer Valery Tarsis, while he was traveling in England, on the charge that he had committed "acts unworthy of a Soviet citizen."
The use of pen names was seized on: ‘only as a pretext. Why then the prosecution, the trial, the heavy sentences?
The Soviet government cajoles the writers, the artists, assuring them privileged living standards, but only on condition that they stick to the "line" laid down for them, that they produce the kind of works needed by the government. Some works, if there is need for it, will. denounce what the government wants denounced -- but no works that depart ‘from the strict and narrow! ©»: Doe
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Howevey” telativons: between ‘the - intellectuals ‘and the Soviet government - ‘Have déteridrated considerably; the intellectuals are. coming more and more to evaluate at their true worth the coarse bureaucrats at the head of the country}. they are asking more and more questions. The government wants to give. them a severe warning, and it did it by brutally hitting those who violated the law by publishing material abroad under pen names and who wrote things that reveal the. hostility of the intellectuals. toward -the bureaucrats in power.
In this connection’ a’ few words ‘should be said about one of ‘the most. powerful stories Daniel. published outside the Soviet Union, Moscow Calling.* This is far from "socialist realism," the conventional stuff. Moscow Calling’ is the tragedy of the Soviet intellectuals. First of all, they have no real relations, only official relations, very superficial ones, with the masses, the Soviet workers. In this story, the masses appear only in the general form of a crowd in the streets. The writers, the artists...live by themselves with their own problems. On the one hand: the narratives they spin about personal problems, and the need to furnish on command a production that corresponds with the requirements of official propaganda, that abides by the official canons. After all, it is their way of making a living. On the other hand, some of them feel with. painful acuteness the problems of the society in which they live. This is the subject of Mos¢ ow Calling.
In the story, things begin with a decision of the Supreme Soviet. "Parallel ‘with the rise in the standard. of living. --and in Previously, . the Soviet authorities had explained that in contrast to Daniel and ‘Binyavsky, Tarsis could not be brought to trial be- | cause he had been ruled to be mentally irresponsible. If this argu- ‘ment were’ true, if Tarsis could not be held responsible for what he did, then the cancellation of his Soviet citizenship could not be justified either ~~ what was called for was medical treatment not judiciel or administrative punishment. Lack of the: slightest logic does. not embarrass the Soviet authorities; they got rid of Tarsis abroad. Displaying a pathological anti-Soviet attitude, Tarsis is a special case among the Soviet: intellectuals. But they came down heavily on Daniel and Sinyavsky, who translated into the particular forms of their art the problems posed, not by the Soviet regime, but by . the bureaucratic’ rod. . a ; *This does not appear to have been published in English, at least in book form. The French title is Ici Moscou. a
accordance with the wishes of the’ toiling masses," the Supreme Soviet decrees a "Day of Public Murder." On this day, according to. the decree, every citizen is granted the right, within the rules prescribed by, the decree, to murder any other:citizen he wishes. The.allusion is more than transparent. How many crimes were committed on. orders from above, in the name of socialism, and- under pretext of fulfilling the wishes. and furthering the well-being of the toiling masses!
Daniel, the author, belongs to the generation that. was stunned by Khrushchev's report at the twentieth congress. For him it was a-revelation. In this story, he voices his inner struggle, and also his rebellion against today's leaders, yesterday Stalin's valets, who are satisfied with an explanation that explains nothing and who live as if there’ had been no monstrous crimes:
"Do they imagine that after having swept their filth onto the _tomb of Mustachio they are quit? No, no, no. ‘They deserve something © “different !" ferns
-He wonders how the same. men who. proved their courage, their” heroisn, during the war can now conduct themselves in such a Sickly way in face of such enormities. "Since .the Day of-Public. Murder ,- ‘this was the first time I had heard people talking about these events. Up to then, each time I mentioned the matter, my. interlocutors had looked at me in a queer way. and- changed the subject. «Now, that's over. Now we are going to: celebrate the forty-third anniversay of the Great Socialist Revolution: of October!" a
Ana the author explains: "They. had. been terrorized!" Terrorized they are, in a different way of course. than in Stalin's time, | but terrorized they still:-are: Moscow Calling and the trial that just took place in Moscow demonstrate. that liberalization. and demo— cratization are not to be confounded. Liberalization has not changed things fundamentally. Society must act and think in conformity with. orders from above. In accordance with these orders the intellectuals must produce works that. of necessity lack life. and. art.
The story by Daniel is not anti-Soviet, put. without the least doubt it is very pessimistic. Implicitly, the. author ‘tends to turn’ inwardly, away from "this cursed and marvellous country," writing for him being a kind of religion, a kind of opium that deadens the suffering he feels over things. Cut off from the Soviet masses, who, moreover, are not yet expressing themselves. anywhere , stifled by a bureaucracy that claims to speak in the name of. socialism, the ‘Soviet intellectuals see no way out. The Russian intellectuals under Czarism turned ‘towards the West where the bourgeois. democracy of the ‘time was attractive and the workers movement Qpened inspiring: Vistas. Today in the field of culture, aside from research on forms, the intellectuals cannot be genuinely attracted by the rank-smelling democracy of the West, and they lack the social base to give stimulus to their rebellion.
‘But despite this: ‘the: bureaucracy cannot bear. such writings . that: reveal its true IMAGE - No. -more . than in Stalin! s time» will it.
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and Sinyavsky was a warning to: the intellec tals not to g° beyond... certain limits. eR ok
However, there are some changes: that. mist be underlined. The defendants pleaded "not guilty.". And, as was the case with the poet Brodsky a few years ago, there were. youth and a few writers (not | officials like Sholokov and Ehrenburg) who in one way or another expressed sympathy with the defendants. Thus not only the critical attitude but also the resistance is | Growing. And it will grow still more.
: * * KL,
Some of the reactions in the West are not without interest. We will leave aside the professional anti-Communists who are elated. The most. sophisticated bourgeois. circles have expressed surprise that a regime scoring successes as great as Luna IX should harbor "obscurantism" worthy of "intellectually underdeveloped societies;".as LeMonde put it February 16. At the same time, these circles express a kind of satisfaction. over Aragon's declaration on. the trial (see. World Outlook February 25], a declaration in which they see a “direct | and : frank" . criticism of a decision made by. Moscow.
. Certainly the contradiction is enormous, | gigantic,. between the soft landing on the moon -- a product of very high intellectual | level -= and this trial’ where the judges, prosecution and witnesses © are worthy of a court of the Middle Ages. But this has been the fun-. damental contradiction of Soviet society since Stalin crushed the Bolshevik party and workers democracy. The productive. forces, freed by the October. Revolution, have achieved prodigious results in certain scientific and ‘technical fields; but the specific conditions that. brought the bureaucracy. to power have simultaneously spawned . monstrous things. .
The bureaucracy © ‘is trying to adapt Soviet ‘society. to presentday conditions, but it cannot overcome its own limits; it can carry out a few small-change operations against its privileges, but it cannot. abolish them as a whole and it cannot renounce power of its own volition. The